HERMENEUTICS SOCIAL CRITICISM AND EVERYDAY EDUCATION PRACTICE

EDITOR
RAFAŁ WŁODARCZYK



INSTYTUT PEDAGOGIKI
UNIWERSYTETU WROCŁAWSKIEGO

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HERMENEUTICS, SOCIAL CRITICISM AND EVERYDAY EDUCATION PRACTICE

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FROM THE EDITOR

The individual chapters written by scholars of the Department of General Pedagogy at the University of Wrocław included in the volume offered to the Readers, showcase selected variants and problems of the hermeneutical and critical approaches to educational practice and research. The general pedagogy we practice in this way reveals its interdisciplinary character, drawing on the resources and achievements of philosophy, sociology, psychology, cultural anthropology, religious studies, and political sciences. By deliberately adopting such an approach, general pedagogy becomes the basic science of pedagogy; one of its major tasks is the integration and criticism of knowledge about education and the study of education and its broadly understood contexts, a knowledge which is produced not only in numerous disciplines of humanities and social sciences. This ambitious task undertaken by many theoreticians and researchers of education all over the world calls for a continuous effort to review the resources of dynamically changing and transforming scientific knowledge and to draw on contemporary and historically significant philosophy. Translating these experiences into the resources of general pedagogy requires from us the effort of understanding the languages of contemporary humanities, social sciences and multicultural societies, as well as the effort of critical thinking, which can recognize and take into account the entanglement of scientific knowledge in social ideas and practices, its conflicts, inequalities and asymmetric discourses. Hence the general pedagogy we practice, exploring the area of ideology (religion) and utopias present in everyday educational practice, implements the vision of bringing closer these two approaches (hermeneutical and

critical). We believe that such a general pedagogy, engaged, practiced with passion, aware of its present social context and its past and of the urgent needs, theoretical and practical difficulties, a pedagogy that explores the possible shapes of the future, is both necessary and inspiring. It addresses new topics and offers novel approaches, revises well-established and newly proposed findings, is aware of opportunities and threats. Nevertheless, the chapters written by us are integral, self-contained wholes, just as their authors retain their intellectual and research autonomy, which can be seen in the issues we choose, the mode of their presentation and addressing.

The statements we make in this volume are divided into two parts, reflecting our dual way of thinking and research on the theory and practice of education. On the one hand, we focus attention on the ways in which theory is practised in education, its structure and potential, and on the other hand, we use theory to observe, diagnose and transform educational and social realities. This does not mean, of course, that these two avenues can be separated or isolated, but rather that there is a different emphasis in our scholarly work.

The first part entitled "Hermeneutics of Everyday Educational Practice" consists of seven chapters. It opens with an article by Wiktor Żłobicki, "The Person and His Development. The Gestalt Approach in Academic Education". The author, developing the right Gestalt holistic approach to man and his relationship with the world, points to several important issues related to the teacher-student relationship, which relationship arises in academic conditions. The method of analysis and interpretation of Gestalt application to academic education proposed by the author demonstrates the great potential of this kind of humanistic pedagogy. Rafał Włodarczyk in the chapter "Transgression – Transdisciplinarity – Translation" points to pedagogy as a discipline that can be a model of an institution of translation, a discipline located at the crossroads of humanities and social sciences, integrating and studying the conditions for the transfer of disciplinary, inter- and transdisciplinary knowledge, which can develop the knowledge necessary to educate in the field of inter- and transdisciplinary translation. In "Hermeneutics of Translation – the Fundamental Aspect of Dialogue. Around the Concept of George Steiner", Rafał Włodarczyk presents the context of George Steiner's original approach to understanding, referring to the thought

and tradition of Judaism. He analyses and discusses the premises of Steiner's basic theorem in reference to the phenomenon of dialogue, examines the consequences and draws conclusions from his concept for education theory and practice. In turn, Monika Humeniuk in the text "Between Exclusion and Inclusion in Religious Education" deals with issues related to models of religious education, which are alternative spaces of socialization. The education formulas associated with these models require the development of different social skills in children and adolescents as well as different modes of communication. Beata Pietkiewicz-Pareek in the chapter "Pedagogy of Rabindranath Tagore" discusses the innovative approach to school and academic education in India of one of the leading thinkers of his time. Tagore's views on education, in which he creatively combined the traditional and modern approach to it, shaped Western education concepts as well as ideas typical of the Hindu tradition related to education in forest hermitages and ashrams. In the text "Everyday Life – Between Rationality of Actions and Authority. An Example of Social Diagnosis by Erich Fromm", Iwona Paszenda refers to the concept and diagnosis of the condition of Western societies of one of the most important contemporary researchers. The author considers the significance of her findings for knowledge about education in the context of the emerging subdiscipline of pedagogy of everyday life. This part of the book closes with Grażyna Lubowicka's text "Understanding Daily Reality in Clifford Geertz's Interpretive Anthropology", in which the author discusses the topic in relation to the idea of a contemporary cultural anthropologist, whose solutions can both provide a methodological basis for conceptualising understanding of individuals or social groups under study, and prove useful in individuals' reflection and deliberation on themselves.

The second part of the book, which consists of six chapters, is entitled "Critically About the Experience of Everyday Educational Reality". This part opens up with the text of Grażyna Lubowicka "Between Argumentation and Persuasion in the Pluralist and Democratic Society: About Virtues and Abilities of Critical Thinking". The author focuses her attention on the challenges facing education, in particular on the need to shape the competence of critical thinking in relation to maintaining the order of public discourse. In the chapter "Between Secularization

and Post-Secularism – on Disenchantment of the World from the Perspective of the Sociology of Religion", Monika Humeniuk analyses the discussion that has been ongoing since the 1960s about the place and role of religion in contemporary Western societies. As she demonstrates, the classic theories of secularization, which initially persisted, linking the processes of rationalization and modernization with the inevitable decline of religion as such, began to be thematised over time, revealing the complexity and opacity of many phenomena and tendencies within the social forms of manifestation of religion and religious involvement. In turn, Beata Pietkiewicz-Pareek in the text "Essentialism and Social Reconstructionism in India", using Theodore Brameld's approach, discusses the tensions characteristic of modern Indian society, where the space of education is one of the fields of social struggle between conservative and progressive tendencies. Iwona Paszenda in the chapter "Success in Everyday Life" scrutinises the impact of cultural processes on the way of thinking about success in everyday life. Her reflections are based on the results of a survey research reflecting the transformation which has taken place in this respect since the late 1980s to date. The next two chapters deal with the issue of the hidden curriculum of schooling. Wiktor Żłobicki in his text "Identifying the Determinants and Effects of Education Based on the Hidden Curriculum Theory" discusses how the hidden curriculum results in the emergence of phenomena that disrupt the teaching and learning process in the entire education system, not excluding kindergartens, schools of all types and universities. In the chapter closing the second part of book "Strategies of Power, Tactics of Emancipation. Hidden Curriculum and Practical Consciousness in the Education of Teachers", Rafał Włodarczyk concentrates on the division and distribution of disciplinary power and authority in the school; he explores the role of the teacher in the process of pupils' empowerment and their regaining the position of subjects.

It remains to be hoped that the articles of the scholars of the General Pedagogy Department collected in this volume, a result of many years of collaborative effort, will heighten the readers' interest and cognitive inquisitiveness.

Rafał Włodarczyk

PART I

HERMENEUTICS OF EVERYDAY EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

WIKTOR ŻŁOBICKI
University of Wrocław

THE PERSON AND HIS DEVELOPMENT. THE GESTALT APPROACH IN ACADEMIC EDUCATION[1]

Contemporary European integration, including, among others, the popularisation of academic education in the new EU Member States, is accompanied by many positive and negative phenomena. For example, supporters of democratisation of education emphasize not only the socially important effects of inclusion of previously excluded groups, but also competitiveness between higher education institutions. On the other hand, opinions are voiced about the danger of *overeducating* the society, i.e. the lack of correlation between the needs of the market and the structure of professions and the actual competences of university graduates[2]. In the situation of such contradictions, attention to the level of academic education and its improvement is becoming increasingly important. Looking at these measures from the perspective of humanistic pedagogy, one should naturally lean towards an individual

[1] Originally published: Wiktor Żłobicki, "Osoba i jej rozwój w edukacji akademickiej", [in:] *Kompetencje absolwentów szkół wyższych na miarę czasów: wybrane ujęcia*, [in:] Wokół problemów socjologii edukacji i badań młodzieży, ed. A. Szerląg, Oficyna Wydaw. Atut, Wrocławskie Wydaw. Oświatowe, Wrocław 2009, p. 75–83.

[2] See Z. Melosik, "Edukacja a stratyfikacja społeczna", [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, Vol. 2, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, Warszawa 2003, p. 357.

who, endowed with intellectual predispositions, perceives academic education as a personal goal, serving his own development and only as a natural consequence offering profits in professional life. Here we can invoke Bogdan Suchodolski's ever topical observation that

> science is not only of indirect significance for people in that it furthers the bettering of material and social living conditions in all areas, but also has a direct meaning in that it shapes people's consciousness in a valuable way, and at the same time awakens in them intellectual needs, enriching their life quality, cooperating in experiencing the meaning of life, endowing them with a specific sense of happiness, which is born out of the pursuit of truth[3].

At present, there are three scenarios which academic education can follow[4]. The first one – subordinating education to the laws of economics and the market – would lead to the atrophy of students' personal development. The second, maximum scenario (in the full sense of the word) assumes that widespread higher education would contribute to the inflation of diplomas and personal educational disappointments of many students. Such a phenomenon can be seen e.g. among graduates of law schools and pedagogical faculties. The third scenario can be described as a search for a *golden means* between the needs of the labour market and the right of every human being to use their potential and personal development. Therefore, I will devote further considerations to the problem of the development of the person who takes up higher education. The theoretical context of these considerations is the Gestalt approach, the essence of which is a holistic vision of the human being and his/her relationship with the world, a harmonious development of personal resources and creative fulfilment of the unique abilities of every human being[5].

3 B. Suchodolski, *Wychowanie i strategia życia*, Warszawa 1983, p. 73.

4 See Z. Melosik, "Edukacja a stratyfikacja społeczna", op. cit., p. 360.

5 A broad view on the Gestalt approach in education is offered in the monograph: W. Żłobicki, *Edukacja holistyczna w podejściu Gestalt. O wspieraniu rozwoju osoby*, Kraków 2008.

PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT AS A NOTION OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY

Considerations about the development of a person are inseparably connected with the assumption that a person is by nature a being growing not only physically but also mentally. Consistently adopting the humanistic paradigm, we can say that the personhood of a person is the result of the development of his or her own natural predispositions. As Karen Horney wrote: "Under favorable conditions man's energies are put into the realization of his own potentialities"[6]. This does not mean that this development is identical for different people. In her study on human development conditions, the author clearly emphasized that we are dealing with a complicated process, contingent on a variety of factors.

> According to his particular temperament, faculties, propensities, and the conditions of his earlier and later life, he may become softer or harder, more cautious or more trusting, more or less self-reliant, more contemplative or more outgoing; and he may develop his special gifts. But wherever his course takes him, it will be his given potentialities which he develops[7].

The problem of personal development was also examined by Abraham Maslow, who, while creating his theory of personality, formulated a theory that a person is endowed with a being potentially existing in him or her, which comes to the fore in a more complete or, conversely, a more limited way[8]. The full realisation of this potential, or the pursuit of destruction, can take place both in the earliest stages of human development, when it is almost defenceless and dependent on the care of adults, and in later life. If, however, optimal conditions are provided during the course of development, then a harmonious path of full development becomes possible, in accordance with this primordial nature of man. It enables the realisation of the human potential. If the conditions in which a person lives inhibit this potential, then coping mechanisms come into play, which in the initial phase enable

[6] K. Horney, *Neurosis and Human Growth. The Struggle Toward Self-Realization*, New York 1950, p. 13.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] See A. H. Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being*, New York 1968.

him/her to survive in difficult moments, but with time can block this spontaneous development.

Deliberations on the concept of development must inevitable reference Carl R. Rogers' approach focused on the person. According to the author, man is born with an individual development potential and a strong desire to realize this potential, i.e. with what he calls a tendency for *self-actualisation*[9]. It is assumed, therefore, that human nature is positive, among other things because it manifests itself in the tendency towards development. Human needs, aspirations and drives are a manifestation of this aspiration and lead to the development of the individual, while developmental disorders, e.g. antisocial behaviour, are the effect of acquiring experience in a pathological environment.

Drawing on Carl R. Rogers' views, we can say that every human being perceives the world in a unique way and these observations create this individual's phenomenological field[10]. Although the personal, private world of the human person is difficult to examine objectively, we can try to perceive and interpret it as it appears to the individual. In other words, we can see and try to analyse the behaviour of a particular person through the prism of his or her own cognition. The spirit of cognition understood in this way lies in a phenomenological way of perceiving reality, emphasizing understanding and interpreting how people experience themselves and the world they live in. Carl R. Rogers therefore stressed the need to understand the subjective experience of every human being, i.e. the phenomenological field of a specific person. Rogers' notion of self-actualisation as the underlying motif of human activity provided an alternative to psychoanalytical theories. This concept implies constant opening to experiences and readiness to integrate these experiences into the increasingly developing sense of the Self. Carl R. Rogers also formulated a hypothesis that man functions in such a way as to experience inner cohesion and maintain a balance between perception, sensing his *Self* and experience. The universality of Rogers' concentration on the person allows us to determine the optimal conditions for subjective learning, and consequently also for development. The basis for this is the belief in the learner's abilities, which significantly

9 See C. R. Rogers, *On Becoming a Person. A Therapist View of Psychotherapy*, Boston 1961, p. 96.

10 See L. A. Pervin, O. P. John, *Personality: Theory and Research*, New York 2001, p. 168.

influences the role of the person helping in learning. First of all, there is no need to control the learning process, manipulate or control the learner, because growth, development, self-actualization, and internal compatibility are the basic activities of each and every person. Secondly, it is necessary to refer to the relationship between the pedagogue and the learner. Of paramount importance here is the pedagogue's focus on understanding the learner. Thirdly, in person-centred learning, authenticity is of key importance; authenticity is the extent to which people who meet each other behave in harmony with their own *Selves*.

Drawing on his own and his collaborators' many years of experience, Carl R. Rogers stressed that the use of a person-oriented approach in psychotherapy and education effectively triggers constructive changes in personality and behaviour and thus fosters development[11]. In such a conducive climate, a person, being free to choose any direction of activity, picks a constructive and positive path and, as a result, takes full advantage of the realisation tendency.

In order to explain even more precisely the relationship between Rogers' learning and development, it is advisable to pay attention to a few issues[12]. Firstly, for various reasons, many learners are unaware of their potential to acquire knowledge. In such a situation, it is easy to manipulate roles by building a strong authority of an academic and a defencelessness of students against this authority. Therefore, an important element of the professional role of a teacher is to help learners to discover their own abilities and to support their development in such a way that they do not cross the boundary when aspirations, instead of stimulating, can become an impediment to development. Secondly, genuine cooperation between learners and those who assist their learning process to further intense development; we need the inclusion of learners into the process of program development in line with their level of self-awareness. They should know what to learn, how, when and where. Thirdly, studying is a development process that is not confined to university premises. Therefore, it does not begin and end in classrooms, but continues even outside the university. It has its own dynamics, i.e. periods of high intensity and effectiveness, but also times of slowdown

11 See C. R. Rogers, *On Becoming a Person*, op. cit., p. 113.

12 See G. Egan, *The Skilled Helper. A Problem-Management Approach to Helping*, Pacific Grove 1998, p. 52–55.

or even block. This means that effective assistance and support in development can be talked about only when the individual learner, at his or her own pace – sometimes slower, other times faster – discovers his or her hitherto unused potential and applies it in practice.

HOLISM AS THE FOUNDATION OF EDUCATION

Holism as one of the key terms related to the Gestalt approach in education comes from the Greek *holos* (whole) and was disseminated by Jan Christian Smuts[13], who put forward a theory of cognition based on three fundamental assumptions. First, the human being experiences the immediate environment with all of the senses; Smuts was inspired here by Kantian philosophy. Second, perception of reality is holistic rather than fragmentary, which means that the whole is something else and something more than just a sum total of the individual parts. Here Jan C. Smuts was indebted to Plato. Third, holism is a tendency of the parts to merge into a whole. This way of ordering the world was encountered by Smuts in Hegel. The essence of holism, or a holistic view of the world, was also presented by one of the greatest scholars, Albert Einstein, who wrote that:

> Man is a part of the whole, which we call the universe, a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something that is separated from everything else, a kind of optical illusion of consciousness. This illusion is a sort of prison that limits us to our own tastes and inclinations towards the few close to us. Our goal should be to free ourselves from this prison. This will happen when we broaden the horizon of our compassion to such an extent that it embraces all living creatures and all nature with all its beauty[14].

[13] Jan Christian Smuts was not only a philosopher, who in 1925 published the book *Holism and Evolution*. He was also an eminent politician who put his philosophical views into practice. For instance, he opposed racial discrimination and colonialism. He was one of the initiators of the League of Nations and later a supporter of the establishment of the United Nations, for which he drafted the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations.

[14] H. Dauber, *Podstawy pedagogiki humanistycznej. Zintegrowane układy między terapią i polityką*, Kraków 2001, p. 78.

Albert Einstein's ideas and his theory of relativity have contributed to the fact that holism has become an important concept in the humanities. The idea of holism also appears among the anthropological premises of the Gestalt approach, which stems from the belief that the human being:

- is in fact trustworthy;
- has a huge potential and capacities whose application calls for the creation of appropriate conditions;
- is a social being;
- is inherently active, changes through its own activity and interaction with the environment;
- strives for a comprehensive development of his/her skills and capabilities[15].

EDUCATION IN THE GESTALT APPROACH AS AN OPPORTUNITY OF PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT IN A UNIVERSITY

All the above premises indicate that human behaviour can only be understood holistically. Therefore, as a subject of the body, psyche and spirit, man lives in an inseparable connection with the ecological and social environment and builds his identity through interactions with that environment. In the university environment, the essence of such interactions is the study, which Wincenty Okoń defines as "learning at a higher level – starting from the first years of higher education – with maximum own initiative and independence"[16]. It can be concluded that the period of study is an ideal period of education that is conducive to personal development, based on a process of contact between the individual and the environment. In the model solution, the student is in contact with the educational content and creates his or her own knowledge in a dynamic interpersonal system. The content of education should be understood as "any accumulated and generalized experience of humanity, which due to its value has been included in the curricula",

[15] See O. A. Burow, K. Scherpp, *Lernziel: Menschlichkeit. Gestaltpädagogik – eine Chance für Schule und Erziehung*, München 1981, p. 124; B. Śliwerski, *Współczesne teorie i nurty wychowania*, Kraków 1998, p. 160.

[16] W. Okoń, *Nowy słownik pedagogiczny*, Warszawa 1996, p. 269.

and knowledge is "everything that a learner assimilates by dealing with the content of education"[17]. To characterise the process of contact between the learner and the educational content, we can invoke an analogy from the Gestalt therapy between the consumption and digestion of food. The learner initiates contact, i.e. stimulates "appetite", recognizing an area of interest in the educational content provided. From among the contents with which the individual is in contact, he/she chooses (i.e. "consumes") something and then processes (i.e. "chews") it, building in, expanding and renewing his/her personal knowledge. As a result, the process of contact enters its final phase - assimilation and integration of knowledge (i.e. "digestion")[18].

If knowledge is to be considered a creative act, inseparably connected with the human need for self-fulfilment, then the desire to acquire knowledge is an inherent feature of the human being. However, contemporary man is forced to live in an extremely complicated world, in an increasing alienation from nature, which results in a distorted feeling of the dynamics of his own internal processes. Civilization processes have long been violating psychological, ecological and social foundations of human life. These phenomena have also affected universities. No wonder that the process of an individual's contact with the world, and above all the assimilation and integration of educational content, is disturbed. Universities continue to pay little attention to the individual's own cognitive activity, sensual cognition and emotions accompanying the learning process. The assumed effectiveness of teaching processes results in imposing contact with educational content (usually reduced to verbalism), and the complex mechanisms of control of learning outcomes assess the amount of assimilated content rather than personal knowledge. Therefore, students are forced to "swallow" rather than "chew" the content. In short, the disturbed process of contact with educational content makes it only partially assimilated and integrated with the current knowledge of the student. At the same time, the connotation of the notion of "development" in contemporary education is connected with a specific way of thinking about the effectiveness of higher education determined by a linear, systematic

[17] See R. Fuhr, "Pedagogika Gestalt. Dostęp do wiedzy osobistej", [in:] *Nieobecne dyskursy*, part 1, ed. Z. Kwieciński, Toruń 1991, p. 144–152.

[18] See Ibidem, p. 146–147.

and, most importantly, measurable increase of learners' competences. In such a perception of the student's development, stagnation, mistakes and regress are mostly unacceptable. Does the Gestalt approach permit a different view of the problem? Well, one can refer here to the claim put forth by Joseph Zinker, who suggests:

> Look at man the way you would look at the sunset or the mountains. Accept what you see with pleasure. Accept man for what he is. This is what you would do in the case of the sunset. You would not say: 'this sunset should be more purple' or 'these mountains should be higher in the middle part'. You would simply stare with admiration. The same is true of another human being. I look at him and do not say, 'his skin should be more pink', or 'his hair should be cut shorter'. The human being simply is[19].

This metaphor does not exclude the educational intentionality of academic teachers, but rather leads to reflection on what students really learn in and outside their universities; how the social environment can hinder the development of intellect, emotions and creative action; what share do academic teachers have in this?

Under the Gestalt approach: "learning takes place on the border of contact" and this border is the place where we recognise and decide to open up to something new in our lives[20]. Therefore, one of the important assumptions of Gestalt is to recognize the phenomenon of contact as the basis for teaching and learning. In the process of contact we can distinguish several phases:

- initiating contact (e.g. searching for a topic, uncovering the needs, searching for ways to raise motivation to act, familiarity with the problem, etc.);
- taking up an activity (trying different activities using all available means);
- integrating experiences (one's various collected experiences can be ordered, rejected, evaluated, differentiated, etc.);
- making solutions (an awareness of the results achieved in the action and of new problems to be solved emerges).

[19] J. C. Zinker, *Creative Process in Gestalt Therapy*, Brunner/Mazel, New York 1977, p. 22.
[20] O. A. Burow, *Grundlagen der Gestaltpädagogik*, verlag modernes lernen, Dortmund 1988, p. 84.

The above approach to the educational process is illustrated in the diagram below:



Fig. 1. Model of activity structure in Gestalt (source: H. Dauber, *Podstawy pedagogiki humanistycznej*, op. cit., p. 181).

The diagram above can be interpreted as follows. At the outset, it should be understood that teaching is the creation of learning opportunities, the support of learning, while learning is a conscious process of developing and applying new cognitive and emotional experiences in action and their mutual and holistic treatment. Then it becomes the teacher's task to support students to ask questions, take action in a problematic or conflicting situation. Teaching and learning thus become a creative process between the learner and the one who helps

to learn. Such experience of answering important questions, gained independently during one's studies, may be a source of new topics and new questions. A willingness to explore the world and new, extremely important experiences may emerge. An example of such action in the Gestalt approach may be taking up the problem of contacts with cancer patients during classes with medical students. Each of the future doctors in their future practice will certainly meet face-to-face with the patient who has been diagnosed with cancer. A suggestion to consider could be the organisation of workshops where the problem is raised: how should a medical student learn to talk to a cancer patient who asks the question: "What will happen to me?"

LEARNING BY PROVIDING INFORMATION	LEARNING BY EXPERIENCE
Standard reaction: – to acquire the best possible medical knowledge and to say: "We will try to help you".	Rejecting the standard reaction: – trying to practice contact with the patient in „safe" conditions during workshops (using e.g. drama), when medical knowledge is accompanied by the practiced skill of conducting a genuine dialogue with the patient.

The teacher's actions can therefore be driven by two considerations: arranging the initial situation, initiating a learning process, or arousing interest on the one hand, and on the other hand responding to the learner's problems or needs. Therefore, the academic teacher working in the Gestalt approach can both creatively support the process of seeking solutions by the student and creatively arrange the problem and arouse interest. Based on the above model, in the teaching process we start from the possibilities, needs and interests, and not from the curriculum content. The aim is to ensure that the acquired knowledge has a direct impact on the learner, engages his or her feelings, thoughts and inclines him or her to creative activity.

The Gestalt approach supports students in recognizing and understanding their own personality-determined ways of acquiring competence. The unique, individual character of learning understood in this way is determined by the principle: each person should be provided what they need here and now in order to develop and

satisfy their needs. Such an approach to learning is an alternative to the solution that is dominant in education: the same for everyone at the same time.

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Abstract:

The Gestalt approach in education sees human beings and their relation with the world as a single whole. This assumption is a base for

methodology of development of human potential. In the article author paid attention to a few topics:
– many students are unaware of their potential and the educator is thus obliged to reveal it;
– the process of studying is dynamic;
– it has its periods of intensity and activity but also slowing down or even coming to a halt;
– the process of learning takes place not only within the walls of an academic institution, but also more often outside (for example the innovation and ground breaking research occurring in the labs of technology sector);
– the involvement of students in the development of the curriculum leads to positive results.

Keywords:

education, person, development, Gestalt, teaching, learning

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TRANSGRESSION – TRANSDISCIPLINARITY – TRANSLATION[1]

Limited as we are in every way,
this state which holds the mean
between two extremes is present
in all our impotence

Blaise Pascal, *The Thoughts*, 355

TRANSGRESSION

The phenomenon of dynamic development and wide dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge focuses the attention of sociology. In particular it determines the state of its self-awareness, of course solely its own. By providing successive readings, especially intriguing ones, it inspires researchers and philosophers of science to verify them, as well as to conduct further research, thus influencing the course and formation of processes of developing specialist knowledge. Such intriguing impulses, which attract researchers' attention, include the issue raised by Wolf Lepenies in his essay *Fear and Science*. Lepenies looks at this modern phenomenon not only from the point of view of the successes of the industrial revolution and the processes characteristic of modernity,

[1] Originally published: Rafał Włodarczyk, "Transgresja – transdyscyplinarność – translacja", [in:] *Interdyscyplinarność i transdycyplinarność pedagogiki – wymiary teoretyczny i praktyczny*, ed. R. Włodarczyk, W. Żłobicki, Impuls, Kraków 2011, p. 53–68.

which have contributed to the growth of the importance of both fields and to their ordering and institutionalization, or philosophical efforts to examine their legitimacy, as well as the internal logic determining the appropriate ways of producing knowledge, division of labour and determining the tasks they should undertake in relation to this. The German researcher focuses his attention on science and technology in which western societies vest hopes to reduce or exclude fear of the forces of nature.

> The view of science as a radical means of reducing fear, if not eradicating it altogether, develops in early modern Europe and is officially confirmed and promoted by seventeenth-century academies [...][2].

The cognitive enthusiasm forming the scientific mentality of modern researchers, which according to Lepenies culminated in the 19th century, seems to be not without significance for the promotion of scientific attitudes outside the narrow circle of scientists and constructors, as well as for the assignment of social functions to science and technology. In other words, the development of science and its social support should be perceived in their interplay:

> Such a scientific mentality is undeniably gaining in importance and is becoming a cultural given in western industrial societies, since science and technology are regarded here as the engines of the enlightenment and thus as the critical mechanisms which have liberated man from the forces of nature, which for centuries have been regarded as incomprehensible and which instill fear[3].

The progress of science and technology seen in this perspective, which gives hope and has a real impact on the remodelling of the organization of western societies, numerous conveniences and an increase in labour productivity, builds up widespread belief in their effectiveness as a universal panacea. The development is mainly supposed to foster the growth of the social sense of security. Therefore,

2 W. Lepenies, "Lęk a nauka", [in:] W. Lepenies, *Niebezpieczne powinowactwa z wyboru*, Warszawa 1996, p. 36.
3 Ibidem, p. 35.

it can be assumed that research-oriented institutions designated in the social division of labour that enjoy trust and are strengthened by it have taken on the role of a kind of defensive mechanism of society, a buffer protecting its members against "direct" confrontation with fear, enabling, the delegation of fear of the forces of nature outside the framework of a typical social practice in the world of everyday life. And if, as Lepenies observes: "Our time, more than the earlier periods, might be an era when large disputes about worldviews and politics evolve around the subject of fear"[4]. Then it is so because "The revealed inability of science and the politics it directs to deal with even a distant catastrophe has its root cause in the inability of science to react appropriately to phenomena that cause anxiety"[5]. Currently, science and technology do not fulfil the function entrusted to them as institutions, which constitutes the social justification indicated here. Their development not only fails to reduce social anxiety, but also introduces numerous threats and problems, and thus intensifies it.

> Self-deception is not a problem as long as science and technology continue to make spectacular progress in understanding external nature and in combating exogenous fears. However, this progress has been halted: genetic technology and the splitting of the atom have consequences that no longer eliminate fears, but awaken fears of irreversible pollution of the environment and destruction of our world of life[6].

According to Urlich Beck, who studies the consequences of modernism like Lepenies, this new definition of the situation leads to a radical change in the way modern societies are organised: "we are eye-witnesses – as subjects and objects – of a break within modernity, which is freeing itself from the contours of the classical industrial society and forging a new form – the (industrial) 'risk society'"[7]. Beck places the re-evaluation of the relationship between science, technology and society in a broader perspective: the logic of the crisis of

4 Ibidem, p. 47.
5 Ibidem, p. 49.
6 Ibidem, p. 51.
7 U. Beck, *The Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*, London, New Bury Park, New Delhi 1992, p. 9.

modernity and the emergence of its variant which is reflexive modernity; the crisis of this modernity, for which one of the main determinants was considered the planned and organized transformation of the conditions regarding functioning of western societies. Therefore, despite its revolutionary effects, such as the establishment of a new quality in the form defined by Beck as a 'risk society', the change itself should be seen as relatively fluid:

> When modernization reaches a certain stage it radicalizes itself. It begins to transform, for a second time, not only the key institutions but also the very principles of society. But this time the principles and institutions being transformed are those of modern society[8].

In other words, the threats posed by the modernisation process, hitherto of a local nature, as a result of the research progress and technological development, their intensity and systematic increase, have both increased and intensified, which has fundamentally changed their nature and, in Beck's opinion, resulted in the establishment of a separate 'sphere', not controlled by modern institutions, which generates risks that are difficult to define and assess on a global scale[9], the sphere requiring radical changes in the way in which fundamental sources and methods of threat functioning are perceived and counteracted, and thus continue the process of modernisation on new principles:

> Modernity has not vanished, but it is becoming increasingly problematic. While crises, transformation and radical social change have always been part of modernity, the transition to a reflexive second modernity not only changes social structures but revolutionizes the very coordinates, categories and conceptions of change itself. This '*meta-change*' of modern society results from a critical mass of unintended side-effects[10].

8 U. Beck, W. Bonss, Ch. Lau, "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization. Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme", *Theory, Culture & Society* 2003, Vol. 20, p. 1. See also: U. Beck, "The Reinvention of Politics", [in:] U. Beck, A. Giddens, L. Scott, *Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Stanford 1994, p. 5–13.

9 See U. Beck, "On The Logic Of Wealth Distribution And Risk Distribution", [in:] U. Beck, *The Risk Society*, op. cit, p. 19–50.

10 U. Beck, W. Bonss, Ch. Lau, "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization", op. cit., p. 2. "This

Modernization of modernism, therefore, presupposes a social division of labour in which the role of science and technology is no longer clear. On the one hand, science and technology are still modern tools for reducing fear of the forces of nature, but on the other hand, fear of the forces released in the process of modernization requires the development of new means and methods of social prevention of threats which "they also cannot be determined by science"[11]. Thus, the production of knowledge socially necessary to deal with new forms of threat exceeds the institutional order established as a result of modernisation and, as a social practice, ceases to be the domain of qualified researchers. As Beck writes, "In risk issues, no one is expert, or everyone is an expert, because the experts presume what they are supposed to make possible and produce: cultural acceptance"[12].

> In the risk socjety, the recognition of the unpredictability of the threars provoked by techno-industrial development necessitates self-reflection on the foundations of social cohesion and the examination of prevailing conversations and foundations of 'rationality'. In the self-concept of risk society, society becomes reflexive (in the narrower sense of the word), which is to say it becomes a theme and a problem for itself[13].

Reflexive modernisation therefore means the dissemination of research practices and the production of knowledge beyond the institutional framework sanctioned by certain procedures specific to academic, scientific and technical centres.

TRANSDISCIPLINARITY

It is disputable to what extent the model of science identified with the ideals of modernity was implemented in the times of the hegemony of

new stage, in which progress can turn into self-destruction, in which one kind of modernization undercuts and changes another, is what I call the stage of reflexive modernization" (U. Beck, "The Reinvention of Politics", op. cit., p. 2).

11 U. Beck, "The Reinvention of Politics", op. cit., p. 6.

12 Ibidem, p. 9.

13 Ibidem, p. 8.

modernism, to what extent Western academies, research centres and institutions monitoring research and scientific careers absorbed it, thus incarnating a way of thinking about the production of knowledge taking into consideration such questions as: in which areas, at what modifications, social and moral costs, with what means, with what conviction or commitment, and with what resistance[14]. Nevertheless, from the point of view of the history of research institutions, it is possible to trace the processes of disciplinarization and institutionalization, emergence and location of new fields and specializations within the academic division of scientific work, in which it should be considered typical. As Krzysztof Michalski writes:

> Specific disciplines are governed by internal logic and have different patterns of rationality. They break down, or fragment the world into parts and layers, prepare their objects, adapt different methods to these preparations, define in their own way specific and non-specific terms that are to describe and explain them. The positive effect of this development is a rapid increase in knowledge and in the efficiency of science, while the negative effect is the problems of structuring, systematizing and integrating this knowledge and the resulting communication problems in the relations between science and science and science and society[15].

What cannot be underestimated is the fact that we are dealing with overlapping of two levels of functioning of the academia, i.e. the scientific and administrative ones, whose progressive rationalisations, in connection with different practices, tasks, objectives and procedures for the production of specialist knowledge and bureaucracy, are not easy to reconcile. Bureaucratisation, according to the

[14] See e.g.: W. Lepenies, *Between Literature and Science. The Rise of Sociology*, Cambridge 1988; H. Schnädelbach, "Science", [in:] H. Schnädelbach, *Philosophy in Germany 1831–1933*, Cambridge 1984; J. Habermas, "Modernity. An Unfinished Project", [in:] *Habermas and the Unfinished Project of Modernity. Critical Essays on The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, ed. M. Passerin d'Entrèves, S. Benhabib, Cambridge 1997; J.-F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge*, Minneapolis 1984.

[15] K. Michalski, "Interdyscyplinarność, transdyscyplinarność, multidyscyplinarność. Nowy paradygmat w nauce i badaniach", *Ekonomia i Nauki Humanistyczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Politechniki Rzeszowskiej* 2007, Issue 16, p. 85.

concept proposed by Max Weber[16], introduces work division in which posts and tasks are interconnected whereas the criteria of verification of the conducted activities are included in rules and regulations. However, the practices and objectives of research conducted within particular disciplines are not clear and definite. They depend on complex and changing research contexts, on the one hand, the growth of knowledge, which requires constant reinterpretation of assumptions and meanings of its components, and on the other hand, the current state of transformations of the world, the dynamics of which influences, among other things, the re-evaluation of tasks pursued by science, distinguishing among them the tasks oriented towards solving current social problems. The question arises, therefore, about the principle and significance of the cooperation of both planes. According to Jürgen Mittelstrass,

> certain problems cannot be captured by a single discipline. This is true, in particular, of those problems, as for instance rendered clear in the fields of environment, energy and health, which arise from issues not exclusively scientific. There is, and this not just in these fields, an asymmetry in the developments of problems and scientific disciplines, and this is aggravated as the developments of disciplines and science in general are characterised by an increasing specialisation[17].

It seems that at the level of functioning of an individual employed in a research institute, the asymmetry between the management of problems and disciplines overlaps with the tension with which the researcher is confronted, between the professional interest and the cognitive interest. Due to the clearly designated pulse to which the researcher is subject, and a strict division into bars containing components of a measurable value, the rhythm of professional duties (annual

16 See M. Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, ed. G. Roth, C. Wittich, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1978, p. 217–226, 956–1005.

17 J. Mittelstrass, "On Transdisciplinarity", *Trames* 2011, 15(65/60), p. 331. See J. Mittelstrass, "Transdisciplinarity – New Structures in Science" (the paper presented at the conference *Innovative Structures in Basic Research* in October 2000), http://xserve02.mpiwg-berlin.mpg.de/ringberg/Talks/mittels%20-%20CHECKOUT/Mittelstrasp.html (available: 1.05.2010).

plans, research, publications, promotions, reports, verification, criteria for evaluation of individual actions) may take the initiative, direct and give concrete dynamics to the practice of the researcher, who occupies the position, regulated by a score of rules, and located in the order of the amphitheatre of an institution.

Administrative links, due to their formal nature, are easier to maintain and sustain than communication and cooperation between disciplines and researchers, which, without individual initiative, effort and commitment to integration on the part of individuals, can ultimately cease, thereby fostering the separation of disciplines and the isolation of researchers. Therefore, interdisciplinarity, as Mittelstrass points out, which is the proper result of cooperation between disciplines and researchers defining their competences on the basis of an academic division of labour, is not a common practice accepted within traditional research institutions, but as such it constitutes a philosophically and theoretically justified project for revitalising the idea of scientific disciplines, justified by the need to counteract the knowledge disintegration;

> interdisciplinarity – German philosopher points out – is neither something normal, nor something really new, nor the true essence of the scientific order. Where it works, it rectifies misguided developments of science, but also renders apparent that (scientific) thinking in larger disciplinary units has manifestly declined. A whole should again arise out of particularities, both in a systematic as well as in an institutional sense[18].

While administration is related to institutional space and develops within a specific territory, the specialist knowledge generated cannot be unequivocally attributed to just one space. After all, even though it derives from research related to a specific place or body, it aims at theoretical generalizations. Its abstract character eludes administration. As Helga Nowotny notes, bearing in mind especially the character of the present development of science and research,

[18] J. Mittelstrass, "On Transdisciplinarity", op. cit., p. 330. See also: S. Fuller, *Interdisciplinarity. The Loss of the Heroic Vision in the Marketplace of Ideas*, www.interdiscipline.org/interdisciplinarity/papers/3 (available: 1.11.2009); D. Sperber, "Why Rethink Interdisciplinarity?", www.dan.sperber.fr/?p=101 (available: 1.05.2010).

> Knowledge seeps through institutions and structures like water through the pores of a membrane. Knowledge seeps in both directions, from science to society as well as from society to science. It seeps through institutions and from academia to and from the outside world[19].

