Multicultural Studies

OBLICZA WIELOKULTUROWOŚCI WE WSPÓŁCZESNEJ EUROPIE – między integracją a dezintegracją kulturową

THE FACES OF MULTICULTURALISM IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE – between cultural integration and disintegration

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When the representatives of various cultures meet,
it gives rise to the complex processes of attracting and pushing away,
of suppressing and assimilating.
Then, violence and mimetic processes play a substantial part.

(Wulf, 2016, p. 172)

Present-day Europe is subject to the advanced process of cultural differentiation of societies, that is of both historical, and contemporary provenance. As a result, we deal with multiculturalism, which is coming into existence in the so-far culturally homogeneous societies, or – in case of the already culturally diversified societies – it has deepened its heterogeneity. Concurrently, multiculturalism of such form has generated qualitatively different social relations in the cultural borderland, starting from the opened antagonism, through its passive form, segregation, open or hidden isolation, coexistence relying on mutual accommodation, assimilation connected with a complex, mutual adaptation, followed by approval and amalgamation, and last but not least, by cooperation (Golka, 2010, p. 100). With regards to these dimensions, special attention is drawn to tensions, which "take place within the area of consent for the existence of *some* form of diversity concerning its scope and the shape", as well as the possibilities "(...) to construct a common platform of core values which would build the agreement at the state-level, and yet remaining a part of the so-far enigmatic

demands of the moral bond within the EU" (Biernacka, 2012, p. 21). In this context, a question of the status of multiculturalism is becoming primal, given the following manners of its comprehension:

> » communitarian, i.e. sanctioning coexistence of communities (one next to another) representing various cultures, acknowledging the image of the world which relies on the assumption that each and every culture is valuable;
> » liberal, granting the right to self-determination for the individuals, and allowing selective utilisation of the tradition and achievements (heritage) of the surrounding world (Biernacka, 2012, pp. 25-33);
> » intercultural, thanks to which the individual "in conditions of the borderland is not doomed to monoculturalism" (Sobecki, 2016, p. 19), where – on the ground of mutual relations and dialogue – a peaceful narration and opening to different cultures are possible, contributing in turn to the increased level of social capital, followed by integration or the establishing of joint, civic ground (Biernacka, 2012, pp. 49-50);
> » and last but not least, perhaps it is also worthwhile to consider the optics of transculturality, stemming from the assumption, that "our cultures in fact already lost their homogeneity and uniqueness, and they are thoroughly saturated with diversity and mutual interspersions" (Welsch, 1998, p. 203).

The defined understanding of the idea of multiculturalism generates and sanctions adequate political, economic, social, cultural and educational practices both in the area of a given state, as well as within supranational, international, i.e. European frameworks. At the same time, they are dynamized by the series of processes conceptualized through European strategies of reducing the perception of the diversity of other people and cultures. According to Christoph Wulf, such processes encompass logocentrism, egocentrism and ethnocentrism. "In logocentrism the European form of the rationality (*logos*) serves the purpose of deprecating or neglecting other forms of the rational thinking and actions. Egocentrism is orientated at a concentration on the own ego and its abilities to self-affirmation, an idea rather unfamiliar to the representatives of other cultures. Ethnocentrism (*ethnos*) entails these forms of thinking, feeling and acting that assume a kind of higher quality of the European culture with concurrent inferiority of other cultures entailed" (Wulf, 2016, p. 173). The three aspects can be recognized as specific rationalizations of multicultural practices within the European domain.

Taking the above into consideration, it is worthy to ponder over the phenomena generating different faces of multiculturalism in the European space, making reference to:

> » integration and the disintegration within European societies in their social and identity-related connotations, conditioned by globalization of the culture and the economic crisis,
> » collective memory and cultural safety,
> » multicultural and cross-cultural practices in the selected culturally diversified societies,
> » migrations and exile as generators of the internal as well as European policies, cultural transformation, social relations and attitudes,
> » citizenship in its educational, social and cultural connotations.

The above depict the specificity of multiculturalism, its complexity and the concurrent controversy within. Therefore, taking it all into account, it is worthwhile to recall the words of Ryszard Kapuściński, who implied that we shall "think, whether living in various cultures, civilizations, and religions, we want to search in other cultures for the worst things in order to strengthen own stereotypes, or shall we rather try to find meeting points. (...) – our world is at the crossroads. The certain tendency seems inevitable – we will live in the multicultural world" (Możejko, 2004, p. 161). Hence, facing the above, can we afford the interpersonal solidarity, the understanding and the agreement? After all, the basic feature of the human existence, as Jerzy Nikitorowicz underlines, "(...) is being in connection with others. Thus, the willingness and need of noticing, discovering, opening, closeness, cognition, understanding, exchange, and cooperation are all of great importance, as they enable human to achieve better understanding of own self and the possibility of understanding others better, reaching agreement with them" (Nikitorowicz, 2010, p. 15). It gives rise to the question whether we are ready for multicultural experience, leading to integration within the European space (also in domestic domains), or – perhaps – being subject to different diktats (mainly of political, social and economic provenance) we passively accept the vision of cultural disintegration?

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Anthropology in a Globalized World. History, Culture and Philosophy

Antropologia w zglobalizowanym świecie. Historia, Kultura i Filozofia

Streszczenie

Dzisiejsza antropologia próbuje powiązać historyczność i kulturę pojęć, poglądów i metod, którymi się zajmuje jako nauka z historycznością i kulturą przedmiotów badań. Antropologia bada odkrycia nauk humanistycznych i tworzy autokrytykę na podstawie filozofii historycznej i kulturowej, tym samym torując drogę dla badań nad powstającymi pytaniami i kwestiami. W sercu tych wysiłków leży nieposkromiony niepokój umysłu. Badania w dziedzinie antropologii nie ograniczają się do określonych kontekstów kulturowych czy pojedynczych epok. Refleksje dotyczące integralnej historyczności i kulturalności badań umożliwiają dyscyplinie odejście od eurocentryczności nauk humanistycznych i skoncentrowanie się na nierozwiązanych problemach teraźniejszości i przyszłości. Tak określony cel implikuje sceptycyzm wobec wszystkich, obejmujących cały przekrój zagadnień i powszechnych interpretacji antropologicznych, przykładowo tych spotykanych w naukach biologicznych. Antropologia nie jest dyscypliną funkcjonującą w izolacji od innych dziedzin nauki. Dotyczy zagadnień z wielu różnych nauk i dyscyplin, w tym filozofii. Mówiąc o antropologii nauk humanistycznych i społecznych należy rozważyć pięć następujących paradygmatów: 1) antropologię ewolucji i hominizacji; 2) antropologię filozoficzną opracowaną w Niemczech; 3) antropologię historyczną i historię mentalności, zapoczątkowane przez historyków we Francji i czerpiące inspiracje ze Szkoły Annales; 4) amerykańską tradycję antropologii kulturowej, 5) wreszcie antropologię historyczno-kulturową. Powyższe paradygmaty stanowią również podstawę antropologii edukacyjnej.

Słowa kluczowe: Hominizacja, antropologia filozoficzna, antropologia kulturowa, antropologia historyczna, antropologia kulturowo-historyczna, antropologia edukacyjna

Abstract

Today's anthropology attempts to relate the historicity and culturality of its concepts, viewpoints, and methods to the historicity and culturality of what is under investigation.

Anthropology examines the findings of the human sciences and develops a critique of itself based on historical and cultural philosophy, thereby paving the way for the investigation of new questions and issues. At the heart of these efforts lies a restlessness of mind that cannot be stilled. Research in anthropology is not limited to certain cultural contexts or single epochs. Reflections on the integral historicity and culturality of the research enable the discipline to leave behind the Euro-centricity of the human sciences and to focus on the unresolved problems of the present and the future. This aim implies skepticism toward all-encompassing and universal anthropological interpretations, such as those occasionally found in biological science, for example. Anthropology is not a single discipline. It touches on many different sciences and disciplines, including philosophy. Speaking about anthropology in the humanities and social sciences, we have to consider the following five paradigms: 1) anthropology of evolution and hominization; 2) philosophical anthropology developed in Germany; 3) historical anthropology and the history of mentalities, initiated by historians in France and taking its cue from the Annales-School; 4) the American tradition of cultural anthropology, and 5) finally historical cultural anthropology. These paradigms also provide the basis for educational anthropology.

Keywords: Hominization, philosophical anthropology, cultural anthropology, historical anthropology, historical cultural anthropology, educational anthropology

New challenges

One new challenge that anthropologists have long failed to address is how to define the *relationship between general insights and specific insights* relating to human beings as individuals and human beings in general. While in archaeology, biological anthropology, and linguistic anthropology it is permissible to make universal statements about human beings and humankind, in historical and cultural anthropological approaches the emphasis is more on being able to use hermeneutic methods to make complex statements on particular historico-cultural phenomena. These approaches are oriented toward the investigation and assurance of cultural diversity. However, even when we are concerned with cultural diversity, the question still arises as to what is common to all human beings.

In these times of globalization it is becoming increasingly important for anthropology to investigate the relationship between similarities and differences among human beings, cultures, and historical epochs. The question as to the role of comparison in both diachronic and synchronic research in anthropology has taken on a significance that we urgently need to clarify. In my view, the aim of anthropological research is not to reduce but to increase the complexity of our knowledge about human beings and its education. This requires interpretation, reflection, and self-criticism, and an ongoing, philosophically inspired critique of anthropology that must include an examination of the fundamental limits of human self-interpretation. In analogy to a definition of God in theology, there is thus talk of the *homo absconditus*. This term expresses the notion that anthropological insights and findings can only grasp the human condition in part, that is, from a variety of different perspectives and thus incompletely.

Anthropological research and discovery is location-related and subject to historical and cultural change. Its starting point is a willingness to wonder or marvel that the world is as it is and not otherwise. Marveling is the beginning of fascination with the mystery of the world and curiosity about the possibilities of anthropological knowledge and the education of the human being (Wulf 2016).

Today's anthropology attempts to relate the historicity and culturality of its concepts, viewpoints, and methods to the historicity and culturality of what is under investigation. Anthropology examines the findings of the human sciences and develops a *critique of itself* based on historical and cultural philosophy, thereby paving the way for the investigation of new questions and issues. At the heart of these efforts lies a restlessness of mind that cannot be stilled. Research in anthropology is not limited to certain cultural contexts or single epochs. Reflections on the integral historicity and culturality of the research enable the discipline to leave behind the Euro-centricity of the human sciences and to focus on the unresolved problems of the present and the future. This aim implies skepticism toward all-encompassing and universal anthropological interpretations, such as those occasionally found in biological science, for example. Anthropology is not a single discipline. It touches on many different sciences and disciplines, including philosophy.

Anthropology cannot be regarded as a closed field of research. It is the result of the interplay between different sciences. Depending on the issue to be examined, the range of disciplines involved can be very different. The object and subject of anthropology can encompass the entire field of human culture in different historical areas and cultures. Anthropology presupposes a plurality of cultures and assumes that cultures are not closed systems; rather, they are dynamic, able to permeate each other, and they have an indeterminate future (ibid.).

Anthropology can be understood as an academic attitude toward examining issues relating to different times and cultures. Anthropological research, therefore, can be found in many different disciplines, such as history, literature, linguistics, sociology, psychology, and science of education. However, the research frequently tends to transcend the boundaries of individual disciplines, thereby becoming transdisciplinary. This results in completely new scientific disciplines and issues that require new forms of scientific interaction and cooperation. Many different research methods are used in these processes. Historical-hermeneutical processes of text, image and music interpretation, qualitative social research methodologies, and philosophical reasoning are widely used, the latter being an approach that is difficult to categorize in terms of specific methodology. Some research makes use of artistic and literary materials, thereby transcending the traditional boundaries between science, literature, and art. A growing consciousness of the role of cultural traditions in the development of different research areas, subjects, and viewpoints has made the increasing trend toward crossing international cultural boundaries a central issue of anthropological research.

In the light of globalization, this transnational approach to anthropology is becoming increasingly important. It provides the framework that nurtures a spirit of inquiry and a commitment to expanding our knowledge, which in turn lead to the development and testing of new research paradigms.

Paradigms of Anthropology

The demise of a binding anthropological norm has made it necessary to take a fresh look at the most important anthropological paradigms and try to locate their common ground as well as their differences. This has also given rise to a need to define the tasks and procedures of anthropology and to illustrate their importance for research in the humanities as well as the social and cultural sciences (ibid.). Four different paradigms of anthropology and the integrative paradigm of *historical cultural anthropology* are of central importance in the conceptualization of anthropology and its central importance for education today.

1

If the subject of anthropology is research on human beings, it seems only logical to include human evolution in the scope of the anthropological examination of the "conundrum of humanity." However, *human evolution and the process of hominization* can only be understood if they are viewed as an integral part of the history of life itself. The irreversibility of human evolution and of the history of life is also an aspect of anthropology; today, this process is understood as a result of the self-organization of material. In the same way that anthropology highlights the historical character of its research, evolutionary theory emphasizes the radical time-scale of nature and human evolution. Time and history are therefore central dimensions of evolution. Hominization is a lengthy process of development that starts with early hominids and includes primordial humans and early humans *en route* to becoming modern human beings. This process is a multidimensional morphogenesis of interdependent ecological, genetic, cerebral, social, and cultural factor (ibid.)

2

Integrating the study of evolution into anthropology raises issues concerning the relationships between all living things and beings and the long duration of human evolution. It also involves a quest to discover general laws of evolution. The central focus of *philosophical anthropology*, on the other hand, is the special character of human beings as derived from a comparison of humans and animals. This character enables humans to be conscious of the objects around them and to have a concept of the world. Like Helmuth Plessner I conceive the uniqueness of humans in their ex-centricity. This term refers to our human capacity to step outside our own bodies by using our imagination. This makes it possible for us to see our bodies not only as something we are, but also as something we possess. For example, in terms of the way we feel and perceive our hands, we sense them as belonging to our bodies and also as organs that we can use as we wish. Arnold Gehlen developed a theory of humans as "deficient beings" (Mängelwesen), building on the idea that the constitutive element of human existence is its insufficiency at the time of birth, which had been formulated by Johann

Gottfried Herder two hundred years before. Humans are obliged to use individual and collective actions to overcome their inadequacies and insufficiencies, and this is the origin of culture, language, and institutions (Wulf 2016).

3

Since the study of anthropology was taken up in the French *Annales School* and in French research on the history of mentalities, historical writing has taken a new direction, called *historical anthropology*. This complements the new issues and the new methodological procedures used in the depiction and analysis of the history of events and the examination of structural and social history. Concentrating on anthropological issues brings into focus both historical structures of social reality and subjective moments of agency in social subjects; this focus is used for research on the basic conditions of human behavior. The studies carried out by Lucien Febvre and Marc Bloch in France are examples of the successful examination of anthropological issues in the field of history, in which historical knowledge arises from the disputed borders between events and narrative, reality and fiction, structural history and narrative historical writings. These works, which have since become classics of their genre, appeared at the same time as the works on philosophical anthropology but link to the works of historians.

4

Additional important anthropological perspectives are provided by the field of *cultural anthropology, or ethnology*. This discipline does not view human beings as being "behind" (i.e., responsible for) the diversity of their historical and cultural characteristics but studies them within the context of these characteristics. It, therefore, is not sufficient to identify body, language, or imagination as universal cultural entities; they must be examined in the context of different cultures. It is this diversity of culture that enables us to draw conclusions about humans. Comparing culturally different forms of expression results in new ideas and calls some areas of accepted thinking into question. Ethnological research into the heterogeneity of cultures yields important results for cultural anthropology. These findings have had a lasting effect on the understanding of what is different in our own cultures. New developments have resulted in an expanded concept of culture in which both the disparities and the shared characteristics of different cultures play an important role. The globalization of politics, economics, and culture is resulting in the overlapping, blending, and assimilation of features that are global, national, regional, and local. This creates a need for new ways of examining different cultures (ibid.).

　　The issue of understanding the limits of our comprehension of different cultures becomes central. The ethnographic methods developed in social and cultural anthropology based on fieldwork and participant observation lead to forms of knowledge other than those gleaned from historical source interpretation and philosophical

reasoning. They not only make us aware of what is different in other cultures but also what is different in our own culture. The application of the anthropological perspective to the cultures of the world broadens and deepens the scope of anthropological research.

In Germany, anthropological issues are examined in cultural studies, educational studies, women's and gender studies, and in the history of mentality, as well as in everyday history and microhistory. The scope of these studies encompasses case studies of actual life stories, local and regional history, the history of mentality, and historical cultural anthropology. Different mentalities permeate each other, forming new combinations. They devise actions appropriate to specific situations and provide orientation and decision-making aids for social behavior. They are specific to culture, class, and social group. Mentalities evolve in specific social conditions and structure social behavior in social subjects without giving it a determined, fixed form. They allow individuals to be different and to behave differently. They are subject to change and historical development. Understanding their fundamental historical and cultural nature enables us to grasp the universal openness of history.

5

In view of this situation in anthropology in Britain, North America, Germany, and France, I suggest that we try to connect lines of thought from these four mainstream paradigms and, where possible, to develop them into a *historical cultural anthropology* that adequately accounts for the historicity and culturality of the researchers and their objects of study and combine general insights and specific insights relating to human beings as individuals and human beings in general. Philosophical reflection can help to render the results of this research fruitful for our understanding and definition of human beings in the 21st century.

The approach to anthropology that I present here employs both *diachronic* and *synchronous* methods to investigate human societies and cultures. In addition to anthropological issues and the hermeneutic and text-critical methods from historical research that are applied diachronically, field research with its numerous qualitative and quantitative methods still plays an important role as a method of synchronous anthropological research. The interpretative and reflexive methods offer the possibility of lending expression to the individual and subjective perspectives.

I have attempted to realize this new concept of anthropology and to demonstrate its importance for education in three large, interrelated anthropological research phases, each of which lasted more than ten years. The main fields of this research have been: *The body and the senses, mimesis and imagination, rituals and gestures* in education and society (Wulf 2016).

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Integration and Disintegration in European Societies – Identity and Social Issues at the time of the Globalization of Cultures and Economical crisis

Integracja i dezintegracja w społeczeństwach europejskich – Tożsamość i problemy społeczne w dobie globalizacji kultury i kryzysu ekonomicznego

Streszczenie

Artykuł zamierza definiować pojęcie „wielokulturowości" w sposób dynamiczny, w sytuacji kiedy jest ono przeważnie używane po to, aby określać tylko widoczne, istniejące różnice między grupami etnicznymi lub religijnymi. Nie można pominąć faktu, że różne grupy narodowościowe lub religijne historycznie rozwijały odmienne kultury polityczne i programy społeczne, które w konsekwencji umożliwiły postęp. W czasach globalizacji, możemy zauważyć zubożenie poszczególnych religii, ideologii i kultur narodowych jako ucieleśnienia wartości twórczych i alternatywnych. Powstaje sytuacja blokująca postęp ludzki i przyczyniająca się do rozwoju frustracji oraz napięć między grupami. Proces nasila się szczególnie jeżeli wielokulturowość zostaje zredukowana tylko do różnic zewnętrznych, podlegających procesom dominującej globalizacji kultury.

Słowa kluczowe: wielokulturowość, kultura, religia, etniczność, postmodernizm, rozwój, naród

Abstract

This article tries to redefine the concept of multiculturalism as a potentially dynamic one, in a situation where this word is mainly used to qualify visible differences between ethnical or religious groups, not taking into account the fact that, historically, different national or religious groups developed different political cultures and social programmes that helped humankind to progress. At the time of globalisation, we observe the impoverishment of religions, ideologies and nations as carriers of alternative values and this created a situation blocking human

progress, creating then frustrations and tensions between groups reduced to their visible differences and all submitted to the same dominant culture.

We shall examine in this article from an historical perspective the real meaning of multiculturalism that we oppose to the conceptions of clash of civilizations (Huntington, 1993), end of history (earlier Fukuyama, 1992) but also post-modernism (Maffesoli, 1992, 2012, 2015) since we think that « liquid modernity » (Bauman, 2000) or « late modernity », is still modernity but a reduced modernity restricted to pure technical progress where leading elites imposed on nations to resign from the main objectives of both Enlightened ideologies and Messianic religions tending to promote spiritual, social and human progress carried on by a better human being, a better citizen, a « human divinely human » (Barbusse, 1927) promoting a society of complete justice for all. Our thought is based on the observation that every dynamic and creative society at a given scientific, technical, economical and social stage of development is from the very beginning of Human history a society characterized by :

- » cohesion, which does not mean a society without internal contradictions. It's even the opposite, since contradictions constitute a driving force for social development,
- » a society able to integrate different ideological, religious, cultural, social, national or ethnical trends in a coherent and mutually dynamic process.

We could observe this phenomenon and this recurrent historical rule at the peak time of such political structures like the old Persian, Roman, Muslim, Chinese, Ottoman, etc, empires, as it was also the case with the « Polish Commonwealth » or during the « glorious age » of the British Empire, the French Republic, USA or USSR. Here we are talking about creativity and social dynamics, and not necessarily about an idealistic idyllic life for all but a society opening some perspectives for all. On the contrary, ethnically, religious or ideologically monolithic States are coherent but, in general, they stay out of the main historical development trends. Culturally pluralistic States are then more creative and progressive but they tend to be more fragile when they face crisis, especially economical or social one, when they can be torn by strong ethnical, religious and identity tensions. But their problems do not come most of the time because of their cultural diversity but because the crisis situation is blocking development prospects and social mobility, what creates then a situation causing fossilization and disintegration, what leads to the development of individualism on one side and regression toward basic and primitive networks of solidarity : clans, tribes and ethnic-religious circles on the other side.

Social ossification constitutes the basic cause of crisis

When social and economical crisis happens in such societies, diverse up till then and mutually creative ideological, religious, cultural, national, regional groups tend to curl

up, to mistrust others and to compete one against the other in a situation where each group prefers to catch for itself jobs, consumer goods and services which tend to be more and more simultaneously rare and with an increasing poor quality and operating time. This process of mutual exclusion and self-enclosure does not come in fact from diversity which was earlier considered as something positive but it comes from the blockade happening in a given economical, social and structural model at a certain stage of development, when egoism and lack of imagination of the elites are linked with the passivity and pessimism of the masses.

The old Polish « Republic of Two Nations » for example did not enter into crisis because here we could find legally tolerated all existing without exception in the World monotheistic faith and numerous Slavic and non Slavic ethnical groups, from Jews to Tatars, from Armenians to Germans, from Poles to Ruthenians, etc. We can observe on the contrary that Poland did begin to develop to a higher stage from the moment when those different groups began to integrate themselves within the frame of a new multicultural entity under an open-minded to social, political, religious and ideological diversity Polish catholic noble core. Crisis began later, when nobility tended to marginalize other social groups and when nobility itself tended to be dominated by a closed caste of magnates (Davies, 2014, Minalto, 2015). When townsburghers were also forbidden access to nobility, when cities could not any more integrate people from the countryside, when administrative functions were reserved almost only for Catholics, and only Latin ones, and when Lords exploited the competition between Jews and bourgeois so the urban economy could not compete with rural production put on a position of monopoly under a concentration process controlled by few families. This situation of overconcentration of power lead Poland to decay at the very same moment when in Western Europe cities were developing, bourgeoisie was growing, tolerance was finally accepted after religious wars and capitalism began to develop. Every social group and every religious group, from the top of the catholic aristocracy down to the non catholic peasants began then to live in Poland their own way in a situation where the strongest became richer and more powerful and the poorest and weakest poorer and weaker. Competition was not based on different social, ideological or theological views then, but on strictly superficial ritual and identity, ethnic-religious, differences. We have here to make a clear difference between religion in itself which is a faith linked with an elaborated theology and philosophy of life for both collectivity and individuals, and its reduced caricature based on purely external and superficial identity features. Christian universalism simultaneously with neighbouring religions of that time was reduced in Poland to different mental ghettos reserved for the privileged and then, as a copy reaction, also the unprivileged. At the very moment when Western Europe was renouncing to crusades and religious wars, even if promoting colonialism but under a quite large social mobility, Eastern Europe renounced from its earlier tolerance, and concentrated on an economical model based on reinforced serfdom linked with the monopoly of the wheat production (Blanc, 1974, Makkai, 1981).

Nowadays we are experiencing at a global scale, especially in Western countries, a situation looking quite similar. We observe social, ethnical, religious problems in Europe and USA because there is an economical and structural crisis linked with a mental and social one. Social mobility and social progress are blocked. People become

mutually exclusive within the Global market, what leads them toward individualism, egoism and the search for security within closed circles in competition to get jobs, money, housing, services and consumer goods. People in this situation do not oppose any more to promote liberalism, socialism or another programme for a better way of development, people do not oppose to promote Catholicism, protestantism, Islam or Judaism to make them better people for the whole community and to get to a paradise of brotherhood after death, but they fight most often so people from « my » family, « my » party, « my » parish or « my » visible identity group take first an office, a job, a powerful institution, ...or to destroy other « more competitive » identity groups, or countries. Individualism promoted by the media and powerful groups lead almost automatically to ethnic-religious egoism in a situation where there are fewer and fewer jobs, houses, consumer goods of good quality, etc. Our societies are looking more and more like a « multitribal » collection of closed « communities », gated cities, ghettos and individuals but they are not fundamentally really « multi-/cultural » then. In a situation when in Europe, State is giving less and less guarantees for a correct life, identity circles are often giving to the dispossessed the impression of belongings and solidarity. Instead of what theorised Margareth Thatcher, human beings are social creatures, and when political entities, local neighbourhoods and productive units are not responding any more to this need, tribal or neo-tribal ones are filling the vacuum.

Lack of political perspectives coming from the lack of cultural creativeness

In this situation, political parties, social organizations, religious structures are not any more able to compete for the promotion of alternative and creative social values or to convert because they believe they represent a better option for all, but most of the time they reduce their ambitions to conquer more influence in favour of « theirs ». Wars in Yugoslavia, in Northern Ireland or in Syria were not organized to convert people to Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Protestantism or wahhabi Islam. Israel is not fighting to transform in Jews the Palestinians, Russia is not tending any more to save humankind and promote world progress and American democracy does not plan to introduce a world democracy for its Global empire but concentrates on « market freedom » for its transnational enterprises within a world economy that should be unified according to the market « Law » calculated so to promote the « happy few » (Giraud, 2012). Present wars are not organized to promote a better social system than the existing one, even when they are supposed to be carried on against a « dictator » most often accused of being « an evil man », even a « new Hitler », but rarely accused for his social or economical policies that were sometimes socially rather progressive like in the cases of Libya, Syria, Yugoslavia or Iraq. If it was the case, the first dictators that should have been denounced by the « International community » would be the both non egalitarian and repressive absolute monarchies like Saudi Arabia, Qatar or the dictatorships of Azerbaïdjan, Honduras or Turkmenistan and a lot of other well considered governments by Western powers (Johnson, 2004, 2010). After Fukuyama proclaimed the « End of history », Huntington and his followers declared the « clash of civilizations »

(Fukuyama, 1992, Huntington, 1993, Couze, 2008). We have then to ask if now, in the really existing economically Global United world, there are still different civilizations and cultures or just one basically monolithic, individualistic, consumerist and capitalistic civilization divided only along lines between the rich and the poors, the owners and the excluded, even if some appearances give still the impression of cultural, national and religious diversity ?

« American way of life » is in fact reserved for an « exclusive » global society based on massive consuming, waste and exploitation of cheap labour worldwide, including now the labour forces of the US prison system. Daech islam is also reserved for an exclusive group of people, and so is Israel or the European Union. We must ask for example if there is basically within EU « difference of cultures » or rather a common rule that can be observed more clearly since the Greek crisis, with a rich core of EU excluding the vast masses pushed at the periphery, especially in its South and East flanks. Even if we observe that the local marginalised Greek for example social or political traditions fight for their survival. But, at least for the moment, we must note that such movements like Syryza for the Left or Golden Dawn for the right are rather caricature of the former Greek political culture and tradition. More or less the same conclusions can be done for the French National Front, the Polish Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc, the « new » French Communist Party or the German Die Linke. As it is the case with the neo-islamism promoted by Daech comparing to the Muslim Brotherhood from the time of Hassan el Banna or the Islamic revival proposed by Muhammad Iqbal. Most of the times, the political culture of proclaimed « anti-establihsment » movements looks rather like a « copy reaction » to the dominant neoliberal neoconservative discourse than the renewal of their own political tradition able to construct an alternative social culture. The same can be observed often when we compare the differences between the political offers of different nations at the world level.

When the European Economic Community (EEC) was founded, German debts were cancelled but that was not any more the case with Greece or other European countries who had and have to pay now usurious interests. Such a situation can be observed on a world scale creating then tensions, provoking wars and massive migrations. This can explain why the integration of immigrants, from both Eastern or Southern « civilization circles », was much easier to carry on during the dynamic years of progress just after 1918 and after 1945 up to the end of the seventies. So-called « Westerners » accept now, when the situation becomes very tense, to give to the needies some fish but they do not show any capacity to give fishing rod so the needy will be able to be economically on their own, to become independent from the debt trap, proxy wars, world prices and terms of trade (Gendron, 2007, Reinsdorf, 2009). EU opens its borders to migrant masses coming from countries plunged into wars that can be carried on because of the import of arms not produced in those countries but in the EU and USA, and later Russia. It looks then like a new old story of getting an extra young labour force able to compete with local older workers. Countries where real minimum wages, real salaries and real living conditions are stagnating or falling down for the poorer.

All this is linked with the fact that « post-modern » societies have most often lost their dynamics when leading social groups lost their creative imagination for a real sustainable development so people do not believe in the future of their society and

consequently do not have any more a sufficient birth rate, and this also is a cause for mass migrations. Very often then, « multiculturalism » became not a new reality but a new slogan for a globalized world where real culture and real diversity is vanishing within the same monolithic economical and social system. Real diversity is not mainly linked in fact with identity symbols, ethnical appearances or religious rituals, real diversity was always existing through history as a dynamic social and political culture promoting new more progressive ideas recovered by artistic trends and specific but changing national appearances.

Monolithic global « culture » with different purely formal « touches »

We have to ask if the « pidgin » language most young people use now and which is most of the time a mixture coming from the more literary language their parents learned at home and at school mixed with approximative and rather poor in its contents concepts taken from what British linguists do not name any more « English » but « Globish » can give birth to a real process of thinking, to a real cultural creativity. When all over the world people are listening to songs using similar styles, without understanding words, when people are wearing the same nylon clothes and « sport » shoes, eventually with a Western, an Islamic or another « touch », do this have any connection to what was defined in all civilizations as culture. Which « multi-culture » when North or South Americans, Europeans, Russians, Chinese or Arabs are consuming quite the same products, playing the same kind of violent videos games, making their shopping in the same types of malls where they buy the same world brands ? Is there then any concrete fundamental difference of culture, religion or ideology between a Saudi, a Canadian, a Brazilian or a Bangladeshi ? Except for his bank account, his basic situation, his basic needs, his basic tastes and his basic thoughts look all quite the same. A feeling of being a stranger in this world for the 99% of humankind. A feeling of complete alienation that can lead either to passivity or violence.

Since the Islamic circle is concentrating for geopolitical and geo-economical reasons world tensions, we must ask to what extent a « Muslim » nowadays is really developing social « values » making him different from a « Christian » or a « Buddhist ». In fact, a young Muslim, when he is « radical » will tell he is wearing a long « qamis » supposed to make him look like his prophet and differentiating him from a « Westerner ». But in fact, he does not really know what kind of cloth was really wearing the prophet Muhammad, and he cannot realize that he is wearing a nylon cloth produced by an overexploited Bangladeshi supposedly « fellow-Muslim » worker, he is walking with TV advertised Nike-style shoes imported from Thailand the prophet Muhammad did never dream about and he is wearing sun glasses imported from yet another country and produced by a firm belonging to an « unfaithful » he is supposed to compete with, if he is a « moderate », and to fight against if he is an « extremist ». What this all have to do with the social message and program's prophets were fighting for ? No prophet never asked to seat at the table of the privileged, the rich and the powerful and to look like them. What real difference then exists between the exclusivist discourse

of a California based « born again » TV Neo-Evangelist, a Saudi extremist preacher, a radical rabbi in the occupied West Bank or a Buddhist or Hindu extremist from Sri Lanka, India. China (Tibet) or Burma ? They are all promising a consumer paradise after life for the ones who will accept now the dominant social rules and avoid the terrible hell they experience …already now most of the times in their everyday senseless life, without any perspective and without any real collective future. In a situation where liberals, neo-liberals, Islamist, socialists or neo-conservatives do not propose any more a concrete response to this moral, intellectual, spiritual and philosophical desert.

When we use the concept of multiculturalism we have first to think about the meaning of the word « culture », and then ask what if there are real cultures taking part in the supposedly multicultural society ? Obviously, the level of knowledge of most Saudi like preachers, not to talk about Daech, demonstrates they have a complete ignorance about the main elements of culture such as philosophy, theology, anthropology, social sciences, not to talk about biology, psychology or logic. Leaving away art, paintings, music, poetry, etc. These people pretend to return to the roots of Islam but are not able to understand the cause of the dynamic of the first Muslim society. In fact, they reform the traditional Islam inherited from their ancestors creating then a « neo-Islamism » without roots in a typical « post-modernist » and « no future » way. We can see something very similar observing « born again » Christian preachers and most of the preachers of other religions we can observe on mass religious TV channels. When we observe political movements on the other side, we note also that very few liberal young leaders really know something about the early ideas of liberal thinkers as very few socialists know really something about the fundamental social methodology created by Karl Marx.

On the other side of the mirror, very few people belonging to the lower classes still know the living sense of the folklore rituals of their grand-parents. The world became in fact, with few exceptions, a gigantic « Indian reservation » where people cut from their traditions are showing for tourists the visible aspects of an already most of the time dead culture. And this creates frustrations first, then rage. We can even say that we all became « tourists » in this world, looking at somebody's else rituals just as we behave with our own traditions and cults which are in fact foreign to us. Observing most of the rituals linked with Christmas in officially more or less « Christian » societies we see that they have more to do with shopping activities and family meetings than with the mystic of Christ. American « melting pot » became in fact a real « success story » since it eliminated almost all over the world, including North Americans, any trace of fundamental, spiritual, intellectual, artistic and social differences, leaving just appearances of differences. The rage shown for example by some catholic or Neo-Protestant fundamentalists in Eastern Europe or in America, or by Muslim, Jewish or Buddhist fundamentalists in Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Burma or Sri Lanka is rather based on a lack of knowledge and an infinite despair. This has little to do with traditions which have been almost entirely eradicated, first by modernistic trends and most profoundly by the superficial consumer's « ethos » of life condemning humans to live isolated from any « eternal » value in an « eternal present » without any long term sense and perspective. And this creates huge frustrations provoking hate among people losing their faith and links with their elders.

When we compare the poetry of traditional Islamic thinkers with the almost materialistic understanding of paradise described by post-modern fundamentalists preachers, we can only note that they do not know what the word culture means, and that they do not know either what means Islamic culture, in « Islamic » countries or in Europe. The same thing happened earlier with the different branches of Christianity. Since the Muslim world is situated at the crossroad between the « rich » West and the « poor » Global South, contradictions based on economical inequalities are there more acute and cannot find a real alternative. We must compare this situation with the one existing in Mexico, where the Global South meets also the « North ». The extreme violence and the extreme social disintegration we observe now in the kingdom of drug gangs of Mexico can be compared to the extreme violence and social disintegration we observe in most Arab countries. This rather tends to show that real traditions and religions play a secondary role in this global scenario, or at least a superficial one. All territories situated at the limit between the still fascinating rich consumer's markets of the West and the marginalised and poor Southern countries behave in a quite similar way, even if the pretext of religion does not exist in the historically very secularized Mexico. We must ask then if there is any fundamental difference between the Mexican drug gangs and the violent « Islamic fundamentalists » captagon (Loumé, 2015, Khoder, 2016, Dinand, 2016) massive users and dealers ? We consider that the basic contradiction of our times is between « post-modernity » and « multiculturalism », since post-modernity is, as this word tells us, an intellectual concept created for « has been », when « culture » is a concept fundamentally linking the past with the future. The egoism and the despair of nowadays Western, Muslim or Indian « has been » creates a barrier against free thinking, creative thinking and creative culture. So when « post-modernistically » oriented leaders talk about « multiculturalism », they do not speak about culture in the real sense of this term, they speak about purely visible identity symbols that should divide people competing for jobs and goods but basically similar in their everyday behaviours.

Defining the concept of multiculturalism

Before giving any opinion concerning the choice between multiculturalism and monoculturalism we need then to define what exactly means the concept of multiculturalism. We have first to ask then what is culture ? Is culture just a different « look » or « touch » within the same basic social values, or is culture a collection of trends pushing toward social creativity on the base of different social, philosophical, ideological or spiritual principles in constant emulation ? We must ask if all existing nowadays extremist trends appearing in fact in each existing ideology and religion, from the « official » extreme right to the extreme left are not in fact part of what we could call an « extreme centre » vision based on the same « there is no alternative » policy. When we analyze process that characterized all decays in the history we should note that the real and creative multi/-/cultural aspect of the leading empires gave then way to formal diversities and oppositions recovering a growing monolithic social, political,

ideological and religious discourse recovering a growing concentration of wealth and power (Roy, 2008).

We must ask if there is now any basic difference between the neoliberal or secular credo telling that « there is no society, only individuals » and « new » religious credos telling to their faithful that they have just to think about their personal salvation through purely apparent rituals and charity acts based on an egoistic feeling searching a consumer paradise for themselves during their life or, at least, after their death, without any care about collective social issues. Such an individualistic consumer's ideology, with « Christian », « Islamic », « jewish » or « secularized » « look », has nothing to do with the prophetical appeals and with the struggle against usure located at the very base of all monotheistic faith and all secularized « post-religious » trends that appeared during the European Enlightenment.

In fact, all traditional existing cultures are summoned to accept to be reduced to strictly superficial « national », « ideological », « political » or « religious » differences, to something looking like a specific parcel containing the very same content, the very same culture :

> » a life where people do not have to think about any universal mission,
> » a consumerist and individualistic lifestyle compliant to the monolithic advertising messages propagated all over the globalized world,
> » a non ending competition of individuals, nations and countries functioning on the very same ideological, economical and social bases.

No really competing alternative social programmes, no real cultural differences, no real new waves of creativity, whatever they are called, « secular » or « religious ». In fact a « monolithic multiculturalism » which is the contrary of the real diversity of cultures, thoughts and social programmes. The concept of multiculturalism has then to be redefined along with the concept of culture.

