The author analyzes consequences of using two similar means of crime/misdemeanor prevention in the area of road traffic: prohibition of driving vehicles (art. 276 of the Penal Procedure Code) and annexation of the driving license document (by regulation of art. 135 of the Road Traffic Bill). The main point of the study is to find out, whether and how should these facts (practical use of the mentioned means) have influence on courts’ jurisdiction and sentencing penal means of prohibiting to drive vehicles in public traffic. The author presents an opinion that constitutional guarantees obligate courts to take into consideration at the time of sentencing the ban also the period of prohibition/document annexation every time when this means was effectively in force. But none of these means – prevention or penal one – is homogenous. It could concern different kinds of vehicles – sometimes even those which require no permission to operate (like bicycles and horse-drawn carriages). So the ranges of those “pre and insentencing” means even in one proceedings could be totally different. This provokes deliberation how to keep the guarantees of traffic offenders’ rights without preferences for them by the penalties (how not to give them back more than they had actually sacrificed). The author suggests that the answer could be provided by the regulations of the Penal Code that have the status of universal rules of humanitarian punishing (starting with art. 63 of the Penal Code), and that point of view can be expanded by using the analogy to some other legal institutions. The study also quotes several sentences of the Supreme Court, which present the guidelines for interpretation of particular regulations.
May 17, 2017
Nov 5, 2013
|Zaliczanie okresów pozbawienia prawa jazdy przy orzekaniu i wykonywaniu środka karnego zakazu prowadzenia pojazdów||May 17, 2017|