The union of bureaucracy and science is not mandatory. Both Nowotny and Mittelstrass point out that the way in which dynamically developing research is practiced outside academic centres [20], also their dissemination does not lie within the boundaries of the structure of scientific disciplines, nor does it stick to methodological standards developed and adopted in traditionally practiced science. Therefore, as Nowotny claims,

> We need another language to describe what is happening in research. We identified some attributes of the new mode of knowledge production, which we think are empirically evident, and argued that, all together, they are integral or coherent enough to constitute something of a new form of production of knowledge[21].

From the positions adopted by both researchers, it can be deduced that the transdisciplinarity characteristic of the new type of knowledge development, which breaks the monopoly of the academia, is the result of the absence of organisational forms typical for traditional scientific institutions in the numerous spaces where such research develops. Therefore, it can be assumed that both types of knowledge development, i.e. disciplinary and transdisciplinary, will develop in parallel, but not independently of each other.

19 H. Nowotny, "The Potential of Transdisciplinarity", p. 1, http://www.helga-nowotny.eu/downloads/helga_nowotny_b59.pdf (available: 1.05.2010).

20 Mittelstrass gives examples of such research centres and organizations, see J. Mittelstrass, "Transdisciplinarity – New Structures in Science", op. cit. See also: S. Krimsky, *Science in the Private Interest. Has there Lure of Profits Corrupted Biomedical Research*?, New York 2003.

21 H. Nowotny, "The Potential of Transdisciplinarity", op. cit, p. 1. Such new language seems to be proposed by John Urry in his work *Sociology beyond Societies* (see J. Urry, "Metaphors", [in:] J. Urry, *Sociology beyond Societies. Mobilities for the Twenty-first Century*, London, New York 2000, p. 21–48).

transdisciplinarity – Nowotny writes – does not respect institutional boundaries. There is a kind of convergence or co-evolution between what is happening in the sphere of knowledge production and how societal institutions are developing. [...] What we see today is a resurgence, for instance, of NGOs and other ways in which various kinds of stakeholders organise in shaping social reality. This is why the transgressiveness of knowledge is better captured by the term transdisciplinarity[22].

Writing about the modern form of rational mass administration as the domination of knowledge, Weber pointed out that the development of bureaucracy, resulting from the need for 'stable, flexible, intensive and calculable administration', is inevitable, although to a large extent dependent on technical means of communication for its precision[23]. However, he also pointed to two exceptions that are important in the context of the topic we are dealing with:

Only by reversion in every field – political, religious, economic, etc. – to small scale organization would it be possible to any considerable extent to escape its [bureaucracy –R. W.] influence. [...] Superior to bureaucracy in the knowledge of techniques and facts is only the capitalist entrepreneur, within his own sphere of interest. He is the only type who has been able to maintain at least relative immunity from subjection to the control of rational bureaucratic knowledge. In large scale organizations, all others are inevitably subject to bureaucratic control, just as they have fallen under the dominance of precision machinery in the mass production of goods[24].

22 H. Nowotny, *The Potential of Transdisciplinarity*, op cit., p. 2. It should be emphasized that such terms as inter-, trans- or multidisciplinarity are not consistently used in the literature pertaining to the subject matter, which is partly connected with defining them, see K. Michalski, "Interdyscyplinarność, transdyscyplinarność, multidyscyplinarność", op. cit., p. 87–90.

23 See M. Weber, *Economy and Society*, op. cit., p. 224. George Ritzer in the book *The McDonaldization of Society* (Los Angeles – Melbourne 2019) adopts Weber's thesis on the development of a rational bureaucracy as a starting point and then points to his new model of macdonaldisation, which, in his opinion, constitutes a contemporary radicalisation of the rationality of administration (see p. 19–66). See also the observations on macdonaldization of tertiary education and the whole education system: p. 74–75, 91–92, 126–127, 132–134, 150, 175–179.

24 M. Weber, E*conomy and Society*, op. cit., p. 224–225. The development of bureaucracy is connected with. Last chapters (part four, chapters 2–7) of the second volume of 1840

Weber's analyses of the nature of bureaucracy shed some light both on the nature of the development of disciplinarity within traditional scientific institutions as mass associations and on the transdisciplinarity for which associations, private initiatives and businesses, and thus civil society actors, are the cornerstone[25]. However, if we also consider that the interdisciplinary projects, studies and publications, both collective and individual, arising within scientific institutions, have all the characteristics of voluntary associations, activities and initiatives specific to civil society[26], where personal involvement, going beyond the rules and principles adopted is essential, we should perhaps recognise that both inter- and transdisciplinarity, although stemming from different experiences and contexts, are an important component of modern reflexion, resulting according to Beck's thesis, from the achievement by modernity of a critical mass of unintended side-effects. This would mean that not only can transdisciplinary research reinforce the interdisciplinary tendencies of traditional scientific institutions, but that interdisciplinary research, conceived as an antidote to the disintegration of knowledge, should extend its scope to include knowledge produced outside the disciplinary order in the integration agenda and lay the foundations for a two-way transfer of knowledge and research practices. Weber's analyses point to the fundamental limitations that can be placed on transdisciplinary research, which seems to be evidenced by the characteristics of trnasdisciplinarity given by Mittelstrass:

Democracy in America (see A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Chicago, London 2000) Alexis de Tocqueville devotes to insightful observations on the concentration of power in the institutions of democratic societies.

25 See E. A. Shils, "Was ist eine civil society?", [in:] *Europa und die Civil Society, Castelgandolfo-Gespräche 1989*, ed. K. Michalski, Stuttgart 1991; M. Walzer, "The Concept of Civil Society", [in:] *Toward a Global Civil Society*, ed. M. Walzer, Providence, Oxford 1995.

26 In this context, it is worth quoting the remarks made by Michalski: "Such a structuring [disciplinary – R. W.] is only a result of scientific fashion, which in addition is very difficult to revise methodologically. This is evidenced, among others, by the fact that the ongoing change in the European model of science towards the synthesis and integration of research defined as inter- or transdisciplinarity is not a reaction of science to internal scientific criticism, but a result of external social processes" (K. Michalski, "Interdyscyplinarność, transdyscyplinarność, multidyscyplinarność", op. cit., p. 86). "Contrary to popular definitions, the place of alternative, inter- and transdisciplinary research is not 'between' or 'over' disciplines, but 'beyond' the traditional disciplinary paradigm" (Ibidem, p. 94).

> transdisciplinarity is first of all an integrating, although not a holistic, concept. It resolves isolation on a higer methodological plane, but it does not attempt to construct "unified" interpretative or explanatory matrix. Second, transdisciplinarity removes impasses within the historical constitution of fields and disciplines, when and where the latter have either forgotten their historical memory, or lost their problem-solving power because of excessive speculation. For just these reasons, transdisciplinarity cannot replace the fields and disciplines. Third, transdisciplinarity is a principle of scientific work and organization that reaches out beyond individual fields and disciplines for solutions, but it is no trans-scientific principle. [...] Last of all, transdisciplinarity is above all a *research principle*, when considered properly against the background I have outlined concerning the forms of research and representation in the sciences, and only secondarily, if at all, a *theoretical principle*, in the case that theories also follow transdisciplinary research forms[27].

According to Mittelstrass, transdisciplinarity being "a *scientific research principle* that is active wherever a definition of problems and their solutions is not possible within a given field or discipline", is not simultaneously "a *theoretical principle* that might change our textbooks"[28]. Practice-oriented transdisciplinary research, representing and prioritising public interest over scientific interest, does not place its projects in a broader theoretical plan and in the perspective of the ideal of unity of knowledge and thus does not go beyond the level of generalizations necessary for direct application and use of knowledge. Although they undermine the order of the structure of scientific knowledge by pursuing cognitive interests where necessary, they are neither an alternative nor an adequate level of general knowledge necessary to carry out the theoretical and practical integration that is autonomous of the existing scientific knowledge system and not

[27] J. Mittelstrass, "On Transdisciplinarity", [in:] *Science and the Future of Mankind*, Vatican 2006, p. 498.

[28] J. Mittelstrass, "Transdisciplinarity – New Structures in Science", op. cit. Mittelstrass emphasizes that "This characterisation of transdisciplinarity points neither to a new (scientific and/or philosophical) holism, nor to a transcendence of the scientific system" (J. Mittelstrass, "On Transdisciplinarity", [in:] *Science and the Future of Mankind* op. cit., p. 497), as well as that „pure forms of transdisciplinarity are as rare as pure forms of disciplinarity" (Ibidem, p. 498).

mediated therein. Orientation towards such objectives would require the development of an organisational apparatus for research, which entails the difficulties signalled by Weber, and thus a loss of dynamism and independence characteristic of the activities carried out in small teams, which are not motivated by the development of bureaucratic rationality. However, the development of transdisciplinary research can have a significant impact on the scientific knowledge system, reinforcing the interdisciplinary trends potentially and practically present in its structure. As Mittelstrass notes:

> If research takes on increasingly transdisciplinary forms, then temporary research cooperatives are the appropriate organizational form, and not isolated component systems. [...] Transdisciplinarity would in this sense be the gadfly of the scientific order[29].

TRANSLATION

The phenomenon of knowledge disciplinarisation as a result of complex and uneven processes of specialisation, institutionalisation and division of labour is also worth looking at from a historical perspective. The book by Wolf Lepenies *Three Cultures* can serve as an example of such an approach. As Lepenies announces in the first three units of "Introduction", he discusses in the book "connection between two groups of intellectuals: on one hand the men of letters, i.e. the writers and critics, on the other the social scientists, above all the sociologists".

> For the middle of the nineteenth century – Lepenies observes – onwards literature and sociology contested with one another the claim to offer the key orientation for modern civilization and to constitute the guide to living appropriate to industrial society. [...] This competing discloses a dilemma which determined not only how sociology originated but also how it then went on to develop: it has oscillated between scientific orientation which has led it to ape the natural sciences and a hermeneutic attitude

[29] J. Mittelstrass, "Transdisciplinarity – New Structures in Science", op. cit. See also: L. Witkowski, "Problem 'radykalnej zmiany' w nauce", [in:] L. Witkowski, *Tożsamość i zmiana. Epistemologia i rozwojowe profile w edukacji*, Wrocław 2010.

> which has shifted the discipline towards the realm literature. The connection between a literary inteligentsia and a inteligentsia devoted to the social sciences was thus an aspect of a complex process in the course of which scientific modes of procedure became differentiated from literary modes [...][30].

According to Lepenies, still at the end of the 18th century, the way in which knowledge on social research is practiced was not diversified. In the mid-19th century Karl Marx or later Hippolyte Taine point to Balzac's *Human Comedy*, which was originally intended to be called *Social Studies*, seeing it as an unprecedented document of human nature, and Henry James speaks of the French writer's opus magnum as a counterpart of what August Comte's sociology aspires to[31]. Gustave Flaubert and Emil Zola saw their achievements in a similar way. However, not only in France, academic sociology, for which natural science is a model, tries to prove its scientific excellence by, among other things, dissociating itself from literature.

> Thus there was soon set in train an inner-disciplinary process of purification: disciplines such as sociology, which at first locked recognition within the system of knowledge and had to acquire it, sought to do so by dis tancing themeselves from the early literary forms of their own discipline, whose purpose was rather to describe and classify than to analyse and reduce to a system. [...] The problem of sociology is that, although it may imitate the natural sciences, it can never become a true natural science of society: but if it abandons its scientific orientation it draws perilously close to literature[32].

Sociology is, of course, just an example. This fragment of Lepenies' analysis allows us to make some additional comments on the relationship between disciplinary, inter- and transdisciplinary research. We can assume that the consolidation of the academic system of sciences has

30 W. Lepenies, "Introduction", [in:] W. Lepenies, *Between Literature and Science*, op. cit., p. 1. In the book, the author follows the fate of sociology and its being 'in-between' three areas, discussing in turn the situation in France, England and Germany.

31 See Ibidem, p. 4–5.

32 Ibidem, p. 7.

been accompanied by transdisciplinary research since its inception, but as sociology shows, the growing distance between academia and non-academic forms of knowledge production and the institutionalization-related identity policies within individual disciplines have led to a gap between the two forms of research. The problem of relations, interdependencies and the flow of knowledge between disciplinary and inter- and transdisciplinary research is not so much something new as it is now returning on the wave of reflexive modernisation, the necessity to counteract the isolation of disciplines in the structure of the scientific system and the socially perceptible risk generated by the development of scientific research and modern technology.

The subject matter taken up by Lepenies, and especially the example of tensions between science and literature, allows us to see and distinguish the specific problem of translation, which is specific to the flow of knowledge. Two ways of producing knowledge not only create separate structures, but also languages characteristic of each other, between which the transfer of knowledge and practices requires translation-related competence. According to the assumptions of one of the hermeneutical theories, we can assume that all understanding equals translation, and the increase in hermeneutical competence is related to translation practice[33].

> translation is – George Steiner observes – formally and pragmatically implicit in *every* act of communication, in the emission and reception of each and every mode of meaning, be it in the widest semiotic sense or in more specifically verbal exchanges. To understand is to decipher. To hear significance is to translate. Thus the essential structural and executive means and problems of the act of translation are fully present in acts of speech, of writing, of pictorial encoding inside any given language. Translation between different languages is a particular application of a configuration and model fundamental to human speech even where it is monoglot[34].

[33] See H.-G. Gadamer, "Lesen ist wie Übersetzen", [in:] *Gessamelte Werke*, Vol. 8, Tübinge 1993; G. Steiner, "Understanding as Translation", [in:] G. Steiner, *After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation*, Oxford 1992.

[34] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. xii. "Any model of communication is at the same time a model of trans-lation, of a vertical or horizontal transfer of significance" (Ibidem, p. 47). See also R. Włodarczyk "Hermeneutics Of Translation – The Fundamental

Both the differences between numerous idiomatic languages in which we operate and which we use on a daily basis, as well as the differences between the order of thinking and the order of action require us to master and constantly develop our translation skills. The more often we use a language and its individual components, the easier, more efficient and, consequently, automatically and invisibly for ourselves, the process of translation takes place. Practicing the research within a given discipline develops our translational proficiency in this discipline, and thus deepens our understanding of related issues. At the same time, however, this specialist orientation does not increase or even decrease our chances of communicating with experts practicing in another field and of transferring knowledge on both sides. Translation problems can also arise between practitioners in the same field, but in different environments that are not isolated from local influences and shape the language of the researcher or their group. In other words, knowledge of the dialect developed in a given centre of cultural anthropology does not translate into proficiency in understanding political science texts, just as a good knowledge of French is not enough to understand medieval Latin texts, even though learning a foreign language of one's own may help to master another, especially a similar one, and also broaden the understanding of the language we speak every day. We are multilingual and need to understand, so we need to be able to translate.

In this context, the situation and the status of disciplines such as pedagogy, cultural studies and environmental protection should be highlighted. In pedagogy the auxiliary sciences such as psychology, sociology, anthropology, etc. should be taken into account. As they play the role of an essential component of the perspective adopted in the research on education, the conduct of which requires prior integration of knowledge from these disciplines and only with its participation the relevant pedagogical research problems can be identified[35].

Aspect Of Dialogue. Around The Concept Of George Steiner" in this book.

35 See K. Rubacha, "Związek pedagogiki z innymi naukami", [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, Warszawa 2003; T. Hejnicka-Bezwińska, *Pedagogika ogólna*, Warszawa 2008, p. 215–221, 241–246. It does not mean that we can talk about something as self-sufficiency of other disciplines, see L. Witkowski, *Problem 'radykalnej zmiany' w nauce*, op. cit.; L. Witkowski, "Uwagi o interdyscyplinarności

In other words, the field of pedagogy has a lot in common with many disciplines, however, it does not overlap with any of them, nor does it function outside them. The same can be said of social psychology, cultural studies or environmental protection, taking into account their respective auxiliary sciences. The status of pedagogy can be described as interdisciplinary due to the fact that its self-determination requires the integration of knowledge from the scope of other scientific disciplines. Moreover, pedagogy, more closely than other disciplines, which are mainly cognitively oriented, is connected with social practice, and specifically with educational practice. The pedagogical studies that are to prepare for educational research and practice presuppose the development of competence in translation from the languages of auxiliary disciplines into the languages specific to pedagogy and its sub-disciplines and in mutual directions between educational theories and educational practice. Educational science studying pedagogies which are transdisciplinary, such as socially created knowledge and educational strategies[36], develops its integrative potential embracing with it the phenomena which are characteristic for non-academic social practice, i.e. development of knowledge in the area of functioning of civil society. Due to our potential and specific conditions, we can see in pedagogy the model of an institution of translation[37], a discipline located on the borderline of humanities and social sciences, integrating and studying the conditions for the transfer of disciplinary, inter- and transdisciplinary knowledge, and capable of producing the knowledge necessary to educate in the field of inter- and transdisciplinary translation.

w pedagogice (z perspektywy epistemologii krytycznej)", [in:] L. Witkowski, *Ku integralności edukacji i humanistyki II*, Toruń 2009.

36 Z. Kwieciński, "Pedagogika przejścia i pogranicza", [in:] Z. Kwieciński, *Tropy – ślady – próby. Studia i szkice z pedagogii pogranicza*, Poznań – Olsztyn 2000.

37 In the context of the concept of pedagogy of asylum (see R. Włodarczyk, *Lévinas. W stronę pedagogiki azylu*, Warszawa 2009) we can talk about a particular area of research into education which have asylum – like qualities of an institution, organisation or translation practices.

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Abstract:

Successive parts of the article deal with the development of disciplinary, inter- and transdicyplinary research and its mutual relations and conditions in a new scientific and social context connected with reflexive modernization. The author points to pedagogy as a discipline that can be a model of an institution of translation, a discipline located on the borderline of humanities and social sciences, integrating and studying the conditions for the transfer of disciplinary, inter- and transdisciplinary knowledge, and which can develop the knowledge necessary to educate in the field of inter- and transdisciplinary translation.

Keywords:

pedagogy, reflexive modernization, interdisciplinary research, transdisciplinary research, translation, knowledge transfers, integration of scientific knowledge

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HERMENEUTICS OF TRANSLATION – THE FUNDAMENTAL ASPECT OF DIALOGUE. AROUND THE CONCEPT OF GEORGE STEINER[1]

Translators are men
groping towards each other
in a common mist

George Steiner, After Babel

DIALOGUE, COMMENTARY AND READING WITH NO LIMIT

A statement "Commentary is without end" could easily be found in Ecclesiastes. Like dialogue, commentary was established long ago, imperceptibly and without our participation, and its potential exceeds the time and capabilities of an individual. Thus, dialogue is always a matter of at least two separate sides and as such it is an idea which, throughout history, invariably continues to seek and find its creative reflection in various forms of continuity of Jewish tradition: covenants, a cycle of holidays, a model of teaching, and rabbinical commentary.

[1] Originally published: Rafał Włodarczyk, "Hermeneutyka przekładu – zasadniczy wymiar dialogu. Wokół koncepcji George'a Steinera", [in:] *Pedagogika dialogu. Dialog w teorii i praktyce edukacyjnej*, ed. E. Dąbrowa, D. Jankowska, Wydaw. Akademii Pedagogiki Specjalnej, Warszawa 2009, p. 85–94.

Commenting is a demanding art of the erudite of establishing a simultaneous and multilateral dialogue of people that transcends the regime of place and time. The subject of the unique logic of commentary is addressed by George Steiner:

> In Judaism, unending commentary and commentary upon commentary are elemental. Talmudic exegesis exfoliates into uninterrupted study of and commentary on the Talmud. [...] Hermeneutic unendingness and survival in exile are, I believe, kindred. The text of the Torah, of the biblical canon, and the concentric spheres of texts about these texts, replace the destroyed Temple[2].

Tradition in Judaism does not contain a conclusion, although it is possible that it announces one. It is a constant exchange of opinions and statements open to those who are yet to join. As a rule, the Torah, the Tanah or the Talmud cannot be read in any other way than with and through other recognized texts. One can say that they themselves constitute successive stages of overlapping comments, an incarnation of the dialogic principle, since as Alan Unterman reminds us: "it is not the text as such which is holy but the text as interpreted by the Jewish tradition of rabbinic exegesis"[3]. The study is a spatially and temporally extended polyphonic conversation.

It is therefore impossible to approach the text in an unmediated way. Reading the riddle of a word, verse, parsha, or story builds a link between distant events and the present day, and at the same time guides it through the many responses that members of Jewish communities have received during their lives. The answers they have given, both those recorded by scholars and those provided daily in the ordinary practice of meetings, are not absolute; they do not attempt to be the last, but rather the penultimate comments in a whole series. Those who offer the comments remember that the Messianic era is still a question of an opaque future, so that in the meantime other commentators will come and reveal other facets and possibilities of the

[2] G. Steiner, "A Secondary City", [w:] G. Steiner, *Real Presences. Is there Anything in What We Say?*, London 2010, p. 45.

[3] A. Unterman, *Jews, Their Religious Beliefs and Practices*, Boston, London and Henley 1981, p. 44.

text, emphasizing different or contradictory meanings which will be characteristic of their time and circumstances. Synthesis is the great hope of the messianic era when, as tradition has it and as Emmanuel Lévinas reminds us, "the prophet Elijah [...] will resolve all antinomies"[4].

Hence the true risk is not an absence of ultimate answers but rather ruptures in the tradition of reading which seeks answers, since "In dispersion, the text is homeland. [...] This reading without end represents the foremost guarantee of Jewish identity"[5], observes Steiner. Hence the merger of commentary and interpretation, as long as the latter means the definitive establishment of meaning; its closure before the time is ripe would be tantamount to the erasure of the fundamental tension between them, which points to the position taken by Rabbi Sacha Pecaric: "the concept of interpretation in this [Jewish – R. W.] tradition simply does not exist"[6].

Maintaining continuity despite differences in time, space, conditions or language, meticulous storage and recording of glosses in their original form of inquiries, questions and answers makes us pay special attention to yet another dimension of the pulsating dialogue and commentary, a dimension distinguished by the ritualisation of the mode of universal reading of the Book. As Pecaric observes:

4 E. Lévinas, "Judaisme and Revolution", [in:] E. Lévinas, *Nine Talmudic Readings*, Bloomington & Indianapolis 1990, p. 118. See also: E. Lévinas, "The Translation of the Scripture", [in:] E. Lévinas, *In the Time of the Nations*, Bloomington & Indianapolis 1994.

5 G. Steiner, "A Secondary City", op. cit., p. 46. See also: H. Bloom, "Free and Broken Tablets: the Cultural Prospects of American Jewry", [in:] H. Bloom, *Agon: Towards a Theory of Revisionism*, Oxford 1982. Steiner also speaks about the crisis caused by a discontinuity in the context of Western culture. As he proves, the real problem for a reader who wants to understand a text may be precisely the loss of continuity of tradition (see G. Steiner, "The Broken Contract", [in:] G. Steiner, *Real Presences*, op. cit.; G. Steiner, *Grammars of Creation*, London 2010, chapter V).

6 S. Pecaric, "Wgląd w Pieśń nad Pieśniami. Istota języka religijnego", [in:] *Hagada na Pesach i Pieśń nad Pieśniami*, ed. S. Pecaric, Kraków 2002, p. 233. By marking the differences between the scholastic tradition and Jewish hermeneutics, Steiner draws attention to the paradigmatic meaning of the "appetite for a summa", a culmination which, according to him, although in a changed form, has survived in Western tradition until the present day (see G. Steiner, "A Secondary City", op. cit., p. 47-50). Steiner stresses the link between the summa with the tendency to eradicate heresy. In the context of literary criticism, the tension between rightful science and heresy would be supplanted by that between interpretation and overinterpretation (see U. Eco, "Interpretation and History and Reply", [in:] U. Eco with R. Rorty, J. Culler, C. Brooke-Rose, *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*, ed. S. Collini, Cambridge 1992).

> In the Jewish world, in the world of Torah, there is a certain obligation to translate, because there is an obligation to strive for understanding. Fulfillment of the commandment of the *shna mikra weechad targum* requires two readings of the Hebrew parsha prescribed for a given week and one reading of the *targum*, i.e. translation. But not every translation. It would not be a meeting of this mitzvah to read a translation that reflects only the grammatical-semantic meanings of the Hebrew words used in the Torah. [...] No translation of a text is necessarily a reflection of the original, but a first step in its understanding[7].

The issue of Jewish commentary goes far beyond the issue of religion, revealing to us the importance of understanding, interpreting and dialogue as the practice of translation.

UNDERSTANDING AS TRANSLATION[8]

The above assumptions were addressed by George Steiner in his extensive text from the 1970s, *After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation*, where he discusses the hermeneutics of translation on the basis of examples of primarily Western literature. In the text he confirms the fundamental correspondence between dialogue, translation and understanding as it is developed and fostered in the Jewish tradition. In the preface to the book we can read:

[7] S. Pecaric, "Wstęp. Mowa na pustyni", [in:] *Tora. Księga czwarta Bemidbar*, ed. and transl. S. Pecaric, Kraków 2005, p. V-VI. The text at hand is *Targum Onkelos*, the translation of the Torah into Aramaic, which grew up in the oral tradition in Palestine in the 2nd c. AD and was written down in Babylon ca. 500 AD. The author of the text was a proselyte, a scion of Roman aristocracy. "Importantly, to this day it has retained its normative character, while the Septuaginta, which was created in the third and second centuries B.C., has not gained this status and is actually forgotten by Judaism. What is the difference between them? Well, it is simply that the Septuaginta can be called a translation aiming at the literality, while the targum by Onkelos is certainly a translation, according to tradition inspired and confirmed by Rabbi Akiba and other Tanaites, whose relation to the Hebrew original consists in explaining and making understandable", (Ibidem, p. V). See also entries: 'Bible, Reading with translations', 'Targum Onkelos' in: *The Encyclopedia of Jewish Life and Thought*, ed. C. Pearl, Jerusalem 1996.

[8] The chapter of George Steiner's *After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation* (Oxford 1992) I rely on the most when reconstructing Steiner's concepts is titled: "Understanding as Translation".

> translation is formally and pragmatically implicit in *every* act of communication, in the emission and reception of each and every mode of meaning, be it in the widest semiotic sense or in more specifically verbal exchanges. To understand is to decipher. To hear significance is to translate. Thus the essential structural and executive means and problems of the act of translation are fully present in acts of speech, of writing, of pictorial encoding inside any given language. Translation between different languages is a particular application of a configuration and model fundamental to human speech even where it is monoglot[9].

Ultimately, in *After Babel* Steiner focuses on a claim which would be worth quoting again in a succinct form: "Any model of communication is at the same time a model of trans-lation, of a vertical or horizontal transfer of significance"[10].

Steiner makes the act of understanding dependent on the capacity to translate. In this regard, he equates interpreting to translating - choosing the right word or phrase to convey the expression of the original is a decision connected with understanding the given expression in all its complexity and the horizon of its context that the translator is able to grasp at a given moment in time. A repetition, or a simple rewriting is impossible. Each translation defines an index of similarities and differences whose reduction and reunification is the work of the translator. A work whose fundamental meaning comes down to an attempt to abolish distance and regain closeness, insight. Literature is only a special case here. According to Steiner, translation is in particular a daily adaptation mechanism, learned and culturally conditioned, whose efficiency usually escapes our attention.

> [...] a human being performs an act of translation, in the full sense of the word, when receiving aspeech-message from any other human being. Time, distance, disparities in outlook or assumed reference, make this act more or less difficult. Where the difficulty is great enough, the process passes from reflex to conscious technique. Intimacy, on the other hand, be it of hatred or of love, can be defined as confident, quasi-immediate translation[11].

9 Ibidem, p. xii.
10 Ibidem, p. 47.
11 Ibidem, p. 48.

The ability to understand the Other would be a derivative of translation competence and experience, including a wide range of gestures and phenomena accompanying the encounter, and sensitivity to the context. He points out that in such a perspective there is no opposition between intercultural and intracultural[12] and inter-subjective dialogue, but that they are based on a shared foundation and therefore cognitive intercultural competences are potentially ingrained in all individuals, provided they are capable of any acts of understanding, and can be developed within education. Thus each hermeneutic act is in fact a lesson in the transfer of meaning, in making choices and decisions, in intercultural translation. As Steiner observes: "*inside or between languages, human communication equals translation*"[13].

The basic competences needed to participate in communication and dialogue are not based solely on knowledge, although they cannot be separated from it. Acquiring knowledge about a different culture or language does not in itself enable us to understand them; without the ability to make translations we cannot exceed the disproportion between the worlds: mine and the Other's. The quality of knowledge is a derivative of the translator's sensitivity and imagination, and experiences gained in relation to one culture or language relate to and retain their value in relation to all others. Of course, the subjects of the relationship do not have to represent mentally distant cultures, but such a case ultimately reveals the complexity of communication.

For Steiner, this incompatibility of worlds is the result of permanent changes and transformations, of a continuous, non-synchronized movement, both within language, which for him represents the embodiment of the idea expressed in the well-known maxim by Heraclitus and within the world of everyday life of every communication subject. These changes deplete the reservoir of what is shared (or rather what is proper not only for me but also for Others, not necessarily

[12] Steiner highlights the importance of the social differentiation of the communication flow due to the existence of irreducible biological and mental differences between individuals and the practice of group identities. He considers in this context the operation of separate languages, e.g. of women and children (see Ibidem, p. 35–47). Mikhail M. Bakhtin's concept of language and dialogue shows clear affinities to later Steiner's (see M. M. Bakhtin, "Discourse in the Novel", [in:] M. M. Bakhtin, *The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays*, Austin 1981, p. 259–422, in particular p. 275–300).

[13] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 49 – original underline.

for everyone), at the same time widening the distance between the parties of a possible dialogue, the distance present because of the underlying separation of subjects, mutual separation, and the constant disposition of the individual's consciousness to concentrate on himself and his own experiences. Steiner's brief comment seems to confirm - which is not insignificant here, especially when we consider the premises of the functioning of individuals in the culture of individualism - that we are always in danger of this disposition becoming a general permanent tendency.

> In old age the impulse towards translation wanes and the pointers of reference turn inward. The old listen less or principally to themselves. Their dictionary is, increasingly, one of private remembrance[14].

Incompatibility is not just a way of drawing attention to the disproportionate existential situation of individuals in the social world, but also to the ontological status of languages. As Steiner points out, we have too little convincing evidence to recognize the premise that allows us to consider language as a system, as something with definable boundaries that could facilitate the constitution of a convenient cognitive perspective and to accept the claim of the symmetry of the internal architectures of each of them. Hence Steiner's emphasises dynamics and argues: "we possess civilization because we have learnt to translate out of time"[15].

Translation seems to prioritize and expose the interest of the "here and now", the present moment and those present within it, over the permanence of what is inherited. Perhaps in this way it creates the conditions for the possibility of inheritance.

Accepting Steiner's emphasis on dynamics, we must also take into account the fact that our general condition is determined by notorious belatedness, the fact that we never keep up, and the whole work is reduced to shortening the distance, which is the work reiterated by

[14] Ibidem, p. 48.

[15] Ibidem, p. 31. As Steiner observes, "The process of diachronic translation inside one's own native tongue is so constant, we perform it so unawares, that we rarely pause either to note its formal intricacy or the decisive part it plays in the very existence of civilization" (Ibidem, p. 29).

every generation. This work never ends; constantly undertaken from scratch, it should satisfy us with but temporary success. What should be considered a success, then?

While Steiner does not preclude an epiphany of complete understanding, he writes:

> The complete penetrative grasp of a text, the complete discovery and recreative apprehension of its life-forms (*prise de conscience*), is an act whose realization can be precisely felt but is nearly impossible to paraphrase or systematize[16],

Steiner, then, is far from admitting that here we should see the core of the translation practice. Understanding a text is but the very first move of the practice; the second one would be an apt paraphrase, i.e. a retranslation[17]. While, then, it is possible for the individual to experience an epiphany as to their awareness, providing a testimony to it in words of another translation is a tall order. One of the obstacles is specifically indicated by Steiner:

> There is an acute understanding, essential to any treatment of communication within and between languages, of the ways in which a text may conceal more than it conveys[18].

Our translation clumsiness reveals itself when we are faced with an excess that is only covered but not eliminated by the ontological presence of a verse, phrase or text.

> [...] any genuine act of translation is, in one regard at least, a transparent absurdity, an endeavour to go backwards up the escalator of time and to re-enact voluntarily what was a contingent motion of spirit[19].

16 Ibidem, p. 26.

17 Jacques Derrida, too, devotes in his works, where the questions of translation are constantly present as one of the principal subjects that span his thought, a lot of room to the incompatibility of speech and writing, accusing at the same time Western classics of ignoring it (see J. Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, Baltimore and London 1997).

18 G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 64.

19 Ibidem, p. 75.

Hence we must accept that, as Steiner observes, "Translation is both possible and impossible [...]"[20]. In another place, showing his awareness of the centuries-old tradition of the questions addressed by him, Steiner writes: "Six walls of light surround Holy Scripture. Six walls: the order to translate and the prohibition to translate"[21].

THE ORDER OF SPEECH, THE ORDER OF ACTION. PRACTICE AS COMMENTARY

From George Steiner's perspective, practising translation is not so much meant to faithfully render the content but to shorten the distance of time and space between individuals. However, this is not so much time and space in general but the time of the Other and the space of the Other, even if we ourselves are them; this is the time and space that not only accompanies our uniqueness and particularity yet intensifies with their continuation. The individual is not so much at risk of self-dissolution or being dissolved in the Other, but of alienation and loneliness with respect to his own transformations and those of the transforming immediate environment. While translation can be seen as approximation, abandoning the effort of "trans-lation", of transcending boundaries, is tantamount to increasing distance.

In his reflection on the hermeneutics of translation, Steiner also gives us the opportunity to look at the action as a kind of commentary, in which understanding comes to the fore. This is because here too translation occurs between two orders of the functioning of meaning - the orders of the gesture of speech and the gesture of action. Similarly, every attempt to reflect on the experience of everyday life or an artistic act requires translation between different orders - understanding what is happening is not so much a reproduction as a translating transformation and a commentary.

[20] Ibidem, p. 66.

[21] G. Steiner, "Aus Worten, nicht Wörtern", *Dekada Literacka* 1997, No. 8–9, p. 21. Steiner's text is dedicated to the translation of the Bible into German by Martin Buber and Franz Rosenzweig and confirms the claim of a continuous dialectical correspondence between writing and speech in the Jewish tradition.

As Steiner writes, referring in this spirit to the sphere of artistic activity:

> Each [selection – R. W.] embodies a specific commentary on the text, each realizes a particular mode of animation. [...] 'Interpretation' as that which gives language life beyond the moment and place of immediate utterance or transcription, is what I am concerned with. The French word *interprète* concentrates all the relevant values. An actor is *interprète* of Racine; a pianist gives *une interprétation* of a Beethoven sonata. Through engagement of his own identity, a critic becomes *un interprète* – a lifegiving performer of Montaigne or Mallarmé. As it does not include the world of the actor, and includes that of the musician only by analogy, the English term *interpreter* is less strong. But it is congruent with French when reaching out in another crucial direction. *Interprète/interpreter* are commonly used to mean *translator*. This, I believe, is the vital starting point. When we read or hear any language-statement from the past, be it Leviticus or last year's bestseller, we translate. Reader, actor, editor are translators of language out of time[22].

Steiner thus tries to encourage us to partially shift our attention from the goal of achieving in the act of translation an appropriate effect in the form of sense, towards action and its logic. This action is the act itself, accompanying as it were other activities - listening, speaking, writing, playing a role in the theatre, editing, performing a part for the piaNo. The author of *After Babel* fundamentally reverses this order - listening, writing, speaking, etc. are possible thanks to translation. They are based on it and the literary work of a translator is only a special case in which an aspect specific to the other activities mentioned above is stressed[23].

Steiner is mainly interested in works of art, but for the purposes of the philosophy of dialogue it is worth showing a broader context of the hermeneutics of translation. For example, when we think up a theory, we make acts of translation within it, drawing on various sources and authors, but in order to be able to use it in action, we need an additional

[22] G. Steiner, *After Babel*, op. cit., p. 28 – original underline.

[23] The author of *After Babel* clearly navigates Jewish metaphysics, yet his direct references owe a lot to "late" Ludwig Wittgenstein and Martin Heidegger.

act of this type, in accordance with the assumption that it is impossible to repeat, and translation is not a reflection of a given state in a different order of meaning, but requires a transformation of this state so that it can be fitted into a given order. It follows that a theoretician is unable to bring his concept to such a stage of notation or conceptualization that it does not require further transformation in translation into practice. In this sense, thinking, speech, writing, acting are different orders of practice, different forms of human expression, and as such they require translation. Interpretation-commentary always assumes subjective participation in the form of creative invention. Demanding that "theoreticians", i.e. practitioners of the translation of texts and thoughts, apply their work is a mis-understanding, an attempt to shift the burden of translation - transformation to others, accompanied by the hope for participation in imitation, but also an escape from responsibility for the inherent risk of transgression, the trans-lation risk.

If Steiner proposes a general theory of understanding as translation, then every action where we recognise the participation of understanding is closely linked to translation. Demanding repetition, we ask the impossible: we demand permanence. The author of *After Babel* recommends not so much an antidote for its absence but personal perseverance on the road to dialogue – practicing understanding through translation.

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It is not easy to interest us in the matters of the world, of the Others, of what does not become familiar without effort. If we accept the assumptions of the hermeneutics of translation, the "learning revolution" means an increase in the importance of translation competences, which belong to general education - they involve learning to learn. By learning to translate, whether through the effort of understanding texts, conducting conversations, or through the implementation of artistic and technological projects, we broaden and consolidate our ability to use different languages, increase our fluency in moving between different orders, as well as the ability to understand and experience the world. Thus, we open up to acquiring new competences, which, apart from their uniqueness, share one thing – they are based on translation skills. Existentially, the lack of translation competence makes an individual helpless.

Practicing translation also prepares for dialogue between the parties. Exercises on texts in the absence of their authors protects against aggression and accusations but does not offer hope for an answer. A conscious translation makes us aware of an encounter with what is irreducibly different, what cannot be absorbed, but this is because familiarity is not based on absorption. Practicing translation and honing a sensitivity to uniqueness teaches the skill of transcending oneself towards meeting, towards synchrony, but does not prevent a possible refusal of the other party which, due to its otherness, remains independent in this matter. The encounter imperative makes dialogue impossible. Being oriented towards closeness is not without a risk. Ultimately, however, the hope for a non-violent relationship means openness to translation, readiness to transformation which, contrary to the risk associated with openness, may finally be reciprocated. Practicing translation helps us to stay ready, even if we do not know the time or place of the encounter.