Real multiculturalism needs opposed social programmes

In most countries now, there is no much differences of social programmes between Christian democrats, liberals, socialists or nationalists and also Islamists. All major political currents lost their roots and, consequently, the differences between Christians, Muslims or atheists are dividing them most often inside their own « community » along strictly individual, moral, personal values on one side and the ones still searching in their « roots » what can be used to promote more collective, more social, more progressive and more creative and vivid principles. Everywhere humans have to deal now with the same universalised atmosphere of « end of history » and « no future ». We cannot then be surprised with the development of satanic like behaviours, of « heavy metals » groups, even when we analyse the supposedly « Christians » Breivik or Timothy Mc Veigh, the « Islamic » Daech death squads, the « Hindu » Tamil tigers or the ultra-nationalist Burmese Buddhist monks. In these cases as in many others, these have nothing to do with traditions and with the spirituality of each religion, in the same way Hitler's « national socialism » had not much to do with socialist basic

internationalist principles. As the Polish proverb says « Fish rots from the head » and this is the very situation we observe in the global world which is in fact rarely multi-cultural but basically monocultural because of leading elites promoting their « soft » monolithic ideology. Here we find the reasons for both migrations, self-confinements and gated cities. Is there any real difference between the born again Christian belief of a George W. Bush crusading in Iraq, the petro-Islamism of Saudi kings helping « moderate Islamists » in Syria, the extremist Iraqi born and Gulf funded « extremists » in the same Syria or Iraq, the Khmer rouge « Marxist » slaughters in Cambodia, the extreme right « Gladio organised » Bologne Railway Station terrorist attack and the murders of civilians religiously blessed by neo-tribal rabbis in the West Bank ? We have everywhere to deal with the results of massive wars, bombings, drones and terrorist attacks, not launched by local people but imported from outside.

There is not much differences between so called nationalists, religious fundamentalists or other « identity » trends which are superficial, even if violently opposed one to the other. They constitute in fact reactions against the « neo-polytheism » of our era, the fetishism of egos, goods and markets promoting the elites, the « happy few » on a world scale. Extreme right racists tend to promote « racial elite » and religious fundamentalists tend to promote charismatic preachers in a non very different logic. Their violence is based on real frustrations which are as logical as logical is the permanent « new nomadism » (Decrop, 2008, Management post moderne) from one country reduced to a poorer market to another country which seem to offer better prices and salaries.

Very few « nationalists » are proposing any new way of development or new methods of understanding social and economical issues than the ones realized by « globalists ». Advocating the closing of borders, extreme nationalists only difference with « globalists » is that they want to reserve the benefits of the same society on a strictly « national » base. We meet very rarely a « Satanist » racist, an « Islamist », a « born again neo-Protestant » or an « ultra-catholic » promoting an alternative social or economical system, and a fundamentally different system of shared social principles. Even if now Francis Fukuyama admits that there was no real « end of history » after the self-dissolution of the socialist block (Philips, 2008), we must acknowledge that very few are the ones, including most of the pretending to be « multiculturalists », who try to analyze and understand the blocking of the global dynamic and who try to invent real new ways of development that will not reduce culture to passive consumption of goods. Culture is an active and creative process but most of the « values » spread by global media and advertising corporations are anti-social, inhuman, strongly individualistic, anti-feminist, subliminally or openly pornographic, and then fundamentally violent.

Speaking about Human rights and dignity, we have to ask why most of the well known feminist organizations are not denouncing advertisings transforming women in sexual toys to catch consumers. A costly war was launched theoretically to liberate Afghan women but in the same time very few campaign against firms advertising half naked female objects « seducing » half idiot muscular men dreaming to buy a more « energetic » car, male underpants or perfume. All « citizens » are supposed to consume and then to be indebted, what put them in a situation of dependency rather similar to

the one of the former subjects of a Lord than the one of a free citizen in a real democracy. All this is contrary to what was always defined in Europe as « culture ».

Since very few politicians or religious leaders are proposing any way to promote a society of dignity, it is then logic when lost people try to find a way back toward an idealized « tribal », « pure » or « mythical » paradise. During the whole human history, societies were dynamic when really different cultural trends were coexisting and looking together forward on the base of tolerance and common social goals. Here is the base of what we define as the real multiculturalism based on some common principles according to the interests of different social stratas and cultural groups.

Migrants, archaism and progres

Tensions happening now are not linked with the diversity of cultures, languages, ideologies or religions, even if some behaviours can look specific, « archaic », reactionary and « inhuman », but this could be overcome in a really dynamic and progressive society. As it was for example the case in Europe for immigrants during the first thirty years after the Second World war as it was also the case then in most of the « multicultural » Third World countries because economical and social progress were then on the world agenda, both in the East and in the West. Now, on the contrary, there is not any more tolerated real diversity but only the appearances of diversity under a monolithic social, economic and political order. The current situation creates huge tensions and frustrations that provoke self-confinements due to the fact that there is no real social mobility, no social promotion but a situation where in most cases, in developed or under-developed countries, poors are getting poorer and rich are getting richer, inside every country and between countries. This explains why there is a need for new cultural hegemons able to propose solutions to this dead end situation creating unending conflicts between people, ethnical and social groups or countries sharing most often the same basic economical and social values carried on by some happy few oligarchs. Here we find the real source of racism or religious fanaticism built on real existing social frustrations. Islam for example was one of the most pro-scientific and pro-social religion since in the Middle ages it invented free universities and free hospitals with systems of scholarships for the poorest (Nagamia, 2003, Noshwrawy, 2007). The Fez Qarawiyin University was even founded by a woman in the 10th century. This experience was transferred later to Europe during Renaissance where it lead to the development of science, freedom and universalism. Universalism based on something that can be called « multiculturalism ». The regressive movements we observe now in the Muslim world have to be linked with the regressive movements we observe in richer countries event if, because of their relative wealth, these are still not submitted to the same degree of social frustrations and violence we observe in several Muslim and third world countries. We have to note also that if the late waves of migrants in Europe created polemics and tensions, nobody here seems to know that, for example, a little and relatively poor country like Syria accepted from the beginning of the 20th century up to 2011 several hundred thousands Armenian refugees during the first world

war, also several hundred thousand Greeks, Circassians, Turkish Kurds, later several hundred Palestinian refugees, more than half a million of Lebanese refugees during the 2006 invasion of Lebanon and more than one million Iraqis after the invasion of 2003. All these refugees of different ethnical and religious belongings were accepted, fed and housed by local people, and Syrian State did not even beg for any foreign help, because it was a question of honour, a notion forgotten by rich bourgeois. Now it is the turn of the tiny Lebanon to accept more than half million Syrian refugees rejoining the already living there Palestinian and Armenian former refugees (Moaz, 2015). Rich Europe, not to talk about USA, did not show so much solidarity comparing to these countries. We must know that the big majority of all refugees and migrants in the world are located in poor Third World countries and we should note that these millions are relatively rarely victims of violence coming from the resident population. We must then ask if Europe, not to speak about USA, is ready to a real « multiculturalism » in spite of official discourses.

Europe was during the last centuries something like a laboratory for better or worse dynamical trends but now its situation reminds us rather the Polish commonwealth at the time of the Saxon dynasty when its elites were pretending that existing institutions were perfect and that people had just to restore old social and political recipes that were supposed to bloom under a « golden liberty » that was proclaimed such as an Tibetan mantra but that did not exist in fact any more. For the more enlightened spirits of the time, this discourse was just hypocrisy under appearances of liberty and democracy. This regressive situation lead finally to the creation of a real program of reforms proclaimed by the « Kollataj's Forge » ? In fact, these enlightened spirits concentrated then on the issue how to give a just place to Jews, religious minorities, bourgeois and peasants confronted with an unending feudal despair. What we can call today « multiculturalism », but a constructive multiculturalism.

If we look at France during the thirties of the XXth century, we observe there too that the Polish, Jewish from Eastern Europe or Italian immigrants were then submitted to much worst treatments than nowadays immigrants. Historical researches showed that Poles, Jews or Italians were often accused then by the press of the same « sins » like now the new migrants : (catholic) religious fundamentalism, strong tendency to banditism and rapes (Ponty, 1988). French newspapers were then full of articles denouncing immigrants supposedly incapable to integrate in the democratic, secularized and tolerant French Republic. At the beginning of the thirties, when unemployment raised, legal Polish immigrants were often given 24 hours to sell all their belongings at very low prices, and to take with them only one suitcase per person so to be sent back to Poland by special trains. Remaining immigrants for a large part integrated later to the French society, but it did happen first during the Second World war when they constituted an important part of the local resistance movement and after the war when they took an active part to the reconstruction of the country. This situation was similar to the one experienced by immigrants from African countries up to the crisis of the late seventies, even if the post-colonial racism did not die.

Nowadays, the new crisis we experience created new conditions for racism and xenophobia but the past experiences shows that it is possible to overcome these problems as soon as leading forces try to find a dynamic solution to the current blocked situation.

The only question is : do we need a new form of fascism and a world war to reach it ? We must ask now this question observing international tensions and growing intolerance combined with the inefficiency of government programs tending to promote tolerance and multiculturalism not questioning the very social and economical causes of frustrations, and then racism or xenophobia. The word « culture » constitutes in this context a key word that has to be re-invented in its really authentic and profound sense. Real culture is always both « national » and « universal ». When « multiculturalism » will mean exactly this, it will be able to open new creative perspectives.

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Collective memory and the cultural security

Pamięć zbiorowa w kontekście bezpieczeństwa kulturowego

Streszczenie

Autor zwraca uwagę na problem nadmiaru i niedoboru pamięci zbiorowej jako wyobrażeń o przeszłości grupy. Wskazuje na „gęstość upamiętniania", pamięć indywidualną i publiczną, dominującą i przeciwną, narzuconą i marginalną. Przedstawia różne interpretacje i rozumienie pamięci zbiorowej, problemy jej konstruowania, manipulowanie ją i ideologizację. Odróżnia pamięć zbiorową od historii, sytuując ją oraz poczucie bezpieczeństwa kulturowego w grupie podstawowych potrzeb rozwojowych człowieka i jego kultury.

Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe traktuje nie tylko jako brak zagrożeń w kultywowaniu tradycji ale także jako ustawiczną potrzebę prowadzenia działalności profilaktycznej i edukacyjnej. Ukazuje przykłady pamięci sprzyjające rozwojowi kultury grupy jak też doświadczenia i przeżycia pomijane przez główny nurt pamięci i tym samym powodujące utratę poczucia bezpieczeństwa kulturowego. Podkreśla, że lęki o bezpieczeństwo kulturowe, o utratę uznania są i były przyczyną wielu tragedii ludzkich, stąd edukacja międzykulturowa winna realizować zadania związane z niwelowaniem niebezpiecznego procesu ideologizacji narodu.

Słowa kluczowe: pamięć zbiorowa, bezpieczeństwo kulturowe, kultura, tożsamość, edukacja.

Abstract

The author pays attention to problems of the excess and the deficiency of collective memory, the latter understood as certain ideas of the past of given groups. He points to the "density of commemorating", as well as individual, public, dominant, opposite, imposed and marginal types of memory. He introduces different interpretations and understanding of the collective memory, problems of its construction, manipulating by it, and the ideologization. He makes a clear distinction between collective memory and history, locating the first notion and the cultural sense of security within the group of the essential developmental needs of human and the culture.

Cultural security is treated not only as the lack in cultivating the tradition, but also as the constant need for preventive and educational activities. He portrays examples favouring the growth of the culture of a given group, pointing to experiences omitted by the mainstream of memory, consequently generating the loss of the cultural sense of security. The author emphasizes that anxiety linked to the cultural security, connected with the loss of the recognition, is the main the cause of human tragedies, therefore cross-cultural education should perform tasks tightly linked to elimination of the hazardous process of ideologization of the nation.

Keywords: collective memory, cultural security, culture, identity, education.

I believe that the problem of collective memory is a phenomenon of great significance, tackled, among others, within the framework of hermeneutic thought, sociology, and understanding pedagogy. Manners of remembrance are connected with the whole range of emotions, as well as rational arguments. They exert essential influence on the identity of a contemporary man, processual character of the identity in interpreting the world, selection of its contents, the search for such content, interpretation, as well as attaching significance to it. Understanding and comprehending are fundamental for hermeneutics, whereas their accomplishment takes place through internal dialogue that one carries out on the basis of the external dialogue, what in turn conditions human existence in the world (Gadamer, 2004, p. 413 and next). Wojciech Burszta stresses that "*we used to live in the illusion that rationality and factual material are able to replace the 'living processes' which are taking place in the human memory. We forgot that it is not possible to hide all the demons stuck in every society, cyclically coming back to life. We are living now in the period when they all have become awaken. Moreover, they are being woken up deliberately!*" (Burszta, 2016, p. 9).

I think that at present we are dealing with the progressing process of the dominance of emotions, with the concurrent marginalisation of knowledge. We thought that activities within the range of cross-cultural education have brought changes to the spheres of cognitive and behavioural attitudes. It seemed that we were becoming more and more understanding and tolerant of each other, able to claim our rights based on rational arguments, understanding such prerogatives, and showing respect in this regard. Nonetheless, we can observe a sort of return to the past in the process of shaping identity of the contemporary generations, entailing abandonment of the critical thinking and resigning from the vision of a wider social perspective, contributing at the same time to the arousing mistrust towards one another, injustice, and resentments. Thus, I understand and acknowledge the stance of Burszta, who highlights that "we *lost the instinct of observing what is really happening to people, where the hate comes from, why people manifest their views differently, not communicating with each other*" (ibidem, p. 10).

As far as my opinion is concerned, the phenomenon of the collective memory is one of the key aspects of antagonizing cultures and people representing them, as it releases various levels of the cultural sense of security. Such conclusion results from numerous experiences and observation of diverse manifestations (reactions, behaviours and

activities) within this scope. Human behaviours and actions, as well as their attitudes, beliefs, principles and values orientating in life, can be understood in the context of the culture in which such individuals grew up, where they were able to acquire elements of the cultural legacy of the ancestors, carrying out and cultivating them without anxiety or fear. Thereby, **collective memory is established, i.e. a set of ideas of the past of a given group, entailing the pattern of commemorating given figures, events, and experiences from the past, accompanied by the discussion on character and the frequency of forms of commemorating, etc.** The momentum and particular care for given elements takes place with the concurrent resignation, denial, or even oblivion of other components. It leads to the dilemma of the "density of commemoration", the meanings and symbolism assigned by one party in opposition to the other, including various governmental and non-governmental forms. It is accompanied by attaching meaning to the elements denied by the previous authority after the nationwide change in leadership. Yet, the problem occurs, when – as Paul Ricoeur points out (Ricoeur, 2007, p. 105–106) – a part of the society pays reverence and honour to the acts of violence, and when something for one is a source of joy and glory, whereas for others it implies humiliation and suffering.

Thus, we can observe the excess of the memory concerning certain events, contradicted with the deficiency of the memory of others. The issue of the relation between the excess and the deficiency of the collective memory can be interpreted in categories of resistance and compulsion of the repetition. According to Jacek Drozda "*the resistance has become an object of the common interest of scholars and journalists, as it reveals not only many crucial, but also previously partly hidden aspects of modern and postmodern societies, providing concurrently a chance to combine the analytical work with personal commitment and participation in the collective euphoria*" (Drozda, 2015, p. 43). The author, referring to the ethics of liberation by Enrique Dussel, indicates that the philosophy of liberation is rooted in the belief based on the encounter with the Other, and on the opening towards the Other, enabling the possibility of establishing more just social order. Such an idea requires from the individuals to recognize, respect, and even to promote the different culture, at the same time paying attention to the problem of existence, transmission, development and revitalization of the inherited culture, followed by the protection of own, unique values. In this context I clearly notice the dilemmas of the collective memory, securing elements crucial for the culture, cultural safety, commemorating, as well as the manners of the remembrance. It occurs that collective memory displays similar characteristics to the invented tradition. Both phenomena strive to acknowledge certain elements in the cultural legacy, revitalizing them and granting them value in the context of the current situation (i.e. anniversaries, signs, symbols, monuments in the public sphere, and etc). In that way a process of creation takes place, followed by inventing the tradition and assigning new meanings, both essential from the symbolic point of view of a given group. It implies a creation from the scratch in order to – for example – satisfy the needs of nationalist movements, or the activities of political institutions, as well as governmental or non-governmental organizations.

In the literature on the subject there are three types of invented traditions (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2008, p. 9–15):

1. The one establishing or symbolising social cohesion and collective identities,
2. The one establishing or legitimatising institutions and social hierarchies,
3. The one socialising people into particular social contexts.

These traditions constitute one of the key elements of the contemporary nation-states, as each nation tries to underline its longevity, embedment, and cultural significance. Collective memory is consciously used and shaped for the purpose of meeting the interest of particular political group. **The problems reside in the way the group perceives itself and the way it constructs its collective identity, i.e. whether it lays claims to the special treatment in relation to other groups, states, nations, in what scope and to what degree it is homogeneous in the way of perceiving oneself in relation to others, and last but not least – what does it differ in**? Traditions strive not to lose their power in the awareness of the citizens. Therefore, they are frequently and deliberately constructed, imposed upon members of a given community, whether it concerns different minorities, or the entire nation. They can be imposed institutionally by the group or the ruling party, state institutions or educational system, thereby serving the purpose of legitimizing the power, stimulating the sense of collective identity, bond, awareness of the common past, common destinies, symbols, figures, authorities, events, and etc.

Starting from the 19th century, i.e. from the coming into existence of the modern nation-states, collective memory has become a tool of constructing and supporting collective identities. When defining collective memory, the majority of authors pay attention to the individual and public memory, at the same time differentiating its dominant, main, imposed, opposite, and marginal types. Piotr Tadeusz Kwiatkowski points to the fact that in the course of the past several years there have been numbers of publications tackling the issue of collective memory (Kwiatkowski, 2008). In my opinion, amongst many of the proposals, particular attention should be drawn to the manner of presenting collective memory by Barbara Szacka (2006, p. 44–45), who considers it as a multidimensional phenomenon entailing:
  » dynamic system of the ideas on the past of own group constructed by its members,
  » contents of diverse character and varied genesis,
  » interactions and the involvement in public activities, participation in the discussions concerning the legacy, exchanging experiences in this regard, etc.

On the other hand, Michel Foucault analysed connections between the collective memory and the power, considering the first phenomenon as an idealized idea of the past of a given group, rooted and subject to reconstruction, depending on the current needs and circumstances. The existence and cultivation of such memory are conditioned by the power of the group exercising authority, the group shaping the mainstream of memory and tackling the issue of solving the ongoing conflict with the so-called "opposite memory". Foucault emphasized, for instance, that the war events are presented according to the official formal regulations established by the state bodies, i.e. the considerable part of the narration is to be omitted, or doomed to oblivion. He also drew attention to the collective memory as a tool of dominance, applying various versions of the past, followed by a sophisticated pattern of its transmission, control over such transmission, and creation of the memory. Foucault brought attention to

the fact that higher education constitutes a part of the "social process of producing the memory". In such a way and due to its prestige it can perform exceptional role, implying a common way of perceiving the past, as well as indicating the line of enquiry concerning it. He introduced the term "dominant memory" which links the perception of the past to the influence it exerts on individual persons, communities, groups, making reference to persuasion, relationships with the apparatus of power, dominating institutions, and the like. Within the framework of one country there can be a problem of domination by one memory, yet it can also encompass different forms of such memory, subject to specific dynamics and constant transformations. Communities can change the shape of the dominant memory, adding new elements considered significant under given social and political circumstances. Hence, the key issues entail what we consider significant, who recognizes it, what are – if they are any – differences between the groups, what kind of conflicts occur within, and why. The memory imposed by institutions at a central level embraces the entire nation, therefore Foucault stresses that educational system is one of the tools of constructing dominant memory in this regard (Pletnia, 2015).

Apart from central institutions, as for the public media, mass culture, private and grass-roots initiatives (associations, organizations, foundations, local self-government, and etc) they all matter greatly in forming collective memory, shaping the so-called "popular memory". I would like to point out that collective memory is most effective when all these elements harmonize with each other, and when a close cooperation takes place between state institutions, media and the system of education. Political ideologies are tightly linked to the process of formulating collective memory, for political dominance is connected with the process of formulating ideas (visions) of the past. It should therefore come as no surprise that collective memory is subject to manipulation, as accentuated by Paul Ricoeur. He claimed that collective memory can become subject to ideologization, i.e. consciously becoming a part of the process of constructing collective identity by the means of the so-called "selective narration". The latter attaches positive meaning to given elements of the culture (relevant figures) and negative to others, thus becoming a tool of legitimizing the current power. Frequently, the narration is constructed in a way, and in order to, portray positive links between the past and the present. Ricoeur pointed to the institutional memory, referring to it as the "taught memory", or a memory extorted in the educational process encompassing anniversaries, celebration of various (national) holidays, presence of symbols in the public sphere, etc (ibidem).

As already mentioned, collective memory is linked to different forms of commemorating, yet **the history of places is not the same as the memory about them**. **History is reconstruction, thus the memory is accomplished and triggered in given, specific situations, conditions, circumstances, and period of time**. Therefore, all forms of commemoration perform significant function for the collective identity of the group. Spontaneity and variety constitute the essence of the memory. The latter can disappear and appear, be rebuilt, modified, or revitalized, referring to problems of experiencing fears and anxiety, concerning peace and the sense of safety, as well as growth and prospect for the future. **The memory creates ideas, concepts, institutions, but also forms role models, authority and cultural texts in order to**

provide the cultural sense of security for the group, followed in the process of shaping identity by the conviction on values of the group and welfare. In this context I perceive cultural security and collective memory through the prism of the group of human needs, such as the essential developmental, activity-related, existential, creative, as well as cultural ones. Notwithstanding, it should be bore in mind that cultural sense of security is not homogeneous. On one hand, it encompasses motivation for creating the memory (mainly of institutional, organised, and national origin), followed by satisfaction from its realization and attachment of indispensable value to such memory. Yet, on the other hand, a process of resignation and escape from remembering and creating of the collective memory can take place in the view of the lack of threats, or the lack of the need for continuation, or/and transmission. It, consequently, generates the problem of the awareness and considering the cultural legacy valuable, i.e. the issue of its recognition as a value, what – irrespective of the sense of security – makes others organise themselves, gather, establish associations or foundations (which can support the cause and secure the state, government, European and worldwide organisations), or quite the contrary – such problems can result in lack of attention, lack of support and no protection for cultural rights of the citizens of given countries.

Considering the above, I believe that the cultural sense of security, and presence – or absence – of the sense of thereat in this regard are dynamic, unpredictable, subject to change in the time, depending on the political, economic, and even military context. It is accompanied by a subjective conviction on the existence of threats or their lack. The latter, however, is not equivalent to its objective existence in fact. The essence of the sense of cultural security is the expression of the identity, the guarantee of freedom within the forms of cultural expression, tradition, religion, and last but not least – liberation from the restrictions in cultivating own culture. **Cultural security implies not only the lack of threats, but also preventive activities not allowing such treats to occur, creating conditions and situations where culture can be fulfilled, developed and fully accomplished**. It implies on one hand protection, yet on the other the growth, cultivation, enculturation and adaptation to new conditions are strongly favoured.

I acknowledge the fact that collective memory is not permanent, hence subject to transformations. Namely, some elements become indispensable, whereas others are subject to oblivion and withdrawal. This, in turn, entails the issue of their value and the emotional level of engagement of the members of such culture in the memory narrations. It is subject to involvement from the educational system, so that a joint perception of the reality in the context of the pursued policy can be created and shaped. Certain events from the past, irrespective of whether their witnesses live or not, can provide a ground for the narration concerning the past of the group, becoming a key component in their collective identity. It is subject to the manner how they are passed on to next generations, i.e. whether as traumatic, tragic, or – quite the contrary – noble and joyful events.

The institutional collective memory also generates symbolic violence, understood by Pierre Bourdieu as the process of imposing meanings in such a way that they become biding and 'natural' in the public reception. The processes of imposing and relation

of power within both remain hidden (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990, p. 60). Therefore, functions of the collective memory are crucial, for they are treated as the tool of uniting members of a given community, and as the tool of creating national identity through the belief concerning the shared, exceptional origin. Reference to historical events, followed by their propaganda upon given celebrations sanctioned by the state, directs towards the feeling of historical community thus can become one of the key elements of the cultural syntagma, determining the uniqueness of a given, national culture. Memory about certain events can acquire features of an indispensable, indigenous value, as accentuated by Jerzy Smolicz, since preserving the culture and strong feeling of the national identity both condition its existence (Smolicz, 1990). However, there is also the "opposite memory" besides the mainstream, treated often as a memory of the minority groups, which is not always taken into account in the "main memory". It has its source in the local community, stemming from the direct experience of this group. This allows to draw attention to other experiences, which are most often omitted within the framework of the mainstream memory.

In such context, I would like to tackle the narration of the "opposite memory", exemplified by, among others, a statement of Olga Tokarczuk, living nearby Wrocław, in the town of Nowa Ruda. In one of TV programmes, making reference to the literary Nike prize award she received in 2015 for a historical novel "Księgi Jakubowe" she said: "*we will have to face our own history and try to re-write a bit, not hiding these all terrible things which we did as colonizers, i.e. the national majority which suppressed the minority, as slaveholders or the murderer of Jews*". This, and other statements of such manner, direct the thinking and reactions of many people towards the phenomenon of cultural security, and this is also what happened. The right-wing web portals were outdoing each other in expressing hatred towards the writer, accusing her of anti-Polonism. She was warned she would never feel safe in Poland again, and referred to as "the Jewish rag, Ukrainian harlot...", and etc. "Księgi Jakubowe" is a piece of work portraying the reality of the eighteenth-century Poland, and this is far from the Sienkiewicz-like glorification of the age of Vasa dynasty, i.e. the mainstream, institutional memory. As Tokarczuk remarked, she was ashamed that the serfdom was abolished as late as in the 19th century under the pressure of invaders, accompanied by the hostile attitudes of the "real" Poles. As she also said, she observed with terror the permanence of the anti-Semitism during the times of the Polish People's Republic. Pope Francis reminds of the commandment "You shall love your neighbor as yourself", openly calling to the aid for refugees, whereas our Polish Catholics refer to him as a naïve, old man. Writing about the 18th century, Olga Tokarczuk emphasizes the permanence of our national superstitions, as well as the permanence of the hostility towards others.

It all leads to the dilemma whether we should consider these problems in our collective memory, or – as far as the sense of well-being is concerned – rather forget them. In my opinion, educational process should embrace these issues, and they shall become a part of the collective memory shared by all the members of community. The opposite memory acknowledges and pays attention to the events, which have been denied and sunk into oblivion because of their contradictory character, compared to the mainstream. Wojciech Burszta underlines that "*in the sphere of mentality we are frozen at the stage of the myth of the society, which is of patriarchal and post-slavery*

character... We still preserve the myth of national identity which directly refers to the noble concept of the nation and visions of the chosen nation" (Burszta, 2016, p. 8).

In the context of the social and political changes taking place constantly, certain statements acquire new meaning, becoming more and more dangerous, and – as a result – a matter of concern. For instance, I can recall here the statement of one of the Members of Parliament claiming we should require from atheists, members of the Orthodox church and Muslims declarations they are familiar with, and undertake to fully respect the Polish Constitution, recognizing values considered in Poland important. Consequently, lack of execution of these requirements should provide a clear-cut reason for the deportation. In view of this statement many questions about the cultural sense of security arise. It should come therefore as no surprise that the representatives of The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius of the Orthodox church reacted accordingly, replying that such a statement violates the freedom guaranteed for every citizen of our country, their dignity and respect. Words of such kind expressed by this politician have nothing to do with the Gospel, nor the Christian faith. They are simply the hate speech, revealing blindness, complexes and pride. They prove to be marked with hate, intolerance and religious fanaticism.

The current disturbing phenomenon of undermining the paradigm of coexistence of people representing various cultures, also entailing the culture of thinking and acting in favour of others, is becoming evident. However, there are no other potentialities of growth than through experiencing other cultures, as only in such way it is possible to understand own culture, one's place and role within. It should be remembered that the contemporary man, as Bogusław Śliwerski highlights, is inherently a part of *"...the pluralistic society, diversity of cultures, values, systems of the orientation and organizational structures, experiencing on one hand the right to different behaviours, tendencies and identifications, driven by different interests and values, and on the other coming into conflict with that multitude and contradictory criteria towards own views or stances, becoming aware of the effort, or even the lack of the agreement or conciliation".* The author points out that being a pedagogue of the democracy implies explicit stance in favour of *"the deep diversity of the everyday world of life, permanence of the heterogeneity, the multitude of paradigms, cultures, spheres of science, and politics"* (Śliwerski, 2014, p. 26).

In my opinion, current issues in this regard tackle the mutual respect and recognition, releasing on one hand the defensive energy protecting own cultural identity, and on the other encouraging to maintain an ongoing dialogue with the representatives of different cultures in order to learn the humbleness, empathy, and common, critical sense, avoiding fanaticism in consequence. I think that in the context of the cultural sense of security, local collective memories used to be, and still are, subject to distinct contradictions, generating conflicts. For example, after reading the stories on the Augustów man-hunt, i.e. one of the greatest post-war tragedies in our country, often referred to as the second Katyń (Stalinist crime from July 1945) and so far unexplained, it is hard to understand and explain human behaviours stored in the collective memory (Kaczorowska, 2015). There are seven documentaries presenting the genuine experiences of many people, their dramas, tragic fates, and suffering. Many of them remember, suffer and still wait for explanation (investigation), and to be indicated

places where their beloved ones had been buried. Analysing the experiences and actions of people in the context of cultural security one is unable to understand for example such a man, who being involved in the Armia Krajowa (Home Army) and as an eager Catholic, at some point became a thug. He was able to slaughter in a bestial way the closest co-workers from the undercover resistance community. During the "Hunts" he accompanied the Soviet secret police in making lists and appointing victims. Thus, in such view we should make analyses and interpretations of the actions and behaviours taking place nowadays, reflecting over how members of the ethnic or religious groups feel towards stigmatizing statements and hostile behaviours. For example, the Belarusian community in Hajnówka and nearby places has recently been experiencing clearly manifested hostility given the existing controversies linked to the period of the Second World War. The lack of sense of security of this group predominantly results from the organization and course of the patriotic marches taking place last year on the occasion of the National Remembrance Day of the "Cursed Soldiers" of the Polish Home Army (the Day established in 2011). In Hajnówka and the nearby places the problem concerns the "good and bad memory" regarding Romuald Adam Rajs, *nom de guerre* "Bury", the commander of a unit that burnt the villages of Zaleszany, Zanie, and Szpaki, murdering in a forest thirty cart drivers in January 1946. From an investigation conducted in the years 1997–2005 by IPN (The Institute's of National Remembrance) it shows that the unit carried out executions of seventy-nine persons, including women and children of Belorussian origin, followers of the Orthodox church. It was proved that on one hand "Bury" was a distinguished soldier of the Home Army, yet on the other he was the commander who carried out executions on civilians. The public prosecutor conducting the investigation collected testimonies of 169 witnesses of the events, members of the families of victims, as well as former soldiers of the commander's unit. After having performed the analysis of documents from those times he stated that felonies are of the ethnic cleansing nature. Yet, on one hand we deal with a constantly vivid memory of the residents of these villages and the region, and on the other we witness annulling charges concerning pacifications of the villages (the decision of the court and the act revoking sentences towards persons victimised for the activities for the independent Polish state). It has been acknowledged that they had acted under the circumstances of absolute necessity which forced them to take not always ethically explicit actions. Therefore, the family received compensation and "Bury" became a part of the group of the "Cursed Soldiers". In the documentary "Sieroża", Jerzy Kalina – a journalist of a TV Biełsat, points to the constantly vivid collective local memory, memory of families and closest relatives, which is not acknowledged nor respected, particularly during the celebration of the Day of the Cursed Soldiers. It is evident that some disregard the IPN investigation results, recognizing exclusively rehabilitation of "Bury", i.e. the decision of the military tribunal. Therefore, they organize meetings with young people, teaching about the activities of this unit in the region in the past, portraying "Bury" as a role model for pupils, at the same time omitting facts provided by The Institute's of National Remembrance.

In January 2016, members of the ONR (National Radical Camp) Białystok and National Hajnówka, prior to 70th the anniversary of the pacification of the villages, declared a joint organisation of the 1st Hajnówka March of the Cursed Soldiers, posting

on Facebook the image of "Bury". In the Facebook invitation the organizers wrote: *"it is easy to manifest in cities, where authorities and the local population are largely sympathetic to the subject matter of the Cursed Soldiers. Yet, revering the memory of the indomitable in places, where the communist propaganda is still functioning, requires courage".*

In the context of the tackled subject, I would like to pay attention to the occurring process of the revitalization of contradictory memories in this cultural region and borderland of cultures (as well as in others). A little group of persons with the priest of Orthodox church went out to meet members of those marching to pay homage to the Cursed Soldiers, disapproving of such approach to the memory of the murdered victims. They carried icons and the inscriptions *"worshiping persons like "Bury" is a stupidity or provocation".* I think that in the process of the ideologization of the nation we miss the local problems of the collective memory, not making effort to respect the human fate, nor reflecting over the human suffering and over the sense of justice of other people, i.e. Polish citizens of other faith or nationality. In view of the principles of cross-cultural education, we should more often analyze, make reflection and inquire how our citizens of other faith or other nationality feel in terms of their sense of cultural security, how they fulfil themselves as citizens, and whether indigenous, personal values can be cultivated without anxieties or fears. It should be also thought over whether they can cultivate their cultural legacy, pay homage and give reverence to their ancestors that have for centuries lived in that area, and contributed to the development of the culture in this culturally diverse borderland. Thus, in the forthcoming years cross-cultural (and intercultural) education should undertake and perform tasks of this type, i.e. within the framework of eliminating dangerous, in my opinion, processes of the ideologization of nation. As Rev. Leon Dyczewski concludes "*the ideologization of own nation is a transition from recognizing it as the core social and cultural value to a superior value, assigning to it all the excellence and dominance, followed by the conviction of being the chosen ones, accompanied by the sense of the mission towards other ethnic groups, resulting in ethnocentrism, megalomania, nationalism, xenophobia, and chauvinism. By so, the nation, acquiring the highest social and cultural values in the consciousness of its members, takes form of the superior political worth. Thus, it demands to strengthen its position within the framework of the state it exists, and amongst other nations. In majority of cases it is accompanied by the Manichaean division of the ethnic groups and nations between good and bad, developed and undeveloped, friendly and hostile"* (Dyczewski, 1993, p. 24).

Fears concerning cultural security and the loss of recognition for centuries have contributed to human tragedies, which we should remember. It should be bore in mind, especially that the human *"...constantly remains in contacts with strangers (Others). Since the range of such contacts has significantly increased, the extension of own culture became a natural necessity (...) yet, it is possible only through revealing the rules, according to which it functions"* (Hall, 1984, p. 7). Such opening is possible through the process of sensitizing, understanding the past, and memories encrypted in the past. Hence, in the recent years I have been paying particular attention to the problem of the awareness, as well as to the individual and collective memory, so that such situations would not repeat itself like, for example, the one presented by Bohdan Korzeniewski

(1993). The author writes that *"pondering over our times, it is clear that the memories grew from anxiety, and will probably last for some years, if not for centuries. Such times arise amazement best expressed by hands pressed to the mouth and eyes asking 'how it could have happened'. I wish people reading these pages made such a gesture of terror"* (ibidem). Korzeniewski analyzes the issue of crudenesses and barbarities, in a similar manner as Albert Schweitzer, awarded with the Nobel Peace Prize, the author of the principle of life reverence, ethics of the reverence for life, and the phenomenon of neoprimitivism (Schweitzer, 1981). He shows that the barbarity applies its unique system of values, extremely different from ours. *"When we opt for freedom, it goes for authority, where we express mercy, it applies cruelty, where we display sympathy, it shows off loud and brutal mockery"* (Korzeniewski, op. cit., p. 12).

Presenting own curriculum vitae, Felicja Raszkin-Nowak (2008) constantly poses the question, makes reflections and attempts to find response in the face of a terrible fate she experienced. She writes how insignificant were the real values of the mind and heart, how much depended on the appearances, but first of all on the origin and religion. Analysing the problems of the hosts giving her shelter, she remarks that each and every authority punished them for the act of coming to the human's aid, despite the fact all good deeds are the duty of every man. She shows how her identity was taken away from her, how she became deprived of citizenship, making her entire family no longer the citizens of the state in which they had been born. In the end, after 1968 everything was made so that the memories were the worst possible. She wonders why she herself and many others lost their lives, although their energy and work could have been utilised better. She portrays the system of degrading the defenceless people only because they were Jews. She presents people forced to tragic choices of sacrificing one for another, with the false hopes that somebody can perhaps survive.

I think that there will always be the issue of the honour of given nations and the problem of shame, disgraceful moments in history, as well as moments worth the reverence. I also believe that the role of the education is to support in facing various periods of the history in a range and manner we regard appropriate, in accordance with our national conscience and collective memory. Hence, it is of paramount importance to establish conditions and situations favourable for the above context. I have been repeatedly paying attention to the process of creating the "good memory" in contacts with the Lithuanians, Belarusians, and Ukrainians. Yet, in order to build upon it, one should confront the "bad memory". I believe that we have nowadays favourable conditions to prepare children and young people to live in a multicultural society, to arrange encounters of the dominant culture with the culture of the minority, for we enjoy the natural possibilities to accomplish oneself according to the principles of tolerance, respect of differences, shaping attitudes of approval, sensitivity, empathy, and so on. Children have the chance to understand own culture through the contacts with others, eliminating unwillingness and fears towards them, acquiring dialogic skills in the communication with others, promoting own culture and tradition, emphasizing the importance and the value of own culture in interaction with others. The issue is, however, why we use these abilities to such a small degree and range, why motivation for work in such field is weakened comparing to the first post-Solidarity years, why we do not establish conditions showing to pupils the abundance of various cultures,

we do not prepare for dialogic interactions, we do not teach to perceive other cultures as sources of knowledge and the value, why we do not teach to understand the causes for various (cultural) conflicts, or to approach problems of the world creatively, so that the growing children were able and wanted to take the active and creative participation in the peaceful process of negotiating conflicts?

Well, perhaps the answer lies in the fact that we ourselves have not developed cross-cultural communication competencies, so we are unable to be driven by empathy, respect, and principles of tolerance. We have not learnt interpersonal abilities, openness in the process of getting to know others, nor cognitive flexibility while processing information. Mirosław Sobecki rightly notices that "*Despite of rich traditions of multiculturalism in Poland, there has been no sensible scheme established that would change the awareness of the entire generations towards recognition of values stemming from contact with the difference*" (Sobecki, 2016, p. 277).

In my opinion there is a disturbing phenomenon manifesting itself as a dangerous activation of indoctrination, that takes place at public schools on number of occasions. For example, one of the issues of the "Szczecin Voice" described a situation of the public primary school in Lubczyn. Running of this facility was entrusted to the Saint Faustina Foundation. The chairwoman of the Foundation took up the post of the headmaster and introduced new rules: compulsory prayers during breaks, checking children's sandwiches on Fridays, investigating whether all teachers live in sacramental relationships. The school motto is the statement by the Rev. Piotr Skarga "*timid Catholics are the most harmful, as they do not burn the just and saint flame in the defence of the reverence of God, lacking zeal and standing as scarecrows*". It seems irrelevant that the constitution clearly states that while teaching religion at schools no freedom of conscience or confession of others can be violated. The religious education scheme (*Directorium Cirectorium cant, ionsnnessesas lyl that the atechisticum*) implies that "*as a part of teaching religion at school one should undertake tasks of the new evangelization or the pre-evangelization, with reference to the unbaptized or those lacking contact with the church*". It proves that in reality the scheme surpasses constitution, i.e. there are crosses hanging in the class rooms, the school year starts and finishes with the Holy Mass services, the course of teaching is subject to regular interferences because of the retreat, preparations for the First Holy Communion or confirmation, and etc. Polistrefa Foundation for Diversity prepared a report "Between tolerance and discrimination", pointing to how the situation unfolds in this regard at schools of the Lesser Poland voivodship. The report is accessible online and I shall not discuss it here. I only wish to mention that it contains, among others, the analysis of the text books for Polish and history. Summing up, for instance, the Enlightenment is referred to as the age which contributed to the disturbance of human minds and sowed doubts into the real faith.

ZHP (The Polish Scouting and Guiding Association), which as the secular organization should be friendly towards atheistic children and youth, provides another example. In the oath, the teenagers declare that "The scout loves God and Poland". Next, the boy scouts announce they have a sincere will to serve with their entire life to God and Poland. Until the mid-1990s ZHP had two versions of the oath, i.e. for the religious believers, and for the atheists without appealing to God, but then the latter was

cancelled on the ground of the "unhealthy dualism". I would also like to draw atten-
tion to the process of acquisition of other spaces. I think that non-Catholics can also
experience problems with adoption of children. In 2011 public adoption centres were
handed over to local authorities, i.e. marshals of provinces or district administrators.
They, in turn, willingly "got rid" of this duty for the sake of foundations or Catholic in-
stitutions. At present, ¼ of institutions are Catholic centres, where specific principles
are in force, e.g. providing certification from the parish priest that the parents-candi-
dates practice Catholicism, certificate of the church wedding, declaration that children
will be raised in a Catholic faith, and so on.

The above cannot be ignored nor shall lack firm reaction within the education-
al process, as this is our obligation to shape and instill cross-cultural competencies,
which *"…are more important than ever, as they allow to acknowledge and get to know
the causes of some most troublesome issues affecting the modern societies particularly
in the view that discrimination, racism, and hate speech lie at the bottom of the cultur-
al, social, ethnic and other differences"* (Brotto & Huber & Karwacka-Vogele & Neuner
& Ruffino & Teutsch, 2014, p. 5).

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Multiculturalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Wielokulturowość w Bośni i Hercegowinie

Streszczenie

W eseju podkreślono istotne wnioski z badania nad zwyczajem ucieczki młodych w celu zawarcia związku małżeńskiego [ang. *elopement*] oraz stopniem pokrewieństwa noszącego tytuł „Through the Window: Kinship and Elopement in Bosnia-Herzegovina" [*Dogłębne spojrzenie na zwyczaj ucieczki młodych i stopnie pokrewieństwa w Bośni i Hercegowinie* – przyp. tłum] wydanego przez Central European University Press w 2014 r. Psychologiczne, kulturowe i socjologiczne znaczenia zwyczaju ucieczki młodej kobiety, która „zdobywa się" na zamążpójście, rozważane są z perspektywy wpływu, jaki czyn ten, popełniany w zmowie z zalotnikiem, ma na całe społeczeństwo. Zwyczaj małżeństwa rozumiany jest w kontekście powszechnego wzorca pokrewieństwa, w którym małżeństwo uznawane jest za ważniejsze niż więzy krwi, a powinowactwo wynikające z małżeństwa za ważniejsze niż pokrewieństwo w linii ojca, co dowodzi, że ucieczka, a następnie spotkanie rodziców pary młodej połączone z ceremonią ustanowienia stosunku powinowactwa są uzupełniającymi się rytuałami przejścia. Esej kończą rekomendacje na potrzeby przyszłych badań zarówno w Bośni i Hercegowinie, jak i w większym regionie.

Słowa kluczowe: wielokulturowość, Bośnia i Hercegowina

Abstract

The essay amplifies the important findings in the study of elopement and kinship titled "Through the Window: Kinship and Elopement in Bosnia-Herzegovina" published at Central European University Press in 2014. The psychology, cultural, and sociological significances of a young woman "stealing herself" to marry are reviewed in terms of how the social action in collusion with her suitor eventually gives character to the larger society. The marriage custom is understood within the dominant kinship pattern that gives emphasis to marriage rather than blood or affinal relations rather than agnatic relations, the point being to demonstrate how elopement and the subsequent affinal visitations that immediately follow are complementary

rites of passage. The essay concludes with recommendations for future research in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and the wider region.

Keywords: multiculturalism, Bosnia-Herzegovina

Uncountable books have been written about Bosnia-Herzegovina since the war that ended in 1995. Many seek to understand the violence that wrecked havoc on the country: its inhabitants, its communities, and its institutions. Some seek to understand the country: its collective self, its shared identity, and its social solidarity. Although some may argue that these commonalities do not truly exist in Bosnia-Herzegovina, *Through the Window: Kinship and Elopement in Bosnia-Herzegovina* seeks to understand a common cultural heritage of the country and its inhabitants (Doubt, 2014).

The study, through the disciplines of anthropology and sociology, examines two rites of passage practiced widely in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The rites of passage function together as complementary rites of passage, holding together communities and society (Van Gennep, 1960).

The first rite (studied through in-depth interviews and survey research) is elopement, where a young woman leaves her parent's home to enter with her future husband into marriage. The marriage custom has been previously studied (Hangi, 2009; Erlich, 1966; Lockwood, 1975; Bringa, 1995). One of the earliest is Anton Hangi's (2009) Život i običaji muslimana u BiH, Sarajevo [The Life and Customs of Muslims in Bosnia Herzegovina], written before 1900. Then, during the Yugoslav period, William Lockwood (1975) conducted an ethnography in a remote Muslim village in central Bosnia-Herzegovina and reported "By far the majority of marriages, easily ninety percent are formed by elopement" (1974, p. 260). In the eighties, Tone Bringa (1995) carried out a similar study in a Muslim/Croat village located in a valley in central Bosnia-Herzegovina and observed "The most common form of marriage during my stay in the village and I believe over the last thirty years was marriage by elopement" (1995, p 76). While elopements among the poor were common for pragmatic reasons, Lockwood (1974, p. 264) observed that the wealthy households also practiced this custom.

To be clear, elopement (*ukrala se*) is different from bride abduction (*otmica*) (Bates 1974; Lockwood 1974). Bride abduction is when a girl is unwillingly kidnapped into marriage; the abduction is rape. In contrast, elopement occurs with a decision and the collusion of the young woman albeit without her parents' consent. The marriage becomes couple-initiated rather than family-initiated.

There are several findings to be emphasized. First, while elopements seem transgressive within the patriarchal society, they occur frequently. In a survey of self-reported marriage practices delivered by Mareco Index Bosnia to a representative sample of the country's population, more than twenty percent of the respondents said their marriages were established by elopement (Doubt, 2016). With a population of a little less than four million, this means three or four hundred thousand inhabitants married by elopement. After elopement, there is sometimes a traditional wedding feast to celebrate the marriage. Elopements are more normative than deviant in the society.

Every family in Bosnia-Herzegovina has at least one story of a member's elopement. The stories are lively and dramatic, perhaps comedic, perhaps tragic. The telling of the story bonds family during gatherings. The family folklore anchors families as families, especially during times of conflict and trauma (Dundes, 2007; Baker & Kotkin & Zeitlin, 1982). The stories are passed onto younger generation, whose members may or may not choose to follow the marriage custom.

A second finding from the book is that elopements occur within each of the three major ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina, among Bosnian Serbs, among Bosnian Croats, and among Bosnian Muslims and in Roma and Jewish communities. The ethnographies in single villages of Lockwood and Bringa suggest the custom is particular to Muslims. The marriage custom, though, is a national one, a heritage shared in a transethnic manner and found less frequently in Serbia and Croatia. During the Yugoslav era in Bosnia-Herzegovina, elopement could be a way to marry a Yugoslav from another ethnic group especially if one's traditional parents opposed such a marriage. Thus, a traditional Bosnian custom was sustained in a modern Yugoslav culture.

The third and most important finding is that the young women who elope assert their right to choose their marriage partner, a right the community respects, sometimes begrudgingly. In rigid patriarchal societies, an elopement could likely result in families not speaking to each other for a long time and perhaps never making peace with each other (Bates 1974). The young women who elope are protofeminists, asserting their right to choose their marriage partner. The risk reflected in their action typically leads to what Eric Erikson (1980) calls a strong ego identity, something positive and healthy, a step in an adolescent's maturation into adulthood. No longer is there is a dichotomy between individuality and membership; the two reside interdependently.

To turn to the second rite of passage studied in the book, affinal visitations are an important kinship structure. After marriage, the families of the bride and the groom establish relations through ritualized visitations called *pohode*. This kinship is important within the community bringing status, prestige, and social capital. The in-lawship is called *prijatelji*, a word that is also used for friendship, thus having two meanings in the language. The kinship visits involve a series of gift exchanges and are bilateral (Bringa, 1995). The in-lawship is not established automatically, but needs to be enacted, performed in a dramaturgical manner (Goffman, 1959).

Marriages in Bosnia-Herzegovina strengthen not the agnatic group vis-à-vis another agnatic group, but the affinal group, creating the opportunity, if not the imperative, to establish relations between non-agnates for their own sake (Donia & Lockwood 1974; Lockwood, 1975). While marriages in general are couple-initiated (Erlich, 1966, p. 183), whether formed through an elopement or a traditional wedding, after marriage marriages are family-sustained through affinal visitations. The custom is practiced with no variation by the three major ethnic groups in the country, reflecting a strong transethnic identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Doubt, 2016).

As anthropologists show, the kinship structure of every community is vertical as well as horizontal. The vertical structure is the descent line, the family bloodline, called *bratstvo* in former-Yugoslavia. There is also the horizontal structure, either formed through affines called *prijatelji* or through fictive kinship called *kumovi* (godfatherhood, baptismal or marriage sponsorship). In former-Yugoslavia, fictive kin are not

drawn from the family blood like or from in-laws. *Prijatelji* (affinal kin) and *kumovi* (fictive kin) thus serve the same function: they create an important and necessary horizontal kinship. Eugene Hammel (1968) and Milenko Filipović (1962) study how *kumovi* hold communities together in Serbia and Lockwood (1975) and Bringa (1995) study how *prijatelji* hold communities together in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Every community needs a vertical and horizontal kinship structure. If there is only a vertical kinship structure, the community implodes on itself. Narcissism and incest demean the vitality of the community. If there is only a horizontal structure, the community assimilates and disappears. Such is the dilemma for immigrants and diaspora.

The key to understanding the society of Bosnia-Herzegovina is to understand how the marriage custom of elopement and the ritualized visits between in-laws are complementary (Van Gennep 1960). Each takes on importance through its linkage to the other. Neither makes sense without the other. Elopement functions as a catalyst to create affinal ties between families that might otherwise not be connected. Society becomes more open through the impetuous love of young people; society is enlarged. When a couple elopes, they seem to be jumping over a cliff, but the couple knows there is a safety net (a social network and cultural heritage) to catch them as they leap. Each rite of passage is incomplete if it is not connected to the other. It is difficult for the Bosnian diaspora to maintain their cultural heritages when one rite of passage occurs without the other.

The book seeks to understand Bosnia-Herzegovina as a country more clearly. A recommendation for future research is to replicate the study's questions on marriage and kinship along with its representative sampling in countries that were part of former-Yugoslavia and surround Bosnia-Herzegovina, namely, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Kosovo, and Montenegro (Doubt, 2016). The goal would be to measure the variation and non-variation among national identities and ethnic identities. For example, there are a half million Muslims in Serbia living in an area called Sandžak around the city of Novi Pazar. Are the marriage customs and kinship structures of Muslims in Serbia comparable to the marriage customs and kinship structures of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Orthodox Serbs in Serbia? Preliminary conversations indicate that the kinship customs of Muslims in Serbia are more like Orthodox Serbs in Serbia. In turn, Lockwood suggests that the kinship customs of Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina are more like Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina than Orthodox Serbs in Serbia. National identities override ethnic identities.

The replication of the survey study could occur throughout East Europe as well. In Bulgaria, for instance, *prijatelji* and *kumovi* (ritual kinship) are important kin relations, and the same words are used to identify the relations. How do these relations structure Bulgarian society and its different ethnic groups? A multinational study would address the interrelation of ethnic and national identities as they are reflected in the country's marriage customs and kinship patterns, which are not just symbolic but also functional.

It would also be informative to study the marriage customs and kinship structures of both Slavic and Baltic post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe. How are marriage customs and kinship structures in Slavic and Baltic countries both similar and different vis-a-vis Western Europe? Such a multinational study would provide a basis for

understanding the complexity of social and cultural identities in Eastern Europe; its framework would be objective and transcend politics.

A second recommendation for future study is the question of whether Catholic women in Bosnia-Herzegovina elope more frequently than Catholic women in Croatia, reflecting a national rather than ethnic identity. The Catholic Church discourages elopements of young women in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A priest will not want to have a wedding ceremony in a church if a young woman eloped to the groom's house without the knowledge of her parents, although sometimes the priest capitulates on this matter. It is therefore surprising that a significant number of Bosnian Croat women eloped to marry, reflecting the importance of folk culture in their lives.

One overlooked casualty of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina is its collective commitment to a pluralistic and integrated society (Lovrenović, 1996; Mahmutčehajić, 2000; Mujkić, 2008; Tufekčić, 2014). Unconscionable violence and vicious propaganda were brought to bear against its heritage, cultural convictions, and social practices. The tragedy is that although the society has a strong trans-ethnic history and culture, today there are few functional institutions to support, respect, and sustain its traditions, which makes it difficult for Bosnia-Herzegovina as a society to re-establish the inclusive, transethnic institutions it needs. The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords established a constitution and federal structure that reifies ethnic particularism at the political level and denies the historical and cultural transethnic realities of the country and civil society. Today political institutions continue to structure Bosnia-Herzegovina along nationalistic lines, and the cultural practices that sustain the poly-ethnic society as a poly-ethnic society are at risk. This study raises inconvenient facts for academics and ethno-politicians who view the country through nationalistic paradigms and atavistic historical narratives from which to predict an inevitable partitioning of the country. The hope is other scholars will want to look through the windows the book opens and find still other windows in other countries to open.

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"Cultural" hate speech and the fall of Yugoslavia – discourse analysis of the selected aspects

„Kulturowa" mowa nienawiści i upadek Jugosławii – wybrane aspekty analizy dyskursu

Streszczenie

Artykuł porusza temat (nacjonalistycznej) propagandy reprezentantów świata kultury w Serbii i Chorwacji u schyłku istnienia Socjalistycznej Federacyjnej Republiki Jugosławii, a więc na początku lat 90. XX wieku. Punktem wyjścia dla dalszej analizy autorka uczyniła zbiór esejów Dubravki Ugrešić „Kultura kłamstwa (eseje antypolityczne)", oraz zbiór tekstów Ivan Čolovicia „Bałkany – terror kultury". Poprzez analizę prowadzonego w mediach (w słowie i piśmie) dyskursu, zrekonstruowana została brutalność, a zarazem banalność retoryki nacjonalizmu, a także sposób, w jaki ideologia nacjonalistyczna przeniknęła do nauki, kultury i mediów, angażując konformistyczne postawy intelektualistów, propagandę, cenzurę oraz pozostałe strategie manipulacji innymi. Przedmiot analizy obejmuje dyskurs medialny w byłej republice Serbii i Chorwacji, dyskurs nauki (szeroko pojętej humanistyki), oraz innych pisemnych form dekonstrukcji ładu społecznego przed rozpadem Jugosławii.

Słowa kluczowe: rozpad Jugosławii, mowa nienawiści, analiza dyskursu, kultura, propaganda nacjonalistyczna w Serbii, propaganda nacjonalistyczna w Chorwacji

Abstract

This article tackles the issue of written and spoken propaganda in Serbian and Croatian realms of culture and media proceeding the fall of Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s. It makes two pieces of writing a point of departure for further analysis, i.e. Dubravka Ugrešić's "The Culture of Lies", and Ivan Čolović's "The Balkans: The Terror of Culture: Essays in Political Anthropology". By so, the article attempts to reveal the banality and brutality of nationalism and the way that nationalistic ideology permeated science, culture and media, involving the conformity of intellectuals, propaganda and censorship, followed by the strategies of human

manipulation. The subject of analysis embraces the use of the Serbian and Croatian state-run mass media, anthropological discourse and other written forms of deconstruction of the social order, shortly before and following the fall of Yugoslavia.

Introduction

In 1997 an international symposium called „Interculturalism versus racism and xenophobia" took place in Belgrade. Looking at the very theme of the event, it is striking that racism and xenophobia were not juxtaposed with culture, but interculturalism. It might have taken place perhaps due to the fact the first notion has been compromised as one of the key reasons for the aggressive, ethnic nationalism "speaking and acting on behalf of the culture", that thrived during the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In such view, culture, despite its creative and constructive potential, served as a justification, legitimization or a cover for the policy of national egoism and dominance, providing a tool of exclusion and intolerance. Moreover, hate speech usually associated with the political rather than cultural realm, apparently truly flourished in the cultural discourse. The latter took place despite the fact the nationalists movement had both a religious and rural character from its beginnings (Velikonja, 2003, p. 93).

The impulse to focus on the hate speech proceeding and contributing to the deconstruction of the social and cultural deal in former Yugoslavia came from the reading of Ivan Čolović's "The Balkans: The Terror of Culture: Essays in Political Anthropology", where the author deconstructs culture as the catalyst for hatred and war in the Balkans, as well as Dubravka Ugrešić's "The Culture of Lies". The first author revealed the postwar "patriotic" discourse and the use of culture in Serbia and other Balkan countries, with the intention of determining how, and through which rhetorical strategies, this sort of discourse managed to preserve its ability to trigger conflicts. As for Dubravka Ugrešić's "The Culture of Lies" (or – as the author puts it – the "anti-political essays"), she deconstructs the way that nationalistic ideology permeates various aspects of life, including culture, the conformity of intellectuals, propaganda and censorship, as well as the strategies of human manipulation by culture. These two references were made a point of departure for the reflections on the "cultural hate speech" that sparked in the former republic of Yugoslavia, especially in Croatia and Serbia.

The analysis allows to throw light on some cultural "procedures" applied by the (at times) prestigious figures to Serbian, or Croatian culture, that prepared the foundation for the process of deconstructing the social and political order of the former Yugoslavia. It took place via one of the most dramatic and violent way, namely though the war, focusing on myths about the so-called "national spiritual and cultural space", i.e. the alleged organic unity between the Balkan nations and the soil on which they live, and to which they lay exclusive claim. Due to the fact that most of the examples of the "cultural hate speech" make reference to the national foundation, the case of Bosnian Muslims was

excluded on the ground of unparallel dynamics of their nation-building practices, rooted in the historical course of events and some political factors[1]. Acknowledging that "culture consists of the derivatives of experience, more or less organized, learned or created by the individuals of a population, including those images or encodements and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past generations, from contemporaries, or formed by individuals themselves" (Schwartz, 1992; cited by Avruch, 1998, p. 1), cultural hate speech concerns these social actors, that generate, project and transmit given visions of the social and cultural reality, affecting the course of lives of the society embers. As follows, the analysis embraces the statements, ideas and decisions of those directly linked to the cultural realm, i.e. writers, journalist, academic teachers, linguists, poets, etc. Thus, the discourse analysis entails some selected examples of the cult of national languages, national poets, and the epic tradition.

The fall of Yugoslavia

The framework of this paper does not allow for an elaborate and in-depth insight into the complex reasons and conditions that contributed to the reconstruction of Yugoslavia as a state, nonetheless, some hallmarks of this process should be taken into consideration in the context of the topic of these reflections. Undoubtedly, varied reasons for the breakup of Yugoslavia encompassed cultural and religious divisions between the ethnic groups making up the nation, memories of WWII atrocities committed by all sides, some economic crises that had been affecting Yugoslavian economy from the 1970s, as well as centrifugal nationalist forces. It can be, however, commonly acknowledged, that upon Marshal Tito's death some fundamental issues embraced, among others, divergent ethnic interests remained, inefficient economy, and the country's institutional structure incapable of retaining Yugoslav unity, followed by other aspects concerned the contradictory institutional structures of the Yugoslav state and the collapse of authoritarian rule. Unfortunately, the dissolution of multinational communist federations and the ensuing armed conflicts that have emerged with their transformation into independent nation-states "have returned the national question to the forefront of debates over international politics, law, and theory" (Pešić, 1996, p. 1). Nonetheless, it needs to be stressed that statistically, Yugoslavia has never had a *staatsvolk* ("state-people") that would create the majority and provide a foundation on which a modern nation-state could be built[2]. This "mechanisms of empowering

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[1]   The *Muslims were granted status* as a constitutive people (*narod*) as late as in 1971 when "Muslims by nationality" was introduced as a category in the census. Cf: Banac, Ivo (1988). *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics*. Cornell University Press, pp. 287–288. Recognition of the Muslims as a distinct group was initiated with the 961 census of Yugoslavia, for which the answer "Muslim" was accepted as an ethnic but not a national category. "Recognition of Muslim nationality was also facilitated by the emergence of an active Muslim intellectual elite, supportive of and loyal to the existing political order. These intellectuals advanced a secular national identity that was built upon the party's own ideology of interethnic equality" (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 41).

[2]   As members of the most populous national group, Serbs constituted only 40 percent of the total Yugoslav population.

mutual hatred and establishing a racial attitude of intolerance function well on the ruins of communistic systems, where it is (was) easier to create nationalistic dictatorship instead of stable democracy" (Jezernik, 2003, p. 168). In, for example, the Yugoslavian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina inhabited by Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Muslims as the three major ethnic groups, public manifestations of national intolerance were suppressed by the communist regime, yet "no effort was spared to assure, at least in theory, that the three national groups had equal access to education, jobs, and positions or responsibility in the government and the party" (Bourg & Shoup, 1999, p. 42).

The creation and maintenance of Yugoslavia hinged on the interdependence of Serbs and Croats, the country's two largest national groups *(Pešić, 1996,* p. 3). Unfortunately, the nationalist fervor of the nineteenth century also pitted Serbs against Croats. Consequently, "the 1890s were a period of pronounced rivalry between the Serbs and Croats over the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina, also with the formation of Yugoslavia in 1918 the national issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina was overshadowed by the struggle between Croatian and Serbian conceptions of the Yugoslav state" (Burg & Shuop, 1999, p. 35). All in all, these peoples not only shared their everyday life existence, but also "imagined" the borders of their respective states as overlapping and clashing.

The breakup of Yugoslavia occurred as a result of a series of political upheaval and the decline of communist ideology, severely weakening Yugoslavian fragile, unifying factors. Although Yugoslav communists were trying to build a strong state by placing the Yugoslav nation as a counterbalance to ethnic tensions that existed in society at the time, nationalist tensions escalated in the early 1990s, and it was clear that the idea of the Yugoslav nation has experienced a collapse. As Sabina Ramet claims:

"Undoubtedly the roots of the Yugoslav wars (in Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1991–5, and in Kosovo and Macedonia (1998–2001) are diverse, and there is no need to engage in Procrustean efforts to reduce the complexity of socialist Yugoslav development to some supposed pre-eminent factor. On the contrary, **economics, demographics, programmatic choices, institutional structures, religious cultures, elite dynamics, and deficiencies in system legitimacy all played a role in pushing the country towards violent breakup**" (Ramet, 2005, p. 56).

To avoid any sort of biased judgment and taking the Norwegian scholar remark into account, it shall be only emphasized that culture played also its part in the process of deconstructing Yugoslavia, moreover – it was profoundly and excessively used as a tool of manipulation and stirring up the ethnic and national animosities, as the following analysis of some of the hate speech samples proves.

Discourse Analysis

The concept of discourse accomplished by Michael Foucault (1926–1984) is transformed in to epistemological category, that allows to analyze not that much the language as the systems of knowledge, hence the structure of the discourse entails the system of

knowledge, values and aspiration of a given community, that also generates meanings within its framework. The French philosopher linked discourse to the power and authority, as the process of production and distribution of discourse was subject to, and dependent from, the power. According to Foucault, the structures and mechanisms of power are noticeable in the socially created meanings, a meaning therefore remains in a tight relation to the mechanisms of power (Foucault, 2002, p. 16). Consequently, every discourse is both system of knowledge, as it entails imposing on given number of people some definition of the truth and false, good and evil, normality and pathology. Therefore, at the foundation of the will of truth there are some institutionalized practices, that concurrently empower and carry out, legitimize and implement the obeying truth (Foucault 2002, p. 16). In such view, the objective of the hate speech propaganda in culture was to convince the members of Serbian, or respectively Croatian society, that their version of the history, the course of events and intentions of "the Others" provide a legitimate and "one and only" version of the reality that is to be followed, obeyed and spread.

The domain of the discourse is "the truth", understood as a socially consolidated knowledge, thus, on the account of acquisition of "the truth", the discourse has the authority to include or exclude of given contents from the resources of social knowledge (such as who is superior and inferior, who is loyal and who is untrustworthy, who is historically and contemporarily "right", and who is "wrong"). Hence, the critical discourse analysis refers to the relation between the production and distribution of the discourse and the power. According to Foucault (1998, p. 189) the main task of the authority is to generate a reality accessible to an individual, as the authority "produces reality, subject domains and rituals of truth" (Ibidem). The ways of presenting the contents evolves around strengthening the "binding" perspectives and diminishing, or quieting the competitive (rivalry ones) as it took place before the fall of Yugoslavia in the public cultural discourse of Serbia and Croatia. Discourse can be therefore considered as a culturally anchored social practice of experiencing the reality. Schiffrin et al (2003) note that there are three main categories of discourse definitions, including "anything beyond the sentence", language in use and a broader range of social practice that includes nonlinguistic and nonspecific instances of languages. Yet, according to Foucault it is not just the language of an individual communication (which s/he regards as a "sample"), but the larger systems of thought within a particular historical location that make certain things "thinkable" and "sayable", regulating who can say them. Such perspective reveals how publicly declared "truths" become automatically linked to the legitimization of power and authority of those saying them, and vice versa, whatever public figure holding a power says, turns into commonly accepted, unquestionable "paradigm of truth", differentiating and separating members of a given, so far common, cultural realm as it took place in the former Yugoslavia.

There are five steps in using "Foucauldian discourse analysis" (Kendall & Wickham, 1999). The first step concerns the recognition that discourse is a body of statements that are organized in a regular and systematic way. The subsequent four steps are based on the identification of rules on how those statements are created, what can be said (written) and what cannot, how spaces in which new statements can be made are created, making practices material and discursive at the same time (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 42).

Consequently, the discourse analysis methodologically encompasses:

a) formal linguistic discourse analysis (sociolinguistics), with the source of data concerning samples of written or oral language and texts, where the analysis embraces microanalysis of linguistic, grammatical and semantic uses and meanings of text (Hodges at al 2008, p. 571);

b) empirical discourse analysis such as conversation or gender analysis using samples of written or oral language, text and data on the "uses" of the text in social settings; hence the analysis takes place on micro and macro levels and concerns ways in which language and/or text construct social practices (ibidem);

c) critical discourse analysis (such as the recalled Foucauldian analysis) with sources of data encompassing samples of written or language/texts ad data on the uses of the text in social settings, and data on the institutions and individuals who produce, and are produced by the language text. Therefore, the latter is a macro level analysis and focuses on the aspect how discourses (in many forms) construct what is possible for individuals and institutions to think and say. **Such stand is corresponding to the specificity of the rhetoric of hate speech as promoted by the main educational and cultural figures in Serbia and Croatia proceeding the collapse of Yugoslavia.**

The approach applied for the purpose of this reflection is a combination of the Foucauldian analysis and critical discourse analysis (CDA), which is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 249). Fairclough and Wodak (1997, pp. 271–80) summarize the main tenets of CDA as follows:

1. CDA addresses social problems
2. Power relations are discursive
3. Discourse constitutes society and culture
4. Discourse does ideological work
5. Discourse is historical
6. The link between text and society is mediated
7. Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory
8. Discourse is a form of social action.

In the context of analysis of the selected aspects of hate speech in the cultural sphere proceeding the fall of Yugoslavia, the ideological and historical domain of discourse comes to the forefront, empowered by the authority that projected the image of holding "the only one truth" on the surrounding reality.

Origins and examples of the Serbian and Croatian hate speech of culture

The Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers" Recommendation 97(20) on "hate speech", defined it as follows: "the term "hate speech" shall be understood as covering all forms of expression which spread, incite, promote or justify racial hatred, xenophobia, anti-Semitism or other forms of hatred based on intolerance, including:

intolerance expressed by aggressive nationalism and ethnocentrism, discrimination and hostility against minorities, migrants and people of immigrant origin."

Hate speech is a speech that attacks, threatens, or insults a person or group on the basis of national origin, ethnicity, colour, religion, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, or disability. It is a communication that carries no meaning other than the expression of hatred for some group, especially in circumstances in which the communication is likely to provoke violence. Hate speech often concerns the most sensitive areas of human identities, including religion, nation, race or ethnicity, i.e. factors highly susceptible to abuse.

Since religion is generally considered to be one of the earliest and most fundamental forms of collective distinction, "religious dimensions also represent one of the most important factors in the creation of national consciousness and politics, especially in the absence of the other, more compelling, factors" (Velikonja, 2003, p. 12). Therefore in the former Yugoslavia national mythologies were tightly linked to the "nationalization of religion", involving national religion messianims and other confessional phenomena evolving around the core of the national identity. The 'Croatian' writer Slavenka Drakulić described its consequences in personal terms:

> *"Being Croat has become my destiny … I am defined by my nationality, and by it alone … Along with millions of other Croats, I was pinned to the wall of nationhood – not only by outside pressure from Serbia and the Federal Army, but by national homogenization within Croatia itself … reducing us to one dimension – the Nation … Whereas before I was defined by my education, my job, my ideas, my character – and yes, my nationality too – now I feel stripped of all that"* (Drakulić, 1993, p. 50–2).

It seems to be also echoed in the auto-biographical note of Dubravka Ugrešić who said that „I grew up in a multinational, multicultural and mono-ideological community, that had a future ahead (…) words like faith, nation, nationality, or even communism and party meant nothing for me" (Ugrešić, 2006, p. 15).

The origins of contemporary Serbian and Croatian religio-national mythologies should be searched for between the eighteenth and twentieth centuries, also from the perspective of their usurpation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Muslim Slavs. Croatian national resurrection began similarly as the Serbian in the late eighteenth century and was "a response to the pressures of Hungarian nationalism and Habsburg centralism" (Velikonja, 2003, p. 105), when "a continual rise of religious nationalism, intolerance, and hatred toward other religious communities (and consequently because of religo-national affinity toward other national groups as well) could be observed" (Idem, p. 115). As for the Croats, two major options of national mythology emerged in nineteenth century, namely the international option, the aim of which was to unite the various South Slav peoples, and the exclusivist group, which fostered Croatian religio-national mythology (Velikonja, 2003, p. 106)[3]. Since "the essence of ethnic conflict is the

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3   Pedro Ramet cites five crucial reasons for the "marriage" between religion and nationalism: 1. Religion represents the historical essence of culture, 2. Religion is a symbol of collective identity and distinguishes one people from another, 3. The avant-garde role of religious groups in the development of a national language and literature, 4. The leading role in society assumed by the clergy because of

struggle between mobilized identity groups for greater power" (Burg & Shoup, 1999, p. 4), the mythology was to encourage the Croatian people to "regain" what meant to belong to them in a manner designed by the leaders of nationalistic parties. Unfortunately, the ideas of nations and nation-states meant "exclusive 'ethnic' rather than (…) more inclusive 'civic' terms, (…) formal 'liberal democracy' has a particularly marked tendency to degenerate into 'ethnocracy' (…) by instituting oppressive new 'collectivist tyrannies of ethnic majorities over ethnic minorities" (Bideleux & Jeffries, 2007, p. 16).

Almost concurrently, the reconstruction of Serbian religio-national mythology began "in parallel with the Serbian *reconquista*, with the uprising of the Christian peasantry against the Turks in 1804–13 and 1815, and the creation of the modern Serbian state" (Velikonja, 2003, p. 93)[4]. Thus, for instance, the motives of the battle of Kosovo were not preeminent features of Serbian epic poetry until the nineteenth century, yet with the assistance of the tradition of the Orthodox Church and early Serbian historiography, the folk epic poetry portraying the Battle of Kosovo "helped bridged the gap between the old and the new Serbian state. The ideological myth of Serbian religious nationalism, now recast with artistic reflection, completes the structural inadequacy of the traditional myth" (Velikonja, 2003, p. 95).

Consequently, the political developments in the late 1980s and early 1990s presented an excellent opportunity for the long-awaited reconversion of their nations' national, political and cultural identity.

In the 1970s, Danilo Kiš, a Serbian writer, said that nationalism is predominantly a paranoia – single and collective one. It is the ideology of banal, a group madness resulting from jealousy and fear. Nationalism, unfortunately, worked for culture, and vice versa – the culture justified its existence for the policy of the national egoism. Nationalism in this context can be also perceived through the ideas of Ernest Gellener as a rebirth of the atavistic cult of blood and own territory (Gellner, 1983). Combining such two extreme and separatist ideologies prepared a gloomy scenario for the (former) inhabitants of Yugoslavia. As the history and the course of the events and discourse proceeding the war in the Balkans at the beginning of 1990s prove, all the factors were utilized by cultural powers. According to D. Ugrešić "created in political and writing cabinets, under the patronage of the Academy of Sciences and Art, the Serbian national-socialistic program found its interpretation in *lighter* literary genres, in the so called newly composed folk literature. *Grandparents bones mark the borders of Serbian lands* – that is the summary of the Greater Serbian scheme" (Ugrešić, p. 32). This view seems to be reflected in the finding of Sabrina Ramet who observes that "Indeed, it was the Serb nationalists who promulgated the slogan, 'All Serbs should live in one state' – a slogan strikingly akin to the allegedly 'German idea of citizenship through blood alone" (Ramet, 2005, pp. 87–88).

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their education, prominence and political awareness, 5. The conviction that the religion of a group of people – as opposed to a neighbouring people or religion – is theirs alone. Pedro Ramet, *Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslavia, in: Religion and Nationalism in soviet and East European Politics*, ed. Idem, 1989, p. 299.

4   For instance, V. Đorđević (Serbian prime minister at the end of the 19th century, 1897–1900) member of the Serbian Academy of Science described the research Albanians as „troglodytes reminding him of a primitive people sleeping on trees and hanging there thank to their tails" (Jezernik, p. 328).

As one of the Serbian writers says (cited by Ugrešić):

"(...) *since Europe wants to beggar our world, in the time of suffering and hardly physical vegetation, all we have left are words, messages passed on to next generation, words out of which in the dust, blood and the everyday life of enslaved fate a noble epos emerges, that overcomes everything, and there are messages we hear that are passed on to us given by our ancient pagan gods*" (In: Ugrešić, p. 97–98).

Some instances of the absurdity of the nationalistic discourse in culture (and education) include the Croatian Ministry of Education that shortly before the war in 1991 decided that the teachers of Croatian shall be "pure" Croats, and sadly none of the institutions, even the Croatian university teaching the future teachers of Croatian language and literature, opposed to it in public. Moreover, on account of the recommendations of the Croatian Ministry of Culture, "patriotic librarians" were encouraged to liquidate books by Serbian writers, getting rid of works in Cyrillic and other text filled with the "Yugoslavian spirit". The covers of Croatian books were marked with a Croatian plaiting, which in the future was to distinguish Croatian writers from all non-Croatian, including Shakespeare (sic!) (Cf. Ugrešić, p. 102). It seems to be working against the logic that "while the Croats are overwhelmingly Catholic, the Serbs and Montenegrins predominantly Orthodox Christians, and the Bosniacs exclusively Muslim, large majorities of each ethnic group speak mutually intelligible dialects, blurring their religious and ancestry marking" (Greenberg, 2004, p. 6). Perhaps that is why one of the most frequently used words in the hate speech was "clean", hence some Croatian intellectual euphorically supported the idea of a "spiritual rebirth" of the Croatian nation, poetically writing that "this is the road of a spiritual revival of the beautiful and clean generations, the path of us all, people of bright and clean conscious" (Ibidem). Existence of one language, common for Serbs, Montenegrins, Croats and Bosnians was not enough, so the „national workshops of the language" constructed three separate national idioms legitimating new, internal political system, i.e. protecting ethnicity oriented at nation, whereas its spirits was to be reflected and hidden in the culture, especially the language.

Since language functions as the predominant form of the foundation for national identity, the linguists and writers were assigned with the task to protect the sacred language from "betrayal and contamination", establishing a form of a *lingua sacra*, a phenomenon already indicated by Jurgen Habermas[5]. Thus, some, as the Croatian linguist, Božidar Finka dared to claim that „Croatian language is the most important feature of Croatianism (...) and we shall not case to protect this feature" (Finka, 1992, p. 69). On the other hand, a Serbian linguist (and a former dean of the Philological Faculty in Belgrade) suggested that „each betrayal is a betrayal, but a cultural betrayal of the Serbian nation is the biggest national betrayal, and betraying the language, one betrays own history and own future", adding that "None Serb sold own language. The stronger ones took it away from us by force, as they know when they get our language, they will get the nation too" ("Politika", 03.04.1998, p. 42). On the other hand,

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5   Already in the middle of the 19th-century Germany he pointed to the fact of shifting the accents from teaching the people to teaching a nation in schools (Habermas, 2002, p. 32).