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Abstract:

George Steiner is one of the leading contemporary comparativists and philosophers of literature. One of the most important themes of his book from the 1970s, *After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation*, focus on the claim about the identity of understanding and translation, which in effect links dialogue to translation competence. In the article, referring to the thought and tradition of Judaism and Steiner’s original approach to understanding, I analyse and discuss the premises of his basic claim in relation to the phenomenon of dialogue, I study the consequences and draw conclusions from Steiner’s concept for the theory and practice of education.

Keywords:

translation, understanding, dialogue, hermeneutics, George Steiner, philosophy of education, theory of education, education

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BETWEEN EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION IN RELIGIOUS EDUCATION[1]

In the face of the post-modern crisis of values and beliefs and widespread phenomena identified with the processes of secularization of Western societies and in the face of the increasingly sharp discussion on the place and role of religious institutions in the public space in Poland, it seems necessary to rethink the challenges and tasks that the current situation poses to religious education of children and young people in general, regardless of the religion professed, related religious message and legal status. In a pluralistic socio-cultural reality, in which the category of truth is depreciated and relativized, should this education continue (or perhaps continue more intensely) to offer knowledge, skills and competences related to strengthening religious identity, acquiring apologetic tools and adopt an exclusive rather than inclusive thinking about one's own religious group? Or should it, in line with the "spirit of the times", educate inclusively, treating its own point of view of reality as one of a plethora of possible ones rather than the only true one, respecting difference and the rights of others to their worldview,

[1] Originally published: Monika Humeniuk-Walczak, "Między ekskluzją a inkluzją w edukacji religijnej", [in:] *Nauczyciel i jego rola w sytuacji zmian społecznych i edukacyjnych: współczesne wyzwania*, ed. U. Szuścik, E. Kochanowska, R. Majzner, Wydaw. Libron, Filip Lohner, Kraków 2014, p. 91–102.

creed and way of life, recognizing dialogue and non-confrontation as a basic means of communication with them?

Reflection on the specificity of a particular socio-cultural context and the shape and function of a particular religious education model requires, first of all, a comprehensive delineation of a map of meanings referring to this issue in relevant literature, stretched between two poles - exclusion and inclusion - of ways to understand the status and specificity of the religion itself, and secondly, to recall the corresponding selected concepts of the pedagogy of religion. Due to the comparative, and not systematic, character of these analyses, I will provide only a general description of the relevant concepts and leave out the details of their origins or evolution. In addition, I would like to point out that the general reflection on the cultural and theoretical context of the education models discussed in this article is based on my assumption that religion and religiosity (religious element, religious experience) constitute the undisputed "pre-existing social and cultural phenomenon"[2], which despite operating in extremely divergent semantic contexts can be grasped as experienced in one way or another by all participants in social life.

THE EXCLUSIVE PERSPECTIVE

The category of exclusivity in the presented approach is connected with the way of defining the boundaries between the internal and the external in such a way that the principles guiding the religious community lead to intentional limitation of the possibilities of participation of those who are not identified as *ours*. This situation is well illustrated by Ryszard Szarfenberg's monopoly paradigm[3]. This paradigm implies the existence and operation of a specific group monopoly which is supported by internal status groups that share a common culture and identity, have a strong sense of distinctiveness, follow their own

[2] B. Milerski, "Współczesne koncepcje pedagogiki religijnej", [in:] *Elementy pedagogiki religijnej*, ed. B. Milerski, Warszawa 1998, p. 144.

[3] See R. Szarfenberg, *Marginalizacja i wykluczenie społeczne. Wykłady*, Warszawa 2006, p. 44–46, http://www.owes.info.pl/biblioteka/wyklad_wykluczenie_spoleczne.pdf, (available: 30.10.2019).

patterns of world perception, consumption and lifestyle, and are reluctant to share privileges with those who come from outside their circles. Attitudes and actions aimed at limiting the inclusion of Others into one's own inner circle become a condition of internal integration (*we integrate with a community that is separate from the others*) and leave no illusions about the possibility of permanent changes of the boundaries (expansion) of one's own group.

The logic of such an exclusionary strategy is connected with a clearly defined, traditional and uniquely modern concept of reality, with an evident pursuit of historical continuity. Here, the "religious modus operandi of belief refers to a past and contains a perspective of the future"[4]. In this perspective, religion appears as a peculiar anchor of stability in a universe dominated by the imperative of change. Religion becomes synonymous with traditionalism, understood after Max Weber as a tendency to accept everyday life and to believe that it is the standard of action[5]. Tradition understood in this way contains a set of images, theoretical and practical knowledge, patterns of behaviour, attitudes, etc., which society adopts in the name of the indispensable continuity between the past and the present[6].

Exclusive definitions of religion combine two basic features: references to supernatural forces on the one hand and the ability to inspire and legitimise intentions and actions aimed at the transformation of society on the other[7]. Peter L. Berger, too, treats religion as a symbolic universe of meaning, which reaches out towards transcendence and encompasses all that influences and sanctions every possible aspect of social life and thus prevents social anomy and chaos[8]. Religion, then, is seen as exclusive through the transcendent comprehensive meta-formula, a trigger of broad social changes and a marker of the line between participation and exclusion.

4 I. Borowik, "Religia jako forma pamięci, czyli Danièle Hervieu-Léger nowe oblicze religii w nowoczesności", [in:] D. Hervieu-Léger, *Religia jako pamięć*, Kraków 2007, p. 14.

5 See D. Hervieu-Léger, *Religion as a Chain of Memory*, New Brunswick, New Jersey 2000, p. 86.

6 See Ibidem, p. 87.

7 See Ibidem, p. 36.

8 See I. Borowik, "Socjologia religii Petera L. Bergera", [in:] P. L. Berger, *Święty baldachim. Elementy socjologicznej teorii religii*, Kraków 2005, p. 15.

Strategies which justify the monopoly of the privileged can be called, following Kazimierz W. Frieske, emancipatory usurpation on the one hand and marginalising exclusion on the other[9]. Access to community goods (e.g. to a proper understanding of truth, clearly defined criteria for valorisation of reality or loyalty and group solidarity) is closely guarded by the definition and enforcement of exclusion criteria (e.g. a group "aspiring" from the outside is identified with features that are negative relative to privileged communities, e.g. has an inadequate vision of reality and improper beliefs, undesirable attitudes or actions which, as a consequence, prevent it to meet the criteria for admission to the privileged circle).

Adaptative rationality[10] usually proves desirable in the exclusive approach to religion and religious communities in relation to the way of thinking, valuation and action. It develops in relation to absolutist and universalist *truth*, is not fond of doubt and eliminates what is uncertain, unstable and relative[11]. Adaptative rationality legitimises action meant to produce planned, specific and predictable effects. Reality is seen here as a universe of objects to be subjugated or led to a state when they prove useful and will serve pre-established purposes. The objectives of the action are formulated and understood in technical or strategic terms as a specific state of affairs to be achieved or extended so that these "subjects" behave in accordance with socially acceptable expectations[12]. This type of rationality along with the corresponding order of values, promotes attitudes and adaptive actions in relation to the conditions that are given. As such, it enables efficient functioning in existing circumstances, ensures compliance with its principles, brings a sense of stability, belonging and security, because it is based on a foundation that is a verifiable, repeatable, apparently permanent, objective, timeless, universal, and unchangeable interpretation of cultural and social reality[13].

9 See R. Szarfenberg, *Marginalizacja i wykluczenie społeczne*, op. cit., p. 45.

10 See R. Kwaśnica, *Dwie racjonalności. Od filozofii sensu ku pedagogice ogólnej*, Wrocław 2007, p. 33.

11 See Z. Bauman, *Postmodern Ethics*, Oxford 1993, p. 21–22.

12 See R. Kwaśnica, *Dwie racjonalności*, op. cit., p. 52.

13 See M. Humeniuk-Walczak, "Pedagogiczne modele działalności misyjnej w dobie nowoczesności", [in:] *Ewangelikalizm polski wobec wyzwań współczesności*, ed. S. Smolarz, S. Torbus, W. Kowalewski, Wrocław, Katowice 2013, p. 259–260.

The adoption of a specific perspective of reflection on the issues of religion, related to exclusion or inclusion, implies a different kind of thinking on the formula of religious education that would be adequate to the chosen perspective. In this context, Bogusław Milerski proposes to replace the term *religious education* with the category of pedagogy of religion, understood as a discipline dealing with the educational potential of various forms of religion and the formulation of the theory of religious education and socialization in the Church, family, school, and society[14]. Under this approach, pedagogy of religion would integrate pedagogical and theological normativity and focus to an equal extent on pedagogical reflection and practical theology[15].

It seems that the formula of an exclusive approach to issues related to religion is linked to the validation of such models and concepts of religion pedagogy that would include the process of religious education in terms of confessional obligations and apologetic tasks rather than pedagogical responsibility constructed on the basis of the current anthropological-social context[16]. The monopoly paradigm linked with the exclusive perspective discussed above assumes the existence and protection of clear-cut and tight boundaries between so-called participants and the excluded. In the context of confessional reflection this is a rift between the members of a given community (Church, religion or other religious group) and persons outside it (dissenters, religious critics and rebels, renegades, and non-believers). Taking as non-relative and universal theological and dogmatic basis of its own creed, it constructs a restrictive system of admission criteria which envisage the necessity of accepting all conditions and full identification with the message and principles professed by the community. Additionally, there is also a system of rituals of passage and access (e.g. baptism in the Roman Catholic or Protestant Churches, confirmation and a church wedding in Roman Catholicism or circumcision in Judaism and Islam).

A model of pedagogy of religion that legitimises such an approach cannot, therefore, be linked to teaching about one's own religious

[14] See B. Milerski, *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna. Perspektywy pedagogiki religii*, Warszawa 2011, p. 138–139.

[15] See Ibidem, p. 140.

[16] See Ibidem.

group or group as a cultural, social and historical phenomenon. Such an approach could lead to the relativization of truths taken as revealed and universal, thus depriving the doctrine of the group of its assigned gravity and blurring the topography of the community. Instead, starting from the revealed universe, the pedagogy of religion – representing the actual custodians of *truth* – should in this case strengthen the doctrinal and cultural identity of the group by adopting a transmission rather than a communicative model of teaching and educating students. Such a perspective is close to the so-called kerygmatic pedagogy, which in the Christian tradition (Roman Catholic and Protestant) is primarily meant to proclaim the Gospel and the kerygma of salvation. A lesson of religious education is seen here as an induction to "supernatural values", shown as the young members' own values and present exclusively within the privileged community[17]. Milerski indicates that the transcendence and supernaturality are additionally highlighted by a formula of a passive process of religious education in this approach: due to the specific content of such a supernatural message and the limited cognitive competence of students in its perception, the listening activity replaces teaching through dialogue[18]. In this sense, as the author notes, kerygmatic pedagogy is a form of anti-pedagogical thinking, narrowing the educational reflection to the area of the Church and the kerygma proclaimed by it, negating all other forms of religious education as forms of existential falsehood. The essence of the educational problem here is reduced to the *life of faith* through the encounter with the kerygma and describes the existential transformation of man, which becomes no less and no more than education in the faith[19].

Such pedagogy, usually based on different *catechisms* seen broadly as sources of revealed or legitimate truths, fosters a narrative that counters postmodern ambivalence and social construct of reality, contributes to the preservation of the historical identity of the community and its internal integrity, as well as to the maintenance and surveillance of its borders. This model reinforces a clear exclusivity towards those who are outside the community and, in addition, appears to be less and

17 See C. Rogowski, *Pedagogika religii. Podręcznik akademicki*, Toruń 2011, p. 66.
18 See B. Milerski, *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna*, op. cit., p. 148.
19 See Ibidem, p. 149.

less suited to the reality of the socio-cultural world, which is getting increasingly secularised[20].

THE INCLUSIVE PERSPECTIVE

The category of inclusion is inscribed in the context of considerations related to secularization processes. Interesting for the reflection undertaken here may be the relations between social secularization and individual secularization. The former, according to Peter L. Berger, is a process in which the dominant role of religious institutions and symbols disappears, the separation of the Church and the State takes place and religious content disappears from art, philosophy, literature. Most importantly, however, this is manifested in the development of science as an autonomous, completely secular vision of the world[21]. Karel Dobbelaere adds after Mark Chaves that "Secularization at the societal level may be understood as the declining capacity of religious elites to exercise authority over the other institutional spheres"[22]. One of the consequences of this phenomenon is the individualization of religion, also referred to as *individual secularization*. In practice, it means the loss of credibility of traditional, religious definitions of reality. The official model of the previously binding religion ceases to be the source of subjective sense which is binding for man; it loses its principal role as a determinant in shaping individual religiousness, becoming one of the possible options rather than the dominant one[23]. This shifts the perspective from exclusivity towards inclusion. The dispersion of the religious element stimulates the construction of individual sub-worlds of meanings connected with the new version of the sacred. On the other hand, it becomes the essence

20 I elaborated on this in my article "Pedagogiczne modele działalności misyjnej w dobie nowoczesności" (op. cit., p. 257–268).

21 See P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, New York 1990, p. 107.

22 M. Chaves, "Secularization as Declining Religious Authority", *Social Forces* 1994, No. 72(3), p. 575, after: K. Dobbelaere, *Secularization. An Analysis at Three Levels*, Bruxelles 2004, p. 189.

23 See K. Zielińska, *Spory wokół teorii sekularyzacji*, Kraków 2009, p. 126.

of *invisible* religion[24] which calls for no intermediary in the form of religious or public institution. As Danièle Hervieu-Léger claims:

> It gives free play to a combination of the themes inherited from traditional religions and the modern themes of free expression, self-realization and mobility which correspond with the advent of individualism. [...] a shift operates [...] from the greater transcendencies associated with the vision of another world to medium transcendencies (of a political nature), and, more particularly, to micro-transcendencies directed towards the individual and investing the modern culture of selfhood with a sacred character[25].

The monopoly paradigm ceases to obtain. Pluralisation of the sacred loosens the borders between *participants* and *the excluded*; its emergence and expansion disseminates cultural symbols to all interested individuals. From now on, freely and directly they can on their own make use of a repository of values and senses, constructing private "religions" to help them cope with the disappointments, uncertainties and hardships of everyday life. Such a shift towards inclusion also affects the way in which religious authorities are perceived. The role of "priests" is changing and their prestige and authority is being dispersed. From the position of exclusive depositaries of the "only truths" they are seen as entitled to contact with the sacred on an equal footing with others. They become partners, delegated at most to effectively manage the local sense of community[26].

The logic of inclusion seems to be based on emancipatory rationality, assuming the uniqueness of situations and motivations of individuals, each of whom has their own unique sense of the normal and of the world order[27]. Within the framework of activities related to the pedagogy of religion corresponding to the perspective of emancipatory rationality, it must be borne in mind that it is never fully possible to read, on the basis of one's own subjective knowledge, the

[24] See D. Hervieu-Léger, *Religion as a Chain of Memory*, op. cit., p. 34.
[25] Ibidem.
[26] See K. Dobbelaere, *Secularization*, op. cit., p. 128–130.
[27] See R. Kwaśnica, *Dwie racjonalności*, op. cit., p. 105.

senses, motivations and intentions of other people[28]. At the same time, emancipatory rationality reveals extremely important dimensions of the social world: its community and communication aspects. They are connected with the conviction that the community establishes meanings in the course of collective action. Robert Kwaśnica accounts for this as follows:

> What I experience includes a meaning which is important not only for me, but also for others. [...] The world of objects, the world of inner experience or the world of cultural standards are called to existence as a meaningful world thanks to communication; in the course of communication the shared understanding of the worlds is established; my participation in these worlds depends on the degree of my participation in establishing their shared understanding[29].

Such a perspective sensitizes one to others' experiences and perceptions of reality; their presence and participation in the community are necessary to broaden one's own understanding of the world and to see "the clash of two different mental perspectives as something that could not be perceived in any other way", without at the same time depriving interaction partners of their subjectivity[30]. Critical reflection is of key importance in the process of learning the world of culture and values; it enables and encourages the transcendence of one's own horizons of cognition and experience:

> In this perspective, man is aware of his own spiritual freedom. He understands it not as independence from the conditions that determine the life of the community to which he belongs, but as the possibility of seeking and formulating in one's own way the available choices, the possibility of reflecting on their meaning, discussing them, and only then – the possibility of choosing[31].

28 See Ibidem, p. 104.
29 Ibidem, p. 100.
30 See M. Humeniuk-Walczak, "Pedagogiczne modele działalności misyjnej w dobie nowoczesności", op. cit., p. 264.
31 R. Kwaśnica, *Dwie racjonalności*, op. cit., p. 102.

thanks to the right and possibility of using one's mind and exercising one's will, in line with one's conscience. The inclusivity of such a perspective is connected, on the one hand, with the individual's right to freedom of choice and the possibility of freely creating his own (inner) world of values and senses, and on the other hand, with the unregulated right of access to the resources of other "sacred repositories".

The individualization and privatization of religion provides a new context for religious education in a secularized society. The inclusive perspective of thinking about the postmodern formula of religion, taking the form of a dispersed sacred, guided by the logic of emancipatory rationality, requires a new model of religion pedagogy. In relation to this, Milerski points to two models that correspond to the specificity of the new cultural context: hermeneutic and critical pedagogy of religion.

Hermeneutic pedagogy of religion in its Christian perspective is more moderate and emphasises the cultural aspect of the religious message. Its aim is not so much to convey faith or religious knowledge as to shape the ability to understand religious content in a wider context, i.e. to understand culture and oneself. Education of this type does not focus on adaptation and reconstruction of the revealed content, but rather on the implementation of hermeneutical tasks, relating to the development of students' self-esteem in the process of understanding existential cultural texts, and as such becomes a peculiar apology of subjective individual existence[32]. It does not treat human development in terms of radical negation of and emancipation from cultural tradition, but in terms of its continuous reinterpretation. In addition to the Bible, religious education is based on other texts, both religious and secular. In this way,

> by interpreting the text we can gain not only an understanding of the fundamental possibilities of existence, but also a more detailed orientation in the surrounding social, cultural and political reality. This is because encrypted in texts is the truth about multiple specific dilemmas, values and possible aspects of existence[33].

[32] See B. Milerski, *Religia a szkoła. Status edukacji religijnej w szkole w ujęciu ewangelickim*, Warszawa 1998, p. 182.

[33] Ibidem, p. 184.

Hermeneutic pedagogy of religion, by invoking understandable foundations of religious education, privileges *understanding* as the key didactic category. It makes this education a space of inspiration for authentic development, stimulating thinking and constant self-reflection. In this way, it provides an opportunity to break the model of exclusive education, which transmits only and eliminates criticism with respect to broadly understood sacred.

Critical pedagogy of religion is a proposal that goes much further in breaking the hurdles of exclusivity in religious education than hermeneutical pedagogy of religion. In its most far-reaching proposals, this concept recognises religion as a product of the social construction of reality and therefore aims to teach not so much historical religion itself, but the phenomenon that describes various forms of constituting existential senses and the interpretation of social life[34]. Its main objective is to strive for the emancipation and empowerment of man, his personal and religious maturity. This is possible via developing the internal potential of individuals, including the achievement of internal freedom and the ability to exercise it responsibly, and via social participation[35]. Achieving individual autonomy in the process of maturity should lead to a high level of self-knowledge, adequate understanding of one's own biography and history as well as criticism and courage conducive to social involvement.

> Educational upbringing can never be critical enough. First of all, in the face of great words, praised values or ideologies, critical decisions become a necessity. Religious education and, with it, religious lessons are intended to make young people immune to the dominant forces and ideologies[36].

As Gert Otto observed in his manifesto:

> The second commandment of the Decalogue "You shall not make for yourself a carved image or any likeness" is a critical principle against all tendencies of absolutization and divinisation. Christian faith has not always been

34 See Ibidem, p. 164.
35 See B. Milerski, *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna*, op. cit., p. 162–163.
36 Ibidem, p. 162.

> faithful to this and has itself turned into an ideology. Instead of taking the side of the oppressed, it has often sided with the oppressors. This makes it all the more necessary to reactivate the critical potential of the religious tradition. Critical religious instruction can contribute to the essential sobriety, offer an insight into the real situation, guarantee critical analysis and, to the same extent, lead to commitment to human relations in our society[37].

Therefore, the model strongly emphasizes the need to develop ideological and critical competence in the analysis of social structures and the need for competent involvement in critical communication in connection with the axiological system underlying social life. One of the first and fundamental tools of social participation are emancipatory communication competences, seen as prerequisites for achieving freedom and justice. They involve training in negotiating and reaching consensus without the need to dominate and limit the autonomy of other participants in interaction. In this way, they enable the deconstruction of religious traditions from the perspective of emancipatory interest and help to transcend ideological limitations.

CONCLUSION

The different formulas of religious education presented in this article, located on the continuum between exclusion and inclusion, presented in specific socio-cultural contexts together with different strategies of access and exclusion, constitute alternative spaces of socialization to dealing with the sacred and the profane. These formulas, emerging on the basis of different rationalities, trigger the need to develop a set of social competences in children and young people and contribute to the construction of different communication models.

Exclusive models transmit rather than communicate, their role being mainly providing information on religious obligations and apologetic tasks. Thus, they more efficiently protect the borders of the

[37] G. Otto, "Was heiss Religionspädagogik", *Praktische Theologie* 1974, Vol. 9, Issue 3, p. 166–170, after: B. Milerski, *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna*, op. cit., p. 162.

community of faith. Inclusive models, on the other hand, communicate rather than transmit, oppose the ideologization of the sacred and any domination and oppression. They stress self-knowledge, critical reflection, emancipatory competence and social responsibility, indicating complete egalitarianism in relation to the sacred.

The socio-cultural legitimacy of making use of sets of values, meanings and senses of each of the presented models in specific educational contexts remains to be reflected on.

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Abstract:

The models of religious education presented in the article are alternative spaces of socialization to cope with the sacred and the profane. These formulas are situated on a continuum between exclusion and inclusion and necessitate the development of different social skills in children and adolescents and different communication models.

Keywords:

religious education, religion, secularism, exclusion, inclusion, adaptive rationality, rationality emancipatory

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PEDAGOGY OF RABINDRANATH TAGORE[1]

Until now, Rabindranath Tagore has been presented as a poet, writer and winner of the Nobel Prize for Literature. There are no studies in Polish devoted to Tagore as a teacher and headmaster of private schools in Santiniketan, Sri Niketan or Visva Bharati. Limited information to that effect can be found in few articles and dictionaries. The aim of this article is to present a fuller overview of traditional and western education, Indian Renaissance in the 19th and 20th centuries India, and the pedagogical activity and creativity of Rabindranath Tagore, in relation to adult education and lifelong learning, excluding his literary output.

TRADITIONAL INDIAN UPBRINGING

The traditional way of education in ancient India has a very long history. Indian philosophical literature touches upon all the problems of life from metaphysics to the organization of social life and upbringing and is thus included in the texts treated as a source of Indian pedagogical thought. Among the oldest are the Vedic hymns, consisting of four parts: Rigveda, Jadveda, Samaveda, and Atharvaveda. Slightly

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later exegetical texts, or brahmans, were created, followed by the Upanishads. The Vedas, the ancient Holy Books, translate literally as Knowledge. Hence the conviction that science and holiness are not two poles of knowledge, but complementary disciplines. The language of teaching was Sanskrit, a sacred language, unknown to most Indians. In line with the spirit of India, the philosophy that constitutes the basis for education also determined the techniques and ways to better mankind[2].

In the Brahmin culture there was an interest in education and its aspects regulating the development of a collective life organized in four castes. According to Rigveda's interpretation, each caste was made from a particular part of the body of a cosmic being, Purusha, which determined their attitude to the ritual and the character of the activities performed in everyday life. The duty of the Brahmin, who grew out of the mouth of Purusha, is to study and perform ritual functions combined with exerting a magical influence on the minds, emotions and imagination of the members of other castes. His tasks included learning the truth, teaching and implementing the thoughts of the wise men. Purusha's arm gave rise to a caste of Kshatri, knights and rulers, who safeguarded the land and prosperity. The studies of Kshatri were functional and prepared for governance and warfare. In matters of understanding the laws of life, they sought advice from the Brahmans, who explained the regularities and ways of fulfilling the dharma[3]. The Waishia caste, originating in Purusha's hips, led an economic life of craftsmen, merchants and farmers, and regenerated herself via education. The fourth caste, the Shudra, came from the feet of Purusha and performed menial work[4].

The hallmark of the Hindu religion is the faith in the reproducibility of the cycles of the creation of the world and the concept of three births: the first birth is the birth of a child, the second time a person is born by initiation, and the third time a person is born after death, in a new incarnation, according to the law of karma. The conviction

[2] See Z. Krawczyk, *Rabindranath Tagore – poszukiwanie prawdy i piękna w teorii i praktyce wychowania*, Warszawa 1990, p. 36.

[3] See Ibidem, p. 39.

[4] See S. Wołoszyn, "Wychowanie i »nauczanie« w cywilizacjach starożytnego Wschodu", [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, Warszawa 2004, p. 83.

about the journey of the soul and its new incarnations puts the whole Indian problem of education in a different context, unknown to the European reflection on human education. It is associated with the theory of merit and transmigration, a symbolic circle of a series of new incarnations that offer a person the chance to mature spiritually. The birth of a child is rife with chaos, lack of discipline and life at the biological level. During childhood, a person lives surrounded by unconditional love, often under the care of the servants, free from educational interventions and corrective pressures. The child, like the world of nature, develops despite the fact that nobody manages these processes. Its existence until the time of initiation is deprived of social and religious status. A child ends his or her existence as a natural human being when, at the age of eight, he or she moves from nature to the world of tradition and spiritual life in the process of initiation. Awareness, discipline, higher will and suffering will take part in its creation. Initiation therefore appears as the moment of spiritual birth, and those who have undergone the initiation are called double-born. A person then enters the Brahmaćarya period no longer develops freely but begins the life of an adult under the care of a guru, a philosopher who shares his experience and under his direction goes from disciplining the senses to disciplining the mind. Moral life gives man a chance to free himself from ignorance and to get closer to the truth, or Satya. Liberation from ignorance, from unfamiliarity with the laws of the universe, from anger and prejudice, according to Indian theory of education, is the content of improving the body and mind; and the soul which has not reached the knowledge will, after death, be reborn in another incarnation.

In the process of upbringing, the student sat next to the guru and listened to the words of the Vedas, the teachings about the creation of the world, the gods, the history of Indian civilization and learned about upbringing, psychology, medicine, logic, language, mathematics, and the art of social life[5]. In individualised education, the teacher paid special attention to the development of the student's mind and consciousness, which were to bring him closer to understanding the laws of model reality and universal reality created by the Absolute[6].

[5] See Z. Krawczyk, *Rabindranath Tagore – poszukiwanie prawdy i piękna w teorii i praktyce wychowania*, op. cit., p. 43–44.

[6] See Ibidem, p. 115.

In India, prior to the colonial conquest, there was no cult of inventiveness or scientific progress, and intellectual activity was directed towards philosophical and religious speculation. The Brahmins did not create a rational and critical intellectual tradition, but preferred comments over original research. Lack of enthusiasm for novelty was a result of the social order; wealth did not change the fate of man as much as spiritual knowledge, virtue and a righteous life. The glamorisation of work, so characteristic of Europe, was unknown. One only tried to do what he or she was destined to do by virtue of being born in a given caste, and the caste order was conducive to passivity and reconstruction[7].

The emergence of unorthodox religions in India, such as Buddhism and Jainism, did not bring about radical changes in the social role of knowledge and education. However, these religions promoted teaching in monasteries, which became the primary centres of religious knowledge. The presence of Islam in northern India dates back to the 11th century, but the Muslim rule did not introduce any changes in the situation of education. Madrasas and Koranic schools were introduced, which offered religious education exclusively to boys.

THE COLONIAL PERIOD

In the 19th c., India faced two concepts of man, two worldviews: Brahmin and English. Indian philosophy with its concepts of the micro world, man and goals of lifegoals collided with European humanism, developing natural sciences oriented towards action and rebuilding of social and economic life. In the foreground were such qualities as positivist thinking and scientism, sharp opposition to metaphysics and preference for broadly understood experimentation, all of which were new for Indian society[8].

In the first period of British colonization, the conservative orientation prevailed. The English did not care if the Indians would get to

[7] See J. Kieniewicz, *Kerala. Od stanu równowagi do stanu zacofania*, Warszawa 1975, p. 146–147.

[8] See Z. Krawczyk, *Rabindranath Tagore – poszukiwanie prawdy i piękna w teorii i praktyce wychowania*, op. cit., p. 55.

know European culture. They knew that familiarity with it could lead to changes in the mentality of the indigenous population and trigger unforeseen consequences. In 1792, the director of the East India Company said: "We lost America as a result of our own madness, accepting the establishment of schools and colleges. We should not repeat this act of madness towards India"[9]. This orientation was supported by European orientalists, who wanted to preserve the Indian community intact, which also involved a policy of tri-religious tolerance.

The liberal orientation began to emerge as of 1815. The British began to see the need for change in Indian society. Missionary schools were allowed to be established. In 1818 the first Indian college for Indians was opened in Serampora[10]. The activity of Christian missions, the establishment of various types of schools led to the popularization of the English language and as a result to an intellectual revival. Learning about the classical European culture, the Indians became aware of its value. Occident, i.e. pro-European groups, consisting of representatives of higher castes, maintained close contacts with the colonists and adopted the conviction imposed by the English about the superiority of European culture. The European models imposed on them were easily assimilated by education. Conservative groups, on the other hand, preferred the traditional way of life and were hostile towards everything European[11].

Founded by missionaries, the schools educated people concerned with the ideas of progress, where the personal role model of a gentleman was more valued than the personality model focused on self-observation, meditation on the sense of life and oriented towards self-improvement. In the late 1820s, a radical orientation began to emerge that sought to modernise India according to the European model. The British Crown needed junior clerks and junior officials to become their tools for managing the Indian Empire. There was no need to educate scientists or engineers, and typically general humanistic knowledge was sufficient for the British administration. The Committee of Public Instruction, established in 1835

9 R. N. Sharma, R. K. Sharma, *History of Education in India*, New Delhi 2004, p. 85.

10 See S. Łodziński, *W dążeniu do równości*, Warszawa 1993, p. 78.

11 See Z. Krawczyk, *Rabindranath Tagore – poszukiwanie prawdy i piękna w teorii i praktyce wychowania*, op. cit., p. 22.

and led by Thomas B. Maculay, compiled a report which laid the groundwork for the educational policy. Macular wrote:

> I therefore propose that we replace their ancient education system, so that they think that everything foreign and English is better for them than their own, until they lose their sense of self-esteem, their own culture, and become what we want them to be: a truly dominated nation. [...] We must make every effort to create classes that are translators between us and the millions we govern; a class of people with Indian blood and complexion, but with English tastes, opinions, morale, and intellect[12].

The Universities of Mumbai, Calcutta and Madras established in 1857 were branches of British universities and their unified programmes were adapted to the requirements of the University of London. There was then no separate education system in India, and the British did not try to distinguish between the way of education in Britain and beyond within the empire. Nor did the British see the need for the creation of primary schools. Parents wishing to educate their children employed private teachers. The British administration would not spend money on primary education and did not do anything about it until the end of its rule[13].

On the other hand, the English, contributed to great socio-economic reforms. They built hundreds of factories, developed the railway network and brought drinking water to the cities. It was a period of industrial and social revolution. The British encouraged the rulers of independent principalities to introduce reforms along the lines of the British model and after a while they annexed them. The British failed to implement Wood's 1854 reform. Its main objective was to extend education to the whole of Indian society by introducing a dual education system. In villages, teaching was to take place in traditional schools in local languages, with lessons schedules, curricula and textbooks were to be Western. Education was to remain secular and neutral. Its financing was to be based on compulsory payments levied from the population. By allowing private initiative, Wood's reform became

[12] R. N. Sharma, R. K. Sharma, *History of Education in India*, op. cit., p. 85.

[13] See D. Rothermund, *Indie. Nowa azjatycka potęga*, Warszawa 2010, p. 228 (English edition: D. Rothermund, *India: The Rise of an Asian Giant*, Cambridge 2009).

a strong incentive for the development of private schools. However, it did not lead to the development of education in rural areas due to the lack of subsidies from the administration budget. People could not afford to send their children to school at the cost of losing their jobs, which has not changed to this day. In 1882 the Education Commission, also known as the Hunter Commission, was established. They pointed to the need to maintain caste and religious divisions in education, favoured a ban on teaching the untouchables and the creation of a separate school organization for Muslims. This led to even greater nationalist and religious tendencies, which began to emerge in the field of education[14].

The conquest of Bengal by the British caused a sudden change in the position of Hinduism. Under Muslim rule, the Hindu religion was barely tolerated. For the English, both Hinduism and Islam were pagan religions, but because the Campaign had no religious interest, Hinduism gained an equal position for the first time in 500 years. Many Hindus called for a return to the sources of Hindu civilization and culture. One of them was Rammohan Roy, a social and religious reformer, father of the Indian Renaissance, founder of Hindu College, founder of the Brahmo Samaj movement. Fascinated by European ideologies, he tried to uncritically graft everything Western onto Indian soil. He developed a programme for the reconstruction of Indian society, eliminating outdated forms of morality such as sati, child marriage and the caste system.

There are three phases in the development of the Indian Renaissance. The first one is connected with the activity of Roy and Brahmo Samaj and is characterized by fascination with all things western. The second stage, linked to Arja Samaj's activity, is a reaction to the previously revealed European influences and an emphasis on pride in everything Indian. The third stage is characterized by a great synthesis of European and Indian ideologies; its representatives were Vivekananda and Tagore. There were two doctrinal tendencies in this period: liberal and democratic, and different approaches to the issue of liberating a country from colonial occupation. Since the 1880s, Indian nationalist ideology opposed the British colonial rule. All Indians, regardless of

[14] See S. Łodziński, *W dążeniu do równości*, op. cit., p. 80–81.

religion, caste or region of origin, became aware of the "alien" nature of the white sahib ruling their country as soon as they came into direct contact with the new rulers. At the same time, the popularity of the idea of social equality, women's rights and access to education that characterized the West was on the increase[15].

The resurrection of the knowledge of Indian history awakened and strengthened the understanding of Hinduism. The resurrection of Sanskrit led to the rereading of the great works of Mahabharata and Ramayana. The long-forgotten history of Chandragupta and Alexander the Great (Sikandra) was discovered and the inscriptions from the times of Asia were deciphered. The Hindus realized that they can be proud of their national heritage.

RABINDRANATH TAGORE – LIFE AND PEDAGOGICAL OUTPUT

Rabindranath Tagore was born on 7 May 1861. At the end of the 17th century, his ancestors abandoned their family estates and moved to Govindpur, which in the future was to become one of the districts of Calcutta. Over the years, thanks to trading and banking activities, the Tagore family became the owners of many properties in India. In particular, they profited greatly from their cooperation with the increasingly powerful East India Campaign. Rabindranath's grandfather, Dwarkanath Tagore, violated the religious ban imposed by Hinduism and travelled overseas to Europe, where he died in 1846 during a tour of London at the age of 52. Dwarkanath Tagore was one of the most prominent and active representatives of the Indian intelligentsia, supporting Roy in his efforts to reform Indian society[16]. He was also highly valued by the colonial administration and court circles, which was reflected in Queen Victoria's knighting him, an honour he did not accept. Also Rabindranath's father, Devendranath, was an ardent supporter of the Brahmo Samaj movement[17]. In 1863 he established the

[15] J. Justyński, *Myśl społeczna i polityczna renesansu indyjskiego od Rama Mohana Roya do Rabindranatha Tagora*, Warszawa 1985, p. 254.

[16] See N. Jha, "Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941)", *Prospects. The quarterly review of education* 1994, Vol. XXIV, p. 603.

[17] Society of Brahman Worshippers.

ashram, a meditation centre called Santiniketan (Peaceful Place), 100 kilometres away from Calcutta[18]. While the Tagore family was deeply entrenched in Hindu and Muslim traditions, they did not spare resources for the development of Western education, including tertiary education institutions, where they could study natural sciences and medicine. This particular situation in the Tagore house explains the combination of tradition and modernity characteristic of the Rabindranath's attitude to life. Devendranath Tagore was one of the main activists in the emerging Bengal community. He studied at the same English-Hindu school as Rammohan Roy and was greatly influenced by him. He was well versed in both European and Indian philosophy. Thanks to his strength of character he gained the nickname Maharshi, i.e. the Great Seer.

Rabindranath was his youngest, fourteenth child[19]. The other kids were also comprehensively educated; they played musical instruments, wrote poetry, novels and dramas, which was rare at that time[20]. His parents didn't show much interest in him. His mother was always busy running the house and his father spent all his time travelling across India. His upbringing was then mainly the responsibility of the servants[21]. The father cared for the harmonious development of his sons' talents and hired private teachers to teach them at home. Rabindranath's brother also took care of his comprehensive development, mainly teaching him his native Bengali, which was neglected at school. In later years Rabindranath attended the Bengali high school, founded by Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar, where he loved especially the Bengali language and literature. He was also sent by his father to English schools, but did not like their style of teaching and the English language itself. His favourite books, apart from the Mahabharata and Ramayana,

18 See D. Rothermund, *Indie*, op. cit., p. 228.

19 R. Tagore, *My Reminiscences*, says: "Shortly after my birth my father took to constantly travelling about. So it is no exaggeration to say that in my early childhood I hardly knew him". All quotations after: R. Tagore, *My Reminiscences*, Project Gutenberg, http://www.gutenberg.org/files/22217/22217-h/22217-h.htm (available: 30.02.2020).

20 Dwijendranath was a Bengali musician and poet, Satyendranath took part in the Bengali national movement and was active for the abolition of Pardah, or a system of female seclusion. Swarnakumari is considered as the first Bengali female writer.

21 See B. Grabowska, B. Śliwczyńska, E. Walter, *Z dziejów teatru i dramatu bengalskiego*, Warszawa 1999, p. 86.

included works by Spencer, Gibbon, Shakespeare's tragedies and novels by Dickens, Thackeray, Shelley, and Byron[22].

Rabindranath gave up formal education and at the age of 14 began to take private lessons at home from specially employed governors. In his memoirs, he describes the reluctance he felt during his childhood towards private teachers, learning venues and memorization. Instead of wasting his time in class, he preferred to give in to his dreams, look out the window, hide in the nooks and crannies of his home and spin his fantastic stories[23]. He hated English lessons, which he considered extremely boring: "Providence, out of pity for mankind, has instilled a soporific charm into all tedious things. No sooner did our English lessons begin than our heads began to nod"[24]. That is why he attached so much importance to language. He believed that India would not preserve its own cultural identity by using English and postulated learning in folk languages.