"purifying", "cleansing" term was used by a Croat writer Petar Selem, who dwelled on the period before emergence of the independent Croat state when Croatian cultural space was to be protected and purified, implying it had been previously deeply contaminated. In a corresponding manner the Croatian writer Slobodan Novak noticed, that Croatia cleans itself from

> *"yugo-unitarian and great-Serbian garbage it has been thrown at in the last century, refreshing its own primary image and **returning to its roots**[6]. Since today Croatia must painfully interfere in own language, history, knowledge, change the names of the streets and places, this process proves to what degree Croatia has been a **contamination** of foreign elements and how all its spheres of live become **dirty**"* (Ugrešić, 2006, pp. 105–107).

Croat intellectuals deliberated on the language and symbolism of the spirit stressing the fact that "when we speak of a **spiritual revival**, we must first departure from the meaning of the word 'duh' in Croatian it kept its **primal meaning**, it means the air, the air we breathe, the soul" (Ugrešić, 2006, p. 103).

It provides an evidence to the fact that in the 1990 "Croats whose variant of Serbo-Croatian had been quite similar to the Serbian variant save for the alphabets (Latin letters for the Croats, Cyrillic and Latin letters for the Serbs) and slight differences in vocabulary and syntax initiated a campaign of language **purification**, purging forms deemed to be 'Serbian' and replacing them with old Croatian forms or crafting new ones from 'pure' **Croatian roots**" (Magner & Marić, 2002, p. 56). Simultaneously, "the Serbs in Croatia, who had voted to secede from Croatia and in 1991–2 captured nearly one-third of Croatian territory, insisted upon the use of the Cyrillic alphabet in their enclaves" (Greenberg, 2008, p. 12). As Misha Glenny recalls:

> *"According to moderate Knin Serbs I met in 1990, only about 5 percent of the local Serbs used the Cyrillic script, the rest not only spoke the Croatian variant, they used the Latin script. Eighteen months later, on my return, I witnessed the extraordinary spectacle of a Knin Serb attempting to write the address of his relations in Belgrade in Cyrillic—he could not do it. Half-way through the address, he gave up and wrote it in Latin"* (Glenny, 1996, p. 11).

Consequently, applying Naylor's terminology (1992, p. 83), language in the Balkans has functioned as a "flag" with which each people has asserted its independence and sovereignty, becoming subject to various separatist activities.

The political rhetoric utilised language as a foundation of the nation and a guardian of the national identity, thus holding the view that language entails the existence of a nation in a form given by God, ergo – the existence of Serbian nation lies within the Serbian language. Consequently, "nationalists became increasingly messianic and collectivist, claiming rights for the nation rather than for individual citizens and demanding obedient service to the nation, which was seen as having a 'historic' or 'God-given' mission or destiny to fulfill" (Sugar, 1971, p. 11). To such a degree, we can read in the Serbian journal "Politika" from June 1988 that "poetical mentors are always most precisely tapping

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6   Bolding made by the author of the article to indicate some of the key words (themes/ tags) for the discourse analysis.

out the **spiritual rhythm** of ethnos, at the same time having the power to activate the **gene of centuries-long** accumulated message, collecting them together and giving **to own nation** so it can serve as a guideline in difficult times" ("Politika", 3.06.1988, p. 27)[7].

The process of empowering the discourse 'Us versus Them' took place also with regards to resettling the cultural borders. As Dževad Karahasan claims, cultural borders are a place of a fruitful tensions, a foundation for the identity, as „exactly in this feature, within which it would be empty, the identity overcomes a dull closure and opens up to something new" (Karahasan, 1997, pp. 110–113). To oppose such liberal, open and cross-cultural stance, the notion of the *Volksgeist* and *Volkseele* were highlighted and strengthened within the image of a final border, i.e. the border of a national culture. Anthropologist Zagorka Golubović observes that "national monism strengthened in Serbia at the end of the 1980s, when instead of orientation towards growth of pluralistic culture, open both within internal as well as external communication, a closure within own national borders took place, isolating the national cultures; this is how quazi-pluralism emerged, i.e. it was referring only towards other national cultures, whereas inside a given nation there was homogenization on the basis of nationalism as the only one, appropriate official ideology" (Golubović, 1994, p. 41). Milan Matić, implied that „in the 20th century as a result of some historical errors and illusions but also Serbian gullibility, a big alienation from **own ideas of autonomy** took place by subsiding to given forms of state and ideologies a totally contradictory to the idea of Serbia" (Matić, 2000, p. 76). Consequently, non-democratic authority is justified as the one according to the will of the nation, telling and allowing others to tell about how it is deeply rooted in the tradition and culture of a nation, i.e. in its spirit, revealing the "true facet" of the *Volksgeits* of Serbia in this regard. Interestingly, looking at the aspects of the spiritual space of the nation, it comes across as a result of separation from the material space. Therefore, the national spiritual space is an area within traces of history and culture of the nation such as the remains of medieval cities, monasteries, battlefields, tombs, toponims, etc[8]. For that reasons the Croatian and Serbian nations allegedly lived in a common symbolic universe, declared the same ideals, were faithful to the same traditions, realized the same God's will hoping to acquire the same fate, their *Volksgeits* was the same: common political fairy tales, symbols, rituals, cults, sacred places and other forms of expressing political imaginary, yet they generated different, contradictory *Volksgeits*. Interestingly, D. Ćosić, Serbian writer and the first president of the federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1992–1993 publicly declared that "The lie is a form of patriotism and confirmation of our inborn

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[7] Since the cult of a national language is vague, the mystery remains uncovered, it can provide a substantial and national *topos* that can be presented only as a mystery. Hilandar sets one of such examples of topos, i.e. a Serbian national scared place, with its political and symbolic values: „Hilandar is ever-lasting, it is immortal, Hilandar is an ethics and the idea of our individual and national existence" ("Politika", 23.05.1988, p. 41). For the same reasons Serbian monasteries ceased to function as Christian/orthodox places and turned into those of national and Serbian origin. "Have we identified all enemies of our spiritual and historical heritage? Is the fact we didn't judge and punish the villains for their crimes the reason of what happens to us?" (Mileusnić, 1997, pp. 474–476).

[8] Thus, ethnic cleansing also included destroying of the material heritage of given cultures, and as a historian Milan St. Protić explains „ Kosovo can still be a part of the Serbian land, not being part of Serbia" ("Naša borba", 15.06.1998, p. 37).

intelligence", hence the deconstruction of dialogue and creating new reality took place openly and applying public discourse. For that reason, Serbian press reconstructed the facts from the II WW and Ustaša's camps where thousands of Serbs, Jews, Gypsies and Muslims died. The following terror of memory and amnesia demanded not to think, misinterpret the facts, wrongly explaining the most obvious truth, spread lies and reactivate the cult of empty clichés, i.e. doing everything against the most essential common sense.

The cultural fairy tales of Serbia and Croatia applied the figure of the "spiritual area" in order to imagine the national territory, which a nation does not inhabit yet, but hopes to (a national territory in spe). The spiritual area served as a version of a poetic (nonpolitical) dream of an ideal national territory, that is larger than it practically seems to be. During the Second Congress of Serbian Intellectuals, Vasilije Krstić said that "without real spiritual unity of our nation we won't be able to efficiently carry out the political and territorial unity" (Drugi Kongres srpskih intelektualca, 1994), accompanied by the claims of the historian Milorad Ekmečić that "cultural unification is a key premise of political unification" (Drugi Kongres srpskih intelektualca, 1994, p. 36). Such discourse seems to be echoed in the words of a poet, Ranko Jovović, who implied that "there is no unified Serbian state because there is no unified Serbian cultural area. Since, if there was Serbian nation, Serbian church, Serbian language and Serbian poetry...in each of us there would be Serbian state within the borders of Serbian lands" ("NIN", 27.08.1997, p. 52).

One of the most petrifying examples of hate speech discourse is reflect in a poem, that can serve as a punch line to these reflections. The tragically prophetic "Sarajevo" was created in 1971 by Radovan Karadžić, who moved to this city in 1960 to study psychiatry at the Sarajevo University School of Medicine. Twenty years later, this Bosnian Serb leader was the mastermind of the barbarian siege the city was under for over three years, consequently charged by the UN War Crimes Tribunal for genocide and crimes against humanity. According to some authors he spoke of his need to write "because it is through poetry that a nation defends itself" (Post, 2004, p. 175).

"I hear the misfortune threads Turned into a beetle as if an old singer Is crushed by the silence and turned into a voice. The town burns like a piece of incense In the smoke rumbles our consciousness. Empty suits slide down the town. Red is the stone that dies, built into a house. The Plague! Calm. The army of armed poplar tree Marches up the hill, within itself. The aggressor air storms our souls and once you are human and then you are an air creature. I know that all of these are the preparations of the scream: What does the black metal in the garage have for us? Look how fear turned into a spider Looking for the answer at his computer." (Cited in: Post, 2004, p. 175–6).

The poem, written 21 years before the war began "as Robert Donia puts it "acquired notoriety later in his life for its apparent prescience (...) contains forebodings of imminent turbulence and human devastation" (Donia, 2015, p. 34). Consequently, two decades later, Karadžić viewed the besieged Sarajevo from the Serb frontline drawing a visitors attention to the fact that "these verses (...) foretold the violent siege he was then commanding" (Donia, ibidem). This proves how such form of literature that uses aesthetic and rhythmic qualities of language as poetry can be used by the nationalist propaganda and adopted to the needs of the insane scheme.

Conclusions

Hate speech is an incitement to hatred primarily against a group of persons defined in terms of race, ethnicity, national origin, gender, religion, sexual orientation, and the like. Although it can be any form of expression regarded as offensive to racial, ethnic and religious groups and other discrete minorities, it can also takes shape of a cultural discourse that aims to separate, denigrate and exclude given ethno-nationalist groups from the mainstream. The objective of the "cultural hate speech" of various intellectuals, journalists and scholars from the cultural domain of Serbia and Croatia before the fall of Yugoslavia was to draw a clear line between "Us and Them", empower the alleged historical and cultural superiority, and point to the fact how inadequately culturally and civilizationally restarted are the former neighbours within the Yugoslavian state. Therefore, the process of dissolution of Yugoslavia was accompanied by the process of "confiscating Yugoslavian collective memory" followed by its replacement by the national memory. Consequently, the hate speech entailed the following key themes affecting the perception of the cultural reality of that time:

- » **newly "rewritten" folk stories glorifying the national heroes and their toposes;**
- » **accusations and judgments of all the "traitors" including Turks, Hitler, "the West", titotists, communists, ustashas, chetniks, foreigners and etc.;**
- » **separation from everything that was "common", "shared" and joint" including the language, the material heritage of southern Slavs (literature);**
- » **public ostracism, mockery and degradation of cross-cultural projects, schemes and discourse;**
- » **creating a distinction division between 'Us versus Them' with a strong negative emotional attachment to the latter;**
- » **sense of cultural, educational and academic superiority;**
- » **projecting the image of possessing the monopoly to the only true version of the history;**
- » **application of the "purifying" practices regarding the material cultural heritage- literature, the community of scholars, and the discourse concerning cultural superiority and importance;**
- » **implications of the spiritual realm that is to be regained, reserved and possessed by given one nation;**
- » **strong attachment to explicit notions as the truth, the evil, the good, justice, the villains and the heroes;**
- » **creating a symbolic universe of the *Volskgeist* (unique 'spirit' possessed collectively by each people or nation) and the *Volksseele* (folk soul) acting the imaginary communities linked to the extensive, politically centralized territorial states emerging around them (or rather, that are to emerge, for instance within the framework of the Greater Serbia or Croatia schemes);**
- » **new political myths and rituals (resulting from the above) that by separating diverse ethno-nationalistic communities, support their decomposition in order to regain "the long time dreamt independency";**

» **national homogenization and propaganda of solving problems by the use of violence (entailing some sophisticated tools as academic essays, academic research[9] and etc).**

Graph 1. The discourse analysis of the applied rhetoric within the framework of the Serbian and Croatian "cultural hate speech"
Source: The author's own study.

The discourse analysis allows to categorize the rhetoric used into the main areas, key themes and the separatist "Us versus Them" rhetoric, the notion to which set of various features is applied. It can be presented as follows:

With reference to the classification of the form of applied hate speech, the ethno-nationalist foundation comes to the forefront, clearly differentiating Others on account of their ethnic origin or religious belonging. The cultural discourse aimed at denigrating and diminishing the value and at time the sole existence of cultural diversity, questioning multicultural realm of the Yugoslavian societies (of course the degree to which is was a imposed or a grass-root level schemes is a disputable issue). Therefore, the discourse applied by the representatives of culture such as writers, journalists, linguists, historians and other scholars stressed differences, generated artificial sense of superiority and heterogeneity of their own cultures with reference to the cross-cultural atmosphere present in the communist Yugoslavia. Such rhetoric, deprived of civic accents and democratic implications, utilized explicit language of segregation, discrimination and xenophobia, proving that nationalistic politicians and

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9   For instance, a group of historians of Serbian literature from the Institute of Literature and Art in Belgrade, Academy of Science of the Universities in Belgrade and Vranjji in 1995 put forward a research project over Serbian literature in Kosovo and Metochia and Macedonia. Yet, in their project the call Macedonia the Southern Serbia, whereas Kosovo the Old Serbia (sic!).

their right-wing media advocates can be also supported by the persons of culture and education, that by their mission, should obey the democratic rule, preserve objectivity of science and promote open-mindedness and civil society.

The above reflections lean towards a rather pessimistic view that culture became an area where the fight and war for national interests moved from the real battlefields. Notwithstanding, apart from the recalled examples of nationalistic discourse of hate and antagonisms, there was also an opposition to such stance, although subject to even more sever attacks and hostility form the mainstream media. The overwhelming nationalistic discourse in the sphere of culture was criticized in many articles, essays and studies on nationalistic manipulation, revealing how cultural tradition, language, art and literature are used for that purpose. Some positive examples concern independent radio stations, journals and newspapers such as Radio B92, Danas, Vreme, Republika, Helsinška Povelja, Reč, Mosotvi, ProFemina. All the recalled formations analyzed various aspects of nationalistic manipulation of the culture, trying to throw a realistic light on the absurdity of the imposed discourse. The positive examples include, for instance, Democratic Center *Dijalog* that released its fist bi-annual volume autumn-winter in 1995, or the Belgrade symposium "Culture as a self-defense of the society and individuals", acknowledging and recognizing the fact that cultural identities are not inborn or autochthonic, they do not originate from the specificity of the land or langue, but emerge in the process of communication with others and are the fruit of such communication.

It can be assumed that political madness affects not only those directly engaged in some ideological agendas, but also the domain of culture, which has been rather perceived as a realm resistance the dominance of power, abuse and violence, providing shelter and an area to create (rather than destroy) for the sensitive minds of the writers, composers, poets, journalists, scholars and other creative figures. Being aware how immensely culture affects the process of personality and identity shaping, the fact that it can be also used for some separatist and violent purposes is alarming for a all the educationist, pedagogues, teachers and parents willing to share rather peaceful image of their children's future. Thus, taking into account the processes of upbringing, socialization and enculturation that use culture to instil given values and norms, it is of paramount importance to be cautious when the image of a culture is projected to the society members, since, as the examples of former Yugoslavia prove, it can be utilized for destructive and differentiating purposes, that can question the social and cultural deal given communities nourish, despite the obstacles and at times unfavourable circumstances.

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Integration policy towards the contemporary challenges of migration: an example of Frankfurt (Oder)

Polityka integracyjna wobec współczesnych wyzwań migracyjnych na przykładzie Frankfurtu nad Odrą

Streszczenie

Jednym z istotniejszych wyzwań, przed którymi stoi współczesna Europa jest wdrożenie efektywnej polityki integracyjnej wobec nowo przybyłych imigrantów. Republika Federalna Niemiec jest jednym z głównych państw docelowych dla obecnej fali uchodźców wędrujących przez Europę.

Esser (2006) analizuje w kontekście integracji społecznej cztery możliwe typy interakcji zachodzących między społeczeństwem migracyjnym a społeczeństwem przyjmującym (wielokrotną inkluzję, asymilację, segmentację oraz marginalizację), uważając za najbardziej efektywną drogę – asymilację (obejmującą cztery obszary: integrację strukturalną, kulturową, społeczną oraz identyfikacyjną).

Niniejszy referat stawia sobie za cel analizę polityki integracyjnej realizowanej wobec nowo przybyłych imigrantów we Frankfurcie nad Odrą. Frankfurt zdaje się być miastem o dualnej naturze, w którym ścierają się różne postawy wobec obcokrajowców. Z jednej strony jest to miasto peryferyjne (z punktu widzenia Niemiec zachodnich), w którym wielu mieszkańców posiada nadal resentymenty względem obcych, a ruchy nacjonalistyczne są wciąż widocznym elementem politycznego i społecznego krajobrazu. Z drugiej strony, z uwagi na, bliskość położenia tak dużej i multikulturowej metropolii, jaką jest Berlin, Frankfurt zdaje dostrzegać zalety otwartości na kulturową, religijną oraz językową inność.

W niniejszym referacie omówiona zostanie zarówno koncepcja integracji, jak również kompleksowy program działań, w zakresie integracji strukturalnej oraz kulturowej (ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem polityki językowej), wdrażany wobec imigrantów oraz uchodźców przez frankfurcką administrację publiczną.

Słowa kluczowe: polityka integracyjna, imigranci, płaszczyzny integracji, polityka językowa

Abstract

One of the most important tasks ahead of contemporary Europe is the introduction of an effective integration policy towards the newly arrived immigrants. Germany is one of the main receiving countries of refugees up to now.

In the context of social integration Esser (2006) analyzes four types of possible interactions between the host society and immigrants (multiple inclusion, assimilation, segmentation and marginalization), assuming that assimilation (in the structural, cultural, social and emotional dimension of integration) is the most probable and effective way to social inclusion.

The paper aims to analyze the emigrational policy towards the newly arrived migrants in Frankfurt (Oder). Due to its eastern border location Frankfurt (Oder) seems to be a town of a dual nature, where different attitudes towards foreigners clash more intensely than in the interior. On the one hand, it is a town of a highly outlying location (from the Western German's point of view), where some of its inhabitants still resent foreigners and Nazi-movements are still an element of its social and political landscape. On the other hand, through its direct location on the German-Polish border and the proximity of Berlin, it is a multicultural metropolis, where many of the inhabitants seem to recognize the advantages of living in a multiethnic society built on the respect for cultural, linguistic and religious differences.

Keywords: Integration policy, immigrants, dimensions of integration, language policy

Introduction

According to the data of the UN Refugee Agency, since 2015 over 1,360,000 people seeking asylum have reached Europe by sea (cf. UNHCR). This is an enormous number of immigrants who have come to Europe over the last two years. The main reasons for migration are contemporary wars and general instability in the Middle East Region. The primary target country for the migrants over the last two years (with over 890,000 refugees in 2015 and 280,000 in 2016) has been Germany (cf. Tagesschau.de).

One of the most important tasks ahead of the German Federal Republic is the introduction of an effective integration policy aimed at the newly arrived immigrants. The structural, social, linguistic and cultural inclusion of these people must proceed quickly to minimize the risk of building parallel societies. In the context of social integration Esser (2006) analyses four types of possible interactions between the receiving society and migrants (multiple inclusion, assimilation, segmentation and marginalization), assuming that assimilation (in the structural, cultural, social and emotional dimension of integration) is the most, albeit not the only, feasible and effective way to social inclusion[1].

The paper aims to analyze the emigrational policy towards the newly arrived migrants in Frankfurt (Oder). Due to its eastern border location Frankfurt (Oder) seems to be a town of a dual nature, where different attitudes towards foreigners clash more intensely than in the interior. On the one hand, it is a town of a highly outlying location

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[1] More about the forms of integration in the chapter: Dimensions of integration by Esser.

(from the Western German's point of view), where some of its inhabitants still resent foreigners and Nazi-movements are still an element of its social and political landscape. On the other hand, through its direct location on the German-Polish border and the proximity of Berlin, it is a multicultural metropolis, where many of the inhabitants seem to recognize the advantages of living in a multiethnic society built on the respect for cultural, linguistic and religious differences.

This paper presents and analyzes the concept of integration as well as the operational integration programs implemented towards immigrants in the field of structural, social and cultural integration (particular consideration is given to language policy) by the public administration of Frankfurt.

Method

The research material for the analysis was collected during a semi-structured guided interview conducted with the Integration Commissioner of the City of Frankfurt (Oder), Ms. Laura El-Khatib, on July 20, 2016. The picture of integration emerging from this interview should be considered only as a partial one due to the fact that the analysis is based only on the statements of one of the agents of the integrational process. This should be taken into consideration whilst reading it. The main research methods are content analysis of the interview as well as examination of statistical data.

Inclusion, Integration and Assimilation

One of the oldest theories trying to define the inclusion processes of immigrants in society is the assimilation theory by Park and Burgess (1921/1969), also known as the "race-relation-cycle" model. Instead of the term integration the authors use the term assimilation. According to the assimilation theory, society is built by social interaction. Social interaction is an interaction of individuals or groups of people. One can distinguish five phases of social integration: contact, competition, conflict, accommodation and assimilation. Whereas contact is caused by competition, conflict is the result of the inequality in social status (pre- and subordination). Accommodation means cultural, technical adjustment, and assimilation suggests the interpenetration of experiences, traditions and history. Assimilation is a gradual and slow subconscious process that is understood as a perfect final product of social integration. The assumption that the total assimilation is the only possible final outcome of inclusion processes together with the claim of ethnic differences in the assimilation stage have led to heavy criticism of the theoretical concept (more cf. Han, 2006, pp. 9ff., 13–28). Barkan (1994, pp. 90–99) understands integration as one of the phases of assimilation in the multiethnic society. He distinguishes six stages of social inclusion: 1. contact, 2. acculturation, 3. adaptation, 4. accommodation, 5. integration and, finally, 6. assimilation.

Contact concerns newcomers who have a limited contact with the core society. This stage is also characterized by the predomination of the mother tongue of the ethnic minority. The phase of acculturation leads to the increase or reinforcement of the sense of ethnic membership. Despite the attempts at first contacts with the social majority the ethnic minority group persists in the use of their mother tongue in the everyday praxis. Adaptation is the phase of equilibrium in the number of persons being born abroad and in the country. The use of the majority language increases, especially by the group born in the country. The culture and society of the receiving country acquires relevance. Accommodation begins when the group members born abroad become a minority. The language of the host[2] country dominates. The next phase is an integration that relies on incorporation in the receiving society by the simultaneous existence of cultural, symbolic, linguistic and ethnic features of the culture of origin. Assimilation is the final stage of the model. It is a multidimensional and reciprocal process developed through several generations. It leads to the annihilation of the ethnical component as a distinctive feature (cf. ibid.).

Beger (2000, p. 10) defines integration as a unification of individuals or groups of people in a social unit with the appreciation for cultural differences. Integration presupposes an interplay of several processes.

While analyzing the integration of immigrants, Jańczak (2009, p. 134) claims that the definition of integration should include the indication of the asymmetries in the size of both integrating groups as well as the *sine qua non* existence of the structural frame conditions. Jańczak also stresses that all the agents should be engaged in the integration process. In the case of integration of immigrants there will be three agents involved in the integration process (state and/or local authorities, receiving society and immigrants) (cf. Jańczak, 2009, pp. 135ff.; 2016, p. 106). It should also be mentioned that the three parties sometimes follow completely different objectives that may in some cases be contradictory (especially for the relation 'receiving society' – 'immigrants').

Dimensions of integration by Esser

Esser (2006a, pp. 21ff.) differentiates between the social and system integration. Whereas social integration means the aggregation of individuals, system integration presupposes the cohesion of all social systems.

Esser (2006a, p. 26) distinguishes four dimensions of social integration: culturation (*Kulturation*), placement (*Platzierung*), interaction (*Interaktion*) and identification (*Identifikation*)[3].

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2 The words "host" and "receiving" related to the society or country are used in the paper as synonyms.
3 Quite a similar pattern of integration fields is applied by Heckmann (2006, pp. 15–18). He differentiates between the cultural integration (correlating with Esser's culturation), structural integration (corresponding to Esser's placement), interactive integration (equivalent of Esser's interaction) and identificational integration (Esser's identification).

Table 1. Dimensions of social integration (Esser, 2006a, p. 26)

Social integration	
Culturation (cultural dimension)	Placement (structural dimension)
Interaction (social dimension)	Identification (emotional dimension)

Culturation is an integrational dimension responsible for the acquisition and transmission of knowledge, skills, cultural ideas and norms. A specific aspect of *culturation* is language acquisition that is considered to be one of the most important factors to integrate. *Placement* secures the adoption of or inclusion in the law system, gaining positions in the social system (educational system, labor market or property market, access to the relevant institutions). *Interaction* focuses on the occurrence of social relations. It presumes the existence of mixed marriages, inclusion in family relations and networks, participation in societies and organizations. *Identification* means the development of emotional bonds (such as loyalty) with the social system and definition of one's identity (cf. ibid.).

While analyzing the possible ways of social inclusion or exclusion of immigrants Esser names four alternative interrelations between the ethnic group and receiving society: *multiple inclusion*, *segmentation*, *assimilation* and *marginalization*.

Table 2. Possible ways of social integration by Esser (2006a, pp. 25)

		Inclusion in the receiving society	
		Yes	No
Inclusion in the ethnic group	Yes	Multiple Inclusion	Segmentation
	No	Assimilation	Marginalization

Multiple inclusion means inclusion in both the ethnic as well as the receiving context. It is an additional value produced when both the heritage and the new culture, laws, languages, groups should interact or even amalgamate. In the case of *assimilation* the inclusion in the host society implies the simultaneous exclusion from the ethnic group. *Segmentation* occurs when individuals network within their own ethnic group and are excluded from the receiving society. *Marginalization* means the exclusion from both the ethnic group and the host society.

All the four possible outcomes of groups' interrelations should be analyzed in terms of each of the four dimensions of social integration (culturation, placement, interaction and identification). For example, with reference to language acquisition and use (as part of the cultural dimension), multiple inclusion would mean competent bilingualism, assimilation – acquisition and use of L2 (majority language), segmentation – use of L1 (minority language, mother tongue) and marginalization – *semilinguismus* (cf. Esser 2006a, p. 8). Language is a part of cultural dimension, but it has a direct impact on other dimensions. It can be understood as human capital helping

the immigrant to integrate in the states structures (structural dimension) or a factor enabling or indisposing one's identity change (identificational dimension).

While analyzing the possible ways of social integration Esser indicates that pluralization resulting from multiple inclusion is not necessarily the best way to integrate (2009, pp. 374ff.). Placement is a dimension responsible for the distribution of vertical resources (such as rights, income, and social status), whereas the other dimensions (culturation, interaction and identification) refer to horizontal values (ibid., pp. 358ff.)[4]. Multiple inclusion implies the support of the ethnic variety by, for instance, cultivating cultural habits or religious beliefs (that are horizontal features), but relating to the structural differences as the position on the labor market or education (vertical features) often implies ethnic stratification and inequality (cf. Esser 2006a, p. 8).

Refugees and asylum in German law

The right for asylum seeking is secured by the German Constitution. All the procedures determining the right for asylum and a legal stay permit for refugees are regulated by German Basic Law *(Grundgesetz, GG)* and Asylum Law (*Asylgesetz*). German regulations differentiate between the individuals entitled to asylum (*Asylberechtigte*) and refugees (*Flüchtlinge*). The rights of the former group are secured by Article 16a of German Basic Law that stipulates that the politically persecuted are granted the right for asylum. Political persecution means repressions inflicted by the state or a third person because of religious or political beliefs or any other features specifying the person's otherness. Article 3 of German Asylum Law (*Asylgesetz*) includes the recognition of the rights of refugees (in accordance with the Refugee Convention of 1951) simultaneously securing the individuals entitled to asylum a more favorable legal status (cf. AsylG. Art. 2, subarticle 2). According to these regulations, refugees are people seeking a safe place to live due to a fear of persecution because of their race, religion, nationality, political opinion or beliefs, or membership of social groups.

Due to the requirement to implement EU-directives as well as the aggravation of emigrational crisis since 2015 the renewal of Asylum Law was needed. The new regulations came into effect in two steps. In 2015, "Asylpaket I" became applicable and in 2016 – "Asylpaket II". Both adjust the regulations to the new situation specifying, inter alia, the distribution of financial support between the federal government and

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4   As mentioned before, language acquisition is considered to have a special role in the integrational process, as it is one of the features of culturation but has a direct influence on other dimensions, first and foremost on placement. Esser's research results (2009) show that only a perfect command of the majority language supports integration in the field of placement (under this assumption language assimilation might bring, according to Esser, even better integrational results than multiple inclusion). To me, the subject seems more complicated. If one presupposes that multiple inclusion in terms of language acquisition and use means competent bilingualism, then the ability of speaking both languages as mother tongues secures not only good structural integration (placement), but also the development of multiple interactional and identificational dimensions.

federal states; distribution of refugees; regulations regarding legal residence, praxis of removals, family reunifications; and safe countries of origin.

According to the new regulations, new countries have qualified as safe countries of origin (Albania, Algeria, Kosovo, Morocco, Montenegro and Tunisia). Immigrants from these destinations are considered as people not entitled to asylum (according to Art. 16a subarticle 3 GG).

Immigrants and refugees in Brandenburg and Frankfurt (Oder) – statistical data

The report about the current situation of immigrants in the Federal State of Brandenburg shows a significant increase in the number of immigrants, by 44% within only 4 years, from 49,000 immigrants in 2011 to 88,000 by the end of 2015 (cf. Bericht zu aktuellen Daten, Fakten und Entwicklungen zu Migration und Integration im Land Brandenburg, 2016: 14).

By the end of 2015, Brandenburg had almost 2.5 million inhabitants (cf. ibid., p. 10). Over 3.5% of Brandenburg's inhabitants (over 88,000) were immigrants. The leading group of foreigners living in Brandenburg were Poles (over 14,000 people) significantly outnumbering Syrians and Arabic Republic immigrants (10,000 people), Russian immigrants (over 7,000 people) and Ukrainian (over 3,500 people) followed by many other nationalities (cf. ibid., p. 19). According to statistical data, foreigners living in Brandenburg are young people. The two most represented groups are people between 25–35 (24%) and 35–45 years of age (20%) (cf. ibid., p. 16ff.). A large group amongst all foreigners in Brandenburg encompasses refugees and people with tolerated residence status (25% of all immigrants). Within the last four years their number went up by over 400%, from almost 5,000 in 2011 to almost 22,000 by December 2015 (ibid., p. 20).

At the end of 2015, Frankfurt (Oder) had 58,377 inhabitants and 4,497 of those were foreigners. A significant group of 1,016 foreigners were people with a settlement permit (*Niederlassungserlaubnis*), and a further 976 those with a residence permit (*Aufenthaltserlaubnis*). Almost half a thousand people were made refugees during the asylum procedure. The rest of that number were citizens of EU member states. In the last two years over 1,400 people settled in Frankfurt (Oder)[5].

Due to the fact that the statistical data submitted by the local administrative authorities focus on the number of asylum claimants (under the Benefits for Asylum Seekers Act – *Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz, AsylbLG*),[6] the number of refugees living in Frankfurt changes rapidly. On October 14, 2016, there were 405 asylum claimants receiving benefits under AsylbLG, and 227 people located in reception centers (*Erstaufnahmeeinrichtungen, EAE*). Four months later, On February 3, 2017, there were

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5   The data regarding the number of foreigners living in Frankfurt (Oder) was provided by the Integration Commissioner of the City of Frankfurt (Oder).
6   Asylum claimants are those refugees whose legal status regarding the residence permit remains undetermined. They are excluded from the statistics after receiving their legal status.

409 asylum claimants receiving benefits and 57 people in reception centers (cf. Integration in Frankfurt (Oder))[7].

Dimensions of integration of refugees in Frankfurt (Oder)

Asked about the definition of integration the Integration Commissioner of the city Frankfurt (Oder), Ms. El-Khatib, stresses that the administration understands integration as a participation-oriented process:

> …dass es eben darum geht, Menschen mit Zuwanderungsgeschichte, Teilhabe zu ermöglichen an gesellschaftlichen Bereichen, und das diskriminierungsfrei und gleichberechtigt[8].

Concerning the provisions included in German Basic Law (GG) Ms. El-Khatib emphasizes the importance of the acceptance of diversity. Integration is not about the adjustment of one's own values, moral concepts or life plans. The diversity in society should be accepted and not adjusted, says Ms. El-Khatib. The leading concept of integration for the Frankfurter administration authorities seems to be multiple inclusion as indicated by the topic of acceptance of diversity which is repeatedly stressed.

Ms. El-Khatib points also to openness as an indispensable value in the integration process. This feature is needed from both parties, the receiving society and the immigrants:

> Integration ist auch keine Einbahnstraße, in dem Sinne also es ist ein Verständigungsprozess, der immer wieder ausgehandelt werden muss[9].

She also stresses dynamism as a feature of integration. As a process, integration should never be defined as a static phenomenon.

The most significant proportion of refugees in Frankfurt (Oder) comes from the Middle East. Syria and Afghanistan account for over 50% of all asylum seeking people. Other countries of origin are the Russian Federation (primarily Chechnya), Pakistan, Somalia, Eritrea, Kenya, Cameroon and Iran[10]. Due to the large sizes of newcomers' groups, their cultural diversity alongside their otherness, experience of war, displacement and violence, their integration seems to be a huge challenge not only for the local administration but also for the city inhabitants and first of all the immigrants themselves.

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7 Due to the fact that new refugees are received every month, it is impossible to say how many claimants have received their legal status within the last few months, according to the data actually published.

8 This is about enabling people with a migrant background participate in social areas, and do so on a non-discriminatory and equal basis [translation, B.A.J.].

9 Integration is not a one-way street, either, in the sense that it is a process of dialogue that needs to be negotiated over and over again [translation, B.A.J.].

10 These are only the countries of origin with the highest number of refugees. The less frequent destinations were not mentioned above.

It should be stressed that some of the integrational projects, especially in the dimension of placement, interaction and culturation, are implemented at the stage when refugees are asylum claimants without the status of asylum seekers[11].

Placement

The crucial task regarding placement is an inclusion of an immigrant (one of the agents in an integrational process) in a social system and the agent gaining a certain social position. This includes in particular gaining certain rights (e.g. right for citizenship), education and position on the labor market. It should be stressed that a special role in the facilitation of placement relies on the state and local administration as an agent who creates the regulations and laws enabling the immigrant to integrate into this field.

Related to the structural integration (placement) are several actions taken by the local administration in order to accelerate the integration of newcomers into Frankfurt's society. One of the most important aspects in Frankfurt (Oder) is the elaborate housing policy for asylum claimants. Most of the claimants receiving benefits under the *AsylbLG* are offered individual apartments[12]. Out of 409 claimants under the *AsylbLG*, 306 people are living in 153 apartments, and only 103 people in community housing[13]. The carefully considered housing policy will surely have a positive integrational effect, decreasing the risk of ethnic marginalization through ghettoization. It also reduces the number of conflicts resulting from the accumulation of diverse groups of people. A wisely conducted housing policy helps the newcomers to be absorbed by and blend into the receiving society.

Another important activity of local authorities in the field of structural integration is, according to Ms. El-Khatib, immigration counseling. Several different institutions (Social Office, International Confederation (*Internationaler Bund*), Immigration Counseling Center, and Health Department offer counseling for refugees. The Immigration Counseling Center provides help of social attendants (*Begleiter*), who support immigrants' efforts to regulate their legal status and manage administrative formalities and solve social difficulties.

Another, equally important matter is the financial support that is defined in Art. 3 of the Benefits for Asylum Seekers Act (*AsylbLG*). According to the regulations, an adult entitled to attendance allowance and living in the reception center receives EUR 122 per person for married couples, EUR 135 for a single person whose children receive – EUR 76–83[14] per child. The amount of social allowance increases for asylum claimants

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11   The information about the country of origin is not insignificant. It should be stressed that asylum claimants from certain countries of origin (Syria, Eritrea, Iraq and Iran) are getting priority in the integrational process that the other refugees without legal status do not enjoy (e.g. participation in integrational courses).

12   That is according to Mrs. El-Khatib a quite exceptional situation. Unlike in many other cities in Brandenburg which lack accommodation resources, Frankfurt (Oder) disposes of many vacant buildings or apartments.

13   Additionally 57 people live in the reception centers (EAE). Statistical data from February 3, 2017.

14   The amount of monthly allowance for a child depends on its age.

living outside the reception centers, correspondingly: EUR 194 per person for married couples, EUR 216 for a single person whose children receive EUR 133–198[15] per child.

One of the rights asylum claimants are not eligible for is participation in the labor market. The people without legal status regulating their residence permit are not entitled to work in Germany. The situation does not change until the claimants receive the formal status of an asylum seeker and a residence permit. As long as the legal status of the refugees is not legally confirmed, there are still regulations and privileges asylum claimants are excluded from as beneficiaries.

Culturation

Culturation means the acquisition of certain skills and knowledge, helping an individual to interact with other members of the group. These are, first of all, cognitive knowledge, cultural and language skills. Language skills seem to be the most important factor, having an enormous influence on the effectiveness of integration in other dimensions. Culturation is interdependent with placement and other dimensions. The legal status as well as securing of other living conditions (e.g. working place) (placement) is necessary in order to acquire some skills and knowledge. At the same time, however, knowledge and education, as well as language skills (culturation) are preconditions for achieving a high status on the labor market. According to Ms. El-Khatib, an immediate inclusion in the educational system and language acquisition are necessary for effective integration. Education of underage children is obligatory for each child without regard to their legal status in accordance with the School Attendance Law. The local administration is responsible for preschool education (for children attending nurseries and kindergartens). All immigrants are encouraged to start the education of children as early as possible. The city of Frankfurt (Oder) offers preschool education for refugee children in several kindergartens (amongst other also integrational ones) that are supervised by the Youth Welfare Office (*Jugendamt*). In these institutions the children may quickly establish new social contacts and learn the majority language. Primary and secondary education is supervised by federal states, with the exception of preparatory classes that are organized at both local and state level. These classes are essential for refugee children as well as other immigrant children lacking knowledge of the majority language (German). Tuition focuses primarily on acquiring language competences that are a necessary instrument for further participation in classes. Ms. El-Khatib stresses the existence of close collaboration between local administrative authorities, the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport of Brandenburg (*Ministerium für Bildung, Jugend und Sport*), Youth Welfare Office and the State Education Authority in Frankfurt (Oder) (*Staatliches Schulamt)* in regard to the effective inclusion of refugee children in the educational system.

Ms. El-Khatib underlines the primary role of language acquisition for effective integration. This should be secured also for adults, first of all through the participation in the integration courses (*Integrationskurse*). During the courses learners learn

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15   The amount of monthly allowance for a child depends on its age.

German (600 hours for 6 months arriving at the B1 level) and are taught about the country and its culture (*Landeskunde*). The integration courses are obligatory for every person entitled to asylum. Due to the limited number of course places, however, they are optionally available only for some asylum claimants. The privileged groups, who can participate in integration courses before receiving the legal residence status, are the refugees from Eritrea, Syria, Somalia, Iraq and Iran. According to Ms. El-Khatib, there is an enormous interest in participating in these courses in Frankfurt (Oder) that makes it quite impossible to secure access to them for each asylum claimant. Yet the rest of the claimants are not left on their own. Asylum claimants from other countries can participate in language courses ("Deutsch für Flüchtlinge" – German for refugees, or "Deutsch für Asylsuchende" – German for asylum seekers), organized by six local agents. Although the number of people interested in these courses is still higher than the number of available places the local administration, in cooperation with educational and non-governmental organizations, tries to facilitate a fast inclusion of every immigrant in the educational and social system.

Interaction

In the dimension of interaction the crucial role in the implementation of a successful integrational process relies on immigrants and receiving society. Interaction presupposes a social activity of both agents that results in establishing social relations, interdependence and participation in social life. This is a difficult goal to achieve, especially for the refugees, who – as a result of forced migration – are torn out of their cultural and social context. Ms. El-Khatib names several different initiatives which should help the receiving society and the immigrants come into social interaction, get to know each other and abandon the stereotypes about each other. According to Ms. El-Khatib, an important role in creating proper relations between the receiving society and the immigrants is played by information and education of society. Before receiving refugees, meetings with the inhabitants of Frankfurt (Oder) were organized in order to make them aware of cultural and linguistic differences of the newcomers and abandon stereotypes resulting from fear or a lack of knowledge. A further step in the creation of social interaction are such initiatives as meeting cafés (*Begegnungscafés*) or special event evenings, where the inhabitants of Frankfurt (Oder) and the refugees get an opportunity to get to know each other by talking to one another and other forms of interaction. Mrs. El-Khatib finds these two forms of interaction successful and promising for the future.

Identification

Identification presupposes the perception of oneself and other society members as members of the same community, sharing common values, cultural heritage and language. The feeling of solidarity and common values is founded on an emotional basis

and, therefore, it should not be expected to emerge soon after the arrival in a foreign country. In the case of people with a quite limited influence on their migrational story, as refugees or other forced immigrants, this dimension is probably the most difficult to achieve and the least important at the beginning of their settlement. Usually it takes years or even generations to create a feeling of solidarity with the receiving society and build a new identity which also (or, in some cases, primarily) includes the new homeland. To analyze the integration in the dimension of identification of refugees and the receiving society a deepened research including the mutual relations of both of the mentioned groups would be necessary.

Table 3. Social Integration of refugees in Frankfurt (Oder) in 2016

Social integration of refugees	
Placement » carefully considered housing policy » immigration counseling led by several different administrative institutions » social allowance » but: exclusion from labor market up to receiving of a legal status	Culturation » cooperation between local administration and federal state in regard to the education » an offer of kindergartens (also integrational ones) under the care of Youth Welfare Office » preparatory classes for refugee children of school-age » key role of language acquisition » integration courses: obligatory for persons entitled for asylum, facultative for claimants for asylum from Eritrea, Syria, Iraq and Iran: » language courses for other claimants for asylum
Interaction » meetings with inhabitants preparing them for reception of refugees » meeting cafés (Begegnungscafés) » special evening events for inhabitants and refugees	Identification[16] --

Final conclusion

Integration of immigrants occurs in four dimensions: placement, culturation, interaction and socialization. During the first period of their stay the most important matter for immigrants, and especially refugees in the receiving country, is the legalization of their residence, and social security status (inclusion in social structures, placement) as well as gaining basic human capital resources (especially language skills, culturation).

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16 Missing information. Due to the short stay the integration in this field cannot be predicted at present.

For an effective integration process one should strive for assimilation in the structural field and enable the multiple inclusion in other dimensions. This will enable the plurality of life patterns with the simultaneous avoidance of ethnic stratification.

There are three agents involved in the integration process: immigrants, the receiving society and state and/or local authorities. They take different responsibilities facilitating integration depending on the type of integrational dimension. The role of the state and local authorities is much more significant in the field of structural integration (relying on the legislative and structural solutions for inclusion of immigrants into society, labor market and other systems) than in the social or emotional field. This is even more important for asylum seeking people, who need to be legally secured, first and foremost. In the field of cultural and interactive integration the state provides the legislative framework, but for integration to occur the main job has to be done by immigrants and receiving society. Supported by the receiving society immigrants should take advantage of its culture increasing their human capital by gaining education and language skills and establishing interactions with the receiving society. In the field of identification the main responsibility rests on immigrants who should redefine their identity or identities. The support of the receiving society (relying on the acceptance of minority and avoidance of exclusion) is thereby needed.

The integration of refugees in Germany is a difficult task that will take many years to achieve. The example of integrational policy in Frankfurt (Oder) shows that the local authorities are prepared to take integrational actions and try to approach the task as a whole. Not only the legislative procedures for the residential status of asylum seekers, but the deliberate housing policy guarantee a prompt inclusion of refugees in the structural field. Additionally, local authorities supervise an extensive package of measures supporting the development of social interactions between the refugees and the receiving society. Also the activities in the field of cultural integration relying on education and the support for language acquisition give a good start to the integrational process. Nonetheless, one should stress that integration is work that should be done by all the parties of the process. Without the engagement of immigrants even the best conditions for integration will not yield the desired result.

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Moral Panic About Refugees in Poland as a Manifestation of Cultural Transformation

Panika moralna wokół uchodźców w Polsce
jako przejaw transformacji kulturowej

Streszczenie

Masowy exodus uchodźców z krajów Bliskiego Wschodu i Afryki Północnej w 2015 oraz obrazy migrantów szturmujących granice Unii Europejskiej stały się zapłonem paniki moralnej w wielu krajach europejskich, także w Polsce. Uchodźcy, szczególnie Arabowie i muzułmanie, postrzegani przez Polaków jako „obcy" etnicznie, kulturowo i religijnie zaczęli uosabiać zagrożenie dla bezpieczeństwa Europy i jej spójności społeczno-kulturowej. Klasyczna panika moralna (medialna) dotarła do Polski na jesieni 2015 roku, wpisała się w kampanię przedwyborczą i podzieliła Polaków na wrogie obozy: „obrońców wiary i ojczyzny" oraz „dobrych Samarytan". W tym momencie mieliśmy już do czynienia z transformacyjną paniką moralną tj. paniką wynikającą z rywalizacji dwóch wizji porządku społecznego, opartych na odmiennych systemach wartości. Społeczeństwu zamkniętemu i ksenofobicznemu przeciwstawiono społeczeństwo otwarte i tolerancyjne, narodowi etnicznemu naród obywatelski, solidarności wewnątrzgrupowej solidarność ogólnoludzką. Polska panika transformacyjna wokół uchodźców wpisuje się w szerszą wojnę kulturową w obrębie Zachodu – zderzenie tradycjonalizmu i modernizmu, konserwatyzmu i liberalizmu obyczajowego, fundamentalizmu i relatywizmu moralnego.

Słowa kluczowe: uchodźcy, kryzys migracyjny, panika moralna, panika transformacyjna, wojna kulturowa.

Abstract

The mass exodus of refugees from the Middle East and North African countries in 2015 as well as the pictures of migrants storming the European Union borders provoked moral panic in many European countries, not excluding Poland. Refugees, in particular Arabs and Muslims, perceived by the Poles as ethnically, culturally and religiously „alien", have become a symbol

of threat for the safety of Europe and its social and cultural homogeneity. The classical moral (media) panic reached Poland in autumn 2015. It immediately became an important issue in the electoral campaign, dividing Poles into two hostile camps, i.e. the „defenders of homeland and faith" and the "good Samaritans". At that point, we were faced with a transformational moral panic, i.e. a panic resulting from two competing visions of the social order, based on different values. A closed and xenophobic society was opposed to an open and tolerant community, an ethnic nation – to a civic nation, solidarity within one group – to general human solidarity. The Polish transformational panic about refugees is part of a broader culture war within the West – a clash of traditionalism and modernism, conservatism and liberalism of lifestyle, moral fundamentalism and relativism.

Keywords: refugees, migrant crisis, moral panic, transformational panic, culture war

European migrant crisis and increasing social concern

At the beginning of 2016, the participants of the World Economic Forum in Davos considered the increasing migrant movement as the greatest risk the world will face in the coming decade of global warming. In 2015, over 1.3 million asylum applications[1] were filed in the EU countries. In the post-war history of Europe it has been an unprecedented increase in the migrant movement. Another challenge was posed by the non-European origins of the migrants. Most of them are Muslims who come from the war-torn Middle East and North African countries. According to the UNHCR data, among the migrants who reached Europe in 2015 dominated groups of Syrians (29 per cent), Afgans (15 per cent) and Iraqis (10 per cent). However, it is worth noting that the war refugees on the Balkan trail were joined by economic migrants from the south of Europe – mostly from Kosovo (5 per cent) and Albania (5 per cent). Another factor important for the public opinion was the age and gender of the migrants. Syrians, Afgans and Iraqis fleeing their war-torn countries are mostly young people coming to one of the most quickly aging world regions (DeSilver 2015). According to Pew Research Center data, more than half (53 per cent) of the refugees, who came to Europe in 2015, are between 18–34 years of age, among whom three fourths (73 per cent) were male (Connor 2016). All in all, about four out of ten migrants who reached Europe in 2015 are young men aged 18–34.

The migrant crisis in question arises from the fact that Europe proved practically incapable of coping with the challenge of an increasing migrant inflow. The factors generating the crisis include: lack of coherent EU migrant policy, lack of solidarity of the EU Member States with regard to migrant relocation and lack of control over the flow of such high numbers of migrants through the European countries, which provokes anti-immigration sentiments and growth of national egoism within Europe.

The symptom of increasing migrant crisis in Poland was a gradual change in the image of a migrant created by the media – from a compassionate into a negative and

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[1] Source of data: a report by Phillip Connor, Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015 (Pew Research Center, August 2, 2016).

stereotypical one (Kropiński, Hansen 2016) – following the summer peak of the migrant movement and EU plans to aid Italy and Greece and relocate refugees. Approximately in mid-2015, the Polish media showed an average refugee as a young, aggressive Arab, suspected of some dealings with ISIS and inclination toward terrorism. The image promoted by the media was reinforced by „Dantean scenes" from the south of Europe, which showed frustrated, olive-skin men forcing the barbed-wire fence which was gradually being built (along the Hungarian-Serbian and Austrian-Slovenian borders), riots in makeshift refugee camps and immigrant ghettos which remained beyond the influence of European jurisdictions (the infamous „Jungle" in Calais).

The sense of social[2], cultural[3] and economic[4] threat, which was heightened and escalated, had an influence on growing social reluctance to migrants across Europe. Many right-wing extremist groups started to build their political capital on anti-immigrant or anti-Islamic slogans[5]. Terrorist attacks in Paris (13 November 2015) and in Brussels (22 March 2016) carried out by Islamic jihadists made the European public opinion even more radical towards refugees and migrants, especially after it was disclosed that among the terrorists were European ISIS recruits who returned to Europe together with the migrant wave. To make matters worse, the media coverage focused on sexual assaults on women[6] on New Year's Eve in German cities, of which men of "migrant origin" were accused.

The peak of migrant crisis was seen in September and October 2015, when Poland was going through an intensive campaign before general election. The issue of migrant relocation was then much politicised and used to mobilize the voters of the two main parties, i.e. Civic Platform and Law and Justice. In result of this political skirmish, the Polish society became highly polarized over migrant admission. On 12 October 2015, opponents and supporters of migrant admission to Poland took to the streets. Internet fora were filled with hate speech, which in turn made many culture institutions take part in „Refugee Solidarity Day" (15 October 2016). In the author's opinion, the accumulation of pro- and anti-refugee action (actions, debates, marches) taken in 2015, allows us to diagnose the phenomenon of moral panic in Poland.

In the next part of the article, the author will analyse to what extent the moral panic in reaction to refugees in Poland was a classical media panic and to what extent it was a transformational panic, i.e. the one which results from a clash of different values and visions of social order.

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[2] Refugees from the Middle East and Muslim minorities in Europe who do not integrate as a source of terrorist threat.

[3] Threat to women's rights and competition in religious dimension.

[4] Competition on the labour and social welfare market.

[5] International PEGIDA, UKIP in Great Britain, National Front in France, Freedom Party in the Netherlands, Alternative for Germany, Freedom Party of Austria, Golden Dawn in the Czech Republic, National Radical Camp in Poland.

[6] On New Year's Eve 2015, in German cities there were 900 sexual assaults, of which over 1,200 women fell victim (including approx. 650 in Köln and approx. 400 in Hamburg). Out of 2,000 men who took part in these assaults on women, 120 suspects were identified. Half of them were foreigners who arrived in Germany a few months before.

Moral panic: media and transformational panic

Classical moral panic was defined by Stanley Cohen – author of pioneer research on media reaction to the conflict of two sub-cultures, i.e. the mods and rockers. In his book *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The creation of the Mods and Rockers*, published in 1972, Stanley Cohen says:

> *Societies appear to be subject, every now and then, to periods of moral panic. A condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media; the moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking people; socially accredited experts pronounce their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are evolved or (more often) resorted to; the condition then disappears, submerges or deteriorates and becomes more visible* (Cohen 2011: 1).

Let us note that, according to Cohen, the key factor which intensifies panic are the media, which initiate and spread it. Social panic is manifested by hysteria and overreaction to the images shown by the media. These use such instruments as overstatement, deformation, stereotypization and stylization, which strongly affect our emotions and imagination. The moral element of this type of panic consists in judgment – condemnation and disapproval of those who are to be blamed for violation of moral norms (*folk devils*).

Following Elżbieta Czykwin (2007), we suggest defining the classical moral panic as media panic. It will allow us to better define the other type of moral panic, which arises in the context of accelerated social and cultural change. Iwona Zielińska (2015) suggests differentiating the classical moral panic, which reinforces the social order based on traditional values (*nomos*) from transformational panic, which questions the current social order and proposes an its alternative vision. Inasmuch as in the former case we deal with a general consensus on defining *folk devils*, in the latter we are faced with a confrontation of two different systems of values, whose representatives see each other as *folk devils*.

An example of classical media panic is the one over the acts of Islamic terrorism in Paris and Brussels or panic spread after the sexual assaults in German cities. In this case, the *folk devils* identified by the media (Islamic terrorists or Arab migrants assaulting women) in the first place pose a threat to our safety and indirectly to our values (the idea of open, multi-cultural society, liberal lifestyle). The host society unanimously condemns the acts of *folk devils*. In the media message and in social awareness there is no fear of rivalry between the alien systems of values[7].

An example of transformational panic is the one over homosexuality and gender (liberalism vs. conservatism of lifestyle), but also the panic which arose over the so called veil affair in France (secularism vs. religious character of state institutions /

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7   Nevertheless, in marginalised minority groups of migrant origin and among young people in the West undergoing an existential crisis, we may observe radical religion-based attitudes and a choice of a jihadist identity as attractive counterbalance to a lack of sense, purpose and dignity both in personal and social dimension (Cfr. Pasamonik 2016).

state)[8] or the panic over the Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdi in Great Britain (freedom of speech vs. respect for religious feelings)[9]. In this case, we are confronted with rivalry of two systems of values which make part of two visions of social order, based on different *nomoses*: religious and lay – deocentric and anthropocentric. Let us stress that for Peter Berger (1997) *nomos* stands for order, universal social order which regulates human experience, and makes the behaviour of individuals and groups coherent. Traditional *nomos* also included order of the universe and was therefore strongly rooted in religion. Since the 1970s and the ferment of counterculture and its evolution into an alternative culture, we have seen *nomos* separate from its religious foundations, and consequently – a change of its shape. A new, lay, anthropocentric *nomos* is being coined in the context of culture war (Cfr. Jawor 2014) between traditionalism and modernism, conservatism and liberalism of lifestyle, moral fundamentalism and relativism.

In the author's opinion, the current refugee crisis provokes media panics, which may transform into moral panics. In summer 2015, first the classical media panic arose, which could be labelled „a wave of refugees pouring into Europe". Refugees being turned into *folk devils* were perceived as a threat to the social, cultural and economic safety of the Poles. Then, in consequence of spreading hate speech, racist and xenophobic attitudes, the more liberal part of the Polish society started a transformational moral panic: an open, inclusive and tolerant society was opposed to the closed, exclusive and xenophobic community[10]. In this case, both parties to the dispute represented different systems of values, i.e. the ethnic nation was opposed to a civic nation, solidarity within a group to general human solidarity.

Both the media and transformational panic may disappear and return if provoked by some new initiating events. Such were undoubtedly the terrorist attacks in Paris (13 November 2015) and in Brussels (22 March 2016) and New Year's Eve sexual assaults (New Year's Eve 2015).

Transformational panic over refugees and moral crusade

Both in classical media panic and in transformational panic, the same stages of their development can be identified: defining social enemies; branding; sudden growth of anxiety; activisation of authorities (moral crusade) and reduction of social tension (Cohen 1972, Zielińska 2015). In the case of migration crisis, the starting point for both types of panic was the threat of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa,

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8 For the first time the dispute over Muslim headscarves worn in state schools broke out in 1989. Panic related to religious symbols being introduced to a lay space of public institutions resulted in the official ban on manifestation of religious symbols in schools (enforced in 2004).

9 In 1988 a British writer of Indian origin Salman Rushdi published a book called *The Satanic Verses*. Crowds of Muslims took to the street in protest against the „blasphemous" book. A year later Ayatollah Khomeini issued a *fatwa*, or religious edict which called on Muslims to the kill the author.

10 The culminating point of this panic was the „Refugee Solidarity Day" organized in Poland by the milieu of „Krytyka Polityczna" on 15 October 2015.

followed by labelling refugees as those who pose a threat to the European social or-der and growth of fear over the social, cultural and economic safety of the Europeans.

The difference between the classical media and transformational panic appears at the stage of activisation of authorities, which take part in the so called moral crusade. In the case of media panic, the authorities represent a big majority of society, which unanimously points at and condemns *folk devils*. In the case of transformational pan-ic, the authorities represent two sides of the conflict over values.

A cyclical CBOS poll (poll report no. 153/2016) showed that the biggest increase in Polish reluctance to refugees took place in 2015, in the context of the increased me-dia coverage focusing on the migration issue during the campaign before the general election (17% increase of reluctance between May and August 2015). Media broadcast „Dantean scenes" from the south of Europe, showing aggressive, olive-skin men who tried to force the quickly built fence (along the Hungarian-Serbian or Austrian-Slo-venian borders) or started riots in makeshift camps. The „negativity bias" known in psychology makes negative information much more expressive; it attracts more at-tention and is better remembered than positive information. Therefore, it is negative news that dominates in the media and in our memory.

In September 2015 governments of EU Member States agreed and adopted a two-year refugee quota plan with regard to migrants from Syria, Iraq and Eritrea to be relocated in Member States. The Polish government represented by Prime Minister Ewa Kopacz, despite criticism of the Opposition, agreed to take in seven thousand migrants from transit camps in the south of Europe. At that time, the covers of right-wing magazines cried: „They are coming!", „Hell at the command of Berlin" („W Sie-ci"), „Invaders, not Refugees" („Do Rzeczy"), „90 thousand Arabs are about to deluge Poland" („Super Express").

A survey carried out by the Public Debate Observatory (*Obserwatorium Debaty Publicznej*) in September 2015 showed that the Polish media were then divided into two opposing camps over the issue of refugees, referring to two mythical visions: in-vasion of the barbarians or that of the great European family (cfr. Bertram, Jędrzejek 2015). The former, larger one, used the narration of clash of civilizations, spoke of an invasion of Muslims and Islamisation of Europe. The latter used the rhetoric of care of the Other and solidarity with those in need. Both narrations were based on powerful metaphors and images which were supposed to take control over the imagination and emotions of their addresses. Division into the narrations went along the line dividing the Polish right-wing and liberal left-wing media.

In the right-wing media – weeklies such as „Wprost", „wSieci" and „Do Rzeczy" and on fronda.pl and niezalezna.pl web portals – two images of refugees dominated:

» Metaphors of war – refugees pictured as „invaders", „colonizers", „conquerors", „civil army" or „Islamic battering ram" who „invaded", „stormed", "besieged" „conquered", „penetrated", „terrorized";
» metaphor of Oriental origin – refugees pictured as barbarians: savage, lascivi-ous, repulsive, lazy.

The above metaphors come from a mythical tale of barbarian invasion (Muslim hordes), Muslim invasion („Poland, bulwark of Christianity") and self-destruction of Europe (left-wing ideology vs. cultural and demographic expansion of Islam). They

are completed by a narration about humiliation of Poland (Berlin's diktat) and „disguised" refugees (social Jihad) (Por. Bertram 2015).

Outside the mainstream were the left-wing, liberal media such as „Gazeta Wyborcza" daily, „Polityka" weekly, „Newsweek" weekly and „Krytyka Polityczna", which – with a sense of shame – criticized Polish politicians and compatriots for their „xenophobia" or „Islamophobia". The vision of barbarian invasion was opposed to the that of great European family, making reference to the values of „solidarity", „Christian mercy", „moral duty", „responsibility" and „empathy". In this narration the „Stranger" was always spelt with a capital letter.

The strongest polarization of the society with regard to refugees admission could be seen in October 2015. On 12 October, in Warsaw, there was a nationalist demonstration „Poles against immigrants", in which supporters of the National Movement and football fan groups took part. The banners read „Poland for Poles", „Stop the Islamization of Poland", „Islam equals death", „Muslim refugee Trojan horse in Europe". One of the nationalist group leaders Robert Winnicki declared that the quota we can accept from the European Commission is zero since Poland will not pay for the wrong migration policy of the Western countries. At the same time, near the Warsaw monument to Copernicus at Krakowskie Przedmieście St. a few hundred people gathered to express their support for the admission of immigrants under a banner reading „Refugees are welcome".

On 15 October, ten days before the general election, many public institutions (cultural institutions, NGOs, media) participated in the „Refugee Solidarity Day". The initiators of this action published their manifesto (2 Oct 2015) reading:

> On this day we would like to say to those who flee their homeland because of war, chaos, hunger, conflagration and misery: „You are most welcome here!". Since Poland is known for its hospitality and solidarity. Since the fate of a refugee and émigré is part of our culture and history. Since we have always been able to offer help and show compassion. (…)
> We want to show that those who cause fear, hostility and reluctance to refugees, who use hate speech, do not voice the opinion of the whole society. Poland says "no" to racism. Poland says „no" to hatred against the weaker, the helpless and those in need (Krytyka Polityczna)[11].

The intensity of different actions, debates[12], pro- and anti-refugee marches in October 2015 in Poland allows the author to diagnose the phenomenon of transformational panic. The authorities quoted in the „moral crusade" – pope Francis and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – stand for two different systems of values. The former supports the pro-refugee narration which I will call „humanitarian" while the latter the anti-refugee one, which I will call "nationalist".

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[11] See full text of the address on: http://krytykapolityczna.pl/kraj/15-pazdziernika-dzien-solidarnosci-z-uchodzcami/

[12] On 23 September Polish public TVP1 broadcast in prime time an expert debate called „Poland for immigrants?" Experts in different disciplines, as well as panellists who engaged in aid to refugees, presented arguments for and against admitting immigrants.

Table 1. Values present in pro- and anti-refugee narration

Pro-refugee narration (humanitarian)	Anti-refugee narration (nationalist)
Human solidarity » Cristian mercy, solidarity with those in need, moral duty to help the weaker and the poorer, » Compassion and moral responsibility for others regardless of their origin.	**Responsibility for the closest** » „Family and homeland comes first, then come the others", „we cannot afford ineffective mercy"; » Patriotic duty to protect homeland against the threat of refugee inflow.
Open society idea » Poland as an inclusive community (civic nation), » Multi-culturalism seen as resource, » Respect for the Other, » EU membership obliges, » Poles have always been immigrants (and owe a debt of gratitude), » Immigrants are in the Polish economic interest	**Defence of the Polish nation (clash of civilizations)** » Poland as an exclusive community – community of origin, faith and culture (ethnic nation); » Ethnic homogeneity perceived as value, » Patriotic duty to defend one's homeland (against the invasion of barbarians, against terrorists), » Protection of the national, cultural and religious community (Poland, bulwark of Christianity), » Protection of economic interest of the Poles, » Protection of Polish women, » Sovereignty of homeland – freedom from the European Union's diktat
Moral universalism: » Human solidarity and unselfish altruism	**Moral particularism**: » Responsibility for the closest, safety of the closest (rational national egoism)

Source: Own study

Humanitarian narration is based on a universal moral obligation – it promotes human solidarity and unselfish altruism. Nationalist narration is based on a particular moral obligation – it promotes responsibility for the closest (family and homeland). In these two narrations two different concepts of national community are opposed: an inclusive community (civic nation) against an exclusive community (ethnic nation). The former dominates due to historical considerations in Western Europe while the latter in central and Eastern Europe (Budyta-Budzyńska 2010).

Below, I will argue that the transformational panic around the admission of refugees in Poland and Europe is placed in a broader context of the culture war which has been seen in the West since 1970s, i.e. since the times of counterculture. As it was said before, lay, anthropocentric *nomos* is coined in the context of culture war between traditionalism and modernism, conservatism and liberalism of lifestyle, moral fundamentalism and relativism.

„Fortress Europe": fear of refugees as political capital of extreme right

Terrorist attacks in Paris (November 2015) and in Brussels (March 2016)[13] as well as New Year's Eve assaults on women created another wave of media panic and fuelled transformational panic. On 6 February 2016, in Warsaw and several other European cities, a series of anti-immigrant demonstrations "Against Islamization of Europe" took place. The Polish demonstrations were organized by the National Movement and the All-Polish Youth, cooperating under the "Fortress Europe" alliance. The organizers of the Warsaw demonstration read out the so called Prague declaration[14], which began as follows:

> *Aware of the fact that the millennium long history of Western civilization may soon come to an end because Europe will be conquered by Islam and because political elites will betray us, we, representatives of different European nations, hereby declare: we will not give Europe up to our enemies. We are ready to act and to counteract political Islam, extremist Islamic regimes and their European collaborators* (http://ruchnarodowy.net/ruch-narodowy-przylacza-sie-do-europejskiego-protestu-przeciwko-islamizacji-europy/).

Speeches of the leaders were interrupted with slogans such as "let every Arab remember that for us Poland is the holy thing", „England and France are crying; this is how tolerance comes to an end", "we will protect our homeland, we will not let immigrants in" or „the whole Poland proclaims her "no" to the Islamic savages". The leader of German PEGIDA, Tatjana Festerling took part in the demonstration in Warsaw. Demonstrations under the banner "Against Islamization of Europe" were also held in Prague, Amsterdam, Tallinn, Bratislava and Birmingham. They were usually accompanied by smaller counter demonstrations[15].

Since 2015 anti-refugee, anti-immigrant or anti-Islamic slogans have strengthened the political capital of extreme right groups all over Europe. Fear of refugees is used by: international PEGIDA, or Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West, United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in Great Britain, National Front in France, Freedom Party in the Netherlands, Alternative for Germany, Freedom Party of Austria, Golden Dawn in the Czech Republic and National Radical Camp in Poland. A survey carried out by Pew Research Center in European countries in spring 2016 show that people voting for right-wing parties consistently more often than those voting left-wing parties agree that the growing diversity of a society (racial, ethnic, national diversity) worsens the quality of life in a given state.

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[13] When the terrorists from Belgium were identified, Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło announced that Poland would not accept a single refugee allotted earlier by the EU because the border points (hot spots) do not perform their duties properly.

[14] It is a document signed on 23 January 2016 at the international conference against the Islamization of Europe organized **in Prague (Czech Republic) by several national organizations** from all over Europe**.**

[15] In Warsaw, the opponents of the nationalists organized themselves under the slogan „ANTI-PEGIDA – against the Nazification of Europe!". On the other hand, in Wrocław, „Razem" [Together] Party organized a counter demonstration under the banner „Together against hatred". Among the slogans the protesters chanted: „Not brown, not national but multi-cultural Poland", „Stop racist violence", „Solidarity is our weapon".

Tab. 2. Growing diversity within a society worsens quality of life in our country

Country	Left	Centre	Right	Difference between Left and Right
Germany	14	29	50	+36
Italy	36	51	62	+26
The Netherlands	20	32	46	+26
Greece	49	65	69	+20
France	15	21	34	+19
Sweden	15	20	33	+18
Great Britain	24	30	36	+12

Source: Global Attitudes Survey, Spring 2016; http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-not-convinced-growing-diversity-is-a-good-thing-divided-on-what-determines-national-identity/

At the same time, people voting for right-wing parties consistently more often than those voting left-wing parties agree that national traditions are very important for national identities.

Tab. 3. National traditions are very important for national identities

Country	Left	Centre	Right	Difference between Left and Right
Great Britain	37	56	67	+30
France	31	42	60	+29
Poland	39	55	60	+21
Bulgaria	56	67	75	+19
Germany	17	29	36	+19
Greece	61	62	79	+17
Spain	34	44	49	+15
Sweden	16	24	30	+14

Source: Global Attitudes Survey, Spring 2016; http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/07/11/europeans-not-convinced-growing-diversity-is-a-good-thing-divided-on-what-determines-national-identity/

Let us remember that European moral panic about refugees focused on the social, cultural and economic safety issues (threat of terrorism, threat to cultural identity, threat of competition on labour market and on the "social welfare market"), which strongly correspond with the concern about quality of life in one's own country and desire for strong national identity which ensures a sense of stability. Evident reluctance to cultural diversity in general and to refugees in particular on the right side of the political scene allows us to conclude that panic about refugees activated a broader culture conflict between conservatism and liberalism.

Aversion towards the stranger and liberalism in the National Radical Camp

Leading slogans of the extreme right in Poland during the electoral campaign in autumn 2015 go in line with the general European trend to combine anti-refugee rhetoric with anti-liberal rhetoric. Analyses carried out by the Centre for Research on Prejudice (*Centrum badań nad Uprzedzeniami*) (2015) show that the National Radical Camp [ONR] was far ahead of all the other political groups in terms of xenophobic declarations.

Tab. 4. Percentage of extreme right slogans in Poland per political movement

Slogan	Kukiz'15	RN	ONR	KORWiN
Liberal economy and EU-like law	21.2	27.3	9.1	42.4
No to international institutions	23.3	23.3	36.7	16.7
Anti-liberal slogans	5.0	10.0	55.0	30.0
Anti-systemic slogans	11.8	23.5	35.3	29.4
Xenophobic slogans	7.1	25.0	60.7	7.1
Polish pride	35.0	35.0	20.0	10.0
Authoritarian law	16.7	37.5	25.0	20.8

Source: Background of right-wing electoral preference among young Poles (Centre for Research on Prejudice, 2015).

If we analyse the distribution of slogans (%) within the ONR narration, it appears that xenophobic slogans prevail, while criticism of liberalism of lifestyle and aversion towards international institution both come second (*ex equo*).

Tab. 5. Distribution of slogans within ONR narration

Slogan	ONR
Liberal economy and EU-like law	5.2
No to international institutions	19.0
Anti-liberal slogans	19.0
Anti-systemic slogans	10.3
Xenophobic slogans	29.3
Polish pride	6.9
Authoritarian law	10.3

Source: Background of right-wing electoral preference among young Poles (Centre for Research on Prejudice, 2015).

Co-existence of xenophobic and anti-liberal slogans supports the thesis of transformational moral panic. The National Radical Camp would make part of the culture

war between conservatism and liberalism within the Polish society. When we look more closely at the content of right-wing xenophobic slogans, it will turn out that the figure of the Stranger is interchangeable – it can be a Gypsy, Jew or a Muslim refugee, while the anti-liberal content remains invariable.

Tab. 6. Examples of xenophobic and anti-liberal slogans in right-wing narration

Xenophobic slogans	White power Gypsies are worse than Jews because they live in our cities Threat of immigration Multi-cultural model is dangerous and false "No" to the newcomers from other countries No mercy for enemies of Polishness
Anti-liberal slogans	A boy and a girl make a normal family Anti-liberalism in the area of lifestyle No way for gay In defence of political correctness Protection of family understood as marriage of man and woman and protection of life from conception

Source: Background of right-wing electoral preference among young Poles (Centre for Research on Prejudice, 2015).

If left-liberal milieus for years have been defending different „minorities" and social „varieties" (sexual, ethnic, religious etc.) – earlier – Jews and Gypsies, today – refugees – then acting against refugees equals a new „war" with liberals and "extreme leftists". Let us quote again a passage from the Prague declaration read out during the anti-immigrant demonstration „Against Islamization of Europe" (6.02.2016): *We are prepared to act and counteract political Islam, extremist regimes and their* **European collaborators**. *If there are so few refugees in Poland*[16], *emotional aversion towards asylum seekers is de facto addressed to the „collaborators" i.e. political opponents – the liberal left. Let us note that in this culture dispute, presence or absence of real refugees in Poland is of secondary importance.*

In order to support the thesis of culture conflict permeating the dispute over refugees, it is worth reading the study by Justyna Kajta (2016) on the identity of members of the Polish nationalist movement[17]. The author was trying to answer the following questions: who are contemporary nationalists and what do they protest against? Kajta diagnosed a non-class character of the nationalist movement and community building

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16   Since 1992 the refugee status was awarded to over 4 thousand people, mostly Russian nationals: over 2 thousand Russians, 426 Syrians, 390 nationals of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 248 Belarussians and 232 Somalians (Pawłowska 2017). After the terrorist attacks in Brussels, Polish government led by Beata Szydło withdrew its declaration to admit 7 thousand refugees in Poland under the relocation policy.

17   Kajta carried out 30 biographical, narrative interviews with members of All-Polish Youth, National radical Camp, National rebirth of Poland between 2011 and 2015. Additionally, the author analysed texts published on the websites of these organizations.

based on the identity and cultural issue. Polish nationalists protest against the social and political situation in Poland – they criticise „fake" political transformation, hypocrisy of the world of media and politics, and finally see a threat to the family (e.g. by promoting aberrance and gender ideology by liberal circles, feminists, EU policies) and the threat to the national identity by uprooting Polish history and tradition in favour of atheist, multi-cultural society. Polish national movement is therefore building a protest identity which is anti-systemic and anti-liberal.

Transformational panic as a manifestation of culture war

The phenomenon of moral panic, described by Cohen in 1970s, has not become outdated. To the contrary, the development of global media and new form of global risk have led to a continued presence of media and transformational panic in the old and new media and in public space. Beck (2012) was right to point out a new element in a risk society, namely staging risk and using it for political purposes. Constructionist potential of panic allows us to create alternative narrations about the world, exaggerate real threat, manipulate facts and figures, and in consequence effectively manage the „risk society".

   Each risk, and even more a great, transnational risk is wanted news and a starting point for the Ulrich Bertram media panic. The latter guarantees high viewership of the media which promote it. Variety of different forms of risk and media panic is a way to maintain a sense of potential threat in a society (Beck 2012), which in turn is in the interest of those who build their political capital on social fear. Lack of sense of safety which manifests itself by a chronic economic, political and social-cultural uncertainty paves the way for transformational panic. People who are uncertain about tomorrow seek support in traditional values and communities and turn their backs to liberal ideology which offers dangerous excess of freedom. Over four decades after the explosion of counterculture, after its ideas were absorbed by mainstream culture – proportions have been reversed. Today we can talk of a dynamic change of forces: it is traditional, conservative, fundamental culture which is being reborn as a new counterculture in the world of relative, nihilist, liquid modernity (Pasamonik 2015). In consequence, it is the left-liberal culture which defends today their bulwarks: freedom of custom and minority rights. Transformational moral panic is a new opening of the old culture.

   After the political transformation in 1989, Poland rapidly followed the trajectory of Western culture. Political and economic transformation entailed secularization, liberalization and relativity of culture as well as growing individualism and social consumerism. On the other hand, increasing social inequality, economic crisis of 2008, progressing precarization of middle class and the present migration crisis destroyed the young social, political and economic stability. In these conditions, in Poland a local movement of conservative and nationalist counterculture (anti-liberal and anti-left) is being born. In the eyes of the radical right wingers, reluctant to refugees, multi-culturalism is unwanted as it has a similar power to that of gender – to make traditional culture relative. Therefore, panic about refugees is yet another face of the same culture

war between fundamentalism and relativism, which was earlier hailed by transformational panic around homosexuality (2005) and gender (2013).

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Teachers-to-be and Islam. Has a change taken place?

Kandydaci na nauczycieli wobec islamu. Czy zaszła zmiana?