His childhood experience allowed him to formulate his own theory of upbringing. His concept was based on the idea of liberating students from household chores, giving them time after school as a form of creative detachment from reality[25]. As a child, Tagore did not have much time for himself because his day was full of school duties. Learning began before dawn with gymnastics, followed by lessons in literature, mathematics, geography and history. After school, in his free time from encyclopaedic learning in the European style, he learned wrestling, drawing and singing. This will affect the construction of the curriculum and the choice of content in the Santiniketan school[26].

Since his earliest years Tagore tried to break free from the constraints imposed by the school[27]. Science was associated by him not

22 See J. Justyński, *Myśl społeczna i polityczna renesansu indyjskiego od Rama Mohana Roya do Rabindranatha Tagora*, op. cit., p. 229.

23 See A. Chaudhuri, *On Tagore. Reading the Poet Today*, Pieterlen 2012, p. 148.

24 R. Tagore, *My Reminiscences*, op. cit.

25 See A. Chaudhuri, *On Tagore*, op. cit., p. 147.

26 See R. Tagore, *My Reminiscences*, op. cit.

27 See Ibidem. He writes: "I had started a class of my own in a corner of our verandah. The wooden bars of the railing 31 were my pupils, and I would act the schoolmaster, cane in hand, seated on a chair in front of them. I had decided which were the good boys and which the bad—nay, further, I could distinguish clearly the quiet from the naughty, the clever from the stupid".

with assimilation of knowledge, but with self-improvement and change in the quality of life. When he was 12 years old, his father took him to Santiniketan and during this short stay Tagore took Sanskrit and astronomy lessons and studied the Hindu scriptures, which became the seed of his views on upbringing. The memory of the closeness and tenderness of his father during his teaching in Santiniketan, absent in Calcutta, evolved in later work with Rabindranath's pupils after 1901[28].

In 1878, at the age of seventeen, Rabindranath was sent to London to study law. However, after eighteen months, at the request of his father, he returned to India without completing his studies. In 1882 his first book in the Bengali language *Sandhya Sangeet* was published. By 1890 he had written many articles, poems and novels, highly appreciated by critics. In 1883, at the age of 23, he married 10-year-old Bhavatarini[29], who was half-illiterate. In 1890 he made his second trip to Great Britain. After his return he took over the supervision of the family estate. In 1886 his first daughter was born, in 1888 his son and in 1891 his next daughter. In total Tagore had 5 children[30]. In 1892 he wrote his first major essay on education in India titled "The Mismatch of Education", where he criticised colonial education and the school system[31]. He was overwhelmed by the terrible economic status and living conditions of inhabitants of rural areas. The villagers should feel the strength, and the only way to achieve this is through adult education. Independence of the rural community, local initiatives undertaken by themselves and a courageous leader may lead to the improvement of their living conditions. Only life-long education was an instrument on the road to social change. As a landowner, Tagore began to introduce the basics of education for his employees. To this end, he founded a school for adults on his property in Seliadah[32], where he also sent

28 See A. Chaudhuri, *On Tagore*, op. cit., p. 148.

29 Throughout his life, Tagore loved his tragically deceased sister-in-law, Kadambari, who committed suicide. He dedicated as many as 6 books to her. During his lifetime he never dedicated a book to his wife.

30 See B. Grabowska, B. Śliwczyńska, E. Walter, *Z dziejów teatru i dramatu bengalskiego*, op. cit., p. 86.

31 See S. Bhattacharya, "Classics with Commentary: Rabindranath Tagore on School and University", *Contemporary Education Dialogue* 2004, 1, p. 259, http://ced.sagepub.com/content/1/2/258.citation (available: 30.02.2020).

32 Eastern Bengal, now Bangladesh.

his own children. It was his first educational experiment. He also organized a hospital which cared for the inhabitants of nearby villages. Tagore himself called this period in his life "Sadhana". It was a time of reflection, self-improvement and preparation for active social life. Later educational experiments will be based on the experience he gained from the educational project in Seliadah[33]. It was then that Tagore understood that education through life must attempt to teach the art of life. The knowledge needed by adults must not come from outside, and education programmes adapted for adults must focus not only on the communicative function of language, but also on learning to draw on one's own experiences. He believed that the transfer of practical professional skills and lifelong learning could be the most cost-effective form of learning. Weaving, spinning, haberdashery and ceramics have always been associated with the lowest castes in India. The knowledge and skills of the rural population have never been recognised as valuable by the higher castes. Tagore tried to change this situation by introducing numerous educational programs[34].

At the same time, Rabindranath's nephew attempted to open a school in Santiniketan (Peaceful Place), which propagated the idea of Hinduism. He prepared a study programme and erected buildings, but his death in 1899 interrupted the project. Only two years later did Tagore decide to continue his nephew's work and in 1901 he left the Seliadah estate and moved with his family to Santiniketan, which he had visited as a child with his father. On December 22, 1901, on the anniversary of his grandfather's accession to Brahmo Samaj, the official inauguration of his new school took place. The school attempted to reconstruct the traditional model of education, aimed at sustaining the philosophy and art of life[35]. It was based on the principles of the traditional forest school (ashram), where dedicated wise men and spiritual guru teachers gathered. In an inaugural speech called "Pratisthadivaser Upadesh", he defined the school's ideological program as a pursuit of truth and beauty, as the tuning of young people's characters to the fullness of life and

[33] See N. Jha, "Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941)", op. cit., p. 605–606.

[34] See A. Bhattacharya, *Education for the People. Concepts of Grundtwig, Tagore, Gandhi and Freire*, Boston 2010, p. 52.

[35] See Z. Krawczyk, *Rabindranath Tagore – poszukiwanie prawdy i piękna w teorii i praktyce wychowania*, op. cit., p. 144.

the universe[36]. Tagore referred to three basic elements characteristic of a forest school: lack of dualism in terms of knowledge, friendship with all and fulfilling duties. He isolated his school from the accidental influences of society and cultivated the multiple connections between the lives of his students and the values of spiritual culture[37]. In addition, he supplemented science with elements of modern knowledge in the field of natural sciences and humanities. The study was conducted in Bengali and treated as the main means of communication, although the boys came from different parts of the country and belonged to different castes. Initially, only five boys from families known to Tagore along with his son attended Santiniketan, and after a few years the number of students increased to several dozen. The school was a boarding school; all the students lived together and living a harsh life, and until her death in 1902 Tagore's wife was a "mother" to all the pupils. They got up at 5 a.m., the boys cleaned their bedrooms and started the day with morning ablutions. Then they went for outdoor gymnastics. After gymnastics, they prayed and contemplated for 15 minutes. Then they went for breakfast. Learning began at 7 am and took place in the open air. The pupils usually worked independently under the supervision of teachers. After lunch the lessons lasted until 5 pm. The curriculum included Sanskrit, Bengali, English, Mathematics, Astronomy, History, Geography, Nature, and Music. In the afternoon the pupils played football, took part in village activities or read poetry loudly. They also took part in field and garden activities. After evening ablutions and prayers, the pupils had free time and went to bed at 10 pm[38]. The school was divided into three sections (high school, junior high school, elementary school), and the pupils gave them their own names. They could move from group to group, depending on their own skills. Therefore, a system oriented towards individualised development of pupils was adopted. Out of five teachers, two were Catholic, one was the son of a teacher from England. The teachers were prepared to work at the University of Calcutta or in teacher seminars run by missionaries. What they learned there was aimed at sustaining colonialism and proved to be useless in Santiniketan. Therefore, only young teachers were employed as it was easier to

36 See Ibidem, p. 135.
37 See Ibidem, p. 159.
38 See Ibidem, p. 222.

change their teaching habits[39]. Students were not charged any fees all bills were paid by Tagore. His fame grew and so did his royalties. In November 1913, he received the Nobel Prize for Literature, thanks to which the school could develop. The school was supported by the maharaja of Tripura; Tagore also sold all his wife's jewellery and the right to publish his works.

In 1905, the National Commission for Education asked Tagore to prepare a programme of educational reforms. A year later he presented his own concept of national education, organically connected with the life of the nation, generally accepted Hindu ideals and traditions[40]. He supported the Swadesi movement calling for a boycott of English goods and the exclusive use of local products. For several years he travelled around the world, visited the United States, Europe and Japan[41]. On 3 June 1915 the British government knighted Tagore, which title he gave up after the Armitsar massacre in 1919. These international experiences had a profound impact on his vision of education and he decided to complement it with contacts with other cultures. He noticed that narrow nationalism pushes one towards a path of conflict. According to Tagore, what distinguishes Indian culture is not commercialism, imperialism or nationalism, but universalism, the unity of the soul and the environment[42].

His vision of an ideal school was implemented in the Visva Bharati[43], a centre of Indian culture established in 1921. The university was only a loose, its organization lacked precise regulations and norms. Tagore's concept was to build a bridge between nations, between east and west, between south and north. People from all over the world and of all ages could study there[44]. Tagore opposed blind imitation

39 See Ibidem, p. 165.

40 See Ibidem, p. 191.

41 By 1934, Tagore had visited Europe, Ceylon, China, Japan, Argentina, Egypt, Singapore, Malesia, Java, Bali, Thailand, Indochina, Persia, Iraq, Canada, United States, and Russia.

42 See P. Parmar, "Rabindranath Tagore's Views on Education", *Language in India* 2011, Vol. 11/1, p. 228, http://www.languageinindia.com/jan2011/tagoreparmar.html (available: 30.02.2020).

43 See Visva-Bhatati, A Central University and an Institution of National Importance, http://visvabharati.ac.in/ (available: 30.02.2020).

44 See S. Bhattacharya, "Classics with Commentary: Rabindranath Tagore on School and University", op. cit., p. 260.

of the Western style of teaching, Western buildings and subjects that unnecessarily increased the cost of education and were therefore too expensive for the poorest social strata[45]. At the same time, he stressed the need for teaching in native languages. Speaking only English was limited to the higher castes; the masses did not know the language of the coloniser and therefore were unable to benefit from education[46]. Universities should never become machines for collecting and distributing knowledge, but rather platforms for exchanging experience. People should offer a wealth of thought in them. He wanted university environments to integrate with the rest of society and take on the burden of educating people living in poor regions. He did not want education to be reserved exclusively for urban communities and the higher castes. School institutions should be at the heart of society, linked to it by living ties of cooperation.

Tagore was particularly concerned about the dramatic situation of the rural population, who, deprived of education, were unable to change their life situation. Lack of food, health, joy, lack of awareness of what a social initiative and cooperation is, made Tagore establish a school for the poorest called Sri Niketan and the Institute for Rural Reconstruction in the village of Surul. He taught the villagers that instead of blaming failure on ill fate, they had better take their lives in their own hands and be dependent only on their own efforts. This motto was the basis of Tagore's theory of rural reconstruction[47]. He was particularly interested in the indigenous forms of upbringing, which were considered scandalous in those times, and especially in the openness of contacts between men and women. He divided knowledge into general and utilitarian knowledge. The former should concern all people, while the latter should be connected with social

45 R. Tagore, *My Reminiscences*, says: "it was a school. The rooms were cruelly dismal with their walls on guard like policemen. The house was more like a pigeon-holed box than a human habitation. No decoration, no pictures, not a touch of colour, not an attempt to attract the boyish heart. The fact that likes and dislikes form a large part of the child mind was completely ignored. Naturally our whole being was depressed as we stepped through its doorway into the narrow quadrangle".

46 See A. Bhattacharya, "Tagore on the Right Education for India", *Asia-Pacific Journal of Social Sciences* 2009, Vol. 1, p. 27, https://brill.com/view/book/9789460912665/BP000009.xml (available: 30.02.2020).

47 See N. Jha, "Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941)", op. cit., p. 605–606.

functions adopted in society[48]. The aim of the school was to provide a comprehensive education to the rural population, to enable them to gain a future income and to equip them with practical skills that would improve their lives in all aspects. His intention was, without negating the role of science and the latest technologies, to teach traditional crafts. Without this effort it was not possible to revive the countryside.

From the beginning, the main task of the program of Sri Niketan, the Tabernacle of Success led by Leonard Elmihst, an English economist and agricultural specialist, was to increase the productivity of the land. In addition, efforts were made to improve the quality of life and hygiene conditions of the rural population. Tagore also tried to organize scouting, mobile libraries and outdoor theatre performances. He considered theatre to be a key factor in the development of students' personalities. He treated work and science as a form of a spectacle. The basic activity was learning local handicrafts[49]. At the end of his life, Tagore became a promoter of the new idea of loka-shiksha, i.e. education for the people. He initiated the publishing of a series of books to popularize science among the poorest strata of society. He divided the illiterate into three categories, claiming that the majority of the villagers were illiterate, secondary illiterate or functional illiterate. He said that there are only two methods of educating the illiterate. The first, Jatra, is outdoor education through drama, and the second through stories of heroes from the Ramayana and Mahabharata[50]. Gandhi saw affinities between loka-shiksha and his idea of Wardha, or basic education for the people. A few months before his death, Tagore tried to draw the public's attention to the fact that unequal access to education is the source of social inequality. Until the end of his life, his activities focused on the lifelong learning of the rural population[51]. In 1940, a year before his death, Oxford University awarded him an honorary doctorate.

48 See Z. Krawczyk, *Rabindranath Tagore – poszukiwanie prawdy i piękna w teorii i praktyce wychowania*, op. cit., p. 209.

49 See P. Parmar, "Rabindranath Tagore's Views on Education", op. cit., p. 231.

50 See A. Bhattacharya, "Tagore on the Right Education for India", op. cit., p. 30.

51 See Ibidem.

Rabindranath Tagore died on August 7, 1941, but his work has stayed very much alive. His texts on pedagogy are valuable research material. The Santiniketan School and the Visva Bharati University have been in existence until today. Art, music and craftsmanship still occupy the main place in these institutions. The study of Indian native languages and Asian culture attracts many students from all over the world to Santiniketan. Its graduates are people who are convinced of the need to fulfil a special mission towards the world and other people, with respect for the traditions and values inherent in the cultures and civilizations of other nations[52].

TAGORE'S VIES ON EDUCATION

The goals of education formulated by Tagore should be read in the context of his philosophy and the art of living. For many educators his views did not have a scientific status and therefore were not treated as the content of education. It should not be forgotten, however, that Tagore's pedagogical writings were created in the atmosphere of the nascent Indian Renaissance, a negation of everything Western, and additionally characterized by a strong liberalism. The boundary line in his views on education was between tradition and modernity and was not clear-cut. Much of his reflection intertwines and links in a new creative way what is new and what is already known. He replaced the positivist concept of education with a hermetic poetic convention, with no points of reference to European intellectual culture[53]. Tagore's views evolved from the ashram paradigm in the first phase, through the model of national education in the second and the ideas of Visva Bharathi in the third, to the promotion of the idea of the loka-shiksha at the end of his life.

According to Tagore, society can choose between two models of upbringing. One aims at the appropriation of the pupil, who is an object of education and total trust is placed in the teaching process, in the process of assimilation and accumulation of knowledge. The second

[52] See N. Jha, "Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941)", op. cit., p. 611.

[53] See Z. Krawczyk, *Rabindranath Tagore – poszukiwanie prawdy i piękna w teorii i praktyce wychowania*, op. cit., p. 97.

model of education is based on limited trust in the didactic process. According to the transmigration theory, man comes into the world with a specific character, which as a consequence assigns to education a far more modest role. Rather, it boils down to an agreement between master and student and knowledge is treated as an object of personality and soul development. The content of the curriculum is limited to the basic tendencies of cultural development[54].

Tagore swore that he had never been influenced by any ideology of upbringing. He emphasized that his views on education were mostly influenced by his childhood memories[55]. In many ways Tagore's ideas referred to the views of Rousseau, Dewey and Montessori. For example, like Frobel, Tagore believed that harmony with nature can be achieved through proper education and that household chores are part of young people's upbringing, just as community service is the responsibility of every student. According to many researchers of Tagore's thoughts, he knew European views on education, but these stemmed from Indian philosophy and tradition[56]. Of special importance were moreover the views of Mahatma Gandhi, who wanted to establish "people's education", adjusted to rural, self-sustaining communities[57].

Thinking about education, Tagore referred to the categories of truth, beauty, love and joy, which came close to wisdom in its metaphysical sense. Education through truth should lead to the full development of the inner spiritual culture and to participation in the transformation of the surrounding world. Beauty, understood as the result of intentional human activity and the search for contact with the ultimate reality by means of symbols, causes not only emotional and aesthetic reactions, but also brings us closer to the sacred[58].

According to Tagore, the goal of education should be a sense of fulfilment and satisfaction with life. Science is not only knowledge and

54 See Ibidem, p. 160.

55 See R. Tagore, *My School*, London 1933.

56 See N. Jha, "Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941)", op. cit., p. 611.

57 See R. Tagore, L. K. Elmhirst, *Rabindranath Tagore, Pioneer in Education. Essays and Exchanges Between Rabindranath Tagore and L. K. Elmhirst*, London 1961.

58 See Z. Krawczyk, *Rabindranath Tagore – poszukiwanie prawdy i piękna w teorii i praktyce wychowania*, op. cit., p. 82.

intellect, but also creativity and aesthetics. Man must become an integral part of the environment, go beyond his human nature to unite with the universe. At the same time, he has to explore the world intuitively, via emotions[59].

Tagore doesn't disregard Western-style education, he says:

> I do not deny that the civilization of the West has abundant material from which we can draw knowledge and educate our intellect. We are allowed to acquire this knowledge and use it properly, but India is not a beggar of Europe, even if this is what the West thinks[60].

A western-style school is compared by Tagore to a factory that opens in the morning when the bell rings, and when a teacher starts talking, the factory starts working. When the teacher finishes talking at four in the afternoon, the factory closes and the students go home carrying on their backs some sheets of paper produced by the learning machine. He was also against examinations, which dominated the British teaching system. In a hierarchical society, they were to mean that a career is not determined by the caste, but by hard work and knowledge[61].

The overarching goal of education should be to pass on to the youngest generation the entire cultural heritage of India and other nations, so that they can learn from it and gain experience. Tagore placed great emphasis on learning the native languages of India, which were the driving force behind Indian education[62]. Science should begin with an ascending curve; it should be rooted in the natural cultural foundations of the community and be guided by values that consolidate the cultural heritage of India as a whole[63].

59 See K. O`Connell, "Tagore and Education: Creativity, Mutuality and Survival", *Asiatic Volume* 2010, Vol. 4, Np. 1, p. 76.

60 R. Tagore, *Nacjonalizm*, Warszawa 1922, p. 102.

61 P. Parmar, "Rabindranath Tagore's Views on Education", op. cit., p. 229.

62 R. Tagore, *My Reminiscences*, p. 60, writes: "On leaving the Normal School we were sent to the Bengal Academy, a Eurasian institution. What we were taught there we never understood, nor did we make any attempt to learn, nor did it seem to make any difference to anybody that we did not".

63 See Z. Krawczyk, *Rabindranath Tagore – poszukiwanie prawdy i piękna w teorii i praktyce wychowania*, op. cit., p. 84.

Tagore was extensively involved in the education of women, who were mostly illiterate. In his schools, women were always welcome and attended co-educational classes. He believed that it was necessary to get rid of the stereotype that the wife's too much knowledge offended her husband. He called for a change in the status of a woman who should cease to be a household object and stand upright next to her husband as his companion[64]. Although he opposed early marriage, he himself married his daughters when they were 15 and 10 years old. At the end of his life he was said to be tormented by remorse because of this[65].

At Tagore's school, the teacher's job was not only to pass on knowledge, but also to cultivate virtues in a way similar to the way a gardener fertilizes his plants. In order for a student to acquire a passion for learning, the teacher should stimulate his or her doubts, ask questions, instil in him or her love for mental adventures, courage to discover the world. At the same time, the teacher should enjoy teaching, feel harmony between himself as a teacher and his pupil[66]. Tagore stressed that the teacher must not only provide information, but also inspire[67]. If no one inspires the students, and they only accumulate information in their heads, the truth loses its meaning. Most school knowledge is wasted because teachers treat their subjects as dead specimens in display cases with which you have to get familiar, but there is no communication with them. Of paramount importance in teaching is spontaneity and a creative atmosphere, and the teacher's main goal should be to work constructively with students. Instead of gathering encyclopaedic knowledge, learning everything from books, thus being cut off from reflection, the student should explore what is truth, beauty and what leads to love in action. Teaching will only be wholesome and natural if it becomes the direct fruit of life and the development of knowledge. The content of the curriculum about the external facts of the world should not be more important than the content developing the truth and beauty of its disciples. Do not teach everything, but only

64 A. Bhattacharya, *Tagore*, op. cit., p. 24.

65 B. Grabowska, B. Śliwczyńska, E. Walter, *Z dziejów teatru i dramatu bengalskiego*, op. cit., p. 88.

66 P. Parmar, "Rabindranath Tagore's Views on Education", op. cit., p. 230.

67 R. Tagore, *My Reminiscences*, writes: "The main object of teaching is not to explain meanings, but to knock at the door of the mind".

what is important for the development of the student. According to the Indian evolutionary order, development is descending, hence Tagore's keen interest in states of mind and consciousness[68].

Tagore was against any form of punishment in order to introduce discipline, which deprived the student of individuality[69]. In his opinion, many teachers believe that fear is essential in teaching. However, it is the teacher who has to create a situation where the student is not afraid to express his or her opinions. His pedagogical proposals oscillated around the idea of education in an atmosphere of joy of creation; upbringing should motivate to learn rather than punish[70]. Tagore considered it a natural right of the child to create forms offering him joy and to learn to be satisfied with the voluntary performance of tasks for his or her own pleasure and to satisfy his or her need for play[71]. Childhood, on the other hand, is a period in which one has the right to an unrestricted life free from the needs of specialisation and narrow limitations of professional life. Children love life, embrace it with an imagination full of spontaneous activity[72]. Tagore's teaching methods were based on the idea of "joyful study", which included trips, picnics, games, music, participation in religious performances and festivals[73]. The children were engaged in gardening, planting, watering, and weeding. Thanks to this they were closer to nature not only through contemplation, but also through action[74]. The main goal was to stimulate the imagination of the alumni. The child was in the centre of his interests; the student was a subject in the teaching process, and education was aimed at satisfying his or her needs, aspirations and abilities.

68 P. Parmar, "Rabindranath Tagore's Views on Education", op. cit., p. 232.

69 R. Tagore, *My Reminiscences*, observes: "What I learnt there I have no idea, but one of its methods of punishment I still bear in mind. The boy who was unable to repeat his lessons was made to stand on a bench with arms extended, and on his upturned palms were piled a number of slates. It is for psychologists to debate how far this method is likely to conduce to a better grasp of things".

70 See P. Parmar, "Rabindranath Tagore's Views on Education", op. cit., p. 230.

71 R. Tagore, *My Reminiscences*, writes: "If children are only allowed to be children, to run and play about and satisfy their curiosity, it becomes quite simple. Insoluble problems are only created if you try to confine them inside, keep them still or hamper their play".

72 See A. Bhattacharya, "Tagore on the Right Education for India", op. cit., p. 33.

73 See K. O`Connell, "Tagore and Education: Creativity, Mutuality and Survival", op. cit., p. 71.

74 See A. Bhattacharya, "Tagore on the Right Education for India", op. cit., p. 34.

Tagore believed that education should benefit the pupil, not the other way around. Similarly, he claimed that a child is not only the fruit of divine love, naturally inclined to do good, but is a necessary condition for God to confirm his divinity.

In the West, the "modern" understanding of adult education and lifelong learning was owed to people such as Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Froebel, Montessori, Piaget, and Dewey. Tagore, on the other hand, was a great promoter of the idea of adult education and lifelong learning, given his efforts to rebuild villages, introduce rural cooperatives, reconstruct traditional crafts and rebuild agriculture[75]. Tagore breaks free from the characteristic Hinduist fatalism and replaces it with the idea of human freedom, which is the prerequisite for all development. Freedom enables man to move from success to success and to create his own history, in which human will plays an important role[76]. Tagore's motto was: "A man who can and does build his own kingdom is indeed a king and a master of himself"[77].

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[75] See A. Bhattacharya, *Education for the People*, op. cit., p. 53.

[76] See J. Justyński, *Myśl społeczna i polityczna renesansu indyjskiego od Rama Mohana Roya do Rabindranatha Tagora*, op. cit., p. 235.

[77] S. K. Behera, "Educational Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore: a Comparative Study", *Golden Research Thoughts* 2011, Vol 1.

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Abstract:

Rabindranath Tagore is one of the foremost thinkers in the world who thought what kind of education India should have for its people. His concepts of an ideal Indian school and university are extremely innovative. In this paper, the author wants to highlight the educational philosophies of Tagore. Five periods of his life have been highlighted: the period until 1901 – Seliadah, the time of Santiniketan 1901-1921, Visva Bharati University appointment, the appointment of Sri Niketan school for the poorest, and the latter associated with the idea of loka-shiksha. Tagore's views on education were shaped by both the Western concepts of education and mainly by the ideas typical of the Hindu tradition associated with education in forest hermitages and ashrams. He was able to creatively combine traditional and modern thinking about education. To date, there is a school of Santiniketan and Visva Bharati University, where students from around the world can study his unusual views on education.

Keywords:

Rabindranath Tagore, education, Santiniketan, university, culture, craft

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EVERYDAY LIFE – BETWEEN RATIONALITY OF ACTIONS AND AUTHORITY. AN EXAMPLE OF SOCIAL DIAGNOSIS BY ERICH FROMM[1]

INTRODUCTION

Everydayness accompanies people throughout their lives. It is different for everyone, even if it is described in the same words and experienced in the same place. It is often monotonous, uninteresting, even banal, and thus unnoticeable. It is hidden in small items, in details, and enters the cracks of our lives[2]. In relation to life-long processes, the category of everyday life is very capacious and its boundaries blurred. However, these boundaries delineate mundane, ordinary and everyday life[3]. In the broadest sense, everyday life is a way of showing man in the entire changing and historical social world, which is known beyond the theoretical point of view. Therefore, everyday life is not discussed; the

1 Originally published: Iwona Paszenda, "Życie codzienne – między racjonalnością działań a autorytetem: na przykładzie diagnozy społecznej Ericha Fromma", [in:] *Codzienność jako wyzwanie edukacyjne*, Vol. 1, ed. M. Humeniuk, I. Paszenda, Instytut Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2017, p. 62–79, https://repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/84051 (available: 1.06.2020).

2 See J. Brach-Czaina, *Szczeliny istnienia*, Kraków 1999, p. 56.

3 See K. Ferenz, "Edukacyjne dylematy codzienności", [in:] *Kultura i edukacja. (Konteksty i kontrowersje)*, ed. W. Jakubowski, Kraków 2008, p. 13.

truth of life is experienced[4]. As a result, everydayness is practiced and needs no definition[5]. Still, depending on what elements of the social world we highlight, everyday life consists of practices, discourses and culture. Under these conditions, the concept of everydayness is identified with everyday life, which refers us to the daily rhythm, to what happens during the twenty-four hours of our life, in a spontaneous and nature-compliant way. A person who is active in the world of everydayness given to him or her must find his or her own world. This calls for a construction of senses, the understanding of which is based on an analysis of the constitution of the senses initially offered to the individual[6]. The basis for interpreting the world is a set of one's own and others' (parents', teachers') experiences, which are a reference system in the form of everyday knowledge[7]. The world of everyday life should be understood as the intersubjective world that existed long before our birth and was already experienced by our ancestors as organized. It is now subject to our experience and analysis. In this context, everyday life is this always pre-determined social construct of the world already constituted in various ways in its specific history.

According to Alfred Schütz's concept of the world experienced, the world of everyday life is both a stage and an object of action and interaction of the individual who must both control and change it in order to realize his own intentions, within this world and among others[8]. Therefore, man not only acts within the world, but also influences it. One's behaviour propels the world by modifying or changing objects belonging to it and their interrelations. On the other hand,

4 See J. Jastrzębski, "Odkrywanie codzienności", [in:] *Codzienność jako miejsce i źródło uczenia się*, ed. E. Kurantowicz, M. Nowak-Dziemianowicz, *Teraźniejszość – Człowiek – Edukacja*, Wrocław 2003, special issue, p. 10.

5 See R. Sulima, *Antropologia codzienności*, Kraków 2000, p. 7.

6 See R. Grathoff, "Codzienność i świat przeżywany jako przedmiot fenomenologicznej teorii społecznej", [in:] *Fenomenologia i socjologia. Zbiór tekstów*, ed. Z. Krasnodębski, Warszawa 1988, p. 428.

7 Everyday knowledge means all the social rules and norms that enable people to act in the social world. It is practical knowledge that is assessed on the basis of its effectiveness. Such knowledge is acquired through the process of socialisation and is the absolute reality of every human being's actions and imparts significance to all events. See A. Schütz, "On Multiple Realities", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1945, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 534.

8 See Ibidem.

these objects resist the actions of the individual, who can overcome or otherwise must surrender to them. In these conditions, the pragmatic attitude, which consists in a realistic assessment of reality and taking only such actions that guarantee effectiveness, becomes essential. The above description shows that the natural attitude of an individual towards the world of everyday life is governed by rationalism. In this perspective, man has to change everydayness through his actions and at the same time everydayness modifies his conduct[9]. A common-sensical person is primarily interested in that part of the world of everyday life that is within his reach and that is concentrated around him temporally and spatially. Events occurring in his external world impose questions about ways of operation to be chosen from, which limits his possible accomplishments. Consequently, the individual manifests his or her pragmatic interest in seeking solutions to his or her personal and private problems arising from his or her existence within the world system he or she calls his or her environment[10]. In these circumstances, the problem of rationality and rational action in the social world becomes increasingly important.

Therefore, the purpose of this text is to answer the questions whether a person in everyday life acts rationally, that is, whether he or she is reasonably guided by his or her own needs, desires and goals. What role does authority play in this process?

The theoretical basis for the deliberations is the concept of rationality as put forth by Robert Kwaśnica[11] and a social diagnosis conducted by the American psychologist and philosopher Erich Fromm[12]. Why Fromm's diagnosis? First of all, because it allows us to understand human tensions, both internal and external, manifested in social groups, from normative positions. Additionally, it is a diagnosis whose characteristics we can transfer to Polish society.

9 See Ibidem.

10 See Ibidem, p. 571.

11 See R. Kwaśnica, *Dwie racjonalności. Od filozofii sensu ku pedagogice ogólnej*, Wrocław 2007.

12 See E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, London, New York 2002.

BETWEEN RATIONALITY OF ACTIONS AND AUTHORITY – THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF REFLECTION ON ERICH FROMM'S SOCIAL DIAGNOSIS

Among numerous discussions on rationality carried out within the social sciences, the approach of Kwaśnica fits perfectly well the objectives of this article[13]; the author reads human *rationality* as human experience that sets the structural framework within which the individual interprets the world and his own existence[14]. Rationality as understood in this way is an individual concept in which each individual experiences the world separately: what one sees as rational i.e. justified by his understanding of reality, can be found by others to be irrational, i.e. not motivated by their project of experiencing the world. Rational behaviour is the conduct of a person in which we are dealing with the anticipation of actions through reflection on the aims and effects of actions and their meaningfulness[15].

According to Kwaśnica, contrary to common belief and the well-ingrained positivist philosophy of science, we should refer to two alternative rationalities of experiencing the world. There is the adaptative rationality (instrumental), founded on the logic of the relation of the aim and the means and the other, emancipatory rationality (communicative), based on the logic of a communicative action[16]. Both these types are a kind of permanent orientation, enabling a person to organize everyday life and to experience and organize knowledge about reality. Each of them, as Henry A. Giroux points out, is responsible for

> a specific set of assumptions and social practices that mediate how an individual or group relates to the wider society. [...] The knowledge, beliefs,

[13] See R. Kwaśnica, *Dwie racjonalności*, op. cit. More on the category of the rational especially in the following texts by: M. Weber, *Racjonalność, władza, odczarowanie*, Poznań 2004; H. A. Giroux, L. Witkowski, *Edukacja i sfera publiczna. Idee i doświadczenia pedagogiki radykalnej*, Kraków 2010; J. Habermas, *The Theory Communicative Action*, Vol. 1 *Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, Cambridge 1986.

[14] See R. Kwaśnica, *Dwie racjonalności*, op. cit., p. 10.

[15] See Ibidem, p. 19.

[16] See Ibidem, p. 11.

expectations, and biases that define a given rationality both condition and are conditioned by the experiences into which we enter[17].

The values to which adaptative rationality directs man come from the axiological perspective of instrumental action. Following Jürgen Habermas, Kwaśnica stresses that each instrumental action aims to expand the technical control over objects, people including, or to maintain the earlier level of control over them[18]. The results of instrumental action can be observable directly, i.e. evident as changes occurring in the world of objects. Evaluating on their basis the value of an action, it is enough to compare it with its goal, i.e. with the previously assumed idea of what should be achieved. Thus, the criterion which establishes the logic of an instrumental action is the convergence between the effects and the intention. In these circumstances, it is reasonable to proceed in such a way as to achieve an observable, measurable and verifiable outcome according to the external criteria of intended use[19]. The above description implies that the approach of a person towards the world and the life priorities in this perspective are justified by the goods which, as Kwaśnica indicates after Jadwiga Mizińska, prove indispensable for supporting and continuing man's existence[20]. Their use is a prerequisite for maintaining and gaining satisfaction from the fact that a person can function efficiently in the existing circumstances. The world seen in this way allures one with the perspective of a comfortable, prosperous and peaceful life. Submitting to it gives a person a sense of stability and security. All the goods contained in it seem to be at one's fingertips; they are visible and accessible to everyone who takes enough effort to get them. These benefits are quantifiable and measurable, not only in economic but also in social terms. It is possible, for example, to compare and evaluate the assets and wealth of a person, but also his or her position at various levels of the hierarchy: power, science, professional

17 H. A. Giroux, "Critical Theory and Rationality in Citizenship Education", [in:] H. A. Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education. A Pedagogy for the Opposition*, Massachusetts 1983, p. 171.

18 See R. Kwaśnica, *Dwie racjonalności*, op. cit., p. 52.

19 See Ibidem.

20 See Ibidem, p. 84–85.

and non-professional life. Accepting participation in such a world is synonymous with the approval of the existing culture and of an attitude to consumption and/or, possibly, to the reproduction of the goods contained therein.

An example that expresses well the actions of adaptive rationality is the irrational authority based on prohibitions, noticed by Fromm in the social space[21]. This authority is not a characteristic to be "had" in the sense of possession or physical features. This is a kind of control where a person is subject to the standards, values, orders, messages, and persons they recognise. In this context, the notion of *authority* may be relevant to understanding the relationship between people when one person looks down on another[22]. The source of irrational authority is always the physical or mental power over others. Power on the one hand, and fear on the other, are the two pillars of irrational authority. Authoritarian ethics understood in this way formally denies man the ability to independently discriminate between good and evil. The one who sets norms is always a superior authority. The person who recognizes authority is fearful of it and aware of his own weakness and therefore does not refer to his own knowledge and reason but uncritically submits to imposed principles. Materially, i.e. content-wise, authoritarian ethics answers the question of what is good or bad from the point of view of the interest of the authority, not the interest of the individual. Examples include situations that often occur in school and in society. "Good" is what you are praised for, "bad" is what you are criticised or punished for by social authority or community. The terms *good* and *bad* are linked to usefulness. A thing is called *good* if it is suitable for the person who uses it. The same yardstick of value can be applied to a person. The employer deems an employee valuable provided the latter is useful. The teacher calls a pupil *good* when he or she is obedient and does not cause trouble. In Fromm's opinion, the formal and material aspects of authoritarian ethics are inseparable. An authority that does not want to exploit a person does not need to dominate it. For the sake of his own interests, however, he demands that "obedience to be the main virtue and disobedience

[21] See E. Fromm, E*scape from Freedom*, New York 1969, p. 186.
[22] See E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, New York 1966, p. 90.

to be the main sin"[23]. For Fromm this distinction is similar to Weber's ideal type. In reality, he claims, there is invariably a mix of authorities. Meanwhile, it is important which factor prevails in the life of a person. An example of the functioning of rational and irrational authority is the 19th century social character. In the 19th century, Western society was characterized by a mixture of these two species of authority. What they had in common was that they were both overt authorities. Man knew who was giving him orders and prohibitions: father, teacher, boss, king, priest, God, law, or moral conscience. An individual could either obey an authority or rebel against it, but he always knew who was who and who should be an authority, what it required of him and what the consequences of the obedience or rebellion would be.

The character of authority in the mid-20th century is different. At this time, an overt authority is replaced by an anonymous authority, an authority of opinion and the market[24]. It is an invisible authority, because apparently nobody demands anything; neither a person, nor an idea, nor a moral law. Nevertheless, everyone is subjecting themselves to the same way as people in an authoritarian society were subjecting themselves. According to Fromm, the disappearance of an overt authority can be seen in all spheres of life. Parents often do not give orders to the child, instead they suggest that the child will "want to do it anyway". Due to the fact that they themselves no longer have any principles or beliefs, they try to lead the child in accordance with the expected laws of conformism. This also applies to business and industry[25]. Here, too, orders are not issued and instructions are not given, but one is encouraged and manipulated. As long as there was an overt authority, there was conflict and rebellion against irrational authority.

23 E. Fromm, *Man for Himself. An Inquiry into Psychology and Ethics*, Routledge 1999, p. 12.

24 See E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., p. 93.

25 In both examples – the previous and the next one – the reader may get the impression that in each case it is as if there are no orders but rather manipulation and persuasion. This is not a correct assumption, nor is the one that there are no open authorities at all. This is rather a generalisation of the main tendencies emerging from the perspective of the diagnosis of the whole society. In other words, Fromm seems to be mindful of the mass character of a certain tendency – among sociologists of that time – of taking interest in the mass society, mass production, industrialisation and their consequences are a certain norm (see D. Riesman, N. Glazer, R. Denney, *The Lonely Crowd. A Study of the Changing American Character*, New Haven, London 1989 or J. Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, Notre Dame 1985).

In this dispute personality developed, and especially the sense of the "self" was formed, because man doubted, protested and rebelled.

The mechanism through which an anonymous authority operates is conformism. A person thinks: I have to do what everyone has to do, I have to adapt, not to differ, not to stand out, I have to change according to the modifications of the pattern; I cannot ask if I am right or if I am wrong, but only if I am well-adjusted. "Nobody has power over me, except the herd of which I am a part, yet to which I am subjected"[26]. This situation illustrates that a person's self-esteem depends on external factors: their success and the assessment of others. For this reason, a person is subordinate to the general public and his sense of security stems from conformism, from never straying away from the herd. Thus, the individual is not afraid of an overt authority, but is driven by the fear of an anonymous authority of conformism. Admittedly, he does not submit to anyone personally, but he does not have his own beliefs, almost no individuality, no sense of his own "self"[27].

In this account Fromm shows the person as two contradictory yet supplementary incarnations of the "to have" approach which intensify the fear: the *homo faber* – a maker, creator, a man of labour, a deft master who is the slave of his own activity and his own income, and the *homo consumens*, who treats life objectively and wants to buy as much as possible for the money he has earned, experiencing an increasingly nagging inner unrest[28]. Fromm recognises the will to have as a major source of human activity[29]. To his mind, most people perceive possession as a natural or in fact the only acceptable way of life[30].

According to Fromm, man chooses a world of "to have" values because they live in a society founded on private property, profit and power. The norms according to which society lives and which shape the social character of its members are not insignificant. These norms include: the desire to acquire property, to retain it and to multiply it,

26 E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., p. 139.

27 Ibidem, p. 96.

28 Fromm's reflection on the topic are expounded esp. in such texts as: *Escape from Freedom* (op. cit.), *The Pathology of Normalcy* (New York 2011); *The Sane of Society*, op. cit.; *On Being Human* (New York, London 2005); *To Have or to Be?* (New York, London 2008).

29 See E. Fromm, *To Have or to Be?*, op. cit., p. 13.

30 See Ibidem, p. 24.

i.e. to make a profit. As a result of this principle, people who possess property are admired and envied. Those who do not have goods are seen as inferior. Consumption is therefore a value for many people. A particular example of the phenomenon of excessive buying, according to Fromm, is most likely a private car. For those who have it, it seems to be a necessity in life, for others it is a symbol of happiness[31]. Fromm believes that it is the pressure of the outside world that makes the individual

> to give up most of his or her autonomous, genuine desires and interests, and his or her own will, and to adopt a will and desires and feelings that are not autonomous but superimposed by the social patterns of thought and feeling[32].

It is worrying that people are unaware that their decision-making is conditioned and manipulated. Most people believe that they are acting according to their will. This image of society shows that 20th-century capitalism "needs people [...] who want to consume more and more, and whose tastes are standardized and can be easily influenced and anticipated"[33].

Fromm's analysis of how new authorities operate (mass culture, fetish of goods, the alluring power of consumption) indicates that they only too easily subject humans, who are not reflexive enough. Fromm sees the reasons for this phenomenon in education, and more specifically in the inadequate education process. In his opinion, compulsory education in all developed countries is aimed at preparing young people for work. The aim of education is the social utility of the individual rather than his individual development or the extraction of his potential (in line with the etymology of the word *e-ducere*, i.e. extract)[34]. Furthermore, as he stresses, "our system of higher education in a relatively small degree triggers critical thinking and impacts character development", while "students remain to a small extent only influenced by the teacher's personality and at best gain only purely

31 See Ibidem, p. 60.
32 Ibidem, p. 64.
33 E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., p. 102.
34 See Ibidem, p. 301.

intellectual knowledge"[35]. Paralysis of critical abilities leads to dependence on others for decision-making and support. This disappearance of creative attitudes occurs when the dominant

> type of activity based on submission to or dependence on an authority. The authority may be feared, admired, or "loved" – usually all three are mixed – but the cause of the activity is the command of the authority, both in a formal way and with regard to its contents. The person is active because the authority wants him to be, and he does what the authority wants him to do. This kind of activity is found in the authoritarian character. To him activity means to act in the name of something higher than his own self. He can act in the name of Cod, the past, or duty, but not in the name of himself[36].

The crisis of norms and values led man to abandon the hope and slogans of the Enlightenment era, which allowed him to believe that he could trust his own reason. Growing concerns about human autonomy and reason have created a state of moral chaos[37]. Authoritarian ethics determines what is good for it and sets the standards of law and conduct. In the humanistic ethic distinguished by Fromm, in opposition to the above humanistic ethics, man himself is both the giver and the subject of norms. His real problem is what kind of authority he should have. This is where the question arises of the *struggle* of the external authority against the internal authority, which manifests itself as a duty, a conscience or the Freudian *superego*[38]. From the time of the religious Reformation, the external authority (persons, institutions, social norms) have supplanted the internal authority, the Freudian superego (conscience). Contemporary human *conscience* has lost much of its weight. It seems that neither external nor internal authority plays a significant role in the individual's life. Everyone is free provided they do not violate the rights of others. Although authority seems to be fading nowadays, this disappearance is only apparent. Rather, authority is invisible, anonymous (public opinion, science, mass media), does not exert pressure but mild persuasion. Importantly, an

[35] E. Fromm, *The Pathology of Normalcy*, op. cit. p. 105.
[36] E. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, op. cit., p. 86.
[37] See Ibidem, p. 4–5.
[38] See E. Fromm, E*scape from Freedom*, op. cit., p. 188–189.

anonymous authority is more effective than an overt authority, few suspect that it is underpinned by an injunction and an expectation of obedience. The case of an external authority is different. It is clear here that an order has been issued and we know who issued it.

The aforementioned realities reveal that the structure of society affects man's everyday life in two parallel ways: man becomes more independent yet also more isolated, lonely and terrified. He finds himself in a situation where much of what he thinks and says is thought and spoken by everyone else. This means that a person has not yet reached the ability to think independently and autonomously. On the one hand, he has freed himself from external authorities, ordering him what to do and what not to do. On the other hand, he forgets about the role of anonymous authorities, such as public opinion, which owe their enormous influence to the willingness of the individual to adjust to the expectations they have set for themselves and to the fear of standing out from the crowd[39].

In these conditions,

> The feature common to all authoritarian thinking is the conviction that life is determined by forces outside of man's own self, his interests, his wishes. The only possible happiness lies in the submission to these forces[40].

However, as Fromm observes, every authority exists in so far as it is recognised. If people do not realize the motives behind its recognition, it becomes an *objective* force to which they submit. This forced conformation causes them to flee from the individual *self* and grow into something external in order to gain the strength they feel the lack of. In this way, they give up freedom and flee from it. As a consequence, people attached to power/authority expect them to protect, care for and take responsibility for their lives[41]. This, in turn, provokes the need to have a "magical assistant". This situation is dangerous for man and culture, because he feels the need to succumb to the comfort of being exempt from thinking, making decisions and dealing with the discomforts of everyday life. This dependence results from the inability to exist

39 See Ibidem, p. 125.
40 Ibidem, p. 194.
41 See Ibidem, p. 196–197.

independently on one's own and to fully exercise one's capabilities[42]. This mechanism makes the individual cease to be himself and adopt the kind of personality offered by cultural models, thus making himself similar to others. The individual becomes what others expect to see. In this way the gap between the "self" and the world is wiped out and so is the fear of loneliness and powerlessness[43]. These conditions prove that man can nourish thoughts, feelings and desires that he subjectively feels as his own, and yet these have been imposed on him from the outside; they are alien and are not what he really thinks, desires and feels[44].

What Fromm writes about in his works about human thinking and feeling also applies to acts of will. As he points out, "Most people are convinced that as long as they are not overtly forced to do something by an outside power, their decisions are theirs, and that if they want something, it is they who want it"[45]. Fromm believes that

> A great number of our decisions are not really our own but are suggested to us from the outside; we have succeeded in persuading ourselves that it is we who have made the decision, whereas we have actually conformed with expectations of others, driven by the fear of isolation and by more direct threats to our life, freedom, and comfort[46].

People think that they are making decisions and wanting something, but in reality they succumb to internal or external coercion that commands them to want what they are to do[47]. In these circumstances, culture fosters a conformist tendency and gives a sense of illusion of individuality. Consequently, man is a lifeless automaton who harbours an illusion that he knows what he wants, while in reality he only wants what is required of him. Fulfilling the expectations of others causes the loss of identity. Man could change this if he knew what he wanted, what he really thought and felt, yet he does not know it[48].

42 See Ibidem, p. 198–199.
43 See Ibidem, p. 208–209.
44 See Ibidem, p. 212–213.
45 See Ibidem, p. 223.
46 Ibidem.
47 See Ibidem, p. 224–225.
48 See Ibidem, p. 278–282.

The other alternative manner of experiencing rationality distinguished by Kwaśnica is emancipatory rationality (communicative). As the author points out, in principle, in order to describe emancipatory rationality, it would be enough to reverse the characteristics of adaptive rationality. However, the fundamental difference between them is due to a system of values that cannot be described in the same way as adaptive values. The order of the emancipatory value results from the axiological perspective of the communication activity. They cannot be named, enumerated or indicated, because they reveal themselves on an ongoing basis, during a dialogue, as emancipatory possibilities. Emancipation is understood here as a search for the possibility of liberating oneself from the previously created and accepted world[49]. The specificity of emancipatory rationality as compared with adaptive rationality is expressed primarily in the diversity of the axiological perspective. The axiological difference is caused by transcending the earlier interests of an individual, focusing on the categories of the state of possession and dealing with the factors of widely understood change[50]. Departure from previous values changes the attitude of man to culture, other people and his own knowledge.

Under these circumstances, culture is not treated by man as adaptation, but as emancipation. Other people are no longer seen from the point of view of the benefits or risks they can pose on the road to success, but as partners in a dialogue. On the other hand, self-esteem is established on a similar basis as the relation to other members of society. This means that life is not treated as an instrumental value, because one's own person is not the means to achieve successful results. In this perspective, the person is aware of his own spiritual freedom, which gives him the opportunity to choose and to create his own world in his own way and is considered a condition for the fulfilment of his humanity[51].

This understanding of the community and communication perspective changes the relationship between man and his own knowledge. In this perspective, "knowledge is not understood as a ready-made

[49] See R. Kwaśnica, *Dwie racjonalności*, op. cit., p. 97.
[50] See Ibidem, p. 99–100.
[51] See Ibidem, p. 101–102.

tool, but as an endless process of learning about the world"[52]. Knowledge is not supposed to instruct people how to act. It can help them in this, but the final decisions must be made by an individual on their own. Its natural purpose is to enable the understanding of the world. In this context, no belief can be accepted solely because other people consider it right or sufficient for their own purposes. Acceptance of these beliefs requires a person to accept them independently, critically and reflectively and to consider their accuracy from the point of view of one's own value and one's vision of the world[53]. Under these circumstances, the changes occurring in human knowledge are not imposed but intentional. Man himself is looking for the weak points of his erudition. He constantly verifies it and goes beyond its previous findings. Every day the individual, reflecting on himself and his life, becomes his own philosopher. For it is up to philosophy to ask questions about the meaning of existence, about the values that impart order in the human world[54].

Emancipatory rationality in the social sphere is exemplified by what Fromm diagnosed as the rational authority[55]. This type of authority allows people to make their own opinions, but it also requires constant inquiries and criticism from people who are subordinate to it. In these conditions, the individual can rely on his or her understanding as a guide to action and judgment, which is conducive to his or her development. In this way he strives for "positive freedom", "he can relate himself spontaneously to the world in love and work, in the genuine expression of his emotional, sensuous, and intellectual capacities; he can thus become one again with man, nature and himself [...]"[56]. This approach corresponds to the human system of values of the "being" type. Fromm understanding "being" as "the mode of existence in which one neither has anything nor craves to have something, but is joyous, employs one's faculties productively [...]"[57]. Regrettably, as Fromm indicates, the society we live in is overpowered by the desire to possess. For

52 Ibidem, p. 102.
53 See Ibidem.
54 See Ibidem, p. 106.
55 See E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., p. 92–93.
56 E. Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, op. cit., p. 161.
57 E. Fromm, *To Have or to Be?*, op. cit., p. 16.

this reason, it is rare in everyday life to see a witness to an existential experience of "being"[58]. As a consequence, the *mode* of "being" is hard to define. However, there are some differences between them. Possession refers to things that can be measured, counted and described. On the other hand, "being" is connected with experience, and as Fromm stresses, human experience is inherently indescribable[59]. The essential characteristic of "being" is independence, freedom and the ability to think critically. The spiritual development of man comes to the fore here, his spontaneous self-expression, transcending the previously isolated self, his own self, which phenomena are impossible to describe[60]. Man's orientation to values of "being" type calls for rejecting egocentrism and egoism and requires "poverty". Unfortunately, as Fromm stresses, for most people rejecting the possession drive seems too difficult. This situation fills them with fear and a loss of safety. The fear and anxiety inherent in the risk of losing what one possesses is absent in the life of an individual who professes the values of "being". A man thinks then: "If *I am who I am* and not what I have, nobody can deprive me of or threaten my security and my sense of identity"[61]. While "possession" is based on things, "being" develops through practice. This includes, for example, the ability to think, to create intellectually and artistically, which develops in the process of human expressivity. The only danger for an individual who believes in the values of "being" is the danger that lies within himself: the loss of faith in life and the strength of his own reason, inner laziness and the desire for others to arrange his life[62].

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The above reconstructed assessment of the impact of various kinds of authorities on the rationality of actions in the everyday life of societies, presented on the basis of the social diagnosis of Erich Fromm, shows a pessimistic picture of human crisis. Although the researcher's

58 See Ibidem, p. 24.
59 See Ibidem, p. 71.
60 See Ibidem, p. 72–73.
61 Ibidem, p. 90.
62 See Ibidem.

analysis concerned American society more than fifty years ago, it is emphasized today that the everyday life of most people is dominated by thoughtlessness and lack of concern for their own humanity[63]. Today's human choices and actions are not rational because they are reduced to automatic habits and routine. An individual engrossed in a race to achieve the highest possible position on the scale of social benchmarks, does not have time to think about his or her own life. Usually he does not consciously interpret the world around him because he lives in an everyday life in which time has exploded[64]. As a result, he knows little about himself, is not aware of what he really wants and of what he thinks and feels. His knowledge about his own needs, goals and desires is not clear because the main criterion for his choices and actions is the pressure of the outside world. His feelings and desires are less important than what is ordered by an anonymous authority (mass culture, fetish of goods, seductive power of consumption). It is also dangerous that most people are ignorant of the fact that their will is conditioned and manipulated. Many people believe that they are acting according to their will. Many people live like automatons that have not achieved the ability to think independently; others prefer to remain silent not to lose social recognition. In a situation where contemporary culture has stripped of any value all that is not marketable, economics becomes the only climate of existence. This unique "market orientation"[65] of everyday life leads to most people wanting to have those qualities that are valuable to consumers. For this reason, they do not have their own beliefs, their own individuality, their own sense of self.

Fromm sees the root causes of this phenomenon in the incorrect organization of the teaching process, which insignificantly stimulates

63 L. Witkowski, "Codzienność i jej pedagogiczne przekleństwa", [in:] L. Witkowski, *Między pedagogiką, filozofią a kulturą. Studia, eseje, szkice*, Vol. 3, Warszawa 2007, p. 290.

64 See T. Szlendak, "Co się dzieje z czasem wolnym? Od codziennego znoju i odpoczynku do codzienności, w której czas eksplodował", [in:] *Barwy codzienności. Analiza socjologiczna*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Warszawa 2009; P. Michoń, "'Nie rozdwoję się przecież'. Konflikt czasu jako przeszkoda w osiąganiu równowagi pomiędzy pracą a życiem prywatnym w Polsce", [in:] *Relacje praca – życie pozazawodowe: drogą do zrównoważonego rozwoju jednostki*, ed. R. Tomaszewska-Lipiec, Bydgoszcz 2014.

65 This is one of the orientations of character distinguished by Fromm next to one orientated to the art of life (see E. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, op. cit; E. Fromm, *The Art of Being*, New York, London 1992).

critical thinking and affects character development. His diagnosis remains valid today, too. Although the ministerial documents regulating the work of the school still mention increasing educational opportunities, supporting the development of the individuality and subjectivity of students, independent thinking is dying out at various levels of education, including tertiary education[66]; formalism, subjugation and subordination are growing[67]. The teacher is enslaved by the principal, the principal by the superintendent, the superintendent by the minister. This yoke is often passed on to students. Literature provides examples for the argument that higher education and academic diplomas become a commodity that can be exchanged for a suitable place on the labour market[68]. The market discourse promotes a model of education where the students want to *have* a diploma rather than *receive education*[69]. The phenomenon of paralysis of the ability to think critically and reflectively leads to dependence on others and search for support. As a result, the individual appears as a *homo consultans* who sometimes seeks advice from others in order to facilitate and shorten the independent process of reaching solutions[70]. In this way, he avoids responsibility by fleeing to freedom. Such a situation is dangerous for both the individual and culture. It indicates that a person has the need to succumb to the comfort of being exempt from thinking, making decisions, difficulties in dealing with everyday life problems independently, otherwise than under the caring care of someone who will do it for him. Such organization and management of life makes a person

66 See M. Magda-Adamowicz, I. Paszenda, *Treningi twórczości a umiejętności zawodowe*, Toruń 2011.

67 See M. Czerepaniak-Walczak, "Emancypacja w codzienności i przez codzienność. Egzemplifikacje edukacyjne", [in:] *Wychowanie. Pojęcia, procesy, konteksty*, Vol. 5, ed. M. Dudzikowa, M. Czerepaniak-Walczak, Gdańsk 2010, p. 110.

68 See Z. Melosik, *Uniwersytet i społeczeństwo. Dyskursy wolności, wiedzy i władzy*, Poznań 2002; T. Bauman, "Zagrożona tożsamość uniwersytetu", [in:] *Uniwersytet między tradycją a wyzwaniami współczesności*, ed. A. Ładyżyński, J. Raińczuk, Kraków 2003; D. Hejwosz, *Edukacja uniwersytecka i kształcenie elit społecznych*, Kraków 2010.

69 See M. Molesworth, E. Nixon, R. Scullion, "Having being and higher education. The marketisation of the university and the transformation of the student into consumer", *Teaching in Higher Education* 2009, Vol. 14, No. 3, p. 278.

70 See A. Kargulowa, "O potrzebie badań poradoznawczych. Ku antropologii poradnictwa", *Studia Poradoznawcze* 2013, No. 2, p. 99–100, https://opub.dsw.edu.pl/handle/11479/40 (available: 7.07.2015).

flee into impotence. As a result, the individual loses his critical awareness, freedom of thought and central position. Instead, he becomes a tool which is lonely, lost, uncertain and alienated; his life is meaningless. These psychological effects of alienation have led to a situation where the person withdraws to a "market orientation", ceases to be productive and loses his self-esteem. He becomes dependent on the approval of others, tends towards conformism, and at the same time does not feel safe. He is dissatisfied, restless and devotes most of his energy to attempts to compensate or hide this anxiety. "His intelligence is excellent, his reason deteriorates [...]"[71].

Fromm, reflecting on ways to improve the situation of a man enslaved by mechanisms of anonymous authorities, proposes a version of emancipatory pedagogy. He calls for concern for the quality of the development of subjectivity and creative autonomy. He indicates the need for in-depth research on the growing domination of anonymous mechanisms. At this point it is worth mentioning that Lech Witkowski, the author of the most important work written so far on how authority operates in the public sphere, takes a different point of view[72]. Instead of Fromm's emancipatory rhetoric, the author proposes to launch processes that provide the ability to creatively address the claims and needs related to the very presence of authority. Witkowski believes that Fromm's emancipatory rhetoric is in open conflict with the vision of "rational authority", which is always temporary, and as Fromm stresses himself, "requires constant scrutiny and criticism of those subjected to it"[73]. According to Witkowski, "We cannot merely stress the rationality of an authority (as an intentional attribute); there must be a rational (creative) attitude towards any claim to be an authority on the part of the addressee"[74]. The problem of the operation of authority in social space, as Witkowski points out, could be solved by educators. Unfortunately, this issue is ignored by them and neglected in scientific research or reduced to trivial questionnaire surveys, without the opportunity to approach the sphere of ethical, and not only cognitive, concerns[75].

71 E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, op. cit., p. 237.
72 See L. Witkowski, *Wyzwania autorytetu*, op. cit.
73 E. Fromm, *Man for Himself*, op. cit., p. 9.
74 L. Witkowski, *Wyzwania autorytetu*, op. cit., p. 132.
75 See Ibidem.

Insufficient preparation of pedagogues to deal with such issues may be an obstacle here. It is evident that the currently binding curricula of teaching young pedagogues are dominated by the strategy of adjusting the educational process and education to the expectations of employers. As a result, graduates of pedagogical studies are equipped primarily in professional competences. This in turn contributes to the deficiency of other competences, existential one that prepare one for a reflective life in society. In these circumstances, in order to avoid errors and pathologies, which are often pointed out with respect to educational institutions and practices, a broader and more insightful reflection on the implementation of processes bringing the ability to creatively and critically relate to the current reality is justified. This issue could be more comprehensively included in the emerging subdiscipline of knowledge, i. e. the pedagogy of everydayness or the pedagogy of everyday life[76]. It allows us to look at everyday life, find in it what escapes our attention, discover its unknown facets, and learn about its new senses and meanings[77]. Unfortunately, so far, the pedagogy of everyday life has been rarely noticed in the educational process. There is also no doubt that with the current curriculum, the existential aspects of education would be difficult to integrate into a single pedagogical discipline. There is nothing to prevent them from being included more broadly in general pedagogy. Although it is impossible to draw final conclusions here and now without in-depth studies and analyses, it can be assumed that the formation of creative and critical abilities to address claims and needs related to the presence of authority in the social realm could create important conditions for their achievement.

[76] See Z. Melosik, "Pedagogika życia codziennego. Teoria i praktyka", [in:] *Edukacja a życie codzienne*, Vol. 1, ed. A. Radziewicz-Winnicki, Katowice 2002; A. Radziewicz-Winnicki, E. Bielska, "Wprowadzenie", [in:] *Edukacja a życie codzienne*, op. cit., p. 11.

[77] See M. J. Szymański, "Problematyka codzienności w badaniach społecznych i pedagogicznych", [in:] *Codzienność szkoły. Uczeń*, ed. E. Bochno, I. Nowosad, M. J. Szymański, Kraków 2014, p. 24.

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Abstract:

In accordance with the sociological concept of the world by Alfred Schütz, the world of everyday life constitutes the object of activities and interactions of given individuals, who – in turn – have to gain control over it but also modify it in order to accomplish their own goals, within the framework of such world and amongst others. In such a context, it comes across as particularly interesting to recognize whether the contemporary man acts according to their own needs, desires and goals, and what role authority has in their own activities. This article attempts to answer these questions on the basis of the social diagnosis carried out by the American psychologist and sociologist Erich Fromm. Fromm reveals aspects of everyday life from a dramatic perspective, emphasising the issue of an increasing dominance of anonymous authority which an individual voluntarily and otherwise succumbs to. In such circumstances, everyday life is like a battlefield whose stake is to preserve the human ability to reflectively reference the claims and needs linked to the presence of authority within the social area. Shaping such skills and abilities can be accomplished within the framework of the emerging sub-discipline and field of science, i.e. pedagogy of everyday life. Unfortunately, so far, this category is absent, underestimated or even omitted in the process of education. Nonetheless, this issue undoubtedly deserves to be treated as a pedagogical challenge.

Keywords:

authority, everyday life, Erich Fromm, pedagogy of everyday life, rationality

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UNDERSTANDING DAILY REALITY IN CLIFFORD GEERTZ'S INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY[1]

How to understand daily reality? This question poses a problem and a challenge for contemporary humanities and social sciences (sociology, pedagogy, anthropology, philosophy). It comprises two aspects: on the one hand, it concerns the method, access, treatment, observation, and research of daily reality; on the other hand, it refers to the issues that each individual entangled and involved in his or her own daily reality can raise: how to understand oneself in the context of one's own daily reality? In this question, posed both from the methodological point of view and from the point of view of an individual involved in daily reality, the emphasis is placed on its understanding. The answer to the question of possible access to daily reality is based on the assumption that it requires understanding, which is a complex operation of the mind that the researcher performs and that each individual can perform. The understanding of everyday life will be presented from the perspective taken by Clifford Geertz, a contemporary representative of the anthropology of culture.

[1] Originally published: Grażyna Lubowicka, "Rozumieć codzienność – z punktu widzenia antropologii interpretatywnej Clifforda Geertza", [in:] *Codzienność jako wyzwanie edukacyjne*, Vol. 1, ed. M. Humeniuk, I. Paszenda, Instytut Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2017, p. 30–43, https://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/84049 (available: 1.06.2020).

The solutions proposed by him may serve as a methodological basis for understanding of the examined individuals or social groups, as well as for reflection and self-consideration of a particular person. The anthropology of culture takes a very broad view on the meaning of the term *culture*, which can be described as follows: „culture is ontologically defined directly in relation to systems of meaning, which are encoded in symbolic forms and tied together in what he famously called, after Weber, »webs of significance«"[2]. Geertz's anthropology approaches such a broadly understood culture through publicly articulated cultural symbols and at the same time through their manifestation in concrete behaviours, events, actions and statements of individuals, which brings the concept of *culture* closer to other concepts dominating in contemporary thought concentrating on the social world expressed through systems of signs and meanings (or more broadly, also symbols and images). These contemporary orientations assume that social life or culture is expressed only through systems of meanings whose sources in the dependencies of violence, domination, power, and interests can only be presumed, as well as their functioning in the mental life of individuals. Thus, daily reality itself is expressed exclusively through meanings that are common, cultural, and manifested in their use by particular individuals. Daily reality is directly experienced by each individual; it is determined by the course of human life, actions and matters in which the individual is involved, close surroundings, meetings, conversations, and learning. However, daily reality, this course of the individual's life, is simultaneously realized within a wider context – the culture that determines it and influences it, affecting also the understanding of oneself in direct experience. Assuming the of textualisation of culture or the social world, it must be accepted that everyday life can also be understood as a text. The individual understands himself or herself in the face of this text, but the text also permeates the meaning of the culture in which he or she is involved. To understand one's own daily reality means to understand oneself in relation to the meanings of culture that define it, to decipher these meanings, to embrace one's own experience and to reflect critically on oneself.

[2] M. M. Kraidy, P. D. Murphy, "Shifting Geertz. Toward a Theory of Translocalism in Global Communication Studies", *Communication Theory* 2008, No. 18, p. 335.

Geertz's approach, in which he emphasizes understanding as a way of accessing daily reality, is based on a hermeneutical or interpretive paradigm. Geertz himself calls it an *interpretive anthropology* or a semiotic approach to culture. For Geertz, culture is a domain of meanings and symbols. All participants of culture and daily reality, their expressions, behaviours and actions are of such character if they are to be understood by others, if they are to be significant acts. Therefore, the problem of understanding as access to daily reality combines two approaches: semiotics and hermeneutics. Geertz, however, does not derive from any of these approaches; what connects him to semiotics is the assumption of ambiguity of meanings (conventionality of signs) and the trichotomic theory of sign, the basis of which he finds in the works of pragmatist Charles Sanders Peirce, who emphasizes that the meaning of sign lies in its being interpreted and understood in its particular use. What connects him with hermeneutics is that the process of cognition is reduced to understanding, i.e. interpretation of signs, or – more precisely – interpretation of meanings of signs. Contemporary hermeneutics, to which Geertz refers, is the thought of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, from whom the author of *Local Knowledge* takes over the model of the text as an intermediary of any interpretation, conceptualizing culture as a text. Geertz mentions the genealogy of his interpretive anthropology in the interview from 2008:

> It starts with [Friedrich Ernst Daniel] Schleiermacher and so on, and then it continues on with [Hans-Georg] Gadamer and people of this sort, which rests on biblical criticism but is secularized. And I, at least, have learned a great deal from that tradition, but it's not mine. I mean I do not come out of that tradition. I mean I come out of a different kind of tradition that is Anglo, which is the study of meaning by [Charles S.] Pierce [...][3].

Geertz's interpretive anthropology was a kind of critical response to positivism and structuralism in the ethnography of the 1960s and 1970s, but since its solutions originated in the late 1960s and 1970s, they are

[3] N. Panourgiá, P. Kawouras, "Interview with Clifford Geertz", [in:] *Ethnographica Moralia. Experiments in Interpretative Anthropology*, ed. N. Panourgiá, G. Marcus, New York 2008, p. 18.

one of the earliest concepts of semiotic and interpretive culture – a concept parallel to the ideas introduced by Jacques Derrida, such as *multiplicity of meaning, signifying, difference and textualization*[4].

The aim of the text is to present daily reality as a manifestation of culture or a symbolic sphere and a method of access to daily reality by means of understanding and interpreting signs. The hermeneutical approach to understanding proposed by Geertz will be presented against the background of profound changes in the linguistics of the 20th century made by several successive "linguistic turns", which resulted in a redefinition of the concepts of *sign* and *symbol*.

LINGUISTIC TURNS – TOWARDS THE MULTIPLICITY OF MEANINGS

The term *language turn* or *linguistic turn* in the humanities and social sciences was coined by Richard Rorty, who in 1967 at the "Rhethoric of Human Sciences" symposium in Iowa City, USA, stated that the linguistic and constructivist breakthrough since the 1960s puts language as a discourse and a sign and its meaning at the centre of cultural and social reflection. The sign loses at the same time the adequate relationship between the self and its thought or image, and between the thing and its representation; the meaning becomes ambiguous and therefore, requires interpretation or becomes merely an interpretation. In this linguistic breakthrough, according to Rorty, there are three consecutive turns: linguistic, interpretive and rhetorical. As a consequence of these turns, language/discourse, i.e. systems of

[4] "At Chicago, where I had by then begun to teach and agitate, a more general movement, stumbling and far from unified [...]. Some, both there and elsewhere, called this development, at once theoretical and methodological, »symbolic anthropology«. But I, regarding the whole thing as an essentially hermeneutic enterprise [...] In any case, »symbolic« or »interpretive« (some even preferred »semiotic«), a budget of terms [...] around which a revised conception of what I, at least, still called »culture« could be built: »thick descriptio«, »model-of/ model-for«, »sign system«, »epistemé«, »ethos«, »paradigm«, »criteria," "horizon«, »frame«, »world«, »language games«, »interpretant«, »sinnzusamenhang«, »trope«, »sjuzet«, »experience-near«, »illocutionary«, »discursive formation« [...]" C. Geertz, "Passage and Accident. A Life of Learning", [in:] C. Geertz, *Available Light. Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics*, Princeton, New Jersey 2000, p. 17.

signs, meanings and symbols, is accepted by humanities and social sciences as a fundamental way of understanding social and cultural reality. Therefore, daily reality, as a reality in which we are immersed, is a result of the use of language and a linguistic product which we ourselves use, copying, transforming, and exploiting it.

Linguistic turn marks its beginning with the book published in 1967 and edited by Rorty *The Linguistic Turn*[5]. This turn emphasizes the fundamental role of language, discourse, text of communication (and their meanings) as an active factor of creation and understanding of reality, especially the social world. The second of the turns described by Rorty is an interpretive phrase which is realized mainly by contemporary representatives of hermeneutics (the already mentioned Gadamer and Ricoeur as well as Stanley Fish, Charles Taylor and Geertz himself)[6]. It introduces a central role of understanding as an interpretation mediated by text. Another linguistic turn has been described by Rorty as rhetorical (rhetorical constructivism). Its authors draw attention not only to the fact that all knowledge is a construct of language, because access to the world or our experience is possible only thanks to discursive forms of knowledge and representation, but also emphasize the functioning of rhetorical mechanisms in discourses, i.e. the role of tropes, rhetorical figures and argumentative techniques. This rhetorical turn is combined with the thought of Derrida, who in his work *Margins of Philosophy* introduces the problem of metaphorical nature of philosophical concepts[7]. A characteristic figure of this turn is also Paul de Man[8], whereas on the historical ground it will be Hayden White[9] and Frank Ankersmit, in anthropology this turn is identified with a literary turn, whose co-author was, next to Geertz,

[5] See *The Linguisic Turn. Essay in Philosophical Method*, ed. R. Rorty, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1967. In this book Rorty presents the reflections of the founders of language philosophy, mainly from the circle of analytical philosophy (Rudolf Carnap), but also its critics (Willard Van Orman Quine) and philosophers going beyond this analytical paradigm (Max Black, Jerrold Katz).

[6] This turn was also described by Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan in the book *Interpretive Social Science. A Reader* (ed. P. Rabinow, W. M. Sullivan, Berkeley 1979).

[7] See J. Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, Chicago 1982.

[8] See P. de Man, *Aesthetic Ideology*, ed. A. Warminski, Minneapolis 1996.

[9] See H. White, *Poetyka pisarstwa historycznego*, ed. A. Domańska, M. Wilczyński, Kraków 2000.

James Clifford[10]. The rhetorical phrase is a development of a methodological perspective oriented towards the interpretation of society and culture, in which mechanisms and tools of rhetoric play a significant role. The process of understanding is therefore mainly of a tropological nature, and the interpretation captures and takes into account the conventions of rhetoric. The symbolic space itself is structured not only as a text or sign system, but also in a rhetorical way. Thus, discourses in the symbolic space contain rhetorical tricks, techniques of argumentation and persuasion, as well as its figurative dimension, it also emphasizes the importance of symbols, metaphors and other rhetorical tropes[11].

Among the linguistic turns determining the way of thinking of contemporary humanities and social sciences, attention will continue to be focused on the interpretive turn, in which the meaning of a sign depends on its interpretation, complementing each other in understanding. Contemporary hermeneutics is constituted on the basis of this solution, and Geertz's thought defining itself as interpretive anthropology is also based on it. It refers to the hermeneutical paradigm modified and adapted to the methodological assumptions of cultural anthropology. The meaning resulting from the interpretation and being completed in the understanding can be considered as the basis for understanding the daily reality.

FROM SIGN TO UNDERSTANDING

A sign, in the most general way, is a visible representation, a representation of an absent thing, i.e. a thought, an intention or a thing, replacing it. In its most visible dimension, a sign most often has a linguistic character, but in its contemporary approaches it can also include

[10] Rhetorical turn in anthropology and then in social sciences was presented in the book whose co-editor was James Clifford (see *Writing Culture. The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography*, ed. J. Clifford, G. E. Marcus, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1986). This turn is more broadly described in the work by Wojciech Kruszelnicki *Zwrot refleksyjny w antropologii kulturowej* (Wrocław 2012).

[11] Linguistic turn which occurred during three consecutive language turns was described by Michał Mokrzan in his work "Clifford Geertz i retoryka" (in: *Geertz. Dziedzictwo, interpretacje, dylematy*, ed. A. A. Szafrański, Lublin 2012, pp. 101–119).

a symbol, an image, any figurative expression, as well as a gesture, behaviour, action (a verbal or visual sign and a gesture). In a narrower, linguistic sense, a sign takes the form of a concept. The relations between the representation and the thing represented by the sign are defined differently depending on the type of semiology adopted. Most often it is the relation between the form and the meaning or between the signifying and the signified.

Ferdinand de Saussure's semiology introduces a dichotomic concept of a sign, the relation between the signifying (material image or material side of a sign) and the signified, which is a concept or idea associated with a sign[12]. In de Saussure's approach, the relationship between the signifying and the signified is arbitrary; this thesis is then used and developed by structuralism, poststructuralism, as well as Derrida's philosophy and its followers. Peirce's semiology, on the other hand, develops a trichotomic concept of sign, closer to the contemporary trends of hermeneutics and to Geertz himself. According to Peirce's pragmatic approach to the sign, interpretability, i.e. its interpretation, becomes a condition of the signality, i.e. the significance of the sign (the sign applies to a specific referee). Peirce's semiotics breaks down the sign into three elements: the representation (the sign appears in our perception), the interpretant and the object. In this terminology, a sign always refers to an object related to it. Peirce, however, insists on the interpretive mediation necessary to link the sign to the object to which it refers. In other words, the interpretability of a sign, its interpretation, its being interpreted, its being interpreted, is linked to a specific use of the sign[13]. The meaning of the sign is complemented by a process of specific interpretation, which requires the involvement of the subject and reference to the functioning symbolic space. This idea is taken up by Geertz, who argues that meaning is articulated by public, accessible cultural symbols and manifested in particular events. This process of specific and contextual interpretation leads to understanding the meaning of a sign.

[12] See F. de Saussure, *Course in General Linguistics*, ed. Ch. Bally, A. Sechehaye, A. Riedlinger, New York 1959.

[13] Peirce's understanding of sign was explained by Hanna Buczyńska-Garewicz in the work "Pragmatyzm Peirce'a, Rorty'ego i Putnama" (in: *Filozofia amerykańska dziś*, ed. T. Komendziński, A. Szahaj, Toruń 1999).

Hermeneutics takes the mental operation of understanding that results from interpretation as its basic method. After many transformations of this broad discipline of knowledge, Wilhelm Dilthey emphasized understanding (*Verstehen*) as a cognitive method of the humanities and the process of assimilation of meaning proper for every human being. The hermeneutical paradigm emphasizes the active involvement in the interpretation of signs (for example, cultural signs) of a particular subject with its presuppositions and its own cultural context. Understanding, therefore, is not entirely arbitrary on the part of the subject, since he understands himself and the meanings, already in the experience of what surpasses and embraces him and what remains opaque; the subject experiences himself as already immersed in the social world of signs and culture, and therefore, his understanding is as much a perception of meaning as its production. Martin Heidegger described this ontological situation of a subject immersed in the "world" as an experience of "being-in-the-world"[14]. From the perspective of Heidegger's hermeneutics, as well as that of Ricoeur or Gadamer, one must anticipate the semantic richness of meaning in the process of interpretation, i.e. one must enter the "hermeneutical circle" in which one must already know something about the sought-after sense of a given representation (and about oneself) in order to be able to start discovering it. It is therefore necessary, in the understanding of the minimum of previous knowledge, to make preliminary assumptions, without which there would be no hidden sense for the subject, waiting for the interpretation in the sign.

Further attention will be paid to Geertz's development of the paradigm of hermeneutical understanding (together with the trichotomic concept of Peirce's sign) and its application in Geertz's interpretive anthropology.

[14] According to Heidegger: "Man is never first and foremost man on the hither side of the world, as a 'subject', whether this is taken as 'I' or 'We'. Nor is he ever simply a mere subject which always simultaneously is related to objects, so that his essence lies in the subject-object relation. Rather, before all this, man in his essence is ek-sistent into the openness of Being, into the open region that lights the »between« within which a 'relation' of subject to object can 'be'" (M. Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism", *Global Religious Vision* 2000, Vol. 1/I, p. 101).

UNDERSTANDING IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF GEERTZ' INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOLOGY

In Geertz's approach, understanding and the process of interpretation is a mediation between the experience of individuals creating their own context of understanding and the meanings functioning in the culture to which they belong. The concept of *culture* has a broad meaning, so the cultural circles to which individuals may belong are very different and overlapping: from the social sphere to local communities, social groups, professional groups, subcultures, places related to leisure time, entertainment, interests, family and the loved ones.