Streszczenie

Artykuł zawiera analizę porównawczą wyników sondażu diagnostycznego (w połączeniu z narzędziem fluencji werbalnej) przeprowadzonego dwukrotnie (czerwiec 2015 i 2016) wśród studentów Uniwersytetu Jana Kochanowskiego w Kielcach kończących nauczycielskie studia licencjackie na kierunku pedagogika. W przypadku badanych – studentów specjalności Edukacja wczesnoszkolna i przedszkolna, zgodnie z obowiązującymi standardami kształcenia nauczycieli, wraz z uzyskaniem tytułu licencjata stają się oni pełnoprawnymi nauczycielami. Prezentowane tu badania przebiegały w zróżnicowanych okolicznościach społeczno-politycznych dotyczących uchodźców i migrantów, szczególnie wyznawców islamu. W czerwcu 2015 r. było niemal pewne, że absolwenci podejmujący pracę w szkole bądź przedszkolu spotkają na swej drodze zawodowej ucznia/wychowanka i jego rodziców – przedstawicieli obcej kultury i religii. Zakładano, że w grupie tej znajdą się również wyznawcy islamu. Świadczyły o tym ustalenia Komisji Europejskiej w sprawie przyjęcia przez kraje członkowskie określonych liczb („kwot") uchodźców przybywających na nasz kontynent, głównie z krajów Afryki Północnej. Intencją autorki było wówczas poznanie gotowości studentów na przyjęcie „innego", ich podstawowej wiedzy na temat islamu oraz stosunku do jego wyznawców zarówno w aspekcie pracy pedagogicznej, jak i życia prywatnego. Wraz ze zmianami na polskiej arenie politycznej, wobec kolejnych (po ataku na m.in. redakcję „Charlie Hebdo" w Paryżu) głośnych wydarzeń z udziałem muzułmanów (np. noc sylwestrowa w Kolonii) nastąpił (nie)spodziewany zwrot. Zgoda na przybycie do Polski imigrantów została wycofana. Media wręcz „bombardowały" informacjami na temat niebezpiecznego islamu. W tej sytuacji autorkę zainteresowało, na ile wśród kolejnego rocznika kandydatów na nauczycieli zmieniła się podstawowa wiedza o tej religii, ich nastawienie do wyznawców Allaha oraz opinia na temat stosunku Europejczyków do nich. Wyniki badań, na tle rozważań teoretycznych, opisuje poniższy artykuł.

Słowa kluczowe: wielokulturowość, islam, islamofobia, nauczyciel, wiedza, tolerancja

Abstract

The article contains a comparative analysis of the diagnostic survey results (in conjunction with the verbal fluency tool) conducted twice (June 2015 and 2016) among Jan Kochanowski University's students, BA undergraduates, major of studies – pedagogics. The respondents have been the students of Early and Preschool Education Faculty. In accordance with the teachers training standards, those who obtain bachelor degree are regarded fully-qualified teachers. The research-project presented in this article was carried out in diversified socio-political circumstances when it comes to relations with refugees and migrants, especially Muslims follower. In June of 2015 it was almost certain that graduates who start working at schools or kindergartens would meet representatives of foreign cultures and religion – students / pupils and their parents. It was assumed that this group would also comprise Muslims, as the result of the European Commission's schemes under which specific numbers of refugees (the so-called "quotas"), mainly from North African countries were to be to relocated into the EU Member States. At that time the author's intention was to examine whether students were ready to accept the "others" and what was the student's basic knowledge about Islam. The author also wanted to examine the students' attitudes in the context of pedagogical work and private life. The changes in the Polish political arena, news-front-page incident (like the attack on Paris-based "Charlie Hebdo" editorial office) which involved Muslims (e.g. New Year's Eve in Cologne) triggered an (un)expected change. Poland revoked its consent for immigrants relocation. The media openly "bombarded" viewers with information about how dangerous Islam might be. In this situation, the author became interested in how much the-then teacher-candidates had changed fundamental knowledge and attitudes towards the Allah followers as well as their opinion on Europeans' attitude towards Muslims. The research results supported with theoretical considerations are described in the article.

Keywords: multiculturalism, Islam, Islamophobia, teacher, knowledge, tolerance.

Introduction

Presence of Muslims in Europe, especially immigrants and refugees has become a more open, controversial and difficult socio-political problem to solve. In Western countries, Allah followers, representatives of different nations and factions of Islam have become an integral part of social life. At the same time this part of the continent is affected with Islamic fundamentalists attacks (ISIS), e.g. the attack on the "Charlie Hebdo" editorial office in Paris, immigrants offence (e.g. New Year's Eve in Cologne, etc.). They cause anxiety and even panic, which aggravates migration crisis. Many Europeans no longer accept otherness, incompatible with the patterns based upon their qualities (Bauman, 2016). Lack of acceptance, according to Nilufer Gole fuels "political manipulations" (Göle, 2016, p. 56) of the representatives of the extreme right-wing movements which have gained increased popularity and have come to power, e.g. Marine Le Pene, Viktor Orban. This group also comprises Polish politicians.

Zygmunt Bauman calls this governance technique the "securitization" (Bauman, 2016, p. 35). Securitization is associated with increasing sense of insecurity. Migrants have been accused of infectious diseases transmission (Jaroslaw Kaczynski), of the

intention to become social parasites, of plans to convert Europe to Islam (e.g. Czech President Milos Zeman). After Viktor Orban's claim that all terrorists are migrants, Hungarian respondents said that the word "fear" is now more associated with terrorism than with illness, poverty or crime (Bauman, 2016, p. 40, 95). For 83% of Poles surveyed by Ziad Abou Saleh and Marek Bodziany, every Arab is a terrorist (Saleh & Bodziany, 2016). There is a similar perception of Muslims in many other countries, regardless of the differences between them, immigrants types and even absence – said Göle (2016 p. 276).

How does this situation affect the candidates to the teaching profession who under the Teacher's Charter act are obliged to take care "about students' moral and civic attitudes development in accordance with the idea of democracy, peace and friendship between people of different nations, races and beliefs" (Karta Nauczyciela, 2011, chapter 2, p. 6). There was one-year interval between surveys (June 2015 and June 2016). The survey was designed to examine teachers candidates', i.e. Jan Kochanowski University students' basic knowledge about Islam. This examination included opinion survey with regards to Europeans' and students' attitude towards Muslims. The examination incorporated diagnostic survey using tools enhanced with verbal fluency tool (Gawda, Szepietowska, 2015). The examinations were held in different socio-political circumstances. In 2015 (before the parliamentary elections) it was assumed that Poland would accept the immigrants / refugees quotas determined by the European Commission. It was almost certain that some of the graduates would meet Muslim pupils. However, the situation has changed with the advent of the new, right-wing government which does not agree for the "others" to come to Poland. Muslim followers, even those whose countries (e.g. Syria) are at war, are not welcome in Poland. This has been demonstrated with numerous media discussions and the ruling, right-wing politicians' declarations. As the result of "securitization" and stereotypes change reinforcement, has a change occurred among teacher-candidates?

Before further research was conducted, it was assumed that the attitude towards Muslims and the opinion about Europeans' attitude towards Muslims has been negatively affected. Basic knowledge of Islam however has expanded alongside the media discourse. Study on the Muslim religion also contains some aspects respondents' religiousness, as it was the case of 2015's examination (Lendzion, 2016).

Research analysis

The 2015's survey incorporated 123 third-year students of pedagogy, speciality – Early School and Pre-School Education. In the consecutive study (2016) there were 115 respondents. The smaller number is owed to the decline in the number of students at the faculty. In addition to early-education teacher-candidates, the students of educational psycho-pedagogy also took part in the survey. The graduate profile holds it that graduates are to work in the capacity of school pedagogical counsellor.

The questionnaire contained 8 questions – closed, open and semi-open ones.

The first question set concerned determination of respondents' religious / cultural identity. The task of respondents was to name their denomination and the degree

of religious commitment (on a *hot, warm, cold* scale). Non-believers were also taken into consideration. The number of the latter in comparison with the previous year's survey has increased from 2 to 5%. One person identified themselves as an apostate.

Both studies show that only a small number of future teachers can accurately name their own denomination. The vast majority, including those who declare "hot degree" of religious involvement (36% – 2015; 35% – 2016) defined themselves too broadly as Christian. In this group the number of respondents' answers of this kind has increased from 52 to 65%. At the same time, the group of people who were able to define properly their religion increased as a Roman Catholic increased (from 7 to 12%). Among the students who declared "warm degree" of religious commitment, the number of the Roman Catholic Church followers decreased from 10 to 4%. In 2015, none of the respondents who declared "cold degree" of religious commitment provided a full name of their denomination. The following year it was 16% (Roman Catholic denomination). Other students, regardless their declared level of religious commitment, mostly defined themselves as Catholics.

Therefore a question may be asked. Is it justified to study the level of basic knowledge with regards to other religions and followers' attitudes towards other religions in the situation when the majority of respondents show a sense of ignorance towards the religion they declare to be followers of?

Despite this dilemma and in accordance with the research plan, the following part of the questionnaire inquires whether Islam is one of the world's major religions. Contrary to expectations, the level of knowledge has not improved in this respect. Compared to last year, 5% of respondents more gave the affirmative answer (84%). The number of students who gave the negative answer has increased (from 6 to 10%). Also slightly greater number of people (10/11%) were unable to answer this question.

The respondents were also asked about their knowledge of Islam-related figures. In this area the hypothesis has been confirmed – knowledge level has improved. More respondents (41%) compared to 2015's survey (26%) said that they are familiar with these figures, 62% (in 2015 – 56%) mentioned Allah. Fewer people however (20/11%) pointed out to Allah and Muhammad. There was 11% increase in people who know only of Muhammad (23%). In 2016 one student pointed out Aisha next to Muhammad. Other student knows "Muhammad and Fatima – his daughter." It should be noted that in both the first and the second study, Buddha (?) was mentioned in individual cases. In contrast however, in 2016 Dalai Lama (?) was not mentioned.

In the next part of the study, verbal fluency elements were used, o.e. the tools that assume that "studying a language we refer to the meaning, the way a person understands a notion" (Gawda, Szepietowska, 2015, p. 58).

Teacher-candidates were asked to provide four words, phrases or expressions they believe are associated with Islam. There was a slight increase in the number of people (3/5%) who did not provide even one word. Compared to the previous survey, there was a 19% increase of those who offered 4 associations, in 2016 it was 72% of respondents. This group and the words, expressions and phrases respondents offered in both studies require a more thorough examination. Summary is presented in the table below.

Tabel 1

words / phrases / expressions	2015 (N = 65)	%	2015 (N = 65)	%
terrorism, terrorist attacks, terrorists	9	13,8	28	33,7
war, army, fight, battle, weapons	7	10,7	23	27,7
Koran	17	26,1	21	25,3
Allah	9	13,9	21	25,3
assaults, cruelty, ruthlessness, pain	2	3,07	18	21,7
woman deprived of rights, lack of respect for women, men's power over the family	12	18,5	16	19,3
religion	15	23,1	12	14,4
other (deep) faith, denomination	17	26,1	12	14,4
mosque	14	21,5	10	12,0
burqa	3	4,6	10	12,0
aggression, violence, assault, mistreatment, hostility	8	12,3	11	13,2
women's covered body, women's covered faces	6	9,2	9	10,8
daily prayer, frequent prayer, 5 times a day	13	20,0	8	9,6
bigotry, chauvinism, xenophobia, dictatorship, no compromise	2	3,1	8	9,6
Mohammed	–	–	7	8,4
bomb, bomb blasts	1	1,5	6	7,2
death, man–slaughter, murder, killer, killing of innocent people, crimes	3	4,6	6	7,2
strictness, hard rules, dictatorship, obedience, loyalty, imposing views	5	7,7	6	7,2
fear	1	1,5	5	6,0
killing in the name of faith	–	–	5	6,0
suicides	–	–	5	6,0
hostility, persecutions	–	–	5	6,0
Turban	–	–	5	6,0
rigour / rigorism, strict laws, strict rules, disciplines, bans	11	16,9	4	4,8
Arabs	1	1,5	4	4,8
evil, bad people	1	1,5	4	4,8
Jihad	–	–	4	4,8

words / phrases / expressions	2015 (N = 65)	%	2015 (N = 65)	%
Sharia, obligations, exact knowledge of the Koran, respect for values	–	–	4	4,8
refugees	–	–	3	3,6
punishment	–	–	2	2,4
Allah Akbar	–	–	2	2,4
Ramadan	–	–	2	2,4
abstinence	–	–	2	2,4
garments, scarves, specific outfits	2	2,1	2	2,4
lack of respect and acceptance for other religions, faith imposing / defense	2	2,1	2	2,4
gold, glamour, magnitude, wealth	2	2,1	2	2,4
poverty, poor children	1	1,5	2	2,4
limited freedom	1	1,5	2	2,4

Source: Own research

In addition to the words contained in the table, in 2016 there were new, isolated words, expressions and phrases:
  » Mecca
  » "There is one God, Muhammad is His Prophet"
  » monotheistic religion
  » outlook on life
  » strange laws
  » Bin Laden
  » beating women
  » female circumcision
  » polygamy
  » Turkey
  » Iraq
Besides, isolated words, expressions and phrases have found a place in both studies.
  » different values system
  » chaos, defeat
  » hatred
  » Far East
  » Heat
The analysis of the data presented above proves the initial assumption; the number of teacher candidates who associate Islam with terror, war, attacks, aggression, difficult situation of women etc. has significantly increased. It needs to be emphasized that there are more associations which demonstrate basic information about Islam – Allah or Mohammed. Besides negative associations, there were also isolated terms

such as Ramadan, Mecca, "There is one God, Muhammad is His prophet," or Islamic countries – Turkey and Iraq. The number of people who associate Islam with gold and wealth has not changed; this is probably owed to the United Arab Emirates. The word refugee has appeared for the first time.

It should be emphasized that there was an increase in the number of people (3/12%) whose "associations set" included only items devoid of negative emotions, e.g. Mosque, Arab, Muslim, burqa; the Koran, deep faith, prayer, Allah. There is slightly fewer people (10.8 / 8.2%) who see Islam only through the prism of war and terror.

The consecutive question was – "Are Europeans are afraid of Muslims?". 96% of the students gave affirmative answers. As assumed, this number is higher (by 10%) than in the previous year's survey. When asked to identify the causes for the concerns, the respondents mainly referred to fear of terror attacks, holy war (61%). In this respect, the number of 2016's survey responses increased by 22% compared to the previous year's examination. Another reason (53%) was a threat for Christian Europe. In 2015, on 22% of students indicated this cause. In both studies, there was a similar number of responses (below 10%) related to the following causes of concern: lack of knowledge about Islam, Europeans' intolerance for other religions, impact of stereotypes and the media information.

Those 2016's respondents who believe that Europeans are not afraid of Muslims (4%) emphasize that Christianity has been and will remain our continent's main religion, we are strong and we able to win every war. Last year, 14% of this future-teachers group felt that Europeans admitted other peoples' right to profess their religion, they respect other religions' representatives, Europeans are tolerant and open-minded.

Given the course of studies the respondents are about to graduate, the author was interested in whether the undergraduates were ready to work with a Muslim student / pupil. Compared to the first study (67%), the number of those who declared to be ready has slightly decreased (63%). Fewer teachers-to-be consider themselves to be tolerant (30/19%). There has been an increase in the number of those who believe that pupil's religion is irrelevant and all pupils should be treated equally (34/42%). A small group of respondents claimed that "the child has not chosen their faith" (4/6%), and that "children's views can still be shaped" (2/4%). In 2016, new reasons were indicated by the respondents. 14% of respondents say that not every Islam representative is an evil person; 7% intend to separate work from their world-views and 4% see working with Muslim pupils as a possibility of mutual knowledge transfer with regards to religions and cultures. One person is of the opinion that "a child does not have such radical views". Another person believes that: "This is only a child, perhaps has not yet been dominated by the religion." Someone else would like "to show what other religions are like." There is also a student interested in the culture of the Middle East and therefore keen to work with the Muslim pupils.

23% of respondents (1% fewer than last year) are of the opposite opinion. 54% admit that they have not had this kind of knowledge and experience. In 2015 this response was given by 88% teacher candidates. In the second study, fear of Islam was expressed by 35% of the respondents, 11% admitted that they did not know any Islam representatives. Such opinions were not expressed in the previous year's study.

This year's respondents explain that, e.g.: "I do not know this religion and I do not want to become familiar with that"; "I do not know how I would react to their [pupils']

aggression"; "I do not know whether I would be able to approach such a student without bias." Someone other respondent does not know how they could "work with people who are taught to be aggressive ever since they are born." Another person would not overcome their reservations "to work with such a student because of students' evil intentions." Other person would be afraid about their lives and children. One candidate teacher clearly declares their "cultural prejudice and intolerance towards Islam representatives."

Students were also asked about their opinion on Christian-Muslim marriages and families. In both studies, those who did not have an opinion were the largest group (43/50%). There was a considerable decrease from 35 to 20% of students who claim that such relations may be successful ("It depends on the partnership relations"). At the same time the number of opponents increased from 22 to 30%. In their opinion, such mixed marriages have no chance of surviving ("Europeans are converted, not vice versa").

The author of the study was also interested in seeing to what extent teacher candidates are open for closer relations with Islam followers (e.g. are they ready to neighbour Islam followers). As expected, the number of people ready to establish such contacts decreased in 2016 by 19% (from 84 to 56%).

28% of this year's respondents (compared to previous year's 41%) believe that a religion does not show what is man's real nature. Besides, not every Muslim is a bad person. 17% (previous year – 26%) of respondents think that such relations offer new experience, allow to become familiar with Islamic culture and religion. Respondents in the second study say (15%) that Muslims are people like us. Unlike 2015's study, 26% of students declared that they were open for the establishing closer relations with Muslims, however under certain conditions. They do now want to be imposed Muslim religion, Christianity ought to be accepted by the other party; they need to become more familiar before establishing a relation and establish trust; find common interests; avoid harm. One person writes: "If these are true Islam followers who respect their religion and principles – I would certainly develop a closer relation." There were also such statements as: "Every day I would think whether they would be able to harm another person"; "In the beginning I would be careful, mainly because of my little daughter"; "I do not think they would harm me if I'm good for them." Some other person writes: "Personally, I am a Christian and I do not care about others' faith."

53% of respondents declare reluctance to establish close relations with relations with Islam followers (previous year it was 50%); fears, anxiety, possible conflicts and religion-related persecution are expressed in the study (e.g. "I would be worried about my life, because I am an active Catholic," "I do not know what they are capable of," "They do not respect our religion"). 26% of respondents in this year's study are not open ("I think they should live in their own countries", "Too many cultural differences", "Their lifestyle, so distant from European style would be problematic"). 10% declare that they do not know Islam representatives (previous year – 20%), and 4% demonstrate their mistrust. 8% of respondents did not explain their choice, which was not the case n 2015's survey.

The author of the study, taking into account the variable degree of the students' religious involvement has decided to analyse selected areas with regards to those who declared to be "hot" Christianity followers, i.e. the followers of the religion in which

love to God and every human being is the highest value. This group has most significantly demonstrated the decline in the number of students (89/40%) who are open to establish closer relations with Islam followers. There was a decline from 73 to 63% in the number of students ready to work with a Muslim student / pupil. At the same time the number of reluctant to work with the Muslim child (23/20%) decreased compared to those who do not have an opinion (4/17%).

Analysis "hot" Christians' / Catholics' opinion about mixed (Christian-Muslim) marriages follows the rend shown before – there was a decline in the number of respondents (34/19%) who believe that such a relation can be successful. Thus, compared to 2015's results, the percentage of students who disbelieve such relation can survive (18/27%) and those who have no opinion (48/54%) have increased.

Perhaps in spite of a deeper than the average religious involvement declared by the respondents (imprecise determination of their denomination allows to assume that the respondents are the Roman Catholic Church members), the respondent do not listen carefully enough to Pope Francis' message or they interpret the message in their own way. They probably have not reached to the Vatican Council relevant and applicable documents. One of the documents, dated 1965 – *Declaration on the Relation of the Church with Non-Christian Religions* reads that the Catholic Church has revised its attitude towards non-Christian religious communities. The Church requires its members to witness to Christian faith and in love to establish dialogue and cooperation with followers of other religions, to explore their socio-cultural values. This also applies to Muslims. Despite the fact that "in the course of centuries not a few quarrels and hostilities have arisen between Christians and Moslems, this sacred synod urges all to forget the past and to work sincerely for mutual understanding and to preserve as well as to promote together for the benefit of all mankind social justice and moral welfare, as well as peace and freedom." (Deklaracja, 2002, p. 335).

The study indicates that neither the *Teacher's Charter Act* provisions quoted in the introduction nor the Vatican document affect the attitude towards Muslims demonstrated by future teachers – a particular professional group that greatly influences the public opinion. Will this group become a part of today's dominant discourse based on fears? Or they may decide to resist the stereotypes and independently seek knowledge necessary to shape their opinion based on tolerance and Christian love?

The research results / Discussion

The survey analysis confirmed the initial hypothesis. It has been demonstrated, as assumed that there has been a negative change in the attitudes towards Muslims and the opinion about Europeans' attitudes towards Muslims. Compared to the previous year's survey there is a greater number of statements indicating antipathy towards Muslims both in private and future professional life. However, basic knowledge of Islam, though rather superficial has increased. Compare to 2015 there has been a greater number of emotionally neutral words, phrases or expressions which are characteristic of the controversial religion.

It is hoped that the will "normalize" with teacher-candidates ready for lifelong self-education. Over one-year period Poland has started to be considered "a selfish nationalist country." This expression was used by Guisi Nicolini – the mayor of the Italian island of Lampedusa – the destination for thousands of immigrants from Africa many of whom never reach the island because they drown during the Mediterranean Sea voyage. The article heroine was called "Conscience of Europe" who treats newcomers on a par with the natives. For her Poland has so far been associated with solidarity (*Żyła,* 2017 p. 12). "What happened to you, Polish brethren?" – asks Bassam Aouil, a psychology professor, a Syrian who has lived in Poland for 22 years noting the wave of hatred, xenophobia and contempt expressed in the streets, in the media and on the Internet (Zdanowicz, 2017, p. 36).

One cannot stay indifferent in the face of these facts. Therefore education is necessary. Especially teachers (this includes teacher candidates) should feel the need to expand their knowledge regarding Islamic culture, religion and civilization. "There is no other way to fight Islamophobia than fighting with lack of knowledge" (Tahar Ben Jelloun, 2015, p. 132). Criticism of Islam should be complemented with thorough knowledge on the differences between Sunnism and Shiism, between the Afghan Taliban and the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. "Sharia is referred to without specifying the meaning of the term. Everything is confused: political issues, nasty terrorism, opium wars, stoning of unfaithful wives, veiling, wearing a full burqa, fanatics' preaching and spirituality-related texts, Saudi Arabia Islam and for example, the French Islam" (Tahar Ben Jelloun, 2015, p. 8).

"Ordinary Muslims" – immigrants living in Europe scared of vicious attacks in the name of Islam should be considered. It is worth knowing that on 10 September 2014 in the UK, an international campaign *Not In My Name* was established as the expression of Europeans' civic attitude. The organization condemns the atrocities of the so-called Islamic State (Goals, 2016, p. 284). One must not forget that many Muslim immigrants belong to the European middle class, many of them are representatives of highly valued professions; they work as lawyers, doctors, artists in all field of art, business-people, non-governmental organizations members. They try to "unite their faith and culture with citizenship" (Göle, 2016, p. 11), however in today's situation they are becoming less visible.

This knowledge is essential because, according to Zygmunt Bauman mass migration is not likely to finish (Bauman, 2016, p. 11). Therefore it can be assumed that some of the teacher-candidates who have taken part in the study will soon start and even have already started their professional life in one of Western Europe's countries. Meeting Muslims not only in the street, but also in the place where teachers live, at school is inevitable. Therefore teachers should be prepared for such encounters. I wish they had been prepared by schools and universities.

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The peaceful expansion of the English language in Europe. A tool of integration or a facet of quiet colonization?

Pokojowa ekspansja języka angielskiego w Europie. Narzędzie integracji czy nowe oblicze cichej kolonizacji?

Streszczenie

Rozważania dotyczą korzyści i negatywnych zjawisk towarzyszących ekspansji języka angielskiego w Europie w kontekście historycznym, politycznym, kulturowym i społecznym w optyce pedagogiki społecznej, teorii krytycznej i myśli post-kolonialnej.

Wieloaspektowe spojrzenie na zagadnienie ekspansji języka angielskiego w Europie obejmuje przykłady polityki „English as the second language" i „English as the foreign language", przytoczone zostają dane statystyczne dotyczące nauczania języka angielskiego w krajach europejskich. Omówione zostaje zjawisko hegemonii języka angielskiego wśród języków obcych w Europie, specjalizacji języka angielskiego na potrzeby biznesu, nauki, medycyny czy nowych technologii. Przywołany zostaje fenomen tzw. „Pidgin English" i przejęcie integracyjno-komunikacyjnej misji uwspólnienia języka komunikacji międzynarodowej przez angielski, uzurpowanej sobie przez Esperanto. Poruszona zostaje teza, że język angielski jest pewnego rodzaju narzędziem kolonizacji, z pozycji władzy i uprzywilejowania, lecz równocześnie jest zawłaszczany i re-kolonizowany przez kraje poddane jego misji cywilizacyjnej, w akcie oporu i odzyskania sprawczej roli przez podmioty podporządkowane jego oddziaływaniu. Motywem przewodnim zawartych w tekście analiz są rozważania nad tym, na ile znajomość języka angielskiego lub jej brak staje się coraz istotniejszym polem ekskluzji/inkluzji społecznej, powiązanej w znaczącym stopniu z kapitałem społecznym, kulturowym i ekonomicznym jednostek z różnych warstw społecznych.

Słowa kluczowe: kolonizacja, integracja, język, tożsamość, globalizacja

Abstract

The paper serves as an invitation to rethink the global growth of English. It refers to the benefits and adverse effects associated with the English language expansion in Europe, in historical,

political and cultural contexts. The findings of the paper are framed by the optics of social pedagogy, critical theory and post-colonial thought.

The analysis includes issues of expansion of the English language in Europe, reflected in the policy of „English as the second language" and „English as the foreign language". Statistical data on the teaching of English in European countries is presented. Furthermore, the discussion draws on the phenomenon of English language hegemony amongst foreign languages in Europe and the specialization of English for business, science, medicine and new technologies. The emergence of so-called „Pidgin English" is discussed, along with the subtle acquisition of Esperanto's mission by the English language, which was to find a common language for integration and communication between different nations. The paper stresses that the English language may be viewed as a tool of colonization, from a position of power and privilege, but at the same time becomes appropriated and re-colonized by the subjects of its civilizing mission, in an act of resistance and repossession of the participatory and empowered role of the subordinated entities of its impact. The leitmotif of the paper can be summarized by a question to what extent knowledge of English or the lack of such knowledge may increasingly become a significant field of social exclusion / inclusion, linked to social, cultural and economic capital of individuals from different social strata.

Keywords: colonization, integration, language, culture, identity, globalization

Introduction

English has undoubtedly become one of the dominant international languages of our time. The estimates by British Council (2013, p. 2) suggest that 1.75 billion people (one fourth of the global population) speak English to some extent. English language has an official language status not only in its nucleus, Great Britain, but in many different countries entangled in a colonial past: USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Barbados, Bermuda, Botswana, Hong Kong, Eritrea, Falklands, Figgie, Ghana, Gibraltar, India, Ireland, Jamaica, Cameroon, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Micronesia, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Puerto Rico, South Africa, Rwanda, Samoa, Seashells, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe and more.

This paper contains questions about the beneficiaries and the disadvantaged of this language expansion, making a claim that an enabler of communication may also be viewed as a dangerous extension of a post-colonial power. The paper does not aspire to look at studying English from a linguistic, neo-linguistic, or semiotic point of view, but from a socio-political one. The findings form a theoretical contribution based on: the desk analysis of statistical data about learning English in Europe and historical accounts that demonstrate the links between language, politics and the colonization processes. The framing of the latter consists of a variety of post-colonial discourses and critical theories, engaged with power relations and their academic deconstructions.

English dominance in numbers

In the year 2013 Eurostat agency published statistical data that has shown that over 80 percent of European Union pupils in elementary schools, learn English as a foreign

language[1]. Studying English at elementary school level is compulsory in 14 EU countries. According to Eurydice (2014), the starting age for the compulsory learning of English, varies between the countries, ranging from 4 to 10 years old, with the majority of countries starting at age of 6–8. The effectiveness of this early start for studying English as a foreign language is backed up by the theory of Penfield and Roberts who proved the plasticity of the 7–9 year old brain, which allows for easier and permanent absorption of a foreign language's system models (Pamula 2004). The statistical indicators of studying English as a foreign language grow with transition to higher levels of education, reaching 94 percent of students learning English as a foreign language in the EU's upper secondary schools. Moreover, learning English as a foreign language in majority of the EU member states is obligatory in secondary education[2].

The popularity of English increased with the accession of new member states, that wanted to break up with their „soviet" past and open towards the western 'English-centric' future. New member states wanted to accomplish a similar level of scholastic achievement to their western EU peers. The expansion of the English language in recent years may be observed when looking at the age cohorts of the EU citizens and their knowledge of English. There is a clear trend showing that the younger the person is and the better educated that person is, equates with a better knowledge of English. European education promotes English as the second language (Fig. 1 and 2).

Although the European Union as a transnational institution has 24 official languages in use for EU business, politicians and civil servants choose English as the most efficient and most common language of international communication. The Bologna process for the unification of higher education across the EU, initiated foreign language certification at university level and the English language is currently the most commonly chosen by students. English is the official language of NATO and the UN. Participation in these international organizations makes English a desirable asset. English is the only foreign language towards which all EU countries have some legal regulations at all educational levels. EU programmes related to vocational activation, entrepreneurship and the development of professional personnel in various sectors of employment, often offer courses in English as support tools. The popularization of English is enhanced by mobility programmes for students and staff. Amongst them the most commonly spread are: ERASMUS, Lingua, Step traineeships, CEEPUS „Central European Exchange Program for University Studies", EURAXESS for the mobility of researchers, Visegrad Fund, Copernicus, Kosciuszko Foundation, Fulbright Foundation and the European Social Fund (devoted to the promotion of international cooperation and studying English).

Globalization and the corresponding Americanization is deeply rooted in the global expansion of transnational corporations, international governmental and non-governmental organizations, financial ad quantitative dominance of US cinematography pop-culture and the transfer of new technologies dominated by Anglo-Saxon

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[1] European Day of Languages. More than 80% of primary school pupils in the EU were studying a foreign language in 2013, Eurostat newsrelease164/2015 – 24 September 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7008563/3–24092015-AP-EN.pdf/bf8be07c-ff9d-406b-88f9-f98f5199fe5a.

[2] Foreign language learning statistics, Eurostat, January 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Foreign_language_learning_statistics#Secondary_education.

vocabulary. According to Swales (1997) the increasing domination of English in global communication is absolutely unstoppable. McArthr (2004, p. 3) shows that the expansion of the English language is a substantial expression of socio-economic globalization. This concept agrees with Anthony Giddens' outlook into the results and means of globalization, achieved through intensified contacts. Such contacts are facilitated by the use of a single language. English can be perceived as taking on a mission once reserved for Esperanto, only more accepted, educationally desired and supported by the joint forces of global politics and business with a long-term history of conquest and dissemination.

Fig. 1. Most popular languages taught in the EU
Source: Foreign language learning statistics, Eurostat 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Foreign_language_learning_statistics#Secondary_education

A brief look back in history

English was used in the Transatlantic slave trade, during the times of Imperial Britain, placing British settlers in multiple locations around the globe, leading to a wide spread of English around the world (Sekhar, 2012). A good example of the fast growing population of English speakers come from trading with native Americans in English and the war with the French in North America in the eighteen hundreds, leading to linguistic dominance there (Gramley, 2012). Crystal (1997) proves that within 200 years of colonization, English speakers grew in numbers from five million to a 250 million by the mid nineteenth century.

Longmore (2005) studied the impact of native tongues of other, non-English colonial settlers (mainly from Ireland, Scotland, Sweden, Netherlands, Germany, Spain,

Fig. 2. Most studied languages in the EU in upper secondary education
Source: Foreign language learning statistics, Eurostat 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Foreign_language_learning_statistics#Secondary_education

France or Portugal) on the English language itself. He also found evidence of some influence of the indigenous people's languages in the colonized lands on the English language. His study shows that the linguistic exchange was not solely one-way. However, it is English that turned out to be dominant, expanded and became a global language.

Imperial powers took control of the education policy in colonized areas, imposing the study of English at schools and at universities. The Foucauldian concept of 'governmentality' (1997, 2007) comes to mind when confronted with commonly shared myths created by policy makers in India and other states controlled by Imperial Britain. Myths, related to personal success and prosperity, through solid education with a good standard of English. Moreover, the industrial revolution and technological expansion of the nineteenth and early twentieth century were heavily dominated by English speaking powers. Successful trade and business contracts required knowledge

of English, German or French (the historic colonial powers and the core of Europe's present integration). Furthermore emigration to the USA, UK or Australia was – and perhaps still is for many – a dream.

Language acquisition = culture acquisition?

Language is a tool of the representation of our internal and external world as much as it is for communication between each other (Gleason & Ratner 2005). Language is also an ingredient of one's social skills and of one's thinking about the world (Schaffer, 2013). Wygotski thought that language is a pre-condition for any change in the way of thinking and in the system of brain functioning, whilst Piaget gave it a more limited role, as a tool of secondary expression of pre-thought ideas.

N. Chmosky claimed that we are all equipped from birth with a „language acquisition device" (LAD), which allows us to incorporate grammar and learn the deeper structure of our own language (Pamuła, 2004). But what about acquiring a foreign language? N. Chomsky tried to prove that languages have similar grammar and do not differ from one another in a significant way, therefore the differences in learning different languages do not lead to differences in thinking. B.F. Skinner's behavioral theory of language acquisition in the social environment, shows that language acquisition happens by copying others, who reinforce the correct use of language (Schaffer, 2013). This theory is rather appealing when applied to learning a second language, but in conflict with naturalists who do not affirm the behavioral conditioning of language acquisition. J. Burner introduces an apt and more up to date theory within the interaction based a „Language Acquisition Support System" (LASS), where the social environment offers different forms of support and help in learning language, through dialog and interaction (Ibidem). This theory would be applicable when learning English as a second language in a natural English speaking environment, but also if the learning of English as a foreign language were to take place in controlled, laboratory conditions of full immersion in English. These highlight the main difference between learning English as a second language and as a foreign language. The difference lies with the context, the intensity of contact and the duration of immersion within the language. Learning English as a second language occurs in a natural, non-formal environment in a country, a community or a family, which uses English for natural everyday communication. Meanwhile, learning English as a foreign language occurs in a classroom, in the artificially created circumstances for its use, outside of a social environment that functions in English (Szpotowicz, 2009). Furthering this analysis, J. House (2003), distinguishes between two types of languages: "languages for communication" and "languages for identification". In this strict division, English becomes the tool of communication for the international community, enabling a transfer of information and exchange of communication, whilst shading away from the cultural implications. This seems to be only applicable when a conversation takes place between two non-native English speakers. Moreover this division seems to mask the aspects of cultural transmission within the language acquisition. The most commonly quoted early reference

to the cultural dimension of a second language is by Charlemagne, the ninth-century King of Franks, who apparently said that to „have a second language is to have a second soul". Culture is an important element of understanding and learning true meanings in the „foreign language", therefore studying of English requires the study of the culture as well as the language system itself (Arabski, 1997).

James D. Marshall (1995) notices that the new role of information technology entrenched with English has the effect of power over the IT users, which he calls the 'busnopower'. He also claims that languages shape both individuals and societies confirming the growth of the global English language power matrix. The inevitable impact of cultural transmission is noticeable and may lead to the perception of the wide spread of English language through the lens of post-colonial imperialism.

Peaceful colonization by language dominance?

Language distinction as a tool of stratification was widely discussed by Bourdieu when referring to class divisions. Similar phenomena may be observed amongst social groups with differing competencies in English. David Crystal (2003, 16) writes about the phenomenon of „linguistic power", which promotes native speakers of English and disadvantages non-native users of this global language. Szymczak (2014) supports the hypothesis that knowledge of English as a second language affects people's position in the social strata of EU countries and vice versa, in that social conditioning affects access to different levels of language acquisition. Caramella (2012, p. 107) goes even further with this critical hypothesis and makes claims that English is a cannibalistic language that slowly takes over other languages, bereaving them from their original identity.

Al-Dabbagh (2005) claims that English has become the „Latin" of today's civilized world. Robert Phillipson (1992) perceives English as a form of linguistic imperialism, which does not reflect a traditional militarized power, but rather a softer form of power, which is based on cultural and economic dominance. Whilst colonialism can be defined as a „relationship between an indigenous majority and a minority of foreign invaders (Osterhammel 1997)", the softness of the post-colonial power is observed in the 'invitation' from the indigenous majority to learn the language of the dominant players of the globalised economy. Modiano (2001) warns about the dangers to cultural identity of those who use English in everyday practice. Badry (2011) questions the level of homogeneity and heterogeneity of English, followed by Pan and Seargeant (2012) who also see the spread of English as a potential danger to some groups and communities.

Reading through the UK's recommendations for teaching English as a foreign language prepared by British Council, one may find confirmation for the key arguments raised in this paper[3] that highlight the advantages for the native English language

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[3]   „English has huge economic value for the UK, it supports trade and exports around the world and a thriving ELT sector at home. **It provides a significant competitive advantage in everything from soft power to commerce, to the media, to universities and academia; and delivers**

countries in the areas of: soft power, commerce, media, universities, global market, cultural industries and education systems (2013, p. 16). The recommendations recognize that English is an international asset, which gives the English native countries an underestimated advantage and a „competitive edge" (2013, p. 2).

This is not to say that the people of countries who share the experiences of learning English as a second language, could be treated as a homogenous „subaltern" collective (cf. Spivak 1988). Their experiences and their positions in the power equations must be as diverse as the heterogeneity of the global population. Nevertheless, they are subjected to a pre-existing linguistic domination regime, within which versatility is limited by the language origins, with a set of rules that control vocabulary, orthography, grammar, writing styles and so-called correct pronunciation. Salman Rushdie (1992), acknowledges the phenomenon of the colonizing effects of the English language, however he also claims that people who were colonized by the English language in the past seem to have „remade it, domesticated it and have relaxed about the way it is used" (1992, p. 64). The suppleness and richness of English allows the colonized to „carve out large territories for themselves within its frontiers (Ibidem)." The early twentieth century 'Pidgin English' originating from China, has a deformed and culturally adjusted structure and pronunciation can be found in multiple variations in many parts of the world, including Europe. This common ground for communication changes the view and the original form of English, whilst sustaining its extraordinarily popular status amongst the other languages of the world.