In Geertz's anthropology, culture is perceived as a language. Each culture is a language with different meanings, i.e. a different integrated symbolic system or a signifying system. *Culture* is defined directly in relation to systems of meanings that are encoded in symbolic forms and linked together in a "network of meanings". Cultural meanings are intersubjective and therefore social, public and hence shared, common ways of thinking, feeling and understanding. In this sense, culture and public meanings are a broad context of understanding for all participants. Culture and its systems of symbols thus provide a meaningful framework for people to find their way around the world, to understand other people and to understand themselves. All cultural behaviours are "produced, perceived , and i nterpreted" in relation to meaningful structures[15]. This fabric of meanings enables individuals to act, from articulation, gesture, to conversation and values, because they are shared by all. Meanings also become a component of social activities and practices and are defined by their rules. Social behaviour is symbolic because the participants have to act in a way that is understandable to others. Our way of thinking and ideals are also entangled in culture. According to Geertz's famous metaphor, man is immersed in culture like a spider suspended in a net:

> The concept of culture I espouse [...] is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance

[15] C. Geertz, "Thick Description. Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture", [in:] C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays*, New York 1973, p. 7.

he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. It is explication I am after, construing social expressions [...][16].

However, the mere understanding and realization of this network of meanings takes place only in individual contexts of consciousness. According to Geertz, the meaning of a sign is articulated by publicly available cultural symbols, but manifests itself in specific events, actions and statements. Human activities and human understanding are therefore negotiated between systems of symbols and individual life experiences. An anthropologist, whose task is to describe culture, captures it on the basis of how people themselves understand meanings and comment on experience. Reaching cultural meanings starts with researching how individuals understand themselves (although this is done in the world of public interaction), how they interpret their lives, how they see and understand their world, how they navigate it. It is the comprehension of their understanding. The role of an anthropologist is to search in an individual understanding for units of general meaning constituting a cultural system. However, in order to study daily reality, it is necessary to focus attention on the understanding of individuals, but to take into account broader and different cultural contexts.

For Geertz, the method of accessing culture by understanding themselves the individuals participating in it is a "thick description" that is both an interpretation and a process of translation. Culture, Geertz writes, is: „interworked systems of construable signs [...], culture is not a power, something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly – that is, thickly – described"[17]. The transition to a dense description means for an

[16] Ibidem, p. 5. A similar definition is proposed by Paul Rabinow: "Anthropology is an interpretive science. Its object of study, humanity encountered as Other, is on the same epistemological level as it is. Both the anthropologist and his informants live in a culturally mediated world, caught up in »webs of signification« they themselves have spun. This is the ground of anthropology; there is no privileged position, no absolute perspective [...]" (P. Rabinow, *Reflections on Fieldwork in Marocco*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1977, p. 151).

[17] C. Geertz, "Thick Description. Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture", op. cit., p. 29.

anthropologist belonging to a different culture by way of generalization and at the same time by way of translation and dialogue.

A raw description ("thin description") concerns the behaviour and statements of people; it is a record of their understanding, which they present themselves. The raw description, however, already conceals a description of how people understand each other in the context of culture (and what circles of culture), which then needs to be developed. An anthropologist also needs basic information about culture (e.g. about the meaning of ritual, exchange, values). He creates a description of culture only on the basis of the constructions that the participants in culture (unconsciously) impose on what they experience, the formulas that they use to define what happens to them. Thus, an anthropologist describes the understanding of individuals, also in their everyday life, striving to extract cultural meanings from them. His task is to describe culture on the basis of its understanding by people, so his method is a thick description, a way of generalizing by linking their understanding with the context of culture. In the text "»From the Native's point of View«. On the nature of Anthropological understanding" Geertz explains his approach to understanding the studied subjects, who are not comprehensible to us as strangers, in the following way:

> where are we when we can no longer claim some unique form of psychological closeness, a sort of transcultural identification, with our subject? [...] The trick is not to get yourself into some inner correspondence of spirit with your informants. Preferring, like rest of us, to call their souls their own, they are not going to be alltogether keen about such an effort anyhow. The trick is to figure out what the devil they think they are up to. In one sense, of course, no one knows this better than they do themselves [...]. People use experience-near concepts spontaneously, un-self-consciously, as it were colloquially; they do not, except fleetingly and on occasion, recognize that there are any "concepts" involved at all. That is what experience-near means – that ideas and the realities they inform are naturally and indissolubly bound up together. [...] I have been concerned, among other things, with attempting to determine how the people who live there define themselves as person, what goes into the idea they have [...] of what a self [...]. And in each case, I have tried to get at this most intimate of notions [...] by searching out and analyzing the symbolic forms - words, images, institutions,

behaviors – in terms which, in each place, people actually represented themselves to themselves and to one another[18].

An anthropologist encounters a multitude of conceptual structures which seem strange, irregular, incomprehensible, but which must nevertheless be ordered, connected and generalised. Anthropological research concerns other, foreign cultures, but do we not now assume that every cultural circle, even those encountered in the context of common culture, is a foreign one for every researcher? The researcher does not try to understand the other from his or her point of view, but to put him or her in their own categories. Therefore, Geertz's method of thick description explains the behaviour of individuals through a stratified hierarchy of meaningful structures, rules of understanding that function in the society. Generalising the understanding of individuals, and thus their understanding in the context of their culture, consists in the accumulation of structures of meanings. An anthropologist selects a small event (situation, symbol, ritual, cultural phenomenon) and tries to describe it in the context of all other symbols, social findings, feelings and concepts in relation to which it is relevant. The thick description makes it possible to characterise culture on the basis of key symbols, deeper layers of structures, principles of symbolic systems. An anthropologist has to face a multitude of conceptual structures that overlap and intertwine. In this task, he becomes a code-maker who aims to impose the framework of interpretation on the statements and behaviour of individuals, on their understanding of themselves. Geertz compares the work of an anthropologist, who studies different cultures, to dealing with a foreign manuscript: "Doing ethnography is like trying to read [...] a manuscript-foreign, faded, full of ellipses, incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries [...]"[19]. Interpretation is an attempt to read such an unknown text as Ann Swidler explains: "The culture of a people is an ensemble of texts, themselves ensembles, which the anthropologist strains to read over the shoulders of

[18] C. Geertz, "»From the Native's point of View«. On the nature of Anthropological understanding", [in:] C. Geertz, *Local Knownledge. Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology*, New York 1983, pp. 56, 58.

[19] C. Geertz, "Thick Description. Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture", op. cit., p. 10.

those to whom they properly belong"[20]. A thick description does not lead to establishing abstract cultural regularities, but outlines those regularities within specific cases.

Cultures are languages that must be translated into a language that can be understood by members of other cultures (more precisely, anthropologist's culture). Similarly, someone's experience of daily reality should be translated into the language of the person who wants to understand it. For an anthropologist, every culture, every person is treated as foreign, incomprehensible. Therefore, in the case of a meeting with another person, the generalisation should be at the same time a translation of another culture into one's own language. Translation is a meeting, a dialogue between two cultures or two strangers. An anthropologist does not deal with naked facts, but with interpretations which he then has to interpret from his own position as a culturally situated subject. Therefore, a researcher, when conducting more general interpretations and analyses, must approach this task with extensive knowledge (also in the area of his or her own culture, for example in the area of meanings of power, faith, work, domination, passion, authority, beauty, violence, love and prestige). Cultural translation juxtaposes someone's understanding with our understanding on the basis of our own cultural context; translation is an exchange between different cultural forms. "Translation, observes Geertz, is not some simple transformation of other ways of treating things in the terms we treat them (this is actually how we lose things), but the showing the logic of the ways things are treated in our stylistics"[21]. Translation is also a kind of interpretation, but this interpretation "consists in catching »foreign« views by »our« dictionaries"[22]. The method of thick description is based on engaging in a dialogue with culture and its representatives, in which the meanings are negotiated by both sides; an anthropologist, on the other hand, tries to reconcile the otherness he encounters with his own cultural experience without any claim to a holistic understanding.

20 C. Geertz, "Deep Play. Notes on the Balinese Cockfight", [in] C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, op. cit., p. 452. "[...] societies, like lives, contain their own interpretations. One has only to learn how to gain access to them" (Ibidem, p. 453).

21 C. Geertz, "Thick Description. Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture", op. cit., p. 16.

22 Ibidem.

> We are not, or at least I am not, seeking either to become natives [...], or to mimic them. [...] We are seeking, in the widened sense of the term in which it encompasses very much more than talk, to converse with them [...]"[23].

The aim of the semiotic approach to culture is to gain access to the key to the conceptual world in which the people who are the subjects of our research live, so that we can have a dialogue with them. Therefore, an anthropologist in this dialogue remains both outside the studied culture and inside his own culture. The model of cognition is not the subject – object relationship, but the relation between a subject and another subject, where the subjectivity of the anthropologist is indelible and it is the vehicle of his culture. The thick description leads to generalisation based on a cultural context, common meanings and, at the same time, it must be a dialogue, because the researcher's point of view is never objective and is never deprived of his own cultural heritage.

However, due to the necessary dialogue, the description and construction conducted by an anthropologist is also only his interpretation:

> In short, anthropological writings are themselves interpretations; and second and third order ones to boot. (By definition, only a "native" makes first order ones: it's his culture.) They are, thus, fictions; fictions, in the sense that they are "something made", "something fashioned" [...][24].

All the more so because the interpretation is made in one's own language and, in the case of anthropology, it gains a written form and becomes a written work, literature;

> the line between mode of representation and substantive content is as undrawable in cultural analysis. [...] The ethnographer »inscribes« social discourse [...]. In so doing, he turns it from a passing event, which exists only in its own moment of occurrence, into an account, which exists in its inscriptions and can be reconsulted[25].

23 Ibidem, p. 13.
24 Ibidem, p. 15.
25 Ibidem, p. 16, 19.

But this writing, this *veni*, *vidi*, *vici* of an anthropologist, these three stages of the search for knowledge are no longer possible to be separated, from the very beginning guessing meanings, guesses, their evaluation and conclusions intertwine, together making up an interpretation. Thus, anthropological knowledge cannot be objective and neutral, neither are its research procedures in the conditions of contextual interpretation of cultural texts. Anthropology itself is a cultural practice.

UNDERSTANDING DAILY REALITY

The model of anthropological understanding presented by Geertz is inscribed in the assumptions of this discipline of knowledge whose aim is to study other cultures and treat each culture as a foreign one. However, the researcher also adopts a postmodern attitude towards the object of his observation. Geertz's very concept, created in the 1960s and 1970s, was even an avant-garde of postmodern thought: it assumes relativism, contextuality of human knowledge, language and meaning as the only available dimensions of social life.

Can this model be applied to the everyday life of another person, a social group or oneself? Assuming that every human being is immersed in daily reality in every experience of his or her life and that daily reality is conditioned by the whole culture with all its signs and relations of domination, we can assume that the method and thought of Geertz's interpretive anthropology is applied in its understanding.

To understand the daily reality of another person means to apply the method of interpretive anthropology, thick description, translation, and dialogue to understand his experience of daily reality, whose cultural context and own life history never fully coincides with ours, and thus to be an anthropologist towards the other. To understand one's own experience of daily reality is to accept critical reflection, to apply the process of interpretation to one's own experiences entangled in the web of one's own culture. Experiencing daily reality is particularly characterised by the fact that, as Geertz stresses, the concepts and reality behind them are inextricably linked, and so it is expressed in everyday language. Knowledge about it has the character of common sense, whose properties Geertz mentions in his essay

"Common Sense as a Cultural System" – they include naturality and obviousness, practicality and usefulness, non-methodical character, direct accessibility and "lack of transparency". According to Geertz:

> The world is what the wide-awake, uncomplicated person takes it to be. [...] the really important facts of life lie scattered openly along its surface, not cunningly secreted in its depths[26].

He presents experiencing daily reality as "world as a familiar world"[27]. If we try to understand the experiencing of daily reality as proposed by Geertz i.e. as a cultural system, an integrated order, we try to discover it empirically and formulate it conceptually, then

> one cannot do so by cataloguing its content [...]. One cannot do so, either, by sketching out some logical structure it always takes, for there is none. And one cannot do so by summing up the substantive conclusions it always draws, for there are, too, none of those. One has to proceed instead by the peculiar detour of evocing its generally recognized tone and temper, the untraveled side road that leads through constructing metaphorical predicates – near-notions like "thinness" – to reminde people of what they aleready know[28].

This circuitous way of understanding one's own or foreign daily reality can be a hermeneutical method of interpretive anthropology, a way of understanding selected aspects of daily reality through their interpretation in the context of meanings of one's own or another's culture in dialogue with one's own culture. In both cases, it requires the understanding of the systems of meanings that are hidden in the experience of daily reality and structure it.

[26] C. Geertz, "Common Sense as a Cultural System", [in:] C. Geertz, *Local Knowledge*, op. cit., p. 89.
[27] Ibidem, p. 91.
[28] Ibidem, p. 92.

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Abstract:

The paper investigates the problem of understanding daily reality, which presents a challenge for the humanities, arts and social sciences today. The problem can be considered from two perspectives: first, as a problem relating to the method, interpretation, observation, study of daily reality; and second, as a problem or a question that every individual entangled in and belonging to daily reality can put to themselves, i.e. how to understand oneself in the context of one's own daily reality? The answer to the question about possible access to daily reality is based on the assumption that that access requires understanding which is a complex mental operation performed by a researcher and susceptible of being performed by every individual. The paper discusses understanding of daily reality with reference to the ideas of contemporary cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz. The cultural anthropology solutions Geertz proposed can both provide a methodological basis for conceptualising understanding of individuals or social groups under study, and prove useful in the individual's reflection and deliberation on themselves.

Keywords:

daily reality, culture, symbolic system, understanding, interpretive anthropology, Clifford Geertz

PART II

CRITICALLY ABOUT THE EXPERIENCE OF EVERYDAY EDUCATIONAL REALITY

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BETWEEN ARGUMENTATION AND PERSUASION IN THE PLURALIST AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY: ABOUT VIRTUES AND ABILITIES OF CRITICAL THINKING[1]

The aim of the article is to expose transgressions that challenge education contained in the abilities concerning the way of thinking, both individual and applied in public discourse. The place of this way of thinking, which transgresses and at the same time increases the competence of an individual participating in social decision-making, is a moral situational judgement. How does moral judgement actualize a moment of transgression as a means of reflection which can be described as critical thinking of the individual and which is also a form of public debate? The critical thinking transgression is contingent on the pluralism of goods and interests in society, that is, the situation of moral relativism and conflict of values, which underpin the concept of democracy. In a democratic society, this ability to think critically, which also requires intellectual and moral virtues, is a transgressive

[1] Originally published: Grażyna Lubowicka, "Między argumentacją i przekonaniem w pluralistycznym społeczeństwie demokratycznym: o cnotach i umiejętnościach myślenia krytycznego", [in:] *Transgresje w edukacji*, Vol. 2, ed. I. Paszenda, R. Włodarczyk, Impuls, Kraków 2014, p. 81–96.

attitude that goes beyond adapting to the historical situation. This attitude of transgression makes it possible to increase the potential for pursuing one's own interests in line with one's own vision of a good life and is a prerequisite for the quality of social life, for what constitutes its foundation, i.e. for public debate. While presenting the transgressions contained in the situational moral judgement, I defend the need to seek in it points of support that transcend only political sources and intellectual and moral virtues.

What skills are the basis for a situational moral judgement or, more broadly, critical thinking? The very concept of a situational moral judgement and the virtues and conditions necessary for its formation is based on the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, who introduces judgement as a way of thinking or reflection which combines arguments referring to the universal moral norm and beliefs referring to contextual and historical conditions. I develop the problem of critical thinking as an indispensable ability for each individual and for the decision-making process in the political community (which leads to the resolution of value conflicts in democratic pluralism) on the basis of Ricoeur's thought. In the background, however, there is the philosophy of two supporters of basing social theory on transcendent principles, first of all Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls. In his ethics of debate, Habermas introduces Kantian formalism, where public debate and decision-making are contingent on the assumed moral norm that is the rule of practical discourse. Rawls, too, referring to Immanuel Kant's formalism, introduces a universal principle of justice in a concept of an equitable distribution of goods.

In the debate with Habermas and Rawls, who retain the possibility of basing ethics on transcendent principles, Ricoeur's concept of a situational moral judgement also refers to a universal norm. However, Ricoeur seeks to reconcile two opposing positions: on the one hand, the universal claims contained in the moral norm, which is expressed in the logic of argumentation, and on the other hand, beliefs which, under the name of a convention based on tradition, are rejected by the formalism inherent in the thoughts of both Habermas and Rawls, and himself proposes a dialectic of argumentation and beliefs. Referring to Ricoeur's concepts, I defend a statement that political and moral philosophy, within which the problem of moral judgement can

be formulated, must be founded on transcendent universally binding requirements and, at the same time, that their reference to individual beliefs or contextual positions in culture and society cannot be abandoned. Ricoeur preserves the universalist and contextualist thesis in moral situational judgement, which is a place of practical mediation and at the same time an area of conflict.

How is it possible to reconcile in situational moral judgement the universalistic claims to the rules of morality and the recognition of specific values that are part of the historical communal contexts of the implementation of these rules?

PLURALIST DEMOCRACY AND VALUE CONFLICTS

In Habermas's and Ricoeur's views, the model of democracy is the basis of a social theory, in which the rules of universal morality and the arbitration of situational moral judgement should be included. Democracy is a political system and a form of governance that coexists with the situation of pluralism in society, strengthening and deepening it. Pluralism is closely connected with the theory of democracy, and even, as its theoretician Werner Becker points out:

> Worldview pluralism is desirable because democratic legitimacy is not about a theoretical discussion between philosophical or religious approaches concerning the establishment of the "truth", but only about their function as an ideological and political means to achieve the majority consent to the state guarantee of individual freedoms through their widespread dissemination. As far as public influence is concerned, it would not be desirable to have a discussion between these divergent and contradictory philosophical and ethical assumptions, where attempts were made to discover which assumptions are "true" and which are "false"[2].

Democracy in its procedural model is a pure form of pluralism because of its neutrality towards a multitude of goods and interests, leading to the formation of compromises among them. At the same time,

[2] W. Becker, *Die Freiheit, die wir meinen*, München 1982, p. 155.

however, democracy is a form of political power in which there are no unifying normative criteria, and thus its legitimacy is justified by the force of overriding, majority interests. The problem of a democratic process based on the majority principle, where it takes the form of compromise between particular and diverse interests, lies in its inevitable violence. We cannot, however, as Habermas stresses, remain merely assuming that

> conceive politics primarily as an arena of power processes. Such investigations analyze the political sphere in terms of strategic interactions governed by interests or in terms of systemic functioning[3].

It is precisely because of this violence, which is characteristic of the democratic process that the theorists of the sociology of democracy, from among whom I mainly take into account Habermas's position, see the need to refer these compromises to non-political and transcendent moral norms with universal claims. Democracy, as its early theoretician John Dewey stresses, cannot be

> *merely* a majority rule [...]. The means by which a majority comes to be a majority is the most important thing: antecedent debates, modification of views to meet the opinions of minorities [...]. The essential need is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion[4].

According to Habermas, the model of democracy should be filled with normative content.

Especially in democracy, conflicts are open, but, as Habermas assumes, they can be solved according to the rules of consent adopted by all protagonists. What is needed, therefore, are binding rules that Habermas identifies with procedural reason, and then the norms adopted by all participants in the democratic process exclude making decisions and deciding on the multitude of goods and values on completely arbitrary principles. Conflicts remain in social practice even

[3] J. Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy*, Cambridge 1996, p. 287.

[4] J. Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems*, University Park 2012, p. 154–155.

if political and moral philosophy is based on moral assumptions with universalistic claims, but these should not, as Habermas believes, lead to relativism or moral situationalism.

The situation of pluralism in a society, institutionalized and deepened by democracy, generates social conflict in political practice and conflict in the moral decisions of individuals. A democracy that places emphasis on political discussion takes into account pluralism of opinion as to what public good is and what the objectives of good governance are. Therefore, in conflict situations, democratic procedures may be applied, in which a decision is reached by practical wisdom, or situational moral judgement. In the concept of situational moral judgement, Ricoeur, referring to the thoughts of Habermas and Rawls, takes into account the rivalry of the three conflict centres:

1. the goals of one's own life, seen from a teleological point of view as a pursuit of a vision of one's own good life;
2. conflict resulting from a multitude of obligations generated by the universal standard itself in its application to a specific situation;
3. conflict, especially emphasised by Ricoeur's philosophy, resulting from the need to refer to the recognition of the other as an irreplaceable and individual neighbour, and therefore requiring exceptional treatment and respect.

Therefore, situational moral judgement must prioritise respect for persons, when there is a conflict between the norm and the requirements of otherness, so that the decision may satisfy exceptions and at the same time deviate from the norm in the least possible manner. The three conflict centres: between the objectives of one's own good life, the requirements of otherness, the universal norm in applying the same rule to a specific situation – call for the arbitration of situational moral judgement, which offers insight into the multitude of obligations and goods. The skill of applying the arbitration of moral judgement requires transgression, which stresses the virtue of impartiality and other intellectual and moral virtues that make up critical thinking.

Democracy is an area of debate and discussion because the procedure of democracy institutionalises discourses and negotiations by means of various forms of communication and deliberation. Democratic

theory is part of the process of communication because of the goal of striving for compromise between interests, but also because this compromise is the result of the use of the art of argumentation, in which the rules of reaching agreement shape opinions. Therefore, Habermas combines the theory of democracy and the theory of communicative action, proposing a discursive concept of democracy, in which decisions are made as a result of procedures embodying the rules of ethics of discussion. These rules are identified by Habermas with the procedural reason realized by public debate as the specific skills of understanding and realizing "horizon for speech situations and the source of interpretations, while it in turn reproduces itself only through ongoing communicative actions"[5]. In democratic debating procedures, moral judgement is the equivalent of prudent deliberation, in which the norms adopted by all, in spite of the multitude of goods and values, exclude the possibility of making decisions and judgements on completely arbitrary terms. The rules of the game for elections and competition between partners who reach an agreement are intersubjective and transcendent. However, how do we solve conflict during the conditions of implementing universal norms? How to move from a transcendent to a contextual plane? For Ricoeur, the method of this transition is moral judgement, an expression of the ability to think critically, which facilitates evaluation and judgement in historical and cultural conditions.

The potential of basing debate in democracy on universal moral norms is addressed by Habermas and Rawls. Ricoeur, in turn, referring to the two philosophers, seeks a way for developing moral judgement, where the universalism of the norm does not oppose contextualism but finds its application there. Habermas and Rawls assume the transcendence of moral norms and differentiate them from practical political reality. Ricoeur seeks to preserve both the universalist and the contextualist thesis in moral situational judgement, opposing pure morality and formalism that is characteristic of the neo-Kantian tradition, and seeking a solution to the problem of the actual application of the universal norm in its conflict with the recognition of otherness and the objectives of one's own good life or community goods.

[5] J. Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, op. cit., p. 22.

TO UNDERSTAND THE UNIVERSAL APPLICABILITY OF THE NORM

How can we reconcile critical thinking with the reference to the universal moral norm, as emphasized by Habermas and Rawls and, on the other hand, how can we apply its universalist claims to contextual limitations? The ethics of Habermas's discourse expresses the decisions taken in relation to the universality requirement, in which procedural reason is the transcendent basis for the actual practice of reaching an agreement. At the same time, the very procedures for reaching consent or making decisions in democratic conditions embody universal moral awareness. On the one hand, communicative reason is therefore embodied in social reality, where it is expressed through the medium of language and within it in the argumentation procedures, and then the debate is based on transcendent claims to validity. Habermas stresses:

> We use the term *argumentation* for that type of speech in which participants thematize contested validity claims and attempt to vindicate or criticize them through arguments. An *argument* contains reasons or grounds that are connected in a systematic way with the *validity claim* of a problematic expression[6].

The historical and contextual conditions for the implementation of debate are grounded in reason and the principles of universalization are pragmatic assumptions of its argumentation. On the other hand, the requirement of the norm is inscribed in the logic of practical discussion, which is the place where real decisions are made from amongst the multitude of goods and objectives. The medium of language incarnates and makes possible communication reason as a linguistic communication *telos*. In this medium of language, Kantian practical reason is replaced by communicative reason, which cannot, however, be attributed to a single subject. The universal norm functions as a rule of universalization, which is accepted by all participants of the discussion and enables mutual understanding through argumentation. The requirement of universalization resembles the

6 J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, Vol. 1, Boston 1984, p. 18.

Kantian principle of testing actual practice; for Habermas it is a strategy of purifying principles, which allows the moral norm to retain a certain power over the practical reality. Rawls places the universal standard as the rule in the distribution and division system. However, if Rawls accepts the hypothesis of the original situation, Habermas brings out the historical conditions for the realisation of the practical discussion, established in reason, the principles of the rule, which become pragmatic assumptions of argumentation. This situation explains how intersubjective recognition goes beyond the standards adopted by a community governed by a social convention. Transcendent reason governs the discussion, transforming it into an open and consensus-oriented process of interpretation. Thus, the conflict of everyday life itself gives rise to normative expectations within the logic of practical discussion.

Therefore, "In what sense could something like communicative reason be embodied in social facts?"[7]. Naturally, as emphasizes Habermas, communicative rationality "it is not a subjective capacity that would tell actors what they *ought* to do"[8], however, it must be accepted and recognised by all concerned. The Kantian principle of argumentation is tacitly established and present in the assumptions of argumentation, constituting its *telos*, through which it seeks the consensus of all, thanks to the autonomy of the judgement of each of its participants. Expectations of consensus are therefore accepted by all interested parties in the practical discussion.

> Communicative reason thus makes an orientation to validity claims possible, but it does not itself supply any substantive orientation for managing practical tasks - it is neither informative nor immediately practical[9].

The acceptance by every participant of its principles is an individual moral effort. Each participant assumes in his autonomous judgement that a communication activity is an activity aimed at understanding. Transcendent reason is expressed as the rationally motivated consent of the entire community of interpreters. The rule of action therefore provides only a counterfactual basis for the practice of reaching

7 J. Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, op. cit., p. 9–10.
8 Ibidem, p. 4.
9 Ibidem, p. 5.

agreement, which, however, can transcend itself. Habermas marks this moment of transgression that is characteristic of the incarnation in the debate and argumentation of the universal norm:

> As we engage in communicative action, the lifeworld embraces us as an unmediated certainty, out of whose immediate proximity we live and speak. This all-penetrating, yet latent and unnoticed presence of the background of communicative action can be described as a more intense yet deficient form of knowledge and ability[10].

However, communication practice alone cannot meet its idealistic assumptions; communication assumptions are to be met only roughly, but in fact all participants have to accept them every time. Therefore, reason itself and the norm itself do not directly motivate and do not direct will as much as Kantian practical reason but are characterized only by the "weak force of rational motivation"[11]. Everyone individually focuses his actions on claims of validity in his use of language, so that his reflection takes the form of judgement. In a situation of pluralism, the participants of public life act in order to achieve success or further their own interests and assess the components of the situation only in the light of their own preferences, however

> actors oriented toward reaching understanding rely on a jointly negotiated understanding of the situation and interpret the relevant facts in the light of intersubjectively recognized validity claims[12].

The effect of this communicatively achieved consensus, which results from the intersubjective recognition of universal claims, is to take a stand, adopt both "yes" and "no" in judgement. The procedure is equivalent to the method of reflexive equilibrium, which is also appropriate for moral judgement. Habermas wrote:

[10] Ibidem, p. 22.

[11] Ibidem, p. 5.

[12] Ibidem, p. 27. Habermas stresses that, in a situation of pluralism, "conceive politics primarily as an arena of power processes. Such investigations analyze the political sphere in terms of strategic interactions governed by interests or in terms of systemic functioning" (Ibidem, p. 287).

> A judgment can be objective if it is undertaken on the basis of a *transsubjective* validity claim that has the same meaning for observers and nonparticipants as it has for the acting subject himself[13].

Habermas expresses his "suspicions against any kind of confounding of reason and reality"[14]. Reason is general and public as well as transcendent with respect to individual consciousness, a transcendent condition of the practice of argumentation. Taking a procedural form, it regulates the understanding of the practice of argumentation, but at the same time transcends the boundaries of social space and historical time. Ricoeur in the theory of situational moral judgement also assumes that a moral norm is a necessary reference but should be mediated by practical action. The French philosopher does not agree with the assumption of pure and formal procedures; moral judgement comes from the dialectic of universalism and contextualism, and thus conviction, i.e. convention or tradition, plays a fundamental role in it. If Habermas adopts the strategy of argumentation as universalisation by purifying maxims, he turns against beliefs and everything that can be placed under the banner of convention. According to Habermas, the strategy of argumentation should avoid contextual mediation, and its discipline and the very requirement of argumentation require a departure from tradition in so far as it is an understanding of the past subject to the principle of authority that cannot be sufficiently justified by its compelling and yet binding character, while "in an ethics of argumentation, convention comes to occupy the place held by inclination in Kant"[15], observes Ricoeur. For Habermas, an element of his debate with Gadamer, authority is anti-argumentative, and so tradition and convention should be outside the scope of a debate.

Ricoeur proposes

> a reformulation of the ethics of argumentation that will allow it to integrate the objections of contextualism, while allowing the latter, at the

[13] J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, op. cit., p. 9.
[14] J. Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms*, op. cit., p. 9.
[15] P. Ricoeur, *Oneself as Another*, Chicago and London 1994, p. 287.

> same time, to take seriously the requirement of universalization in order to focus on the conditions for placing this requirement in context[16]

and replaces the contradiction between argumentation and convention "dialectic between *argumentation* and *conviction*, which has no theoretical outcome but only the practical outcome of the arbitration of moral judgment in situation"[17].

Argumentation includes the requirement of universality, and so it seeks to extract the best argument that can be presented to the protagonists of the discussion, but, as Ricoeur reminds us, a discussion is held about something, goods and values are chosen, including one's own aspirations for a good life and the recognition of the other. One cannot therefore completely disregard the specific goods and values that are the content of beliefs. These beliefs contain the historical and communal character of meanings and evaluations, so argumentation and discussion about something, about goods and values cannot, according to Ricoeur, be opposed to tradition and convention. Beliefs, therefore, cannot be completely reduced, since they express positions that give rise to meanings, interpretations, values relating to various goods, right up to the concept of a good life. In this situation:

> argumentation is not simply posited as the antagonist of tradition and convention, but as the critical agency operating *at the heart* of convictions, argumentation assuming the task not of eliminating but of carrying them to the level of "considered convictions," in what Rawls calls a *reflective equilibrium*[18].

Therefore, we discuss goods, meanings, values that cannot be removed, but must be judged and evaluated critically. This is reflected in the balance between the ethics of argumentation and judgement. The reflexive balance of judgement between the requirement of universality and the recognition of contextual limitations to which it is subject is the rate of situational judgement in the area of conflict.

16 Ibidem.
17 Ibidem.
18 Ibidem, p. 288.

VIRTUES AND SKILLS IN MORAL JUDGEMENT

The purpose of situational moral judgement is to achieve a reflexive balance and thus, to invoke Aristotelian *fronesis*, the golden means between the different centres of conflict and more specifically, between the universal norm, respect for otherness and one's own vision of a good life. It was Aristotle who, in his concept of *fronesis*, focused ethics studies on intellectual virtues, the application of which leads to the achievement of this golden means in reflection. The theories of moral judgement refer to Aristotle's practical wisdom, which, as Ricoeur stresses, consists in

> the skill of bringing out an adequate rule, *ortos logos*, in the difficult circumstances of action. The use of the virtue is inseparable from the personal quality of the prudent man – *fronimos* – the sensible man[19].

In Aristotle we see that in moral judgement, justice in relation to a universal norm reveals itself as impartiality, but it is also a transition from a general norm to a norm that is a maxim in given circumstances. Moral judgement is the ability to reflect when decisions are made to reach agreement in a situation of conflict of different goods, by a community and individuals. Particularly important is the ability to understand it against the background of the universal requirement, but to refer it to beliefs and thus to one's own concept of a good life, and to tradition and historical awareness. Beliefs express positions from which arise meanings, interpretations and evaluations, starting from one's own concept of goodness to the collective concept of what good life should be. The task of moral judgement as a critical instance acting in the depths of beliefs is to elevate them to the rank of prudent judgements. However, in order for moral judgement not to decline into situationalism or relativism, it requires special skills, intellectual and moral virtues, which determine its orientation towards the universal norm. These competences, among which Ricoeur distinguishes – following Habermas and Rawls – the virtue of impartiality, make up the ability to think critically, which can be described in more detail as the

[19] P. Ricoeur, *Le juste* 2, Paris 2001, p. 65.

thinking and skills of a judge and a historian. They enable a transgressive attitude towards social reality.

Impartiality itself is an intellectual and moral virtue. Its meaning is addressed by T. Nagel in his book *Equality and Partiality*. Impartiality is the basis for reflection, in which the intentions of a moral norm (truth) or justice are inscribed, inducing us to make a correct judgement and decision. Thus, thanks to the rules of argumentation, moral judgements acquire a characteristic of impartiality. The most important consequence of Nagel's virtue of impartiality, as seen by Ricoeur, Habermas and Rawls, is that it encourages everyone to take the position of the other, a third party, in relation to the positions occupied in public space by social activity protagonists. The virtue of impartiality thus makes it possible to take the position of an impartial witness who, involved in the debate, is, however, oriented towards the moral norm. In the chapter "Two Standpoints" of his *Equality and Partiality*, Nagel defines the general conditions of impartial judgement:

> Most of our experience of the world, and most of our desires, belong to our individual points of view: We see things *from here*, so to speak. But we are also able to think about the world in abstraction from our particular position in it—in abstraction from who we are. It is possible to abstract much more radically than that from the contingencies of the self[20].

> Each of us begins with a set of concerns, desires, and interests of our own, and each of us can recognize that the same is true of others. We can then remove ourselves in thought from our particular position in the world and think simply of all those people, without singling out as I the one we happen to be[21].

Thus, impartiality can be defined as the acceptance of an impersonal point of view or that of an uninvolved observer. Nagel reinforces this necessary assumption by writing: "we should [...] living, in effect, as if we were under the direction of an impartial benevolent spectator of the world in which we appear as one among billions"[22].

20 T. Nagel, *Equality and Partiality*, New York, Oxford 1991, p. 10.
21 Ibidem.
22 Ibidem, p. 13.

The most important intention from an impersonal point of view is to consider every person and every point of view as equally important. This understanding of impartiality is the basis of the rule of universality because it implies the ability to change one's point of view, to rise beyond one's own individual point of view to a higher point of view that allows us to accept and understand the perspective of the other and to admit that it is as important as our own.

> [Impartiality – G. L.] can be termed an instance of intellectual virtue. – as Ricoeur points out – The epistemic aspect has to do with the internal split in viewpoint, the moral aspect with the implicit assertion of the equal value and dignity of viewpoints, once the other viewpoint is seen to be the viewpoint of the other[23]

– which makes it possible to achieve transparency of a situation and avoid relativism and domination of one's own interests. This virtue of impartiality is decisive in a situation in which many political ideals are judged, conflict of moral norms, a clash between respect for the norm and respect for individuals, because it is possible to avoid arbitrariness of situational judgement. According to Ricoeur:

> The wisdom of judgment lies in working out unsustainable compromises that are less about separating good and evil or white and black, and more about what is grey and grey, or - in greatly tragic cases - lesser and greater evil[24].

The intellectual virtue of impartiality, indispensable for the participant of public life, i.e. the citizen, is accounted for by Ricoeur in the chapter "The Historian and the Judge" of the book *Memory, History, Forgetting*. "In what way and to what extent do the historian and the judge satisfy this rule of impartiality inscribed in their respective professional deontologies?"[25] Both the functions of a judge and a historian require the realization of this virtue because of their claim to the role of an impartial, uninvolved witness, whose reflection is thus guided by

[23] P. Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, Chicago and London 2004, p. 315.
[24] P. Ricoeur, *Le juste*, Paris 1995, p. 220.
[25] P. Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, op. cit., s. 315.

the universal claims of the moral norm. The role of a judge and a historian encompasses the intentions of truth and justice, which encourage the adoption of the principle of impartiality. Ricoeur points out that

> The polarity between judicial judgment and historical judgment forms one of these remarkable dialectics, while, at the same time, remaining an external limitation on history: the vow of impartiality common to both forms of judgment is subjected in its actual exercise to opposite constraints[26].

The judgement of a judge, like that of a historian, is based on the weighing of many points of view, uncertain testimonies, opposing interests, rights and goods, a whole network involving many actors. At the intersection of all these ambiguous and uncertain interpretations, there is a verdict, a decision taken within the rule of law in a specific situation. The basis of the task of both the judge and the historian is justice in conditions of uncertainty and error, which, however, are eliminated by the judge and the judgement, creating a breach. With respect to the judge who is to issue a decision, emphasis is on individual responsibility. The principle of justice forces the judge to take the position of an uncommitted witness. The judge draws conclusions and makes decisions where the word justice terminates the debate, stops the dispute and makes the decision final. The judge does not take on the role of a historian who analyses facts and multiplies points of view but stops within the limits of his competence; nor does he broaden his analysis or add his own moral commitment to it.

Why is the principle of impartiality confirmed by two protagonists as different as the judge and the historian? Because, according to Ricoeur, moral judgement includes the virtue of impartiality inherent in a judge and historian, but it is in the role of a historian that its contextual mediation is evident. The desire for impartiality is characteristic of both forms of judgement, but only the historian takes account of contextual limitations. The historian moves in the area of analysis and evaluation of events that are unique and individual, thus limiting his knowledge. The judgement of a historian, guided by the desire for impartiality, therefore takes into account the fact that the historian

[26] Ibidem, p. 295.

cannot take a completely impartial stance on account of his belonging to a community and its historical consciousness. Although the historian's judgement takes into account the pursuit of truth, in its interpretation of the multitude of events he does not adopt an impartial point of view and always remains a committed witness, subjectively interested in producing historical objectivity. The requirement of impartiality in the case of a historian should therefore "impartiality must thus be considered in light of the impossibility of an absolute third party"[27], which points to other competences indispensable for anyone making a judgement. The historian does not issue a final verdict, the price of which is the recognition of the judgement's uncertainty, involvement and bias. This judgement can be criticized by the community of historians and society and is subject to a process of endless revision; writing, interpreting history becomes its rewriting, and the historian's court remains provisional, entering into an endless dispute. Historians cannot write a single story; they can only seek a partial consensus in partial stories, the boundaries of which, unlike judges, they can and must cross. This involvement in the debate and dispute, which is necessary for a historian, allows him to deepen his moral involvement, which is the basis for a multitude of interpretations of beliefs and traditions. This interpretation of tradition or historical experience depends on the moral position taken by the historian, combining the understanding of the past with his specific intention of expectation.

Moral judgement therefore pursues the virtues inherent in both the attitude of a judge and a historian, and thus undertakes a dialectic of impartiality and commitment resulting from the lack of an unambiguous point of view of the position of an impartial observer. This dialectic of the attitude of a judge and a historian is characteristic of a citizen who as an impartial witness emerges

> in the order of time: with a gaze that is structured on the basis of personal experience [...]. On the other hand, the intervention of citizens is never completed, placing them more on the side of the historian. But the citizen is in search of an assured judgment, intended to be as definitive

[27] Ibidem, p. 314.

as that of the judge. In every respect, the citizen remains the ultimate arbiter[28].

In a pluralistic democratic society, the citizen combines skills and competences, as Ricoeur puts it, referring to the thoughts of Habermas, of the judge and the historian. These skills, especially the virtue of impartiality (which is the basis for reflection on universal moral norms), as well as the ability to balance one's own life's goals, respect for others, and the multitude of duties resulting from the application of the practical norm itself, constitute the basis for the formation of moral judgement. Situational moral judgement is the basis for critical thinking which, as Ricoeur shows, shapes the transgressive attitudes of individuals and opens up a transgressive dimension in social life, preventing citizens from being passive and simply adapting to the existing conditions of a given historical moment. Critical thinking specific to individual citizens, participants in public debate, is not only aimed at achieving consensus based on intersubjectively shared principles, but also requires a moral commitment. Thus, the transgression of critical thinking is based on the ability of citizens to develop their own beliefs and moral positions and to derive from them a multiplicity of interpretations of social space. However, as can be seen from Ricoeur's desire to seek links in the moral judgement between argumentation and conviction, critical thinking is at the same time an instance that judges the beliefs of the individual and of the community, defined as convention or tradition. Critical thinking and intellectual virtue are the basis for transgression at the level of practical decision making, both for individuals and for political communities making choices and seeking consensus in the situation of conflict of goods, senses and values. Critical thinking, however, should be based on tradition, which is then interpreted from the point of view of various moral positions and subordinated to the principle of impartiality and, with it, is directed towards justice and truth. Virtues and skills and the critical thinking ideals of impartiality, justice or truth are only a *telos* of the deliberation of moral judgement, but they mean subjecting one's own convictions and community's beliefs to non-political requirements and restrictions.

[28] Ibidem, p. 333.

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Abstract:

The aim of the paper is to highlight transgressions which present a challenge to education and reside in the skills relating to the way of thinking both of an individual and in use in public discourse. The area of this way of thinking which is decisive of transgression and, at the same time, increases the competence of the individual who takes part in social decision making is moral judgement in situation – also a form of critical thinking – which is here discussed with reference to the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. The ground for transgression which resides in critical thinking is pluralism of goods and interests in society, that is a situation of moral relativism and conflicts of values, which stem from the concept of democracy. Discussing transgressions which pertain to moral judgement in particular situations, I defend the necessity of seeking in the latter, first, points of support going beyond political sources alone – that is beyond universal moral norms making the logic of argumentation – which is the approach proposed by Jürgen Habermas, and, second, intellectual and moral virtues, the most important one being the virtue of impartiality, which occurs in the thought of both Habermas and Ricoeur.

Keywords:

pluralism, democracy, Paul Ricoeur, Jürgen Habermas, moral judgement in situation, critical thinking, argumentation, persuasion, impartiality

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BETWEEN SECULARIZATION AND POST-SECULARISM – ON DISENCHANTMENT OF THE WORLD FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION[1]

INTRODUCTION

Reflection on the source and dynamics of changes taking place in the area of religion and religiosity of modern societies has been present in humanities and social sciences at least since the Enlightenment. For such contemporary disciplines of knowledge as sociology, theology, philosophy, and religious studies, these issues gained particular significance in the first half of the last century. In the wake of totalitarianisms, the 1960s brought the idea of God's death (taken over from Friedrich Nietzsche), also known as radical theology, according to which with the death of the Christian God on the cross was the end of transcendental and eschatological thinking, the end of religion and

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religiousness. Theologians and philosophers representing such a way of thinking (e.g. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Thomas J. J. Altizer) advocated the idea of a "mature" world, grown up and "disenchanted" from religion, affirming the existence of the individual fundamentally left to his own devices. From now on, the place of transcendence was to be taken by the here and now and ethics of secular life.

The demands of radical theology quickly penetrated Western sociology and began to accompany researchers in their reflections on the state and role of religion and religious institutions in the contemporary world. The transformations of the second half of the 20th century in the field of modernisation progress, gradual separation of social institutions from religious ones, the processes of pluralisation and domination of secular values over religious values were perceived as manifestations of the "disenchantment" of the world with the sacred. The secularization approach long dominated the interdisciplinary perspective of research and thinking about the place, role and nature of religion in the contemporary world. Subsequent criticism of individual concepts and theories in this field was connected with questioning the legitimacy of their methodological foundations. The problem concerned mainly so-called *confessional* sociology of religion, and the main accusation levelled at it was excessive concentration on the condition of religion almost exclusively in Christian Western societies which grew on the basis of the Protestant tradition. Nevertheless, the empirical context of many studies in the field of the sociology of religion of the 20th century indicates unquestionable changes in the social status of religion and a clear decrease in the traditionally understood religious involvement in these societies.

Therefore, are the transformations of the socio-cultural world of late modernity, corresponding to the theologians' vision of God's death, the actual end of the spirituality and religiousness of the West, the weariness of the civilisation with the myth of transcendence and the outdated model of thinking about the needs of contemporary man? What conclusions can be drawn from the research on the sociology of religion that deals with diagnosing, analysing and forecasting the present and future of religion in this respect? What knowledge concerning the sources and consequences of these transformations is provided by the research on secularization, carried out continuously

since at least the 1950s? The article reviews the most representative findings for the sociology of religion from the above area, which may serve as an important context for the theory of religion developed at the same time by Erich Fromm. The text moreover refers the conclusions of the review to the question of the legitimacy of diagnosis of the disenchanted world.

SOURCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF SECULARISATION PROCESSES

According to one of the leading sociologists interested in the questions addressed here, Peter L. Berger, the sources and potential of secularisation can be sought in the uniqueness of the Judeochristian tradition, connected with the polarisation of the elements of the sacred and the profane, the principal division between the creator and creation[2]. God is situated here outside cosmos, outside his own creation; he is transcendent, impossible to identify with any natural or human phenomenon. At the same time, the essence of man as an element of creation is his fundamental difference and distinctness not only from God, but also from the rest of his creation. The God of Israel is the God "from outside". This transcendence of God has initiated a history of divine and human actions, different in their deepest essence, largely independent of each other and separate. This idea, which, as Berger emphasizes, was the foreshadowing of secularization, over the centuries underwent many modifications, mainly due to the Catholic version of Christianity, which, initially introducing the idea of incarnation, and with time also the concept of the Holy Trinity, hosts of angels and saints, and Marian devotion, led to the disruption of this original polarization of worlds: heavens came into contact with the earth, and man in various mediations came close to transcendence. Protestant Reformation, through the reduction of sacraments, elimination of holy intermediaries, symbolism and aesthetic expression, again simplified the violated dichotomy of the sacred and the profane. As Berger has it,

[2] See P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion*, New York 1990, p. 113–125.

> The Protestant believer no longer lives in a world ongoingly penetrated by sacred beings and forces. Reality [again – M. H.] is polarized between a radically transcendent divinity and a radically "fallen" humanity that, *ipso facto*, is devoid of sacred qualities. [...] In other words, the radical transcendence of God confronts a universe of radical immanence, of "closedness" to the sacred[3].

Protestantism limited the point of contact between the profane and the sacred to an extremely narrow channel of mediation expressed in the concept of God's undeserved grace towards man (*sola gratia*). The possible interruption of this rather fragile channel was to mark the beginning of the process of separating transcendence from mortality, and thus - the beginning of secularization. As Berger expresses it: "A sky empty of angels becomes instead open to the intervention of the astronomer and eventually the astronaut"[4]. This dichotomous way of religious thinking clearly distinguishes Judeo-Christian tradition from others, for example from archaic traditions (the cosmologies of Mesopotamia and Old Egypt) or Buddhism, making it potentially susceptible to the processes of disenchantment and rationalization of the world. Hence, as the sociologist proves, the processes of secularization concern first of all the societies growing on its grounds.

Another issue common to many secularization theories is religious difference and pluralism[5]. It seems that a reference here to the anthropologic interpretation of the function of religion put forth by Berger[6], one that is classical for the sociology of religion, will help map out the consequences of pluralisation for monotheistic religions.

3 Ibidem, p. 112.

4 Ibidem, p. 113.

5 See Ibidem, p. 135–153; B. R. Wilson, "Conclusion", [in:] *Religion in Secular Society*, London 1966, p. 221–233; R. Stark, W. S. Bainbridge, *A Theory of Religion*, New York 1987, p. 289–293; J. Beckford, *Social Theory and Religion*, Cambridge 2003, p. 73–102; J. T. Richardson, "Prawo. Kontrola społeczna a nowe religie", [in:] *Socjologia religii. Antologia tekstów*, ed. W. Piwowarski, Kraków 2012, p. 294–298; K. Zielińska, *Spory wokół teorii sekularyzacji*, Kraków 2009, p. 113–115.

6 See P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 3–51. I discuss this concept in more detail in the article: M. Humeniuk-Walczak, "On the Validity of Religious Education in the Age of Secularization. Reflections from the Border of Religious Sociology and Religious Pedagogy", [in:] *Atomization or Integration?: Transborder Aspects of Multipedagogy*, ed. J. Pilarska, A. Szerląg, A. Urbanek, Cambridge 2016, p. 253–270.

In this perspective, the functioning of an individual in society is connected with the necessity of equipping him/her with mechanisms of defence against what different authors define as "phantoms of the world of anomy", the source of which are to be the inevitable borderline experiences. Anomy understood in this way must be kept within the safe limits of the established, external, objective order of internalized meanings, called *nomos*. This socially objective "knowledge", which serves to explain, maintain and justify the social order, is defined by these authors as a process of legitimacy. However, in borderline situations, such as severe illness or death, it is not enough for an individual to refer to a familiar *nomos* rooted in everyday life, as old and familiar ways of imparting meaning and interpretation fail. This reveals the need for new, special legitimizing mechanisms – institutions, language, a set of validations, judgments, values, and principles – that would enable these "different kinds of realities" to be integrated with the known realities of everyday life, assigning them only a higher cognitive status and placing these human events in the cosmic system of reference that the authors call cosmos. It is at this point that religions and religious legitimacy "begin". They are

> purports to relate the humanly defined reality to ultimate, universal and sacred reality. The inherently precarious and transitory constructions of human activity are thus given the semblance of ultimate security and permanence. [...] the humanly constructed *nomoi* are given a cosmic status[7].

This "methodology" helps the individual experiencing borderline situations

> to continue to exist in the world of his society—not "as if nothing had happened", which is psychologically difficult in the more extreme marginal situations, but in the "knowledge" that even these events or experiences have a place within a universe that makes sense[8].

7 P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 35.
8 Ibidem, p. 43.

The role of religious legitimacy is therefore to perpetuate credibility structures for situations and experiences that do not fit into the everyday *nomos*, so that the individual can avoid anomy, despair and chaos. Pluralisation processes turned out to be a serious challenge for the concepts of *nomos* and cosmos understood in this way. The Reformation, as sociologists of religion often emphasize, by breaking the unity of Christianity and initiating the process of further religious conquests and divisions, in fact initiated the process of de-monopolisation of dominant religious traditions – belief systems, values and religious institutions, so to speak – local religious legitimizing systems, thus leading to a situation of religious diversity and pluralism. In this way, as shown by James A. Beckford, religion in industrially developed, pluralist modern societies loses or abandons its former function of providing ultimate values and legitimizing the entire social system, as well as integrating individuals into society[9]. These changes brought autonomy to various spheres of social life, which for religious individuals and institutions has both "economic" and "metaphysical" significance.

In the first case, it can be said that the "market" situation thus created[10] has legitimised the status of many different religious organisations and groups, enabling them to function on the basis of similar principles[11]. This situation has become important both for the institutions maintaining the legitimacy systems and for the content of these systems, as Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann illustratively explain:

> it is one thing to rule as a brahmin over the metaphysical problems of a closed and relatively homogenous rural community, which has no choice in this matter, and another to try to sell the legitimacy system to wealthy and intellectually sophisticated clientele from suburban residential districts, to housewives from the Midwest, to city secretaries, etc. [The situation of pluralism - M. H.] introduces new forms of temporal

9 See J. Beckford, *Social Theory and Religion*, op. cit., p. 46.

10 Thomas Luckmann, recapitulating the origin of the term, points to its earlier usage than Berger's: Karl Mannheim originally used it to analyze world views and then Reinhold Niebuhr in his reflections on the sociology of religion (See H. Konblauch, "»Niewidzialna religia« Thomasa Luckmanna, czyli o przemianie religii w religijność", [in:] T. Luckmann, *Niewidzialna religia. Problem religii w nowoczesnym społeczeństwie*, Kraków 2011, p. 55).

11 After K. Zielińska, *Spory wokół teorii sekularyzacji*, op. cit., p. 86.

> influence, probably more capable of modifying religious content than older forms [...]; religion can no longer be imposed, but must be sold. [...] It is almost a priori impossible to sell a commodity to a population of non-coercive consumers without taking into account their wishes concerning a commodity[12].

Pluralism is also important for the individual who gains consumer status in this situation and for the freedom to choose between different legitimacy systems. This situation has an impact on the personality structure of the individual[13]. The demands are clearly growing on both sides: religious institutions must seek new strategies to attract "consumers", shape "messages" accordingly, employ appropriate "personnel", and uniquely "administer" and "manage" their "goal-oriented" activities from now on[14]; in turn, individuals may make autonomous choices and they will have no one else but themselves to blame for them.

On the other hand, from this perspective, the coexistence and legitimization of various religious systems meant that from now on none of them could provide a universal model of sacred cosmos, nor could it be identified with the system of the entire community. As Grace Davie puts it,

> If there is more than one sacred canopy present in society, or more than one claim to ultimate explanations of the human condition, they cannot both (or indeed all) be true. The next question is unavoidable: could it be that there is no ultimate truth at all? [...] [In this way – M. H.] pluralism erodes the plausibility structures generated by monopolistic religious institutions in so far as it offers alternatives[15].

In addition, secularization has forced religious groups to compete in "defining the world" with various non-religious competitors who were backed by "legally tolerated and socially powerful"[16].

12 P. L. Berger, T. Luckmann, "Socjologia religii a socjologia wiedzy", [in:] *Socjologia religii*, op. cit., p. 158. See P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 144–148.

13 See P. L. Berger, T. Luckmann, "Socjologia religii a socjologia wiedzy", op. cit., p. 158.

14 Berger describes in detail the situation of religious institutions (See P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 127–153).

15 G. Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, London 2007, p. 53.

16 P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 137.

Pluralism has deprived the human world of its former permanent frameworks and landmarks. Perhaps it did not so much abolish the borders between nomos and cosmos as made them more flexible, so that their situation could never take place "forever". From now on, local systems legitimizing social imagination, not entitled to make universal and total claims, were to decide where and how to place them and how to delimit them, and how to define and mark the content of both these spaces of meanings. At the same time, the individual and the society have lost the "sacred canopy" but have also gained access to alternative systems of self-understanding and of defining and interpreting the external world, a capital of emancipation and secularization that cannot be overestimated.

Another topic pointed out in the sociology of religion when dealing with the issue of secularization are the processes of rationalisation, disenchanting the world, historically also associated with the Reformation[17]. Berger, as the continuator of Max Weber in this respect, indicates the ramifications of the earlier indicated separation of the profane and the sacred: "that Protestantism divested itself as much as possible from the three most ancient and most powerful concomitants of the sacred – mystery, miracle, and magic"[18]. Robert N. Bellah describes these phenomena in a similar vein: "A great deal of the cosmological baggage of medieval Christianity is dropped as superstition"[19]. The mental and doctrinal austerity of Protestantism, manifested itself in such trends as Calvinism or Methodism, was expressed in an unprecedented, extremely pragmatic and rational interpretation of Christian and non-Christian ideas. This clear change contributed to a specific infection of the social imagination with new rationality, introduced the logic of religious thinking on the verge of science. A gradual transformation of religious beliefs and institutions into non-religious ones was initiated by "disenchantment"

17 See Ibidem, p. 112–113; M. Weber, *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism*, London, New York 2001, p. 123–125; G. Küenzlen, "Max Weber: religia jako odczarowanie świata", [in:] *Filozofia religii. Od Schleiermachera do Eco*, ed. V. Drehsen, W. Gräb, B. Weyel, Kraków 2008, p. 23–24; S. N. Eisenstadt, "The Protestant Ethic Thesis in Analytical and Comparative Context", *Diogenes* 1967, No. 59, p. 25–56; K. Zielińska, *Spory wokół sekularyzacji*, op. cit., p. 115–117.

18 P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 111.

19 R. N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution", *American Sociological Review* 1964, No. 29, p. 369.

with specific knowledge and behaviours, the sources of which were previously seen in the divine power. The growing authority of rational scientific views on the world of nature, cosmogony, disease, education or work, as Beckford describes it, was to result in the marginalization or disappearance of the authority of institutional religions and the attendant way of thinking in these and many other fields of knowledge[20]. Thanks to this, with time it was easier for the scientific explanations of the world to dominate over the religious ones. As a result, religion and religious thinking got to be anthropomorphized - and society could take over their functions - and desacralization: the world, man and nature were subject to free and rational interpretation. The society re-training its "relation" with the supernatural in a new, "disenchanted" way, gradually becomes more and more susceptible to situating itself in space and within the limits of understandable temporality. Religious interpretations are no longer useful; they are being replaced by non-religious interpretations which pave the way for the modern organization of social and institutional life. In this way it is possible to move from a "sacred" society to a "secular" society, a secular society in which all social decisions and actions are based on rational and utilitarian presuppositions[21]. In this way rationalization paves the way for secularization: the loss of legitimacy and meaning of the logic of metaphysical thinking triggers a similar loss by religious institutions, former depositaries and translators of this logic.

The processes of rationalisation as a topic are usually undertaken by sociologists dealing with secularisation along with the question of modernisation[22]. According to Davie, modernisation is a core of secularisation, which he calls after Bryan R. Wilson, a culture and collective *mentalite*[23] of a society subject to the changes discussed here. Two dimensions of this phenomenon seem to be of key importance:

20 See J. Beckford, *Teoria społeczna a religia*, op. cit., p. 48.

21 See K. Zielińska, *Spory wokół sekularyzacji*, op. cit., p. 66.

22 See P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 105–171; J. Beckford, *Teoria społeczna a religia*, op. cit., p. 49–52; T. Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*, New York 1967, p. 28–40; K. Dobbelaere, *Secularization. An Analysis at Three Levels*, Bruxelles 2004, p. 29ff; K. Zielińska, *Spory wokół teorii sekularyzacji*, op. cit., p. 30–42, 120–125.

23 See G. Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, op. cit., p. 54–55.

on the one hand, diversification of social roles and changes in the network of social institutions, and on the other hand, increasing organisation and rationalisation of the latter. An obvious aspect of these processes is the separation of ecclesiastical institutions from other social institutions, which is sometimes referred to as functional differentiation[24]. As a result of the process of social differentiation, religion loses its dominant position and its functions are taken over by other social institutions. Thus, as a result of such processes of social differentiation, the logic of "sacred cosmos" ceases to be an element giving meaning and importance to institutions and organizations of society. Berger describes this mechanism as follows:

> Any particular religious world will present itself to consciousness as reality only to the extent that its appropriate plausibility structure is kept in existence. If the plausibility structure is massive and durable, the religious world maintained thereby will be massively and durably real in consciousness. [...] However, as the plausibility structure is weakened, so will the subjective reality of the religious world in question[25].

On the institutional level, the elimination of God from the world of human activities caused the taking over of earlier functions of religious institutions by secular institutions. This process is evident in the area of education. Church education was gradually replaced by non-religious education, while the content of religious-moral nature – by problems of instrumental-technical nature[26]. The above processes influenced the change of order in the previous world of social phenomena and experiences. Karel Dobbelaere describes this state of affairs as follows:

[24] See A. Kasperek, "Teoria sekularyzacji i jej wrogowie. Próba apologii niepopularnej teorii", *Prace Naukowe Akademii im. Jana Długosza w Częstochowie* 2009, Issue XVIII, Series: Pedagogika, p. 29; J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, Chicago 1994, p. 43–51; K. Dobbelaere, *Secularization*, op. cit., p. 26, 88–93; K. Zielińska, *Spory wokół teorii sekularyzacji*, op. cit., p. 36–39, 82–86.

[25] P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 150.

[26] See K. Dobbelaere, *Secularization*, op. cit., p. 19–21.

> magical and religious *versus* rational and empirical orientations; an overarching sacred cosmos *versus* institutionally specialized ideologies; incalculable magical powers and forces *versus* calculable and controllable actions and situations; traditional values *versus* secular law; moral habits *versus* legal routines; a religious ethic *versus* instrumental technical control; [...] total personal relationships *versus* specialized anonymous roles; face-to-face relationships with known people *versus* social interaction between unknown role players; affective *versus* contractual, formal, and utilitarian relationships; horizontal and vertical bonds *versus* anomie and social class; small workshops and offices *versus* large factories and bureaucracies; the church as a total and official organization *versus* churches as voluntary associations[27].

Thus, secularization fundamentally changes the social order, leads to the reduction and elimination of religious foundations of the functioning and organization of society, which has an impact on the sphere of individual value systems. Usually, as Katarzyna Zielińska notes, the separation of individual social institutions is accompanied by the formation of new, differentiated social roles, which are a response to the new social situation. This in turn entails changes in the axiological sphere in the direction of increasing the functionality of a given role within the institution in which it is realized[28]. The old systems of religious references lose their ability to legitimise many norms and values. The individual no longer experiences them as determining the meaning and the way of giving meaning to his own existence. At best, they can be a partial horizon of reference for the individual, but most often they are replaced by new ones, better suited to the current social context. At this point, one might say, the reflection on the transformation of the world of social experiences of individuals, groups and religious institutions through secularization processes begins.

Relevant empirical studies indicate the phenomenon of indivdualisation of religion[29], its split into the public and private spheres

27 Ibidem, p. 35.

28 See K. Zielińska, *Spory wokół sekularyzacji*, op. cit., p. 122–123.

29 See P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 133ff; K. Dobbelaere, *Secularization*, op. cit., p. 137–155; J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, op. cit., p. 40–55; P. Beyer, *Religion and Globalization*, London and New Delhi 1994, p. 70–96.

as one of the principal consequences of secularisation itself. The loss by a traditional religion of the function of legitimizing the existing reality entails changes not only in the functioning of the entire social system. Importantly, it changes the real significance of religion itself for man and his world of life. As one of the aspects of this phenomenon is described by Bellah in the context of American society,

> In fact, for many churchgoers the obligation of doctrinal orthodoxy sits lightly indeed, and the idea that all creedal statements must receive a personal reinterpretation is widely accepted. [...] but just as surely many [people – M. H.] have developed elaborate and often psuedoscientific rationalizations to bring their faith in its experienced validity into some kind of cognitive harmony with the 20th century world[30].

In practice, this is connected with the growing recognition that although religious institutions may continue to develop the locally valid metaphysical imagination as a horizon of individual references for their members and sympathizers, and may create favourable conditions for their identification with these institutions, the individual must nevertheless come to these "final" solutions independently, assuming full responsibility for himself, his own choices and their consequences. In this context, there is a clear separation between the voice of a religious institution and the individual voices of its followers. Official doctrine can satisfy the need for formal integration of the community, but at the individual level it is treated as a commodity; everyone draws from it as much as it responds to their immediate needs, selectively and for a time only.

The impact of secularization processes and of the attendant processes of rationalization and modernization, causes not only a gradual departure of the individual from the previously binding religious organizations, but also a diminishing share of the supernatural element in its individual universe of meanings. In this context, one hears of the process of secularization of consciousness, the source of which is the discrepancy between social and ecclesiastical (related to the institutional religion) value patterns, and the result is an increasingly

30 R. N. Bellah, "Religious Evolution", op. cit., p. 372.

powerful and compelling experience of the cognitive tension of the individual. As Niklas Luhmann puts it, "religions starts to deal with problems arising from functional differences, which can no longer boil down to transcendental reasons, but themselves refelxively regulate the problem of mastering contingence in the society"[31].

Individualisation of religion triggers its privatisation, as seen by José Casanova: "marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere"[32]. Religion becomes a matter of individual choice or preference and thus loses its universal and binding character; it becomes subjective. Analysing the sociological phenomenon of "religion of choice" as a universally observable phenomenon that is a symptom of the processes of privatization of religion, Paul M. Zuelhner draws attention to the characteristic mechanism of transforming the content of subjective religiousness from a general system of interpretation of the world and ways of life into an interpretation and assistance matrix limited to individual and family aspects of life, helping the individual to overcome crises in life, bringing comfort, hope, self-confidence and thus stabilizing the world of life[33]. This private religion, says Berger, "true" for the individual that accepts it, cannot in the long haul fulfil the "classic" task of religion, i.e. the construction of a shared world where all aspects of social life would have their ultimate meaning, binding for all believers[34]. Now, a religious stance permeates only selected, unique enclaves of social life, clearly separable from secularised sectors of modern society. The values and content of private religiosity do not in principle include the non-private institutional context[35].

The exploitation of space and functions previously reserved by religion by secular institutions triggers a peculiar "liberation" of societies from religion, depriving it of its real influence; the spiritual dimension of existence is separated from the political sphere[36]. At the same time, the previously dominating interpretation of the world is changing. The

31 N. Luhmann, *Funkcja religii*, Kraków 2007, p. 223.

32 J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, op. cit., p. 211.

33 See P. M. Zulehner, "Religia z wyboru jako dominująca forma społeczna", [in:] *Socjologia religii*, op. cit., p. 453.

34 See P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 134.

35 See Ibidem.

36 See C. Taylor, *Varieties of Religion Today. William James Revisited*, Cambridge and London 2002, p. 78.

importance of religious interpretations is diminishing and the supernatural is being replaced by the temporal, on which social attention begins to focus. Émile Durkheim, one of the classics and protagonists of the theory of secularization, wrote about it very eloquently:

> God, who was at first present in all human relations, progressively withdraws from them; he abandons the world to men and their disputes. At least, if he continued to dominate it, it is from on high and at a distance, and the force which he exercises, becoming more general and more indeterminate, leaves more place to the free play of human forces. The individual really feels himself less *acted upon*; he becomes more a source of spontaneous activity. In short, not only does not the domain of religion grow at the same time and in the same measure as temporal life, but it contracts more and more[37].

Thomas Luckmann sees things from the same angle and indicates the process of a gradual loss of the "interpretation monopoly" by the Church, which

> becomes one of the multiple institutions, and its interpretation of reality is not privileged. Earthly systems of the interpretation of meaning, of political, economic or "scientific" provenance, increasingly take over its place. [...] Under these circumstances no binding vision of the world can be transmitted[38].

As a result, the individual gains a sense of a greater freedom in the reading of the world and awareness of own life, which can be interpreted outside the religious topic and methodology. The new perspectives of self-understanding and understanding the world are characterized by a narrower scope and a low or completely negligible level of "transcendence". The ability of religions to build the world comes down to constructing sub-worlds, fragments of the universe of meanings, whose meaning can be divided in a very narrow circle, for example, only by members of one family. Religion based on this type

[37] E. Durkheim, *On the Division of Labour in Society*, Illinois 1960, p. 169.

[38] H. Konblauch, "»Niewidzialna religia« Thomasa Luckmanna, czyli o przemianie religii w religijność", op. cit., p. 52.

of credibility structure is, according to the above author, by necessity, a rickety structure[39].

Many theoreticians of secularisation indicate moreover ecumenism as a kind of strategic response to the marginalisation of the role of religion in social life[40]. As has been said earlier, in a situation of equalisation of all religious institutions, none of them has any real advantage over others. Faced with such "egalitarianism" of depreciated statuses, religious institutions face a common need to attract the faithful. This situation, as I mentioned before, is dominated by the logic of market economy – the factor determining the activities of the organization in this area is the orientation "on the result", on acquiring the faithful - consumers. Such orientation rationalizes social and religious structures, recognizes as a common goal the utilisation of previously unused, those who, as never before, have the possibility of free choice. Berger describes this process as the creation of a kind of bureaucracy, a platform for action with a common denominator, a network of bureaucratic structures involved in rational trade relations, both with society in general and between individual institutions. According to the author, the pluralistic situation "tends toward cartelization, tends, toward »ecumenicity« in its social, political and economic dynamics"[41]. The competition of various religious offers is replaced by the collaboration of religions. The potential *faithful-as-consumer* becomes a desirable *client*, and his or her acquisition in such a situation may be tied with the necessity to abandon earlier support of particular tenets of a specific religious tradition and doctrine. We could say that religious *small companies* are replaced by religious *corporations*, ready to modify religious tenets, enter into all kinds of agreements and unions, and even to shift focus from the supernatural towards moral and therapeutic elements to make sure that the client would make a choice beneficial form their point of view.

39 See P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 134.

40 See Ibidem, p. 137–153; H. Desroche, "Religia i rozwój społeczny", [in:] *Socjologia religii*, op. cit., p. 338–340.

41 P. L. Berger, *The Sacred Canopy*, op. cit., p. 144.

TOWARDS POST-SECULARISM – NEW FORMULAS OF RELIGION AND RELIGIOSITY

The sources, consequences and contexts of secularization mentioned above are well represented by classical sociologists of religion, who in their works undertake secularization theories, a formula for describing the transformations of the social world and the condition of institutional religions of the second half of the 20th century, inscribed in the spirit of the idea of "God's death". However, in the works of contemporary sociologists there are also those who show a different dynamic of the process of change in this area than in the discussed theories of secularization. Research by Grace Davie, José Casanova, Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge, Peter Beyer, Steve Bruce, Gilles Keppel and Eillen Barker[42] provide ample evidence that the processes of modernisation, rationalisation and pluralism, although they may undoubtedly influence the change of the function and status of institutional religion, do not justify the thesis of the ultimate irreligiousness of societies, nor do they bring sufficient evidence for the elimination of the spiritual element from the space of individual and social experience. The clear testimonies of these secularization ambiguities include, among others, the phenomena of large-scale conversions leading to the emergence of new religious movements, mass shifts in the presence of Christianity from the northern hemisphere to the southern hemisphere, the emergence of Islam as an important socio-cultural factor or the development of religious fundamentalism in all monotheistic religions.

In the opinion of many researchers, the claim that modernisation and rationalization are closely related to the weakening religiousness of the technologically advanced western world is unfounded. A case in point is the longevity of Protestant evangelical communities in the

[42] See G. Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, op. cit.; J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, op. cit.; D. Hervieu-Léger, *Religion as a Chain of Memory*, New Brunswick, New Jersey 2000; R. Stark, W. S. Bainbridge, *A Theory of Religion*, op. cit.; P. Beyer, *Religion and Globalization*, op. cit.; S. Bruce, *Fundamentalism*, Cambridge 2000; G. Kepel, *The Revange of God. The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World*, Cambridge 1994; E. Barker, *New Religious Movements. A Practical Introduction*, London 1989.

highly advanced United States. The tendency to jump to conclusions from the secularization theory, to turn local regularities into formulas accounting for the entire social world and the transformations taking place in all corners of the globe are also considered illegitimate. Numerous studies prove that Europe should not be treated as a global prototype of such changes[43], because different societies are developing in different directions, even when they are affected by the same forces of economic development. According to Davie, there are two problems here. On the one hand, the process of developing a society from industrial to post-industrial is associated with some typical cultural changes, but on the other hand, the systems emerging at every stage of this evolution are conditioned by the specificity of the local past, they have their roots in Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, or Confucian religions, each of which has its own, characteristic value system[44]. The resulting differences, shaped to a large extent by cultural heritage (or more precisely religious heritage), are visible even after the impact of economic development has been limited. Thus, although economic development may push societies in a similar direction, they are not so much similar to each other as they move long separate, parallel trajectories shaped by their cultural heritage. It is precisely the identification of historical secularization processes with their supposed, predicted consequences for the fate of religions which is, according to Casanova "The main fallacy in the theory of secularization, a fallacy reproduced by apologists and critics [...]"[45]. To illustrate his claim, the author uses the cases of Spain and Poland, in which "public" religion played a special social and political role in certain historical circumstances, in a way contrary to the logic of secularization[46]. The doubts that the forces of modernisation would lead to a homogenous, de-sacralised and a-religious world culture in the foreseeable future can therefore be regarded as quite legitimate[47].

43 See G. Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, op. cit., p. 109.
44 See Ibidem, p. 106.
45 J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, op. cit., p. 19.
46 See Ibidem, p. 75-113.
47 See G. Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, op. cit., p. 106.

In addition, the classic secularisation approach rarely draws attention to the fact that the aforementioned changes in the level of religious involvement may be part of a trend typical of the second half of the 20th century, which involves basically all voluntary organisations, not only traditional religious communities but also political parties or trade unions, to weaken the social involvement of individuals and groups. Late modernity, which does not use holistic ideas, permeates not only religious but also secular thought. This shift from "grand meta-narratives" to "medium-range transcendence" (e.g. political) and, above all, towards an individual-oriented "mini-transcendence"[48], undoubtedly impacts the shift in the position of religion in the structure of cultural significations and functions, but surely does not give ground for its invalidation. Therefore, as Davie observes,

> No longer is it assumed that a secular discourse will gradually overcome a recognizable and unified religious alternative. Instead both secular and religious thinking will evolve as multiple groups of people look for new ways forward, and new creeds (both secular and religious) to live by in the early years of the twenty-first century[49].

Recent research in the sociology of religion speaks of a process of continuous constitution and reconstitution of cultural programs that take into account the changing meaning of religious experiences. Just as cultural expressions of late modernity can be diverse and heterogeneous, so can the forms of religion:

> the essential core of [late – M. H.] modernity resides in its potential for self-correction [...]. Thus religion [...] becomes one resource among many in the process of continual self-appraisal. [...] [Late – M. H.] "modernity is not simply rejected or readopted but critically and creatively reappropriated" by new religious practices in non-Western contexts[50].

48 See D. Hervieu-Léger, *Religion as a Chain of Memory*, op. cit., p. 34.
49 G. Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, op. cit., p. 95.
50 Ibidem, p. 108.

In this way the category of de-secularisation into the sociology of religion[51]; it can be seen as both the state of rejuvenation of traditional religious faith and practice as well as an emergence of new forms of religiosity outside the Church, individualised, and new aspects of spirituality, independent of institutionalised religions. It is in order to briefly mention a few relevant examples[52], of formulas earlier unknown or of limited appeal, without references to the relevant controversy, doubt and debate among the sociologists of religion.

The first such formula is the aforementioned faith without membership, a result of the processes of privatisation of religion[53]. It concerns changes in the area of religious involvement and the individual's relationship with the life of a religious institution and its religious doctrine. In traditional, orthodox forms of religious affiliation, these elements performed control functions, which enabled the beliefs and conduct of the faithful to be strengthened and reproduced. At present, there is talk of voluntary membership on the basis of principles recognised by the individual as one's own. Such membership no longer requires a membership card or proof of identity by practicing exactly the same local doctrine.

The second formula is that of substitute religion[54]. It is expressed in the recognition of religious institutions as an important element of their own cultural and national identity, treating them as representing the national community towards the outside world. These "nominal" faithful recognize the duty to pay taxes to them, to bear the costs of maintaining religious infrastructure, to remunerate religious "professionals", while remaining outside the community, even assuming the status of non-believers and nonpractitioners. In this case, religious institutions enjoy a special treatment of the state and citizens not as a place of fulfilment of the spiritual needs of individuals, but as needs for identification and identity, despite the lack of religious commitment of the faithful at other than the indicated levels. Such a formula is present in the experiences of Scandinavian countries, such as Sweden and Norway.

51 See J. Mariański, "Religie na wolnym rynku", *Znak* 2012, No. 681.

52 See M. Humeniuk-Walczak, "On Validity of Religious Education in the Age of Secularization", op. cit.

53 See G. Davie, *The Sociology of Religion*, op. cit., p. 137–138.

54 See Ibidem, p. 140–141.

Another idea described by sociologists is the trend called "from obligation to consumption"[55], where religious institutions operate according to market mechanisms, and respond with the supply of religious services to the social demand for diverse needs. This formula encompasses both local phenomena of adjusting old doctrines, rituals and practise to social needs, as well as the development of new religious movements, such as New Age. A particular example of this formula of religious involvement are religious fundamentalisms, very complex and widely described in sociology of religion phenomena, here only signalled. In view of progressive secularization, the diminishing interest in traditional spirituality and religiousness, the cultural questioning of great ideas, as well as in relation to the relativization of norms and values, the so-called "universalisation of heresy"[56], emerging on the market of religious "services" is the demand for a return to a world of simplicity and unambiguity, clear visions and old certainties[57]. Fundamentalism, expressive of social fears of the world without fixed reference points seems an efficient escape from the "heresy imperative" of the present day and, as Dominika Motak observes in her text on this question, becomes as widespread as modernisation itself[58]. Kepel accounts for its as follows:

> A new religious discourse was born that no longer called for the need to adapt to secular values, but for the need to extract the sacred foundations of the organization of society, and even, if necessary, for its transformation. In this approach, it was recommended in various ways to go beyond the fallen modernity, to which all failures were attributed as well as entering the cul-de-sac of distancing oneself from God. We no longer talked about the *aggiornamento* but about a "re-evangelisation of Europe", not about the modernization of Islam, but the "Islamization of reality"[59].

[55] See Ibidem, p. 143–148.

[56] See P. L. Berger, "Modernity as the Universalization of Heresy", [in:] P. L. Berger, *The Heretical Imperative. Contemporary Possibilities of Religious Affirmation*, Garden City, New York 1979.

[57] See D. Motak, *Nowoczesność i fundamentalizm. Ruchy antymodernistyczne w chrześcijaństwie*, Kraków 2002, p. 45.

[58] See Ibidem, p. 34.

[59] G. Kepel, *The Revange of God*, op. cit., p. 34.

Contemporary fundamentalism seems to be gaining recognition on a ground similar to that of modern utopias; it is driven by ideas and aspirations for a world filled with meaning, happy and perfect. Such "mechanics" fits well with Weber's type of religious behaviour of "asceticism within the world"[60]. Here the world, spoiled and abandoned by God, is treated as a duty, a task of an ascetic within the world, God's fighter. It is he who is responsible for the mission of transforming the world in accordance with the principles of asceticism and ethical and doctrinal purity. The contemporary ascetic within the world, a fundamentalist, has modernised methods at his disposal: it can use democratic procedures, create political and economic pressure groups, conduct electoral struggle or organize its own education system. He is always against the hated, relativized world of postmodern "anti-values", and in defence of those goals and values which are considered absolute and universal.