Nevertheless, if we consider Fanon's (1967) argument that the colonization of people can be achieved through the colonization of their minds, which changes their identity, their culture and even their nature, then the expansion of English and the creation of a need or even a deep desire to learn it maybe an example of the embodiment of Fanon's hypothesis. Ashis Nandy (1983) perceives two forms of colonization: violent, militarized invasion of land and a peaceful civilizing influence on a subjugated culture, nation or community. The second category is to be feared more, as it creeps into the unconscious of the subjects of the peaceful colonization, disarming them and changing them into inert marionettes in the hands of the colonizers. The impact of joint politics and social-economics directed towards learning English can be observed in policies and the educational curriculum of EU countries as well as in corporate and private business strategies and employment requirements. Acceptance, compliance and approval from EU citizens (Szpotowicz, 2013) may be an expression of successful Foucauldian governmentality mechanisms, closely related with peaceful colonization by the English speaking global powers.

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a ready and growing global market for the UK's impressive cultural industries. It is a critical component of trust building and, in turn, **trade and prosperity**. Around the world there is enormous demand and **need for English in the state and public education systems,** especially in developing economies. The UK is uniquely placed to support the development of high quality English teaching. This is the right thing to do to support improved prospects for countries and individuals in low and middle income countries, but also in the long term it will help to build closer relationships with the UK as well as **growing the market for UK goods and services."** [emphasis were added by the author of this paper]. *(The English Effect 2013, p. 16).*

Conclusions

The enabling of efficient and clear communication, between nations, together with greater integration through linguistic ability, reveals and enhances the understanding of the cultural differences and barriers between those nations and makes the world a more open and a more cultivated place. Nevertheless, embracing the norm critical pedagogies' approach[4] (Odrowaz-Coates 2015), one must ask which groups and individuals benefit from the expansion of English across the EU and beyond and who is disadvantaged? From a subaltern studies' perspective, the identification of those who become marginalized or excluded, due to language deficiency is important. Pennycook (2001, p. 81) notices that knowledge of English has become a prerequisite for progression to higher education, improved employment opportunity and enhanced social status. Conversely, it is also a powerful tool of social and economic exclusion. This negative view of English language expansion has not yet been widely recognized, with societies focusing on the positive effects. Is this an expression of the successful biopolitics (Foucault, 1997) of an integrated Europe in relation to one dominant language? Equipping the citizens of the future with one common language of communication would reverse the biblical Tower of Babel effect. However, whilst this may be an innocent and benevolent gesture for the common good, the process is deeply rooted in the power matrix of post-colonial politics and business, and may create, sustain and reproduce new areas of inequality and dominance.

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4 **Norm critical pedagogy** aims to reveal how social norms create fields of exclusion and inclusion at school and in society. Norm critical pedagogy intend to **expose power relations**, questioning who benefits from creation of certain norms or their reproduction and how norms dictate what is considered to be '**normal**' and what is vied as '**abnormal**' by the majority.

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Citizenship in a multicultural space – educational and socialization references

Obywatelskość w wielokulturowej przestrzeni
– edukacyjne i socjalizacyjne odniesienia

Streszczenie

Współczesną wielokulturowość dynamizują zjawiska i procesy generujące (nie)sprzyjające warunki do jej uobecniania się oraz funkcjonowania w niej zróżnicowanych kulturowo społeczeństw. Wiąże się to w szczególności z rozpadem wielonarodowych państw, imigracją i uchodźctwem, rozszerzającym się terroryzmem czy nasilaniem się etnocentryzmu. W efekcie wielokulturowość stała się źródłem narastających problemów i dylematów. Towarzyszy im deficyt obywatelskości zwłaszcza wśród przedstawicieli mniejszości narodowych czy etnicznych. Obywatelskość tymczasem sprzyja tworzeniu społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, w którym możliwa jest koegzystencja zróżnicowanych narodowo, etnicznie i wyznaniowo grup, możliwe jest więc współistnienie odmiennych kultur, kultywowanie tradycji, pielęgnowanie własnej kultury i tożsamości, wzbogacanie jej wartościami innych kultur. Przenikanie i mieszanie się kultur nie wymaga zdystansowania się do kultury pierwotnej identyfikacji, może stać się natomiast istotnym odniesieniem dla budowy wspólnoty obywatelskiej. Ważne znaczenie w tym procesie przypisać należy edukacji obywatelskiej oraz rodzinnej socjalizacji mających miejsce na pograniczach kultur. O obywatelskości przesądzają bowiem nie tylko wiedza i rozumienie systemu społeczno-politycznego kraju, zagadnień społecznych oraz problematyki europejskiej i międzynarodowej, nabyte umiejętności (obywatelskie, społeczne, komunikacyjne i międzykulturowe), ale także rodzinna socjalizacja, w której odmienność narodowa rodziny oraz orientacja na przesłanki międzykulturowe i ponadnarodowe warunkują kształtowanie się obywatelskości młodego pokolenia. W efekcie obywatelskość ma szanse zaistnieć jako nowy rodzaj tożsamości społecznej.

Słowa kluczowe: problematyczna wielokulturowość, deficyt obywatelskości, obywatelskość, edukacja obywatelska, obywatelskość w rodzinnej socjalizacji

Abstract

Contemporary multiculturalism is dynamised by the phenomena and processes generating (un)favourable conditions for its manifestations, and for the functioning of culturally diverse societies within. It is particularly related to the disintegration of multinational countries (states), processes of immigration and exile, as well as the expansion of terrorism and the increasing level of ethnocentrism. As a result, multiculturalism has become a source of arising problems and dilemmas. The latter are accompanied by the deficit of the sense of citizenship, especially amongst the representatives of national or ethnic minorities. Yet, citizenship favours the process of establishing civic society, where concurrence of various national, ethnic, and religious groups is possible, hence the coexistence of diverse cultures is possible too, empowering the process of enriching own cultures with the values of the other cultures. Saturation and interspersion of cultures does not require to distance from the culture of primary identification, quite the contrary – it may become a crucial point of reference in establishing a civic community. In this process, the paramount importance is assigned to civic education and the primary socialization, both occurring at the cultural nexus. Notwithstanding, citizenship is endorsed and developed not only by the knowledge and comprehension of the social and political system of a given country, social matters, the European or international affairs, and acquired skills (civic, social, communicative and cross-cultural ones), but also by the socialization taking place in a family, where national diversity and orientation towards multicultural and transnational premises both condition the process of moulding the sense of citizenship of the young generation. Thereupon, citizenship provides an opportunity to emerge as a new type of a social identity.

Keywords: problematic multiculturalism, deficit of citizenship, citizenship, civic education, citizenship in the family socialization

Multiculturalism – the deficit of citizenship

At the beginning of the 21st century, multiculturalism is conceptualized by the phenomena forming its various facets and providing (un)favourable conditions for its emergence. Amongst such process and phenomena the following appear as particularly important:

» Dissolution of multinational states followed by the consequent emergence of new states or countries regaining their sovereignty (usually also of multinational origin), which – within the framework of the adopted ideological order as well as internal and external policies – define the principles of functioning of the minority groups, entailing the range of their entitled rights of political, social and economic origin, followed by the rights related to fostering own culture, or citizenship freedoms they can exercise. Nonetheless, globalization of the communication concurrently increases "the clarity of the policies of the national states in relation to ethnic and national minorities, resulting in the increased external pressure to avoid explicit discrimination or injustice in issues of the majority-minority balance", leading to further "democratization of the democracy that cannot be discontinued at the stage of the national state)" (Burszta, 2009, p. 32).

» Processes of migration flows (immigration, exile, and etc.) intensifying cultural diversity in societies of the hosting countries, disturbing "a given, imaginary model of homogenous national community" (Burszta, 2009, p. 20). Such states can be willing to accept immigrants and refugees, for, inter alia, economic reasons (the demands of the job market), but they can also limit their acceptance, or withdraw and distance themselves for such scheme, for example on the ground of national or social security reasons, with their political, social, economic as well as international, distinctive consequences. The latter are particularly palpable within EU, where contemporarily the European community faces immigration crisis as repercussion of the implemented mechanism of the imposed relocation of the refugees. "Commonly acclaimed – especially following the September 11 2001 attacks – slogans of tightening the borders, establishing 'transitory camps' and regulating the emigrants' quota prove to function as a response to the progressing porosity of all sort of borders. Thus, longing for the order returns with even a greater impact" (Burszta, 2009, p. 21).

» Expanding terrorism in its economic, political, cultural (separatist and national), ideological, motivational as well as psychological and social conditions, driven by, amongst others, the accomplishment of religious objectives, and providing certain groups (in particular the minorities) the area of impact, the right to self-determination, or the realization of national or independence ideologies (Wojciechowski, 2013, p. 65). In numbers of countries, as indicated by Z. Bauman, this phenomenon is accompanied by the policy of securitization, i.e. shifting the attention of the society from the problems governments cannot deal with, or are not interested in solving, towards the issues of fighting with the terrorists. The undertaken political activities are, on one hand, followed by the concern to acquire social support and gain potential election votes, whereas on the other hand – the individual and social sense of security is threatened, panic around the sense of security is being stoked up, and fears are fuelled and maintained. The common cliché is that "all terrorist are migrants", what results in adiaforization of the migration issues, i.e. pushing immigrants and all what they experience beyond the boundaries, and out of the reach of moral responsibility, particularly beyond the area of compassion and the sense of accountability. Policy of securitization and identifying the issue of migration with the problems of national and individual security both consequently release from the responsibility (the pressure of moral duty) for the fate of the immigrants/refuges, shaping explicitly negative attitudes towards them (Bauman, 2016, pp. 38–52).

» Breaching the civic rights of the ethnic minorities in totalitarian regimes, or undemocratic states, leading to ethnic cleansing, destroying the cultural heritage of the ethnic groups, repressions and discrimination (Gajda, 2007, p. 33) or war conflicts, what in turn results, inter alia, in immigration to the European countries.

» Intensification of ethnocentrism which can accelerate fanaticism of given religious groups, whereas in national groups leading to nationalism (Gajda, 2007, p. 31), which – exposing the national interest – may orientate towards exclusive focus on the welfare of own nation, including the Other, or quite the contrary

– entailing elements of disdain towards other nations. Such negative approach towards Others can result in manifestation of negative attitudes, social distance (often intentionally intensified in the public area), separation, marginalization, hate crimes committed both on the side of the minority representatives as well as the majority cultural groups, causing the emergence of specific type of conflicts, i.e. stemming from cultural diversity.

The above-outlined phenomena and processes generate problematic multiculturalism. According to J. Nikitorowicz "(...) a specific conditions of multiculturalism have been created, followed by a generated problem of understanding and accord between the diverse cultures in a given area, the problems of prerogatives to fully exercise cultivating of tradition in given situations, as well as the problems of the revitalization of tradition, returning to the sources, adaptation, acculturation, assimilation, all accompanied by the dilemmas of social communication, mutual expectations and fears, prejudices, stereotypes, megalomania, and xenophobia" (Nikitorowicz, 2011, p. 11).

In the states, where the issue of multiculturalism constitutes a key distinctive feature of the society (and where manners of democratization of the multicultural orders were sought), given solutions were worked out and implemented. Such resolutions, according to J. Nikitorowicz, consequently contributed to the idea of trust, political correctness, social justice and liberalism, with the concurrent resignation from evaluating (assessing) cultures and cultural confrontation. It did not, however, as J. Nikitorowicz points out, prevent from the emergence of number of dilemmas concerning the necessity to resign from own values, own identity, understanding and agreement, cultural discrepancies, obeying human rights, respect for law and the principles of the hosting countries, as well as the principles of interpersonal coexistence within such societies (Nikitorowicz, 2011, p. 11–12).

The civic deficits are also becoming palpable as a phenomenon specific for the membership countries of the EU, concerning mainly the young generation. Nonetheless, it can be also tackled from the perspective of the relation between the Other/ethnic group and the state, with its dominant „(...) unilateral accomplishment of the rules of citizenship by the ethnic groups, relying on the maximum level of exercising the rights and civic privileges in democratic states with concurrent shrink from obligation, breaking the rules of law, and the accompanied lack of loyalty towards the state" (Gajda, 2007, p. 32).

Such deficit can also stem from depriving (intentionally) the ethnic groups of the law to preserve and foster their own cultural heritage, and own cultural identity. This occurs as a rather disturbing process since the civic society, through its traits and norms, provides conditions for coexistence of the nationally, ethnically and religiously diverse groups via cultural borrowings of some elements of other groups, not becoming deprived of the essence of own cultural embedment at the same time. Thus, coexistence of various cultures is achievable, followed by the cultivation of tradition, legal security of the accomplishment of own lifestyles, maintenance of the core values of own culture and identity, as well as the process of its enrichment by the values of other cultures (Nikitorowicz, 2011, p. 26).

As K. Dziubka highlights, citizenship should be identified „(...) with a set of ethical, moral, intellectual, legal, social, mental and cultural dispositions and behaviours of

a human as a citizen, shaped on the basis of his or her subjective legal status" (Dziubka, 2001, p. 85). Ergo, citizenship understood in such way, measurable and rational in its own features (Gliński, 2005, p. 225–226), recognizes and respects cultural diversity. Simultaneously, it can provide an area conceptualized by interculturalism, where each national culture can manifest itself, whereas openness to contact with other cultures can favour the process of establishing the community.

Nonetheless, as A. Kłoskowska unwaveringly suggests, conversions and national transgressions do not have to imply a complete abortion of the ties with the cultures of the previous identification: „(…) preserving bi-culturalism or even bi-nationality is possible and can prove fertile in the world of the new homeland, under condition it shall be accepted by the individual and his/her surrounding, and not considered as a source of the disturbing ambiguity" (Kłoskowska, 2012, p. 140).

Taking the above into consideration, citizenship demands cultural rooting, i.e. „(…) internalization of given values, convictions and patterns of behaviour the latter entail, that altogether outline the minimum of competencies to participate in the civic community. To such a degree, citizenship can become a new type of a social identity, whereas the community shaped on such ground could be – according to J. Habrmas – referred to as the civic nation" (Sadowski, 2007, p. 51).

The examples of multicultural societies (particularly those in the USA, Canada, Australia or Switzerland), prove that „(…) political culture, where constitutional principles could settle in, does not have to rely on one, joint for all the citizens ethnic, linguistic or cultural heritage. The liberal, political culture constitutes solely the common ground for *constitutional patriotism*, which concurrently deepens understanding of the multitude and integrity of the coexisting various forms of life in a multicultural setting (…), democratic citizenship does not have to be in such case rooted in the national identity of a given nation, yet recognizing and respecting multitude of cultural forms of life, it requires from all the citizens to socialize within the framework of own, joint political culture" (Habermas, 1993, p. 17).

Acquiring such stage, as an extremely complex and difficult process in the contemporary domestic and international realities, demands integrated (e.g. educational and socialization) influences orientated towards, predominantly, young generation functioning in a multicultural society, in its various interpretations. Thus, it is worth making such processes subject of reflection, as on such ground citizenship, as a new type of social identity, can be shaped.

Civic education: pupils' competencies

In the process of moulding citizenship of the young generation in the multicultural setting the leading role is played by civic education that shall „(…) bridge individual, national and supra-national identity" (Potulicka, 2008, pp. 41–42). It is of great importance to stress the fact that civic education is, indeed, education for citizenship, that – exposing knowledge and understanding, as well as developing values and skills – prepares to become involved and engaged in the community. The latter, consequently,

is the necessary condition to form a civic society and democracy (Education for citizenship, 1998, p. 10–13). Thus, such education shall be orientated towards the following objectives (Edukacja obywatelska w Europie, 2012, pp. 27–28):

» Development of the political fluency reflected in familiarity with basic facts and understanding of the key concepts. From such angle, civic education is linked to transferring knowledge on issues such as: social, political and civic institutions, human rights, state constitutions, civic rights and duties, social matters, recognition of the cultural and historical heritage, as well as cultural and linguistic diversity of the society.

» Shaping the skills of critical thinking and analytical abilities, enabling the youth to analyse and asses information concerning social, as well as political issues.

» Shaping and instilling given values, attitudes and behaviours, particularly the sense of respect, mutual understanding, tolerance, social and moral responsibility, solidarity with others, and etc.

» Encouraging active participation and engagement in the school life and the local community that both provide opportunities for practical application of the acquired, socially and culturally oriented knowledge, skills, values and attitudes.

The above objectives conceptualize civic education within its three essential aspects, i.e. education on the citizenship, education through citizenship, and education for citizenship (Potulicka, 2008, p. 40).

Therefore, according to the recommendations of the national-level teaching schemes (International Standard Classification of Education: ISCED 1–3, 2010/2011), within the framework of civic education pupils should be equipped with knowledge and understanding, yet also acquiring given skills (Edukacja obywatelska w Europie, 2012, pp. 30–37).

In the first instance pupils are expected to become familiar with the knowledge and understanding within the three following aspects, i.e. social and political system, social issues, as well as European and international policies. The specific points of the agenda shall entail social and political system of the state, human rights, democratic principles, equality and justice, cultural diversity, tolerance and discrimination, sustainable growth, sense of belonging and national identity, followed by the history, culture and literature of Europe (Edukacja obywatelska w Europie, 2012, p. 31).

Knowledge of that kind should be accompanied by understanding and comprehension, in order to fully prepare pupils to become a citizen through the accomplishment of given civic duties.

The objectives of a school as an educational institution is also to shape skills that help pupils to become active and responsible citizens. Such skills/competencies entail (Edukacja obywatelska w Europie, 2012, p. 32):

» *civic skills* – participation in social life (e.g. charity activities, NGO's, etc.), having impact on political evens by taking part in the elections and petitions;

» *social skills* – life and work with others, conflict solutions;

» *communicative skills* – listening, understanding and participating in discussions;

» *intercultural skills* – establishing cross-cultural dialogue and acceptance of the cultural differences.

The indicated knowledge, comprehension and skills provide a ground for the establishment of the *social* and *civic competencies*, perceived generally as a combination of knowledge, skills and attitudes (Zalecenia Parlamentu Europejskiego i Rady, 2006), facilitating the promotion of equality, social integrity and engaged citizenship, consequently contributing to the process of creating social conditions, enabling the growth of democratic culture open towards diversity on the citizenships level (Edukacja obywatelska w Europie, 2012, p. 3).

Social competencies, according to the recommendations of European Parliament and of the European Council, embrace personal, interpersonal and cross-cultural competencies, facilitating effective and constructive participation in the social and professional life. Recommendations also encompass solving conflicts, particularly within the societies characterised by the progressing cultural diversity. Thus, they are related to the personal and social welfare, empowered by the comprehension of multicultural as well as social and economic dimensions of the European societies (also within the framework of a given country), accompanied by a mutual interaction of the national, cultural identity, and the European identity. By cause of such competencies, respect for the cultural diversity and intercultural communication are enabled and endorsed, contributing to the process of building up the community.

Civic competencies, on the other hand, prepare to participate fully in the civic life on the basis of the familiarity with the notions, as well as political and social structures, entailing motivation to active and democratic participation. Consequently, they encompass the ability of effective involvement (with other persons) in public actions, solidarity and interest in solving problems concerning local and more far-reaching communities, that shall be accompanied by the critical and creative reflection, followed by constructive participation in activities undertaken in the neighbouring and local communities. At this point, it is of a great importance to participate in the decisive processes at all levels, i.e. local, state and European ones. By virtue of them, the recognition of human rights is facilitated, principally concerning equality as the ground for democracy, acknowledgment and understanding of the differences in the systems of values of various religions and ethnic groups. Last but not least, it deals with comprehension and respect for the common values: "high level of the civic competencies allows to establish agreement reaching beyond various divisions, providing with the atmosphere of cooperation, trust and openness between the groups, promoting the effective accomplishment of the ideas of political variety" (Kształtowanie kompetencji społecznych..., 2015, p. 10).

As the Eurydice report proves, presenting the research results tackling the issue of civic education in 35 European countries, the most frequently accomplished teaching objectives are related to „(...) knowledge and understanding of the social and political system in a given state, human rights and democratic values, as well as equality and justice. The teaching agendas also embrace some of the contemporary social issues, which pupils encounter in their everyday life. The most common topics tackled in this regard concern tolerance and discrimination, cultural diversity, and sustainable growth. The national context is not the only aspect of the civic education, as the European and international dimensions matter to the same degree" (Edukacja obywatelska w Europie, 2012, pp. 30–31). As far as the most frequent skills accomplished at

primary schools level and recommended within civic education are concerned, they entail the communicative and social abilities, whereas the most seldom recommend skills tackle the civic issues. In terms of the secondary schools the recommended skills include the civic, social, communicative and intercultural abilities. „Yet, there are exceptions too: in Greece at this level there are neither civic nor communicative skills considered, in Bulgaria developing civic and social skills is recommended only in schools of the second degree at this level, whereas in the German-speaking part of Belgium and the United Kingdom no recommendations for developing intercultural skills are provided at this level, apart from the first degree secondary schools in Wales. As for United Kingdom (except from Scotland) forming intercultural skills is advised exclusively at the first degree of secondary schools, whereas in Ireland and Turkey at the second degree institutions no skills from the above-mentioned are subject of recommendation. Taking this into account it can be assumed that the secondary schools of the first degree constitute the stage where majority of countries recommend pupils to develop the four above-mentioned types of skills" (Edukacja obywatelska w Europie, 2012, pp. 33–34).

Keeping in view the above, it can be assumed that the official teaching agendas in the majority of the European countries encompass some key contents for civic education in terms of knowledge, understanding and the key skills. Nonetheless, forasmuch as the actual dimension of the citizenship within the range indicated above, it should be stressed that its embedment in everyday activities of the culturally diverse European societies is rare, making it a problematic issue (*Education for citizenship, 1998, p. 14*). This conclusion comes into view as of key importance in the context of the intensified crisis of the civic education.

Citizenship of the Other in the family socialization

The environment, playing a key role in the process of moulding the sense of citizenship of the young generation, also entails family. Thus and so, family home, within the framework of the family socialization, through own culture, recognized values and attitudes, provides conditions in which cultural identification of the young generation takes place, followed by the process of shaping the youth's identity, attitudes toward cultural heritage and homeland(s), as well as civic duties towards the country of residence. Therefore, it is worth making citizenships in family socialization a subject of the analysis, particularly under the circumstances of the cultural diversity, or in other words, in the cultural borderland. As far as the latter notion is concerned, there might be various samples of such cultural nexuses, subject to various historical conditionings, or emerging as a result of the contemporary processes of migration and exile. In the first instance such borderland entails the attachment to the cultural heritage of the ancestors, the generationally conveyed sense of embedment, joint past and historical area, forms of social life relying on the subjective bonds, as well as the sense of identification with two homelands, i.e. the homeland of the ancestors (perceived within cultural categories and spiritual bonds), and the supranational

homeland (perceived within the framework of citizenship and patriotism). In the second case, functioning in the borderland of cultures is subject to the following aspects: migration policy of the host country, functioning in two social worlds, the process of becoming "the migrant /the refugee family", the sense of exclusion and marginalization in the society of the origin, manners of entering the social and cultural area of the country of migration, the degree of integration, as well as social and cultural capital of a migrant/refugee, accompanied by the acquired social and cultural competencies (Bojar, 2011, p. 14–24).

Each of such borderlands, in a manner specific for itself, develops the sense of citizenships amongst members of the groups of a cultural minority. For the purpose of this article the subject of analysis concerns shaping citizenship in family socialization in the historically constituted cultural borderland, i.e. in Polish families living from generation to generation in the Vilnius region.

As the research results prove, such families are subject to the process of a nationally dual identification, what, in turn, results in bi-cultural nature of such process, i.e. on one hand it is related to the sense of Polishness, whereas on the other it is linked to the sense of being Lithuanian (Szerląg, 2013, p. 207). In the overwhelming majority of cases, regardless of the fact whether such Polish families are internally nationally diverse or homogenous, socialization of such kind embraces the following spheres: family-autonomous (respect for own family, development of own personality), national identification (preserving Polish language as the first tongue, confession, cultural heritage of the ancestors, tolerance), axio-normative (morality, generally humanistic values), existential and prospective (consideration for education, respecting the work, concern for the material welfare), and last but not least civic, i.e. respect for Lithuanian homeland and the entailed civic attitudes (Szerląg, 2014, pp. 32–34). The last sphere, i.e. the civic domain, although stemming from the awareness of the commitments towards the second homeland (the Lithuanian homeland) does not constitute a part of the key domains of family socialization. In the family area of socialization, the necessity to shape citizenships of the young generation is relatively marginalized. As for the causes for such situation, a relatively low level of significance attached by the parents to the values related to citizenships can be recalled as one of the reasons. Such values are usually perceived by them through the prism of the struggle of Polish minority for the rights they are entitled to. Thus, the sense of belonging to a national minority is striking in such case, as if confronted in social, political or cultural dimension with the dominant group, it sensitizes towards the respect of the cultural diversity. It consequently results in dissatisfaction with the state of the Lithuanian democracy. It is worth stressing the fact that 56% of the Lithuanian residents[1] are dissatisfied with the condition of democracy in their country, whereas 30% of the respondents agree that some part of the representatives of the national minorities displays lack of loyalty towards Lithuania (Demokracja na Litwie…, 2016). Issues of that kind undoubtedly intensify the problem of the national diversity.

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[1]   This group embraces mainly persons 50 years of age or older, living in the countryside, with vocational or secondary school educational background, with income below 600 Euro, retired persons, physical workers, the unemployed, and the representatives of national minorities.

The significance of cultural diversity is also reflected in the premises favouring, according to some pupils of the Polish national minority,[2] the process of shaping citizenship. The most important premises entail those of *intercultural character*, i.e. openness to other cultures, tolerance, respect and cooperation despite cultural differences, intercultural dialogue, compromise for the sake of consent and accord, as well as the right to foster own culture.

Another group of the premises indicated by the research pupils and favouring the process of forming citizenship, can be referred to as *supranational*. Regardless of the cultural sense of belonging, citizenship should be manifested with the respect and recognition towards common homeland, cooperation contributing to, and for the sake of this homeland (particularly through science and work), patriotism, respect for the state language and culture, civic attitudes, and respecting the law.

Taking into consideration the dominant premises observed in the family socialization, as well as the specificity of the national diversity of families, the following regularities can be claimed:

» Regardless of the national homogeneity or its nationally diverse character, the premises of forming citizenships in the family circle are predominantly of intercultural nature.

» The leading attributes of interculturalism, crucial for shaping citizenship, include openness to other cultures, tolerance and respect, as well as cooperation despite cultural differences. Concurrently, national homogeneity and diversity of the family do not constitute factors crucially differentiating the significance attached to such attributes.

» In the process of shaping citizenship, national homogeneity of the family contributes to diminishing the importance of the supranational premises, which enhance intercultural assumptions.

» Inter-family national diversity exposes the supranational premises of forming the sense of citizenships to a larger degree.

» Relatively low exposure of the supranational premises of the citizenships (with the exception of the respect towards the Lithuanian homeland) confirms the awareness of its importance is not common amongst the researched pupils, whereas its contents does not significantly reflect the civic knowledge and skills within the schemes of civic education in Lithuania (Pilietiškumo ugdymas..., 2008, p. 1011–1028).

» Attitudes of the researched pupils toward the citizenship reflect the overall tendency noticeable amongst the young generation in Lithuania (Szerląg, 2016, p. 116). The national diversity factors do not therefore significantly differentiate the core of the civic attitudes amongst the pupils (Zaleskienė, 2005, p. 125).

Summing up the above reflections it can be assumed that the manifestations of the citizenship in family socialization in the context of national diversity of the family is subject to:

» the sense of national dualism,
» awareness of the socialization commitments toward the joint homeland,

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[2] Research concerning citizenship was conducted by the author if this article in 2016 amongst 52 pupils of the Vilniaus Lepkalnio pagrindine mokykla.

- » bicultural nature of socialization,
- » socialization oriented toward the welfare of the joint homeland,
- » civic values perceived as the core values,
- » attitude toward cultural diversities in the public area,
- » respecting the right of national minorities by the state (satisfaction from democracy).

The specificity of shaping citizenship in the process of family socialization is determined by belonging of a family to national minority, and the homogeneity or diversity of the nationality of given family members, followed by intercultural and supranational orientation of the process of developing citizenship. Thus, family socialization provides a foundation for socialising the youth within the framework of the common political culture. Yet, it is of key importance to be aware of the significance of intercultural and supranational premises of shaping citizenship in the conditions of a multinational state, which should become a subject of an aware reflection and its effective accomplishment in political social, cultural and educational practices.

Conclusion

Summarising these reflections, it can be concluded that due to civic education and family socialization oriented toward citizenship of cross-cultural and supranational provenance, accomplished altogether within the common homeland area, the citizenship stands a chance to emerge as a new type of a social identity, shaped on political, social and intercultural levels. In view of such identity, it is possible to participate in a civic community within the framework of a join political culture, deepening at the same time the multitude and integrity of the cultural coexistence. It is, however, not possible without improving the quality of the educational and socialization influences concentrated on forming citizenship, and – in the context of the Others – in their intercultural and supranational dimensions. Concurrently, integrity of such influences is of paramount importance, as the latter provide the conditions in which such changes shall occur, dynamised by democratic values, rooted in social and political practices of a multinational state.

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Dimensions of Citizenship and Nationality in the Area of Comprehensive Education: Experience of the Republic of Lithuania

Postawa obywatelska i tożsamość narodowa w podstawie programowej kształcenia ogólnego: doświadczenie Republiki Litewskiej

Streszczenie

Nasilające się procesy globalizacyjne dotyczą większości dziedzin życia społecznego. Mają one charakter ambiwalentny; wyzwania współczesnego świata szczególnie boleśnie dotykają kultur narodowych. Polityka realizowana przez Unię Europejską nie ma na celu niwelowania różnorodności form ekspresji kulturowej. Procesy te odbywają się samoistnie w związku ze wzrastającą mobilnością mieszkańców.

Przedmiotem niniejszego artykułu jest dyskurs o tym, jaka strategia mogłaby być obecnie zastosowana dla umacniania podstaw państwowości litewskiej. Czy poczucie tożsamości narodowej, pojmowane w edukacji społecznej jako kultura etniczna, już zatraciło swoje znaczenie? A w ogóle jaka przyszłość czeka państwa narodowe? Czy dojdzie do ich stopienia się w zglobalizowanej przestrzeni światowej, czy też pozostaną one kolorowymi wyspami kulturowymi o aspekcie ekonomicznym i prawnym w integrowanej wspólnocie państw europejskich? W związku z tym dylematem rozpatrywane są również cele stawiane przed oświatą na Litwie. We wnioskach się stwierdza, że wspieranie i upowszechnianie kultury etnicznej jest zadaniem wagi państwowej, które powinno być efektywnie realizowane przez instytucje oświatowe i kulturowe. Powyższe stwierdzenie jest również aktualne dla szkół mniejszości narodowych w dążeniu do nawiązania ściślejszej współpracy i konsolidacji społeczeństwa. W artykule prezentowany jest też nieco inny pogląd na integrację w przestrzeni kultury lokalnej zamieszkałych na Litwie mniejszości narodowych.

Przeprowadzone w 2016 roku badania reprezentatywne (około 1030 respondentów) ujawniły, że młodzież mimo wszystko interesuje się (w pewnym stopniu) historią Litwy, kulturą

etniczną. Historią narodu litewskiego i państwa ciekawią się także przedstawiciele mniejszości narodowych zamieszkujących nasz kraj, a więc Polacy, Rosjanie i in.

Abstract

The rapid processes of globalization affect a lot of spheres of social life. They are assessed as ambivalent; the challenges of the contemporary epoch are especially painfully accepted by national cultures. The European Union policy does not attempt to level the variety of cultural expressions of its member countries. These processes occur spontaneously due to the increase in citizens' mobility.

This paper is a discourse on what could be the present strategy of reinforcing the fundaments of the state. Has nationality, which is being instilled in public education as ethnic culture, lost its meaning for that purpose? The conclusions state that the reinforcement of ethnic culture is a goal of national importance and it has to be efficiently implemented in the institutions of education and culture. This is also important in the schools of national minorities in pursuance of closer cooperation and integrity of the society. The paper also contains insights about a slightly different view on integration in region's cultural space, held by ethnic minorities in Lithuania.

A representative study (involving 1030 respondents), conducted in 2016, revealed that the youth is still interested in the history of Lithuanian nation / ethnic culture. People of other nationalities, e.g. Polish, Russian, etc., living in Lithuania are also interested in history of Lithuanian nation / ethnic culture.

Keywords: citizenship, nationality, identity, heritage, comprehensive education, ethnic culture.

Introduction

Historic times endow the concepts of nationality and citizenship as well as their relations with a different and shifting significance in the arena of world politics. The fall of totalitarian empires at the end of the 20th century conditioned a second wave of the establishment of national states which demonstrated the power and validity of nationality. In the European Union (EU) similar processes are also happening today and they show that citizenship is just a derivative of the dimension of nationality. And what is the future of nation states? Will they evaporate in the realm of globalized world, or will they become colorful cultural blossoms in the economically and legally integrated community of European countries? In the context of this dilemma we must discuss the goals of education in our countries.

Nationality in the Globalized World

The complicated, constantly changing social, economic and cultural public environment of the present day is shaping the concept of national identity. And this is true not only for Lithuania, but also for the whole of Europe. It is argued that nowadays national

identity is conceived in relation to otherness. Thus, it is indeed becoming an increasingly reflexive formation (Vabalaitė, 2006; Jastrumskytė, 2006). In general, identity develops through public activity, it is reinforced by social activity and engaging in creative work for national community. On the other hand, identity gives meaning to the actions of separate individuals, especially if they specialize in culture or research. On the whole, the concept of 'national culture' is more relevant to the description of ethnic communities rather than political bodies. The nationality of modern societies is problematic since it requires forms of support which are based on the conscious decision and commitment of the citizens. Let us suppose that the Lithuanian folklore, which was a phenomenon of mass, hence, popular culture in the 19th century, at present is only a matter of elite stage expression. The conscious construction of identity presupposes the assimilation of spiritual values, world outlook and thinking (Roepstorff & Simoniukštytė, 2001). Hence, it is a very significant goal of education as it encompasses the mission of national school.

Generally speaking, in its strategy of development, the national state follows two principal blocks of ideas – the universal principles of human rights, extensive democracy and social welfare, as well as fostering the ethno-cultural identity. It is essential to retain the balance between the two blocks – the Lithuanian nation was taught this by ideologists of National Rebirth. Political independence had to combine the human and national values, duties and responsibilities; they resembled two wings which could carry the state to its future... In the pre-war period the interrelations between nation and the state were theoretically grounded by philosophers Stasys Šalkauskis (1886–1941) and Antanas Maceina (1908–1987). Their insights are still relevant for the Lithuanian society and education system even today (Asakavičiūtė, 2007).

Thus, there is no doubt that the power of national state and its potential to take care of the destiny of the nation and its people depend on the citizens' cultural awareness. It is an objective collective community which is shaped by the effort of generations (Girnius, 1995). Such a community should be pursued by creating efficient images of 'national pride': the media and artistic measures could be used to make the national history a topicality, unique ethno-cultural customs and traditions should be promoted, people's creative achievements in research and art could be emphasized in the society, sports achievements should be publicly announced. The emerging characteristics and trends of cultural evolution show that cosmopolitan attitudes will be ultimately defeated in the 21st century; the future of global civilization is multicultural diversity and dialogues between cultures (Honko, 1988).

But what one can see in today's Vilnius, capital of the Lithuania? The effects of economic and cultural globalization of the past few decades are evident in the public spaces of the old town. Commercial advertisements, names of cafes, pizzerias, hotels are in English and French; words in Lithuanian language are a rare sight. Commercial goals, orientation towards foreign tourists and guests clearly overshadow ethnic pride...

Nationality and the Policy of European Union

During the integration process to the EU structure everybody's attention was focused on political principles ant the significance of national identity was nearly forgotten.

There is also a possibility that it was deliberately ignored without a proper consideration of the EU regulations concerning national cultures. Nevertheless, if there was no exclusivity of national culture, political independence would also lose its sense. A nation which is unable to preserve its cultural distinction cannot lay claim to political independence (Jokubaitis, 2008). Certainly, if one emphasizes the objectives of upholding the ethnic culture, it is not allowed to diminish most important political principles of the present day – human rights, expression of democracy, moral and cultural pluralism.

A close analysis of the EU documents shows that the implicit position of the EU institutions is as follows: the cultures of the member countries have to exist as individual and independent structures of those countries; and the function of the united Europe in the cultural sphere is just auxiliary – it has to guarantee the increasing contacts between the cultures, their cooperation, cognition and comprehension. Hence, the contribution of the EU institutions in the sphere of culture is focused on the enhancement of cultural cooperation. Cultural objects receive financial support, but it comes indirectly, through different programmes – promotion of tourism, countryside development, etc. For example, support was given for the Lithuanian Museum of Ethnocosmology (Molėtai district), for the Pottery Craft Center in Leliūnai (Utena district), for the Estate Craft Center in Zypliai (Šakiai district). Such policy can be virtually acknowledged as an efficient factor of the vitality and development of every national culture since the cultural spread is implemented through interchange (Čičinskas, 2006).

Cultural cooperation is based on the assumption that all national cultures have no difficulty in their individual development and cooperation with national cultures of other EU members. Thus, the culture of the smaller nations should not face a greater danger of extinction than the cultures of bigger European nations. It has to be noted that this aspect is not included in the EU cultural policy at all. The upstaging threat is only seen in the context of American mass culture, i.e. globalization which comes with vigorous consumerism and pragmatism (Manent, 2006). Basically, the EU cultural policy encourages the state governments to take care of their national cultures so that every country would be really able to cooperate in cultural exchange and receive as much benefit as possible (Johler, 2002).

The strategic EU documents emphasize the fact that in the future the role of culture will inevitably increase. It is being said that culture, its European dimension will become a way of the citizens' self-awareness and self-expression as the EU states will be more and more united due to economic integration (Tomlinson, 2013).

The EU institutions also have an implicit goal to uphold, create and develop the common European identity not only in the political, but also in the cultural sphere. The motif is clear and understandable: it will help to enhance the political identity of Europe and the EU unity (Rubavičius, 2006). Such orientation of the EU cultural policy to the common European cultural identity is not cosmopolitan. Nevertheless, there is some concern since the concept of 'European culture' has not been clearly defined yet in the EU documents...

The EU pays exceptionally great attention to regional culture. Such position makes it possible to support the 'Lithuanian islands' in Belarus, Poland and Latvia. In general, such attitude reflects a historically inherited and still living tradition of regional

identity in Western Europe which has not been obliterated even by the establishment of national states.

The prerequisites for preservation of traditional culture and its spiritual part were further strengthened by the UNESCO convention for preservation of intangible cultural heritage, which insistently stresses the necessity to foster the living traditions and take every measure to preserve centres of traditional culture. Protection and fostering of ethnic culture does not promote its reticence; on the contrary, it opens up the spiritual values created by a certain nation to the whole world. The education strategy in Lithuanian schools should be designed with this perspective.

What is the influence of people's free movement – student exchange, tourism, employment of specialists – on the development of national culture? It is ambiguous. Good news about Lithuania spread more and more widely – the culture promotes the country. But economically weaker EU member states will inevitably face bigger threats for their natural culture than the greater states. It becomes one more incentive to activate the country's attempts to preserve the national culture.

Situation of Ethnic Minorities in Lithuania

A few words about the situation of ethnic minorities in Lithuania. Tatars, Karaites, Jews, Russians and Poles had their own communities since the time of Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The capital Vilnius in the first half of the 20th century was a multinational and multicultural city, in which the Lithuanian language wasn't dominant. The current state culture policy ensures freedom of ethnic and religious expression and maintaining of identity for ethnic minorities by legislative procedures. Especially since Lithuania has a painful experience of being part of the Russian Empire and USSR, when ethnic consciousness was suppressed by both harsh and subtle measures (Kavolis, 1996). The Soviet era sought the formation of 'homo sovieticus', psychological type of people. Larger ethnic minorities in Lithuania – Poles, Russians, Jews – now have their own schools, cultural press. The House of National Communities is open for activities in Vilnius.

To be honest, there are differences in integration of ethnic minorities into the cultural panorama of Lithuania. History of the Tartar community could be an example for the entire European Community of finding a model of peaceful coexistence ('modus vivendi') between nations of greatly different religions and customs. Sparse ethnic minority communities are more open to the society of Lithuania in their activities, while those which receive support from neighboring countries are more oriented towards relations with fellow countrymen. Certain problems in relations with Vilnius Polish community are obviously escalated by the activities of certain politicians – both Polish and Lithuanian. However, there is no doubt that historic experience of existing as a single country and great personal relationships between scholars and cultural figures will help resolve these non-essential conflicts.

The aims to recall the multicultural evolution of Vilnius and pleasant coexistence of nations should be judged affirmatively. A good example could be the bilingual street name signs installed in the old town this year.

The Practical Steps and Problems of Consolidating Identity in Lithuania

The significance of scientific research of ethnic culture heritage and its exhibitions in museums is no longer questioned. Likewise, nobody doubts the importance of the volumes of Songbooks published by the Institute of Lithuanian Literature and Folklore. Research of ethnoculture and lithuanistics is considered to be a priority research branch in the trends determined by the Research Council of Lithuania. It is evident that the independent state is created as a guarantee for the nation's survival and versatile evolution in the cultural context.

The nationality priorities in the present-day cultural life as the urgency to pursue the national traditions can be grounded by the following arguments. Ethnic culture in Lithuanian families and primary education can be a perfect educational measure for developing honesty, moral norms, and knowledge of true spiritual values. Other pedagogical aspiration – respect for personal work, love for the nature of native land – can also be easily accomplished without moralizing didactics, by utilizing ethnic culture. The basis of music, singing, dance is easily comprehended form folklore works (Kirdienė, 2004). Folklore is based on the mythological way of thinking, which comprises the basis for creative fantasy; empathizing with mythical spaces of sagas, legends and fairy-tales activates the creative abilities of the child. Acquaintance with semantics of works of folk art can provide additional creative and motivational impulses for youths with artistic inclinations (Klimka, 2012). Ethic culture is a continuous development of the entire nation – it happens in the family, in the circle of like-minded people, in the cell of the society, in the society as such. It provides the spheres of cultural expression with authenticity and viable traditions; and turns them into spiritual heritage of the country. Ethnic culture unites the life of the nation, and by means of artistic forms it forwards the moral norms, ecological behavior and the principles of healthy lifestyle from generation to generation. During traditional holidays the commonality among members of the nation can be best felt; national self-awareness and the sense of citizenship develop and mature. Ethnic culture is a basis for professionally created culture. It is open for various expression forms, therefore it cannot be either compared to the Christian, professional European or global culture, or contrasted with them. Traditions and national customs colour the nation's and state's way among the other European nations, make it interesting and attractive for the other members of the global community.

About the problems in this area... Unfortunately, the phenomena of national culture are insufficiently reflected by the popular mass media. The society also has a controversial view of the attempts to revive and uphold the Lithuanian folklore, traditional customs and folk art. The positions of the national identity wing had to be reinforced in 1999 when the Law on the Principles of State Protection of Ethnic Culture was being passed. Nevertheless, one has to regret most of the principles of this law, especially the ones connected to education, which are not practically implemented. They are not implemented notwithstanding the Strategy on the Development of Ethnic Culture in Educational Institutions and the General Programmes of Ethnic Culture of Schools of Basic and Secondary Education that were endorsed by Ministry of Education and Science in 2012. They consolidate the principal provision that ethno-cultural

elements, such as folklore, traditions and customs, folk art and others, should be integrated into a number of study subjects and after-class activities. The body that is responsible for implementation of the actions and is accountable to the Parliament (Seimas) – the Council for the Protection of Ethnic Culture – has turned into routine bureaucratic body.

Youth Discourse about Ethnic Culture as a Value

The research, conducted in 2016, inquired is the Lithuanian youth interested in the history and ethnic culture of the Lithuanian nation? The research sample involves 1030 respondents. Selective sampling has been applied seeking to ensure its representativeness. 0.05 bias has been chosen, which is considered appropriate in social sciences. The respondents are 16–29 year old persons living in Lithuania. The research geography covers all the regions of Lithuania.

The distribution of the respondents according to their nationality, living place and education is presented in Table 1.

The methods of mathematical statistics (confidence intervals) have been applied. Provided the reliability is 95%, the interval is:

$$[(a\text{-}1{,}960 \sqrt{\frac{a(1\text{-}a)}{m}}\ \%;\ (a\text{+}1.960 \sqrt{\frac{a(1\text{-}a)}{m}}\ \%]$$

where:
m – the number of respondents (sample);
$a = \frac{m_A}{m} \times 100\%$– the percentage of the respondents having property (A);
m_A – the number of respondents that claim having property (A).

Table 1. Information about the respondents

Characteristics		%
Gender	Female	48
	Male	52
Education	Basic	23,8
	Secondary	34,5
	Vocational or upper-secondary	8,8
	Higher non-university	7,5
	Higher university	25,4
Living place	Vilnius	10,1
	The five largest cities	26,0
	Cities (district centres), towns	39,3
	Rural areas	24,6

Characteristics		%
Nationality	Lithuanian	95,3
	Polish	2,2
	Russian	1,6
	Jewish	0,1
	Other	0,4
	Not specified	0,4

Source: own study

The analysis of research data revealed whether the youth took interest in the history and ethnic culture of Lithuania and to what extent. The questionnaire consisted of the scale from 0 to 10, where 0 meant 'I take no interest' and 10 – 'I take great interest'. The respondents were asked to select and mark the estimate for each statement. All the respondents had a course on the history of Lithuania in general education school. It is a compulsory course and is integrated into the History course. The state examination on History is rather popular among the youth. Every third school graduate takes this examination.

The situation of ethnic culture as a subject is exceptional and specific. General programme of Ethnic Culture in Basic and secondary Education Cycle was confirmed by Order No. V-651 'On the Approval of the General Programme of Ethnic Culture in Basic Education and the General Programme of Ethnic Culture in Secondary Education' of the Minister of Education and Science of the Republic of Lithuania of 12 April 2012 (*Programmes*, 2012). The programmes can be:
  » integrated into the contents of the study subjects or subjects;
  » offered for learners as freely elective study subjects;
  » implemented as compulsory study subjects;
  » implemented by allotting a certain number of days per school year;
  » implemented as a part of children's non-formal education;
  » implemented in other ways selected by the school.
The school can select one module or another. Hence, education of ethnic culture is, can be and should be an integral part of general education in schools.

The research data revealed that the interest of Lithuanian youth in the history / ethnic culture of the nation was moderate. Having evaluated the obtained data, it became obvious that the number of the respondents who took no interest in the history / ethnic culture of the Lithuanian nation was considerably larger than the ones who took great interest in it. The marginal positions of the scale (12.5% (N = 131) – 7.9% (N = 83) suggested that the aforementioned school subjects were not sufficiently exploited to develop the learners transcendental values and value attitudes. The fifth (the middle) position of the scale, which was chosen by 132 respondents (12.6%) permitted to divide the research data into two oppositions: positive and negative. Their estimated were 43.1% (N = 453) and 42.4% (N = 445). The slight positive result allowed stating that the youth of our country were not indifferent to the history / ethnic culture of the Lithuanian nation.

Table 2. Respondents' interest in the history / ethnic culture of the Lithuanian nation

Replies		Frequency N	Percentage (percentage of confidence interval with 95% reliability)
Scale	**0 I take no interest**	**131**	**12,5/10,5 – 14,5**
	1	63	6,0/4,5 – 7,5
	2	58	5,5/4,1 – 6,9
	3	82	7,8/6,2 – 9,4
	4	111	10,6/8,7 – 12,5
	5	**132**	**12,6/10,6 – 14,6**
	6	105	10,0/8,2 – 11,8
	7	119	11,3/9,4 – 13,2
	8	88	8,4/6,7 – 10,1
	9	58	5,5/4,1 – 6,9
	10 I take great interest	**83**	**7,9/6,3 – 9,5**
	Total	1030	98,1
Other replies	I do not know	16	1,5
	I refuse to answer	4	0,4
	Total	20	1,9
Total		**1050**	**100,0**

Source: own study

Members of different nations and cultures have lived in different stages of Lithuania's development. The present period is not an exception. The research sample included representatives of different nationalities. The distribution of the respondents according to nationality was as follows: 95.3% (N = 982) – Lithuanians, 2.2% (N = 23) – Polish, 1.6% (N = 16) – Russians, 0.1% (N = 1) – Jewish, and 0.8% (N = 8) did not indicate their nationality or represented other nationalities. Such a distribution of the respondents according to nationality did not reflect the real situation of our country: according to the general population and housing census of the Republic of Lithuania for 2011, Lithuania hosted 2 million 561 thousand residents of the Lithuanian nationality (84.2% of the overall population), 200.3 thousand (6.6%) of the Polish nationality, 176.9 thousand (5.8%) residents of the Russian nationality, 36.2 thousand (1.2%) of the Belarusian nationality, 16.4 thousand (0.5%) of the Ukrainian nationality, and 19.3 thousand (0.6%) representatives of other nationalities (*Statistics Department*, 2011). Consistent generalisations and conclusions regarding the interest of young citizens of Lithuania (of different nationalities) in Lithuanian history / ethnic culture can be drawn only after having accomplished a research with a probability sample: systematic or stratified.

Having analysed the research data, it is obvious that the respondents (representatives of different nationalities) take interest in the history / ethnic culture of the Lithuanian nation. Every eighth (N = 131) research participant claimed that s/he did not take interest in Lithuanian history / ethnic culture: 95.4% of the Lithuanian nationality (N = 125); 1.5% of the Polish nationality (N = 2); and 2.3% of the Russian nationality (N = 3). The number of the respondents who took great interest in the history / ethnic culture of the Lithuanian nation was N = 83: 97.6% of the Lithuanian nationality (N = 81) and 2.4% of the Polish nationality (N = 2). The fifth (the middle) position of the scale was chosen by (N = 132) respondents. The distribution according to the nationality was as follows: 97.7% respondents of the Lithuanian nationality (N = 129); 0.8% of the Russian nationality (N = 1), 0.8% of the Jewish nationality (N = 1), and 0.8% of the respondents (N = 1) did not specify the nationality. The research results lead to the assumption that the youth, representatives of different nationalities, were not indifferent to the history / ethnic culture of the Lithuanian nation (Table 3).

Table 3. The links between the respondents' nationality and their interest in Lithuanian history / ethnic culture

Do the young people take interest in the history / ethnic culture of the Lithuanian nation: dependence on nationality?								
			Nationality of the respondents					
			Lithuanian	Polish	Russian	Jewish	Other	Not specified	Total
Scale	**0** I take no interest	Frequency / percentage (%)	125/95.4%	2/1.5%	3/2.3%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	1/0.8%	131/100.0%
	1		54/85.7%	6/9.5%	2/3.2%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	1/1.6%	63/100.0%
	2		55/94.8%	2/3.4%	1/1.7%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	58/100.0%
	3		79/96.3%	2/2.4%	1/1.2%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	82/100.0%
	4		102/91.9%	5/4.5%	4/3.6%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	111/100.0%
	5		129/97.7%	0/0.0%	1/0.8%	1/0.8%	0/0.0%	1/0.8%	132/100.0%
	6		103/98.1%	0/0.0%	1/1.0%	0/0.0%	1/1.0%	0/0.0%	105/100.0%
	7		115/96.6%	3/2.5%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	1/0.8%	0/0.0%	119/100.0%
	8		83/94.3%	1/1.1%	2/2.3%	0/0.0%	2/2.3%	0/0.0%	88/100.0%
	9		56/96.6%	0/0.0%	1/1.7%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	1/1.7%	58/100.0%
	10 I take great interest		81/97.6%	2/2.4%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	0/0.0%	83/100.0%
Total			**982/95.3%**	**23/2.2%**	**16/1.6%**	**1/0.1%**	**4/0.4%**	**4/0.4%**	**1030/100.0%**

Source: own study

The analysis of Table 3 demonstrated that the representatives of other nationalities also took interest in the history / ethnic culture of the Lithuanian nation: the youth living in our country was exposed to intercultural dialogue and was ready to elaborate it.

Discussion

The term 'value' is explained in different ways in different sciences: the example of pluralism is obvious. What is considered as a value in the conditions of globalisation and information society?

The youth are educated for future activities in the modern school. Hence, the following problem-based questions arise: do modern general education schools exploit the possibilities of the subjects of History / Ethnic Culture to develop the learners' value attitudes and genuine values? How deep is the learners' interest in the history and ethnic culture of the Lithuanian nation? What content areas can be used to develop the discourse of Lithuanian youth on ethnic culture as a value? Do the youth consider ethnic culture as a value?

The research data lead to the assumption that there is a lack of creativity in the space of general education when constructing and organising the process of education in the way that school youth absorb genuine values, which make human life meaningful, social life – harmonious and solidary, and national life – progressive and safe. Nevertheless, the research data undoubtedly encourage the strategists of the organisation / modernisation of the education process and all the participants of education to focus on common activity of the analysis of the content areas of general teaching plans and the process of the development of education organisation strategies, as well as to search for new methods and ways of education. It is inevitable when seeking to help the younger generation to develop transcendental values and value attitudes.

Conclusions

The rapid processes of globalization affect a lot of spheres of social life. They are assessed as ambivalent; the challenges of the contemporary epoch are especially painfully accepted by national cultures. The European Union policy does not attempt to level the variety of cultural expressions of its member countries. These processes occur spontaneously due to the increase in citizens' mobility. Unfortunately, the phenomena of national culture are insufficiently reflected by the popular mass media. The research, conducted in 2016, reveals that Lithuanian youth is interested in the history and ethnic culture of the Lithuanian nation. People of other nationalities, e.g. Polish, Russian, etc., living in Lithuania are also interested in history of Lithuanian nation / ethnic culture.

A national state, pursuing to maintain and enhance the national identity of its citizens, should ingrain the awareness of the ethnic significance in the system of education. The Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Lithuania developed a Strategy on the Development of Ethnic Culture in Educational Institutions in 2009, which

resulted in the activity programmes in 2012. It consolidates the principal provision that ethno-cultural elements, such as folklore, traditions and customs, folk art and others, should be integrated into a number of study subjects and after-class activities.

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Positive Individual's Socialization in the Intersection of Cultures and Religions: Narrative of Mimicry and Metamorphosis

Indywidualizacja socjalizacji na skrzyżowaniu kultur i religii: imitacja i metamorfozy

Streszczenie

W XXI wieku socjalizacja staje się szczególnie istotna, gdyż człowiek nie żyje w odosobnieniu; funkcjonuje w społeczeństwie, które jest niczym innym, jak powszechnym zbiorem wartości, postaw, zachowań i innych kwestii. Jednostka, na której autokreację wpływa postrzeganie przez nią kwestii kulturowych i religijnych, staje w obliczu pytania o swoją wartość, o to, jak poruszać się w świecie kultury i religii oraz w innych sferach życia. Efekt ten wzmacnia coraz większe otwarcie społeczeństwa na świat. Stąd pojawia się pytanie: „Czym jest ta otwartość, czemu służy? Czy jest nieograniczona czy też ma jakieś granice?" (Lukšienė, 2000, s. 399). W tym kontekście można sformułować pytanie naukowe: jak duża jest rozbieżność między socjalizacją jednostki a mimikrą i metamorfozą na skrzyżowaniu kultur i religii?

Celem artykułu jest wykazanie, jak istotne znaczenie ma pozytywna socjalizacja jednostki na przecięciu kultur i religii poprzez ujawnienie rozbieżności między mimikrą a metamorfozą.

Postawę metodologiczną opracowania stanowi konstruktywizm społeczny (Kukla, 2000). W artykule przedstawiono koncepcję pozytywnej socjalizacji jednostki, omówiono czynniki, które na nią wpływają oraz schematy i możliwe przejawy mimikry i metamorfozy. Autor przykłada istotną wagę do inteligentnej edukacji, która według Kvieskienė (2015) odzwierciedla sektor twórczy i społeczny, która pozwala na rozwinięcie zarówno potencjału jednostki jak i różnych grup społecznych. Może stanowić ona także zachętę do pozytywnej socjalizacji jednostek zanurzonych w określonej przestrzeni kulturowej i religijnej.

Słowa kluczowe: pozytywna socjalizacja, kultury, religie, mimikra, metamorfoza.

Abstract

In the 21ˢᵗ century socialization becomes particularly important because an individual does not stand alone on his/her own, he/she is in a certain society, which is nothing less, indiscreet

in the aspects of values, attitudes, behaviour, and other aspects. A person faces his/her value, cultural, religious navigations and other issues because the self-formation is influenced by his/her cultural and religious perception. This gets strengthened when the society becomes more open for the world. Thus the following question emerges: "What is this openness, for what is this openness, unlimited or with limits?" (Lukšienė, 2000, p. 399). In this context it is possible to formulate the question of scientific problem: what is the gap between individual's socialization and mimicry as well as metamorphosis at the intersection of cultures and religions?

The aim of the article is to reveal the importance of individual's positive socialization in the intersection of cultures and religions by disclosing the gap of mimicry and metamorphosis.

The methodological attitude is social constructivism (Kukla, 2000). The article presents the concept of individual's positive socialization, discusses the factors influencing it, the scheme and possible manifestations of its possible mimicry and metamorphosis. The attention is paid to a smart education, which, according to Kvieskienė (2015), is the measure of creative and social industries, which helps every person to develop, enable oneself and help different social groups. It can also be the incentive for the positive socialization of a person in the space of cultural and religious connection.

Keywords: positive socialization, cultures, religions, mimicry, metamorphosis.

Introduction

The 21st century is full of challenges – globalization enhances social, educational, technological and other challenges, but at the same time it opens new possibilities as well and it induces creation of innovations and their implementation. It is not simple for a person in environment of different changes. He/she constantly faces socialization problems because the society, in which he/she lives, is not indiscrete in value, cultural, religious, economical and other viewpoints, and different social, political, technological and other factors of globalization stimulate the life change.

A human being faces his/her value, cultural, religious navigation and other questions because self-formation is influenced by his/her cultural and religious perception. This gets strengthened when society becomes more open for the world. Thus the following question emerges: "What this openness is, for what purpose, is it boundless or with borders?" (Lukšienė, 2000, p. 399). In this context it is possible to formulate the question of scientific problem: what is the gap between individual's socialization and mimicry as well as metamorphosis at the intersection of cultures and religions?

The aim of the article is to reveal the importance of individual's positive socialization in the intersection of cultures and religions by disclosing the gap of mimicry and metamorphosis.

The objectives:
  » to discuss conceptual space of individual's positive socialization.
  » to disclose smart education as the drive for individual's positive socialization in contexts of intersections of cultures and religions.

The object is positive socialization of an individual in the intersection of cultures and religion.

The methodological approach is social constructivism (Kukla, 2000).

Socialization of an individual has been analysed in different aspects: Bales and Parsons (2007) present the topic of Family: Socialization and Interaction Process analysed by different authors; Morgan (2015) pays their attention to Social Theory and the Family; Singh-Manoux and Marmot (2005) analyze Role of Socialization in Explaining Social Inequalities in Health; Vous and Baumeister (2011) present questions on Person's Self-regulation in Sociality analysed by different authors; Kvieskienė (2005) – matters of positive socialization. Thus no studies, which would explore individual's socialization by disclosing the aspect of mimicry and metamorphosis, have failed to be found. Methods of scientific literature analysis and modelling were applied in this paper.

Theoretically the article is important because the aspect of mimicry and metamorphosis of individual's positive socialization is revealed; in the practical viewpoint it is important because on its basis it is possible to construct the instrument for the research on the intersection of person's positive socialization by invoking smart education.

Discussion on conceptual space of individual's positive socialization. In the context of global and local individual's socialization changes individual's socialization acquires much more importance. Though the authors define socialization differently; however, it is the process related to the interception of society or its separate group rules, norms and values – norms and rules are related to values.

It is necessary to agree with the thought of Michael (2015, p. 1) that defines socialization as "a learning process that involves development or changes in the individual's sense of self, and this is exactly true. Socialization is a learning process." Thus socialization is individual's learning. However, this is rather complicated and multi-aspect process. This already testifies that in the value viewpoint society is not indiscrete; thus it can be problematic to intercept norms and rules of certain groups, organizations and so on because in the value viewpoint this cannot concur with individual's value attitudes – values of certain persuasions or religions, separate subcultures or counter-cultures, etc. can differ from individual's ones. In such case internal and/or external conflict can occur. It can be constructive, but it can become deconstructive. But it should be understood so that, when a person faces the values, norms, rules unacceptable for him/her, he/she could defend themselves by their internal resistance. Sometimes he/she is also constrained in the trap of certain norms and rules. This usually summons his/her internal resistance. In order to avoid socialization intervention or at least to neutralize or handle them, it is necessary to understand socialization process. It consists of two stages (Leonavičius, 2004). The first stage is related to formation. During this process a person develops basic value attitudes, persuasions, and norms. According to Leonavičius (2004), each individual is born in objectively existing social structure, in which he/she interacts with important people responsible for his/her socialization. Each person is born in not only externally existing society structure (a social class, residence place, parents' income) but also in objective or subjective socially constructed reality (values, attitudes, perception categories and so on). Other people are important as agents between social world and a person being socialized. Presently an individual constructs perception and understanding of own world on the basis of value attitudes. This construction is related to emotional relationship with environment – after all one identifies with others and the environment by means of emotions and feelings. A person tries to identify himself/

herself in the environment (as well as in cultural and religious because it relates to his/her micro environment), his/her role in society, constructs conception of very self and so on. Also he/she identifies himself/herself with particular roles in the society, his/her status in it; usually this is influenced by his/her referential group or a particular person or people. It should not be forgotten that during this process the people, certain groups present in the virtual environment can make great influence. During the primary socialization person's framework world is forming. This influences the stage of the secondary socialization and his/her entire social life. Secondary socialization is person's adjustment in public social environment. According to Leonavičius (2004), it involves his/her particular roles, which are directly related to labour world, the roles performed by him/her. Emotional relationship is not so important in the secondary socialization. Undoubtedly, a person is emotionally related to important people, certain groups or separate people (at the same time present in the virtual environment). In this stage a person can pursue to change the content and identity internalized during the primary socialization. Thus the change of individual's norms, rules, values can take place. Even the constructed framework of the world in his/her first socialization stage can be changed.

Generally, socialization is a complicated process in the life of an individual. It constantly takes place and this is important when one digresses from legalized society norms and rules. Then it is already possible to face re-socialization, which is the process complicated enough. In order to avoid it, the positive socialization of an individual might be encouraged. It, according to Kvieskienė (2005, p. 5), can be defined as follows:

> "Positive socialization is the policy of positive actions (scenarios of positive socialization), referring to which certain people or their groups correct behaviour of socialization subjects by pursuing to consolidate positive components of culture and make the barrier for the outcomes of this culture elements unacceptable for society. Employment of human resources (social capital, partnership), indices of social policy, scenarios/ methodologies of positive socialization in pursuing for child and society welfare and optimal socialization is important".

Thus positive socialization is the purposeful process aimed to create scenarios for make socialization process in order it would take place in the right direction of value viewpoint and barriers for not facing socialization deviations. This process is related to all levels of education reality:

» societarian (societal level, in which legislation exists);
» systemic (the system is created for implementation of the order confirmed by the laws: different educational an socialization systems);
» institutional (in a particular organization there are certain values, norms, rules, which influence his / her socialization process);
» inter-personal (this is the interaction person to person. Here immediately one faces a particular person and one interacts with him / her).
» intrapersonal (personality phenomenon. This already the personal level – some values become life credo and on their basis certain norms, rules are accepted or they are rejected or ignored) (modified according to Targamadzė, 2010, p. 10).

In every level of the education reality it is possible to initiate the processes influencing individual's socialization. Smart education can help in this aspect.

Smart education as inducement for individual's positive socialization. Education, culture, socialization relate to values that are the fundamental of education and culture; and in the socialization process an individual intercepts or not attitudes, rules formed on the basis of values. They can become its self or it can possess contraposition for them or tolerate them. Sometimes this contraposition emerges due to ignorance due to certain cultural and/or religious traditions, misunderstanding of written or unwritten norms of society or its separate groups, etc. For example, Muslims keep one life way, this is influenced by the Islam confession; the life way of Christians is different (they refer to the Bible); traditions of Georgians' table traditions and particularly toasts make their culture concurrent part; however, in Lithuania the table is different and does not distinguish in long toasts. And, in principle, this is neither spontaneous goodness nor evil – it depends on the context, situation, objective and so on. However, in any case the intersection of cultures and religions should not be ignored because it makes one or another influence upon individual's socialization. It is important that an individual would understand otherness and could wisely envisage deep, value matters, which often are even similar in value viewpoint (only here one should not intermix instrumental, terminal and transcendental values and their expression in social context). In general, the intersection of cultures (their subcultures or counter-cultures) and/or religions strengthens the importance of positive socialization in different contexts of global society: this means that an individual could clearly understand the value backbone in order to be able separate own and other people mimicry and metamorphosis because the latter is related to the change, and mimicry – to adjustment. An individual, who faces global challenges of virtual and real world, has to think about essential matters of own socialization: values, norms, rules, meaning of own social role or roles, their expression in one or another social, cultural, religious context by not losing own moral backbone as well as moral values and norms. Really, when one gets into certain context, it is necessary to find adequate own "text" recorded by actions, behaviour, etc. Beyond a text, always a context exists; and every context contains own personal text – this is personality's decision a text written by actions, behaviour considering some norms, rules. If the relation of the text and context breaks, the "gap" between individual's social life and adequacy/inadequacy of society or its group (-s) norms, constructive and destructive behaviour, but sometimes this can become the possibility for innovativeness, positive socialization. In such case problematic field is forming (one should not forget that every problem possesses both challenges and possibilities within itself). In this context the attention should be paid to the process of positive socialization, to which smart education can contribute.

What is smart education? As always in social sciences, when wishing to find out about one or another conception, we face peculiar definition.

Uskov et al (2016, p. 5) understand this as educational system possessing own directions: "A smart multi-disciplinary student-centric education system – linked across schools, tertiary institutions and workforce training, using: (1) adaptive learning programs and learning portfolios for students, (2) collaborative technologies and digital learning resources for teachers and students, (3) computerized administration, monitoring and reporting to keep teachers in the classroom, (4) better information on our learners, (5) online learning resources for students everywhere".

Meanwhile Kvieskienė (2015) more refers to the logic of construction of smart education model. She states:

"It is possible to state that a new smart education model being modelled is based on 3M – multi-functional, multi-criteria and multi-sector – model as well as priority synergy of smart education leadership, which functions locally and globally by creating outburst directions and new possibilities that are fast and wisely used to empower knowledge, innovations, learning, networks and digitality for the greater welfare of a person and society (community) with rational costs and sustainability probability of sustainability, is based on leadership professionals working at educational institutions (we have in mind social pedagogues)" (Kvieskienė, 2015, p. 14).

Zhu, Yu and Riezebos (2016, p. 6) refer to the following concept: "the essence of smart education is to create intelligent environments by using smart technologies, so that smart pedagogies can be facilitated as to provide personalized learning services and empower learners, and thus talents of wisdom who have better value orientation, higher thinking quality, and stronger conduct ability could be fostered".

Referring to this concept, the authors suggested the research framework. This is reflected in Figure 1 (Zhu & Yu & Riezebos, 2016, p. 6).

Fig. 1. Research framework of smart education

The figure presents three basic elements of smart education: smart environments, smart pedagogy, and smart learner. According to Zhu, Yu and Riezebos (2016, p. 6), "smart education emphasizes the ideology for pursuing better education and thus had

better to be renamed as smarter education, which address the needs for smart pedagogies as a methodological issue and smart learning environments as technological issue, and advances the educational goals to cultivate smart learners as results. Smart environments could be significant influenced by smart pedagogy. Smart pedagogies and smart environments support the development of smart learners". Investigation of the interaction of these three elements in the viewpoint of stimulating individual's positive socialization and its optimization can help improve person's positive socialization. Considering globalizing dynamic environment, different factors that influence individual's socialization (particularly changing technologies) and that education, culture, socialization are related in value viewpoint, it is possible to search for improvement of individual's positive socialization by invoking smart education. In this context the attention should be paid to that individual's socialization is his/her learning, smart education is also related to person's learning, and this takes place in certain social, political, cultural or other context. In order to improve individual's learning it is possible to concentrate forces of different institutions. Thus social-educational cluster should be initiated. In order to initiate it is possible to refer to the following logical scheme:

» creation of cluster's idea and/or conception (a group focuses on reveal a cluster's idea or its conception and forecasting of potential partners);

» search for potential partners of the cluster (one speaks with possible partners of the cluster, discusses predictable mission of the cluster, their role and other important matters);

» discussion about predictable participants of the social cluster (the idea and conception of the social cluster, the role of clusters' participants are revealed, guidelines for the scenario of cluster's strategic activity are discussed, the group for preparing the scenario of strategic activity is planed);

» preparation of the scenario for cluster's strategic activity and its discussion (the group prepares guidelines prepared according to the scenario, consults with social partners; if it is necessary, experts are involved). The scenario is discussed with the cluster's participants. If essential corrections are necessary, it can be corrected and discussed anew. Sometimes it might be possible to correct the structure of the group if efficiency of its activity is missing. One works till the scenario for cluster's strategic activity is coordinated);

» implementation of cluster's strategic activity and its monitoring (while implementing the scenario for cluster's strategic activity, every subject of the cluster has the scenario of own activity, which is coordinated with the cluster's strategic activity. Proactive management takes place and from the very beginning the monitoring system observes the cluster's activity, informs about possible problems, actions or activities to be corrected, gives recommendations for improvement of the cluster's activity).

Five stages of cluster initiation are presented. They are coherent: they start from the idea of cluster's creation, and end with the creation of the scenario for cluster's strategic activity and the beginning of its activity. It is important that the activity of these stages would be purposeful directed towards implementing of the basic idea of the cluster – by means of the cluster smart education would be used to improve individual's socialization in the intersection of cultures and religions by emphasizing

the difference of person's mimicry and metamorphosis. This difference is related to person's value attitudes: if it is only imitated, one adjusts to certain rules, norms and they are not his/her self, this will be mimicry; if it becomes individual's self and positive socialization, so then it should be related to individual's metamorphosis in respective context.

Discussion

Everyone has his/her own understanding of the world and constructs its phenomena individually. It depends on many factors: his/her value attitudes that be based on religious, cultural or other backgrounds; his/her capabilities to adapt; his/her education, emotional intelligence, etc. For that reason the socialization process does not always go smoothly and it may be even controversial. When an individual is confronted with a different culture or religion, he/she sometimes can't understand other cultural norms and value, they can unconsciously set these norms and values off against their own cultural, religious value attitudes. It is understandable, because we only see the culture externally – traditions, rituals, physical environment, we hear the myths, legends, etc. and we often form our own judgement by separate individuals and/or groups, their words or behaviour. It does not always reflect the essence. The values connect culture and/or religion with the socialization process where family, referential group and etc. usually has a great impact on them. In this way subcultures play an important role in the individual's life, they can discord with accepted cultural norms in the society or even religious dogmas, and this may impede the intercultural communication and complicate individual's socialization. On the other hand, individual's socialization does not have to be positive. As a result of various impediments (bullying, slight, etc.) an individual can retreat into himself/herself and reject the objectively existing standards and rules in the society. There may also be a miscommunication due to religion, prejudice or personal experience. Further research should be based on the analysis of problems an individual faces during every stage of the socialization, exploration of the possibilities of smart education helping an individual not to set off against other cultures and/or religions and avoiding the assimilation, and at the same time fostering socialization to keep one's own culture and/or religion. Nowadays the ability to keep one's self while thriving in the context of different cultures and/or religions is seen as a problem that includes both challenges and possibilities therefore the topic of the individual socialization still remains topical. After all the main objective is not an individual mimicry but a metamorphosis that creates the possibility to thrive for an individual and others in the cohesion of culture and/or religion and at the same time to create the welfare together with other members of the society. For that reason we should understand that socialization is learning and we should use a smart education without so common pressure (in the form of norms and values) that often directs individuals to mimicry. Further research should be conducted on factors influencing the individual mimicry and metamorphosis; we should find possibilities to help every individual in the process of the socialization avoiding destructive conflicts

in the intersection of cultures and religions, and to help him to socialize in this context without losing the self.

Conclusions

In the process of the own socialization, every individual intercepts or not certain norms or rules, which are formed and being formed on the basis of values; thus the socialization process can possibly face individual's mimicry (adaptability) or metamorphosis (changing, change, transforming). In this process virtuous spine and moral norms of an individual are important. His/her every social context (actions, activity, performed role or other social expression) possesses own context. As in the picture of social life (visible or not) one cannot use an eraser, thus positive socialization becomes the important part of his/her social life in the intersection of different cultures and religions.

When treating individual's socialization as his/her learning, smart education that is related to smart environments, smart pedagogy, and smart learner can make an important influence. In order to use smart education for improvement of individual's socialization the social educational cluster can become the instrument. It is possible to distinguish five synergetic stages for initiating a cluster:

» cluster ideas and / or conception creation;
» search for potential partners of the cluster;
» discussion of prospective participants of social cluster;
» preparation of scenario for cluster's strategic activity and its discussion;
» implementation of the scenario for cluster's strategic activity and its monitoring.

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Wydarzenia naukowe

Cultural Events

KAMILA KAMIŃSKA | University of Wroclaw, Poland

„Konferencja Dziecięca Foresight 2036/2056": Europejskiej Stolicy Kultury Wrocław 2016 i Instytutu Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego

Children's conference accompanying Wrocław 2036/2056 Social Foresight

W dniu 16.11.2016 roku o godzinie 9.45 w Auli Instytutu Pedagogiki przy ul. Dawida 1 rozpoczęła się Dziecięca Konferencja Foresight 2036–2056. Projekt był elementem programu „Miasto Przyszłości, Laboratorium Wrocław" realizowanego w ramach obchodów Europejskiej Stolicy Kultury 2016. Rozmowy o przyszłości w, jak mówi chińskie przysłowie: "ciekawych czasach" trwały ponad pół roku. Realizował je zespół badaczy I animatorów z Instytutu Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, koordynowany przez dr Kamilę Kamińską. Założenia metodologiczne oparte były o teorię bajki magicznej Wladimira Proppa i elementy miasta w ujęciu Kevina Lyncha. Metaforą, wokół której fokusowała się uwaga dzieci była postać Gąsienicy Przyszłej. To właśnie ona – w słynnej opowieści Carolla: „Alicja w krainie czarów" opowiada o przyszłości... heterotopie: miejsca różne/inne – tego poszukiwali badacze. Nawiązanie do foucauldiańskiej teorii, na grunt pedagogiczny zaszczepionej przez profesor Marię Mendel stanowiło teoretyczny horyzont rozważań. „Heterotopia" – to było trudne słowo na „h", którego nauczyło się przeszło 300 dzieci w murach Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Konferencja była wszak naukowa!

Uroczystość otworzyła dr hab. Alicja Szerląg, profesor Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, przybyłych gości przywitała prof. dr hab. Iwona Bartosiewicz, prorektor ds. nauki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.

Dzieci wysłuchały wykładu Łukasza Medekszy i dr Kamili Kamińskiej, która przedstawiła wyniki badań. Po wykładach był czas dyskusji i głosowania nad rozwiązaniami dla miasta. Najwięcej entuzjazmu wzbudziły pomysły ekologiczne: truskawki i maliny w ogródkach przy szkołach, lekcje biblioteczne na kocykach i idea „drzewa do przytulania" dla każdego mieszkańca.

Druga cześć wydarzenia miała wyraźnie artystyczny wydźwięk: dzieci prezentowały wyniki swojej kilkumiesięcznej pracy: film, spektakl, prace plastyczne, taniec.

Wyniki obrad zostały zebrane w listę postulatów dzieci do władz miasta, zamierzamy kontynuować ten innowacyjny na skalę europejską format. *Całość zakończył poczęstunek przewidziany dla wszystkich uczestników konferencji.*

Bez wątpienia dzień 16 listopada 2016 r. zapisze się w kartach historii Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, ilość dzieci w tym dniu w Auli Instytutu Pedagogiki wyniosła około 300, co było niezwykłym doświadczeniem zarówno dla uczestników jak i organizatorów spotkania.

Konferencja powstała we współpracy Instytutu Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego z Europejską Stolicą Kultury Wrocław 2016.

Zdjęcie 1. Obrady konferencji w Auli Instytutu Pedagogiki UWr. Fot. Wojciech Nekanda Trepka.

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Indeks cytowań[1]

Citation index[2]

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[1] Indeks zawiera zestawienie nazwisk i imion osób, które występują w tekście zasadniczym, w przypisach oraz bibliografii.

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1. Publikowanie tekstów w czasopiśmie „Multicultural Studies" jest bezpłatne.
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2. Ocena nadesłanego utworu pod kątem jego kompletności.

3. Przekazanie utworu do recenzji (dwóch recenzentów, zgodnie z zasadą *double blind review*).

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4. After receiving positive review, the paper undergoes editing which includes verification of cited sources and text editing.

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