POST-SECULARISM AND DE-PRIVATISATION – CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

The reflections show the enormous complexity of the socio-cultural world of the turn of the 21st century. It seems that regardless of institutional transformations in the discussed area, the need to reach for transcendence, experience the sacred, express one's faith and religiousness or its various transformations can still be seen as characteristic of a certain part of secularizing societies. This diagnosis corresponds to Jürgen Habermas's concept of the post-secular society, where the philosopher deems as unjustified or even socially harmful the treatment of secularisation processes as a

> zero-sum game between the capitalistically unbridled productivity of science and technology on the one hand, and the conservative forces of religion and the church on the other hand. Gains on one side can only be achieved at the expense of the other side. [...] This image – convinces the

60 See M. Weber, "Religious Groups (The Sociology of Religion)", [in:] M. Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, ed. G. Roth, C. Wittich, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1978, p. 479, 542–543.

philosopher – is inconsistent with a postsecular society which adapts to the fact that religious communities continue to exist in a context of ongoing secularization[61].

Instead, he calls for the recognition of the idea of so-called common sense[62], a third way between science and religion, symmetrically open to both of them and equally evading the absolutist claims of either.

Habermas considers the temptations of the scientistic logic of secularization, speaking about the absolute necessity of translating religious arguments into the "rational" language of the "disenchanted" public sphere, to be illegitimate and dangerous. This practice is intended to lead to the exclusion and discrimination of this symbolic universe, which is represented by the believing part of society. The philosopher postulates a fundamental symmetry of publicly permitted expressions, both non-religious and religious. Believers are members of the law-making process and participants in political processes just like non-believers. In addition, as he emphasizes,

> Religious traditions have a special power to articulate moral intuitions, especially with regard to vulnerable forms of communal life. In the event of the corresponding political debates, this potential makes religious speech a serious candidate to transporting possible truth contents, which can then be translated from the vocabulary of a particular religious community into a generally accessible language. [...] The truth content of religious contributions can only enter into thein stitutionalized practice of deliberation and decision-making if the necessary translation already occurs in the pre-parliamentarian domain, i.e., in the political public sphere itself. This requirement of translation must be conceived as a cooperative task in which the non-religious citizens must likewise participate, if their religious fellow citizens are not to be encumbered with an asymmetrical burden[63].

61 J. Habermas, "Faith and Knowledge", [in:] *The Frankfurt School on Religion. Key Writings and Major Thinkers*, ed. E. Mendieta, New York and London 2005, p. 329.

62 See Ibidem.

63 J. Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere", *European Journal of Philosophy* 2006, Vol. 14, Issue 1.

At the same time, as he stresses, believers should attempt three acts of reflection, which are essential in this context: to recognise realities other than their own visions ("They succeed to the degree that they self-reflectively relate their religious beliefs to the statements of competing doctrines of salvation in such a way that they do not endanger their own exclusive claim to truth"[64]), adjust to the authority of the social sciences ("They can only succeed if from their religious viewpoint they conceive the relationship of dogmatic and secular beliefs in such a way that the autonomous progress in secular knowledge cannot come to contradict their faith"[65]) and recognise the premises of the constitutional state, based on secular morality ("This can succeed only to the extent that they convincingly connect the egalitarian individualism and universalism of modern law and morality with the premises of their comprehensive doctrines"[66]).

Consequently, as Habermas proves in his concept of the post-secular society, only when all citizens, both believers and non-believers, have equal chances to articulate their beliefs, to hold a dispute, even if only at the expense of acute cognitive dissonance, and to experience all the consequences of worldview pluralism in this way, is it possible to have a genuine training in democracy. Its participants

> learn to deal with this fact of pluralism in a nonviolent way, that is, without disrupting the social cohesion of a political community, they realize what the secular grounds for the separation of religion from politics in a postsecular society actually mean. The neutral state, confronted with competing claims of knowledge and faith, abstains from prejudging political decisions in favor of one side or the other. The pluralized reason of the public of citizens follows a dynamic of secularization only insofar as the latter urges equal distance to be kept, in the outcome, from any strong traditions and comprehensive worldviews. In its willingness to learn, however, democratic common sense remains osmotically open to both sides, science and religion, without relinquishing its independence[67].

64 Ibidem, p. 14.
65 Ibidem.
66 Ibidem.
67 J. Habermas, "Faith and Knowledge", op. cit., p. 330.

Corresponding to the theory of the post-secular society is Casanova's concept of de-privatisation, which provides alternative visions and explanations of the process of the religious transformations of the present day[68]. The sociologist sees this notion as a process of a return of religion to the public scene of societies. Invoking Habermas's model of the public sphere, with its tripartite division into the state, political society and civil society[69], he proposes a similar typology of public religions and

> the conceptualization of a modern form of public religion characterized by the public intervention of religion in the undifferentiated public sphere of civil society. The result [would be – M. H.] a conception of modern public religion which is compatible with liberal freedoms and with modern structural and cultural differentiation[70].

Using the Catholic Church as an example, he argues that religious institutions can gain legitimacy to re-enter the public sphere if they redirect their aspirations and actions from the state to society. When accepting the principles of religious freedom as a universal human right, they will defend the institutionalisation of modern universal laws, the creation of a modern public sphere and the establishment of democratic systems[71]. The sociologist points to examples of such processes, e.g. the active role of the Catholic Church in the democratization processes in Spain, Poland and Brazil in the 20th century.

However, he emphasizes that these signs of modern de-privatisation cannot be absolutized.

> Privatization and deprivatization are, therefore, historical options for religions in the modern world. Some religions will be induced by tradition, principle, and historical circumstances to remain basically private religions of individual salvation. Certain cultural traditions, religious doctrinal

68 See J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, op. cit., p. 211–234.
69 See Ibidem, p. 217. See also: J. Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society*, Cambridge 1991.
70 J. Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World*, op. cit., p. 217.
71 See Ibidem, p. 220.

principles, and historical circumstances, by contrast, will induce other religions to enter, at least occasionally, the public sphere[72].

Such a dynamic of processes of making religion present - in both the public sphere and in the private sphere – becomes a guarantee of the vitality of religion as such. On the one hand, religious institutions, in order to maintain their effectiveness in the public sphere, should communicate in a way that is devoid of partiality, "non-denominational" and in a universalistic language[73], on the other hand, to guarantee their recreation as "private religion of individual salvation" should, "counting on a large reservoir of traditional cultural allegiance among large sectors of the faithful", focus their pastoral tasks and develop "some form of voluntary, denominational, revivalist expression"[74].

In the above aspects, the concept of deprivatisation seems to correspond to Habermas's position. Casanova, as a sociologist of religion, focuses more on specific conditions of retaining the "vitality" of religious institutions by referring to examples of de-privatisation of specific religions in their concrete, historical and cultural context. Taking into account both concepts, as well as the alternative formulas discussed earlier, expressing the religious involvement of individuals and entire societies in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, it is difficult to insist on the classical theory of secularization, which speaks of the inevitable disappearance of religion and religiousness as a result of the processes of modernization. Furthermore, the claims of radical disenchantment of the world seem to be somewhat premature and not fully legitimate. Perhaps God is not dead after all, but only observes from a distance and with considerable curiosity the countless creative discoveries of various human variations on himself...?

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72 Ibidem, p. 221.
73 See Ibidem, p. 223.
74 Ibidem, p. 222–223.

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Abstract:

Since the 1960s, many theories, concepts and approaches have emerged in the sociology of religion, dealing with the subject of the transformations of the place and role of religion in modern Western society. The classic theories of secularization, which initially persisted, linking the processes of rationalization and modernization with the inevitable decline of religion as such, began to be thematised over time, revealing the complexity and opacity of many phenomena and tendencies within the social forms of manifestation of religion and religious involvement. This article reviews the most representative, relevant findings for the sociology of religion, which may serve as a valid context for the theory of religion developed at the same time by Erich Fromm. The conclusions arising from the review are then applied to the question of the validity of the diagnosis of the disenchanted world.

Keywords:

secularization, post-secularism, sociology of religion

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SUCCESS IN EVERYDAY LIFE[1]

Success is an integral part of culture, one of the core social values which are universally binding and oblige us to make concrete efforts. The term can be interpreted in various ways, which makes it extremely capacious and difficult to define unambiguously. It is commonly perceived as synonymous with an accomplishment, with achieving an intended goal. It implies satisfaction, happiness and prosperity, whereas its lack is associated with failure. According to the *Słownik języka polskiego* PWN (PWN *Dictionary of the Polish Language*), success means "a favourable outcome of an endeavour, the achievement of an intended goal", as well as the "gaining of fame, wealth and a high social position"[2]. Many people, not only young ones, have made success the content and meaning of their lives, sacrificing for its attainment some other values, such as family, friends, health, etc.[3].

1 Originally published: Iwona Paszenda, "Sukces w życiu codziennym", [in:] *Sukces jako zjawisko edukacyjne*, Vol. 1, ed. M. Humeniuk, I. Paszenda, W. Żłobicki, Instytut Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2017, p. 25–40, https://repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/84245 (available: 1.06.2020).

2 *Sukces*, [in:] *Słownik języka polskiego* PWN, http://sjp.pwn.pl/sjp/sukces; 2576536 (available: 17.07.2014).

3 See B. Jedlewska, "Pokolenie niewolników sukcesu? O fenomenie sukcesu we współczesnej literaturze i aktualnym wymiarze zjawiska zwanego 'wyścigiem szczurów'", [in:] *Edukacja. Moralność. Sfera publiczna*, ed. J. Rutkowiak, D. Kubinowski, M. Nowak, Lublin 2007, p. 682–683.

A brief definition of success necessitates a broader review of this category in its social and educational aspect. It is therefore worth asking whether and how the way of thinking about success has changed, what categories of thinking about it are dominant and what the implications for education of a specific approach to it are.

In this article I will try to answer the above and other questions. In order to obtain a broader perspective, I will refer to the theoretical assumptions of the course of cultural processes formulated by the American philosopher of education, Theodore Brameld, i.e. to the idea of subjectivity and the concepts of determinism and indeterminism.

THE WAY OF THINKING ABOUT SUCCESS AT THE TIME OF THE BIG SHIFT GENERATION AND IN THE POSTMODERN ERA

Analysis of relevant literature shows that for the Big Shift Generation[4], who entered adult life after 1989, and in the postmodern era, success was not and has not been a stable social construct, since it is contingent on social factors and first of all on the values espoused by a given society. This phenomenon is aptly illustrated by three trends[5]. The first of them reveals that at the time of communism in Poland, success was solely the domain of sports, culture, sometimes science. However, it did not have a market character, and it did not cover business and politics. The freedom and development of the market brought about a change; new categories and activities emerged where it was possible to achieve success. There was rivalry in sales departments, promotion on the rungs of the corporate ladders and success achieved by companies rather than individuals. Currently, there are even more of these areas. People compete against each other in sports and their passions, fulfilment of life's ambitions or family welfare[6]. These conditions often induce mutual competition for more and more consumer goods. The most important factor is satisfaction arising from prestige; a new car,

4 See P. Rabiej, O. Janiak, "Ukąszeni wolnością. Portret Pokolenia Wielkiej Zmiany, Projekt Re-definicje", Thinktank, *Malmen* monthly, 2013, http://www.redefinicje.pl/download/TT16_RE_DEFINICJE.pdf (available: 17.07.2014).

5 Ibidem, p. 31.

6 Ibidem.

fridge or TV set is not only supposed to serve people, but also to make a powerful impression on their neighbours. This is why many people believe that it is not enough to have a car, but it must be better than the one owned by one's neighbour. Similarly, it is not enough to build a house; it should be more impressive than those of others and one should spend their vacation in more attractive places than those their friends visit. You should also have more expensive clothes than your colleagues or friends[7].

The above contributes to the emergence of a phenomenon known as successholism[8]. It occurs when the human being seeks the approval of the environment by all available means. Two categories of people are especially susceptible to it. One is made up mainly of those who try to build up their self-esteem through success. The other consists of people who, through the euphoria given by the acceptance of their environment, become dependent on success, so that their bodies produce large amounts of adrenaline. Adrenaline acts as an inner drug and is addictive. As a result, a successful person is no longer driven by his or her new goals and visions, but by the pursuit of this inner drug. This leads to a paradox: even though the individual has achieved his goals, he does not know what to do as he misses the adrenaline and euphoria that he has delivered himself while striving for success; this leads to self-torment.

Addiction to success very often means addiction to approval and applause[9]. This applause and other people's raptures boost the sense of self-worth, which makes people seek approval merely to be seen. Others, in turn, would go out of their way to rivet others' attention to themselves and be approved by an audience which they recognise as their authority. When those addicted to success lose their audience, they became sarcastic and frustrated, which not infrequently has a negative impact on their loved ones. For example: children of success-addicted parents routinely experience emotional betrayal. An addicted parent prioritises his or her own addiction over the needs of

7 See B. Więckiewicz, "Konsumpcjonizm jako nowy styl życia współczesnego społeczeństwa polskiego", [in:] *Przemiany wartości i stylów życia w ponowoczesności*, ed. J. Daszykowska, M. Rewera, Warszawa 2010, p. 184.

8 See B. Pawłowicz, "Uzależnieni od sukcesu", *Zwierciadło* 2015, No. 5 (2023), p. 123–124.

9 Ibidem.

the child who then hears the following message: "Work is the most important thing for me; I have a chance to get promoted, leave me alone, I will hire you a tutor, a tennis instructor or I will have your classmate play with you, but I don't have time for you today"[10]. Treated in this manner, the child feels unimportant and abandoned, which affects his or her sense of self-worth.

This has further negative consequences. Success depends most often on people who, as children, did not receive reliable feedback on the importance of their achievements, who were underestimated and humiliated, or conversely – overestimated and excessively praised. Both these extremes "produce" perfectionists who are unable to accept failure or defeat. They feel compelled to be deserving of the longed-for praise that usually never comes. As adults, they feel unworthy of standing ovations, glamorisation, awards, and distinctions. There is no amount of success that would ease their doubts about being worthy of recognition and love, and such a conviction leads to a sense of loneliness[11].

The other trend illustrates the phenomenon of the transition from material to non-material indicators of success. This process began in the early 1990s, which, thanks to training companies and the American management model, brought a renaissance of the term success. In those times, a promotion, which took years to achieve in other countries, was quickly achieved by Polish society. Americans visiting Poland paid attention to the young age of CEOs and managing directors of companies. In the States people often achieved similar success as a result of hard and long work at the age of 50.

It was not difficult to succumb to the magic of success. Its achievement had tangible outcomes, such as a good position, a company mobile phone, a car, and a credit card. In private life it earned one a flat, a car and a consumer lifestyle. Apart from these tangible indicators of success, also intangible ones quickly became important. Research conducted regularly by the Public Opinion Poll Centre CBOS (1994–2010) shows that the top three life goals of Poles are: love and friendship, a successful family life, and a job in line with one's interests[12]. The latest

10 Ibidem, p. 124.

11 Ibidem.

12 See P. Rabiej, O. Janiak, "Ukąszeni wolnością", op. cit., p. 33.

analyses reveal that since 2005 the hierarchy of values adopted by Polish society has remained relatively stable – family happiness and good health have always been the top priorities[13]. Success and fame rank low and are indicated by a mere 1 percent of the polled population[14]. For half of them (from the Big Shift Generation) both personal and occupational success is precious, but the former is more appreciated. Interestingly, the "rat race" as a category seems to be on the wane. Close to 80 percent of the polled population claim that they would not devote anything for success. Today, it is not only with wealth and professional status that one can prove to oneself that one can achieve a specific goal. Nowadays, one can experience success, for example, thanks to the good projects they implement in their lives rather than thanks to their money and renown[15].

Because of this diversity, a man of success has become a complex being. In the past, success was measured mainly by money and thus a man of success was invariably an affluent person. Today, when asking which Pole has achieved success in life, one can hear names ranging from Maria Skłodowska-Curie, through Adam Małysz to Doda. The lesser-known people who do not fit into the common definition of success, e.g. those with success in a narrow field, are also considered to be successful[16].

The third trend allows us to discover that in the postmodern era, what counts more is what man himself considers a success than its definition according to others. An inner, gut feeling is more important than an external yardstick. Research conducted in 2012 by the THINK-TANK Dialogue and Analysis Centre and *Malmen* magazine shows that success is measured by a happy family and the realization of one's own passions. Further indications include: work and professional achievements, self-satisfaction, relationships with the environment, one's education and material goods. Popularity and fame are at the end of the list[17]. These observations reveal that vying for success, comparing

13 See Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej, *Komunikat z badań*, BS/111/2013, Warszawa 2013, http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2013/K_111_13.PDF (available: 17.07.2014).

14 A study carried out in July 2013 on a representative sample of adults Poles (N=1005).

15 See P. Rabiej, O. Janiak, "Ukąszeni wolnością", op. cit., p. 32–33.

16 Ibidem, p. 32.

17 Ibidem, p. 34.

oneself to others, searching for points of reference are no longer that important. This is probably due to the fact that the pressure to succeed was greater in the 1990s than now. The shift is due to the overcoming of social and class barriers after 1989. For this reason, internal success indicators seem to be more important than external ones. However, it should be noted that external measures are also subject to evolution. The material criteria still remain in vogue. Thanks to mass culture, factors like popularity, fame and recognition have been added to wealth and professional achievements.

The shifting way of thinking about success makes it impossible to measure it by means of a single yardstick, because it is subjective and variable. Although everyone understands success on an individual basis and refers to their own experiences, it is possible to distinguish two categories of success:

1. Success as the development of one's own potential and achieving an ambitious and difficult goal results in getting to know oneself, developing one's own skills and becoming aware of one's goal. It involves accomplishing what one wants and what is within one's reach and at the same time seems hardly reachable. This kind of success is measured by a test of one's influence, of how much strength and skills one has to change the reality;
2. Success as an aspiration to gain market values – it becomes present in specific aspects of modern life, for example in successholism and consumerism. Within its framework, man experiences himself as a thing that can be successfully used on the market and manipulated. In private life, this leads to suffering from isolation and loneliness. The alienated individual loses much of his or her sense of dignity, which is characteristic of man even in the most primitive cultures. First of all, one loses the sense of one's own self, the sense of oneself as a unique and inimitable personality.

The two categories of thinking about success demonstrate two opposing forces at work in culture. One helps to build one's humanity and the other leads man to self-destruction. As a result, culture generates opposing values, which trigger much tension and many crisis of everyday life.

CULTURE AS A GENERATOR OF CONTRADICTING VALUES – THEODORE BRAMELD'S DIAGNOSIS

Culture as a generator of contradicting values was scrutinised by the sociologist of education, Theodore Brameld. In his works, he critically analysed American society, which set standards of behaviour for other cultures. Brameld conducted research on the mental condition of man, so he was interested in human tensions, both internal and external, which manifest themselves in social groups from a normative position. Although he was not a pedagogue, due to his education he adopted the scientific perspective of pedagogy. He diagnosed social reality, set specific goals for its development and referred practically to real problems occurring in everyday life[18]. The results of his anthropological studies on the condition of US culture, he concluded that it was in a state of profound crisis. An important manifestation of this crisis was a kind of "schizophrenia" of American society, manifesting itself in the simultaneous adherence of its members to contradictory values, resulting in a series of tensions in their daily lives[19]. These occurred, among other things, between self-interest and social interest or between a person turning against himself and a person acting for his own good[20]. Brameld interpreted these tensions as a crisis of culture, a violation of the axiological orientation which had previously marked this culture. This, in turn, leads to destabilisation, i.e. disturbances in the functioning of fundamental institutions, in the sphere of customs, practices and attitudes within a given culture. For this reason, the members of these cultures feel puzzled, lost and deracinated[21]:

> The old ways of beliving in the good life as they regarded it are no longer adequate. Consequently men become deeply disturbed, confused, indeed

[18] See H. Zielińska-Kostyło, "Zdrowie – społeczeństwo – edukacja. Koncepcje Ericha Fromma i Theodore'a Bramelda", *Rocznik Andragogiczny* 2014, No. 21, p. 157–171, http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/RA.2014.011 (available: 17.07.2014).

[19] See H. Kostyło, P. Kostyło, "Edukacja jako narzędzie rekonstrukcji kultury", [in:] T. Brameld, *Edukacja jako siła*, Bydgoszcz 2014, p. 21.

[20] See Ibidem, p. 23.

[21] See T. Brameld, *Education as Power*, New York, London 1965, p. 10.

> often emotionally ill, because the value orientation to which they have been accustomed is torn from under them[22].

This observation led Brameld to ask a number of questions: What happens in culture when the traditional axiological orientation is falling apart? What happens to the efforts of people who want to understand and control their own ways of life? In response, he came to the conclusion that people present very different ways of responding to situations in which old guidelines for a good life do not provide the direction or goals that they need, regardless of cultural circumstances and conditions. Brameld identified six alternative models for people's responses to cultural crises[23]:

1. skepticism – its followers believe that there is no way out of the culture as it is;
2. eclecticism – this philosophy denies the possibility of finding answers to life's problems by taking only one perspective. Eclecticism is open to many different types of meanings. It becomes a kind of intellectual opportunism, in which everyone can follow different philosophies of life, one after another. The eclectic can be satisfied with the fact that he does not have to engage in any matter until the end. However, he or she is never a truly integrated person, as they lack role models that could impart meaning to both their own lives and the lives of their cultural environment;
3. conservatism – another possible approach of people living at a time of destabilisation of culture. Conservatists primarily aim to retain and strengthen their own legacy. They often claim that the culture they have encountered is not bad, but people have forgotten its foundation and core. These should be returned to, recalling the patterns of modern history. We need to fight and preserve our cultural heritage;
4. regressivism – it is summed up by a statement: 'We cannot merely preserve cultural heritage. We need to look much deeper into the future in order to get to know the most primordial sources of culture and thought';

[22] Ibidem, p. 21.
[23] See Ibidem, p. 22–24.

5. liberalism – a position that strongly opposes conservatism and regressivism. In this approach, the human response to the crisis is to move forward, experiment cautiously, try and then modify one's earlier habits, attitudes and practices in the one's own life. Within this position, people support a kind of prudent planning of one's own life and gradual development;
6. radicalism – people who identify themselves with the last pattern of reaction to the crisis claim that it requires big, radical actions and setting an equally great goal. It is therefore necessary to rebuild and redirect the entire existing system.

FROM RADICAL DETERMINISM TO INDETERMINISM. ALTERNATIVE WAYS OF HUMAN REACTION TO THE CRISIS OF CULTURE

There are also other alternative ways in which people can react to a cultural crisis. They depend on whether the individual appears as an object or object of a cognitive relation. Among the many views referring to the idea of subjectivity in the history of philosophical thought, three main positions can be distinguished[24]. According to the first, defined as radical determinism or fatalism, man is not a subject, "never and in no respect"[25]. Thus nothing can be changed in one's life. Here the individual is perceived as passive, controlled from the outside, deprived of responsibility for his own life and deeds, an object manipulated by external forces (nature, destiny, fate).

The second position, called moderate determinism or activism, assumes a certain margin of human freedom, pointing to a partial dependence, but not a complete dependence, as is the case in radical determinism. According to the idea of moderate determinism, the individual is at times the subject and at times the object of change, to a certain extent free with respect to certain power systems, and subordinate to others. Man has to take into account in his conduct and planned changes the concrete reality and objective facts, which he

[24] See J. Lipiec, *Wolność i podmiotowość człowieka*, Kraków 1997, p. 16.
[25] Ibidem.

has no influence on, if he wants to effectively pursue his own goals. However, the awareness of the existing limitations does not (or at least should not) prevent taking an active approach to constructing one's own life.

The third position, referred to as indeterminism or voluntarism, indicates an absolute autonomy of the human being. According to this idea, man is "always and in every situation a subject, regardless of the degree to which he or she achieves his or her intentions, and he or she alone is entitled to subjectivity"[26]. Man can therefore be seen as an entity under the dominant influence of internal forces. Regardless of external factors, he consciously pursues specific goals and assumes responsibility for his actions. He or she has unlimited freedom of choice and relation to the occurring phenomena, including their changes, for example by modifying his or her attitude towards them.

Man's reactions to the crisis of culture are also connected with the meaning imparted to everyday life. In social sciences, the notion of everyday life appears as a dimension of the social space in which an individual lives and moves and as "a definition of a subjective world of meanings and knowledge about the world, addicted to changing social contexts"[27]. It can therefore be said to be a kind of "habitus, which consists of the ways of thinking, feeling and acting observed in the form of social practices"[28].

The understanding of everyday life changed with the development of culture. In the past, it was associated with routine, monotony and boredom. Each day resulted from the previous one and gave an outline of the next one. It gave a sense of security, certainty as to what would happen and what could not happen, what could not be done and what could not be avoided. In the past, "everyday life was the enemy of everything that was unusual"[29]. In postmodern culture, completely different terms are associated with the concept of everyday life. From

[26] Ibidem.

[27] M. Dzięgielewska, "Teorie życia codziennego – poszukiwanie znaczeń", [in:] *Edukacja a życie codzienne*, Vol. 1, ed. A. Radziewicz-Winnicki, Katowice 2002, p. 51.

[28] E. Hałas, "Powrót do codzienności? Szkic problematyki socjologii życia codziennego", [in:] *Barwy codzienności. Analiza socjologiczna*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Warszawa 2009, p. 57.

[29] Z. Bauman, "Niecodzienność nasza codzienna", [in:] *Barwy codzienności*, op. cit., p. 77.

what happened today, it is not clear what will happen tomorrow. The time "has fallen apart into beads of episodes"[30]. Everyday life is combined with surprise and chance. These are the only experiences that are repeated routinely, day by day[31]. This observation indicates that everyday life is dominated by various patterns, which are the source of completely different worlds of human life. We can distinguish three variations among them[32]. In one, everyday life is "enclosed into objectifying oppression which one cannot break free from; it is then frequently embroiled in melancholy, resentment, determination, uniquely excessive and exaggerated", while man is "subject to the pressure of hopelessness and a mechanism of resignation from the subjective opposition to it"[33]. The second variation involves:

> processes of active balancing, counterbalancing the struggle to maintain a minimum balance in the field of tension and pressure. The effort of life requires a strategy of survival, active compromise in the face of the pressure of the present moment. The reality in which people are stuck becomes dual and torn apart. The subject is stretched between extremes with which he can play a game, which for a time brings change and a sense of complicity in stimulating it[34].

In the last, third variation, the individual opens himself up "to a perspective in which everyday life is subordinated to a long-term plan, in which [...] he finds a sense associated with distant tasks and deferred gratification"[35].

The above typology of everyday life reveals that on the one hand it is an opportunity for a human being to learn, a context of creative, satisfying actions, a way of realizing dreams and goals, and on the other hand it is a limiting everyday life which fails, pushes man to a margin, condemns him to loneliness and excludes.

30 Ibidem, p. 78.

31 Ibidem.

32 See L. Witkowski, "Codzienność i jej pedagogiczne przekleństwa", [in:] L. Witkowski, *Między pedagogiką, filozofią a kulturą. Studia, eseje, szkice*, Vol. 3, Warszawa 2007, p. 280–281.

33 Ibidem.

34 Ibidem, p. 281.

35 Ibidem.

IMPLICATIONS OF ADOPTING A SPECIFIC PERCEPTION OF SUCCESS

The influence of cultural processes on the way of thinking about success presented in this article has specific implications. An individual who identifies success with the pursuit of market values and builds his or her life according to the concept of radical determinism together with the vision of everyday life locked in objectifying oppression, as well as with a regressionist and conservative attitude, is condemned to passivity. Such behaviour leads to the resignation from the subjective opposition to cultural tensions and crises. A negative attitude towards change triggers a withdrawal from managing one's life and renouncing oneself. Such a course of action triggers a sense of helplessness and fear. The phenomenon of existential anxiety paralyses its causative function and constricts its development. The individual is convinced that activity does not matter for the changes taking place both in himself and in the environment. The consequence of such orientation is resignation from one's own aspirations and expectations in order to meet the expectations of other people, to succumb to the course of events which, from the point of view of the individual, can neither be changed nor controlled.

A person who, in the understanding of the concept of success, navigates between thinking about it as self-development and striving for market values and who creates his world in accordance with the concept of moderate determinism, eclecticism and the attitude of active balancing, in the field of life tensions and pressures, despite the declared willingness and readiness to introduce changes in his life, does not always decide to take the related risk. This manner of conduct, as Margaret S. Archer points out, is characteristic of the personality of someone with a "fractured reflexivity"[36]. This mechanism is present in the case of individuals whose inner conversation does not lead to action but intensifies their disorientation. Individuals who are unable to continuously verify life projects become "losers of reflexivity" of globalization or its victims[37].

[36] M. S. Archer, *Structure, Agency and the International Conversation*, Cambridge 2003, p. 298.

[37] See L. Scott, "*Reflexivity and Its* Doubles. Structure, *Aesthetics*, and *Community*", [in:] U. Beck, A. Giddens, L. Scott, *Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics*

Those who think of success as an aspiration to develop their own potential and who create their everyday world in accordance with the concepts of indeterminism, liberalism and radicalism, with an open perspective in which everyday life is subordinated to a longer-term plan, have systematic control over their own lives. They appreciate the importance of their own aspirations and goals as well as value self-knowledge and self-assessment. Taking such a viewpoint allows people to adapt flexibly to a changing world and to engage consciously in the process of personal development. At this stage, they are no longer externally controlled and assume their own responsibility for their own humanity.

CONCLUSIONS – IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

In conclusion, it should be noted that the impact of cultural processes reveals simultaneously man's greatness and futility. On the one hand, it triggers in man the attitude of "engaged subjectivity"[38], which is responsible for single-handedly choosing "methods" and establishing "values to be attained", which sets goals for itself, demands of itself and tries to meet the challenges of the world in which one has to live and act. On the other hand, man rationalises the social pathologies (consumerism, successholism) and makes them a norm or even a necessity. This irregularity gives rise to an unquestioned acceptance of reality without any further verification. As a result, man becomes passive and identifies himself with market values, becoming a constant consumer or trader. He has transformed himself into a commodity and treats his own life as capital to be invested with profit. If he makes it, he succeeds and his life makes sense; if he fails, life becomes a failure. As a result, man's self-esteem is closely linked to market attractiveness and depends on such external factors as one's own success and others' assessment. It follows that the market determines the character of a person. He experiences himself not

in the Modern Social Order, Stanford 1994, p. 127.

38 A. Bielik-Robson, "Wstęp. My, romantycy – źródła romantycznego modernizmu Charlesa Taylora", [in:] C. Taylor, *Źródła podmiotowości. Narodziny tożsamości nowoczesnej*, ed. T. Gadacz, Warszawa 2001, p. XXI.

as an active manager of his own strengths and intentions, but as an object dependent on other external objects. When transformed into an object, man is full of fear and anxiety and stands on the edge. No one imposes a meaning of life on him and he does not have the courage to take responsibility for constructing it himself. He is unaware of the importance of reflection in his life. Yet the individualised culture of everyday life demands that man should increasingly perceive, interpret and manage the opportunities, threats and ambivalences in his life[39]. This obligation indicates that reflection is a prerequisite for a better understanding of the world and oneself, as it minimises a sense of uncertainty[40].

Researchers reveal that in postmodern culture the everyday life of human beings is largely free from reflection and concern for their own humanity[41]. Man poses no questions about the meaning of life as this life is deemed meaningless, which in effect leads to a "death of humanity"[42]. In this context, everyday life is "a pedagogical challenge"[43]. Having as much potential as it does threats, it must focus on the emancipatory skills of students[44]. The honing of these skills is the fundamental task of education seen as "all activities, processes and conditions conducive to human development; where development is defined as a superior understanding of oneself and one's relations with the world"[45], of one's own place within this world, a preferred lifestyle, and a sense of agency with respect to external phenomena. Under these circumstances, education is obliged to help people regain their jeopardised humanity. It has a duty to support them in their search

39 See U. Beck, "The Reinvention of Politics. Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization", [in:] U. Beck, A. Giddens, S. Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*, op. cit., p. 8.

40 See L. Scott, "*Reflexivity and Its* Doubles", op. cit., p. 111.

41 See L. Witkowski, "Codzienność i jej pedagogiczne przekleństwa", op. cit., p. 290.

42 H. Romanowska-Łakomy, *Droga do człowieczeństwa. Usłysz wewnętrzny nakaz bycia człowiekiem*, Kraków 2001, p. 15–16. See also M. S. Archer, *Being Human. The Problem of Agency*, Cambridge 2000, p. 1.

43 L. Witkowski, "Codzienność i jej pedagogiczne przekleństwa", op. cit., p. 288. See also M. J. Szymański, "Problematyka codzienności w badaniach pedagogicznych i społecznych", [in:] *Codzienność szkoły. Uczeń*, ed. E. Bochno, I. Nowosad. M. J. Szymański, Kraków 2014; I. Orzelska, *W stronę pedagogiki istotnej egzystencjalnie. Życie i jego trudności z energią duchową jako wyzwanie pedagogiczne rezyduów tożsamości*, Kraków 2014.

44 See L. Witkowski, "Codzienność i jej pedagogiczne przekleństwa", op. cit., p. 290.

45 T. Hejnicka-Bezwińska, *Pedagogika ogólna*, Warszawa 2008, p. 467.

for answers to the difficult question of how to live wisely in states of uncertainty, tensions and crises.

If education is to teach people how to live smartly, then today's preferred and implemented model of the ideology of success is no longer sufficient. Novel ways of thinking about education are needed. This demand was addressed by Theodore Brameld, who in his philosophical reflection developed an innovative concept of education known as social reconstructionism. Assuming that education is the most significant medium of social change, he developed a new way of thinking about it. In his opinion, traditional education is too broadcast-oriented. Anaesthetized by education, we do not understand our culture and our lives in their current, problematic functioning. We remain in the culture as given and offered for adaptation, without any possibility to change it. Reconstructionism convinces us that culture is a living creation. This perception opens the way to reflection and offers a sense of being able to influence it. Brameld stresses that the reconstruction of any element of contemporary culture must be carried out through democratic procedures and the universally accepted principles of social life[46].

Against this background, the implementation of social change requires the curriculum in schools to be adapted accordingly[47]. First of all, most students need to learn to use academic methods much more effectively than they have done before. To date, most young people have not learned to adequately absorb natural science methods. Young people, at most, learn what is called natural sciences by learning formulas, axioms, principles, and equations. They do not learn this method as a universal way of analysing problems arising from experience. If they do, they refer this method to a narrow section of reality, treated in isolation. As a result, many young people graduate from high schools and universities having internalised only partially the academic method. Therefore, in educational practice, teachers should help young people to understand how to use academic methods not only in relation to natural sciences, but also in relation to personal and social life. A social shift calls for adopting school

[46] See H. Zielińska-Kostyło, "Zdrowie – społeczeństwo – edukacja", op. cit., p. 170.
[47] See T. Brameld, *Education as Power*, op. cit., p. 53.

curricula accordingly[48]. School should become a centre of constant experimentation, where children learn to think and act academically from the very beginning, not only in physics and biology, but above all in all in human relations. The problem is that most people do not know how to think and act academically in relation to solving human problems. Many representatives of culture, which is in a state of crisis, do not know what to believe and what is good, desirable and purposeful. They face so many conflicting choices that they often lose confidence in what to do. Pursuit of new, firm values and their presentation to learners and teaching them how to live are some of the priorities of education. Human life must be targeted and have clear goals. In this context, the main task of education is to formulate, apply in practice, verify such goals and search for axiological orientation. This requirement is justified in so far as the world has been divided into warring camps, which devote most of their energy to sustaining hatred to one another and striving for mutual destruction. These anti-values are often more visible in everyday life than the values of love, cooperation and creativity. In this context, another important goal of education is to practice the procedures of democratic axiological orientation. Within this orientation a person believes in himself, in his ability to make decisions about his own life and in the ability to navigate interpersonal relations. A democratic axiological orientation boils down to a deep conviction that ordinary people have more common sense and sound judgment of what is good for them than anyone else. If teachers do not develop within themselves a profound confidence in this social self--fulfilment of most people, they will never accept democracy[49].

It should be remembered, however, that human rationality has its limitations and therefore man needs support and adequate preparation through education. The question of assessing and analysing whether contemporary schools inscribe in the educational process and education at various levels care for the acquisition of vital competences and preparation for everyday life, as well as whether and to what extent teachers are open and ready to accept such broadly defined tasks, remains open.

[48] See Ibidem.
[49] See Ibidem, p. 37.

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Abstract:

The aim of this article is the analysis of influences of the cultural processes on the way of thinking about success in everyday life. The foundation for the reflections is constituted by the results of survey research reflecting transformation which took place within this area from the end of the 1980s up to the post-modern period. The research results prove that the category of success is not a stable social construct and the society members assign contradictory values to this notion. Those disadvantageous lead to number of tensions. The article presents alternative ways of human's reaction to these tensions and consequences such approach entails. The conclusions drawn with regards to education provide a summary for the overall reflections.

Keywords:

determinism, education, indeterminism, subjectivity, success, Theodore Brameld, everyday life

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ESSENTIALISM AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTIONISM IN INDIA[1]

The world of pedagogical ideas is extremely rich. From the perspective of Theodore Brameld's anthropological typology, there are four patterns of educational behaviour: perennialism, essentialism, progressivism, and reconstructionism. Essentialism and social reconstructionism play the major role in adult education in India and therefore both will be presented in this article in the context of adult education and lifelong learning. It should be noted that India serves as an example of Brameld's theory of educational ideology. Thus, the use of the ideology of essentialism aims to explain the essence of this ideology by means of a specific example, while the presentation of the ideology of social reconstructionism, which is only a postulate, can demonstrate how reforms in adult education can trigger change in the entire society.

Will Indian schools dare to build a new social order? This could be the paraphrase of George S. Counts' question, which nobody has been able to answer until now. According to the 2001 census, about 46 percent of women in India were illiterate. The corresponding figure for men was 24 percent[2]. This was mainly due to the elitist educational policy, which for

[1] Originally published: Beata Pietkiewicz-Pareek, "Esencjalizm i społeczny rekonstrukcjonizm w Indiach", *Rocznik Andragogiczny* 2011, Vol. 18, p. 194–199.

[2] See International Literacy Statistics: A *Review of Concepts, Methodology, and Current Data*, Montreal 2008.

centuries favoured mainly the caste of the Brahmins. This continued until the nineteenth century, i.e. until the conquest of India by Great Britain.

In the first period of British colonization, the British did not want the Indians to get acquainted with European culture. They knew that learning about it can lead to changes in the mentality of the natives and cause unforeseen consequences. In 1792, the director of the East India Company said:

> We lost America precisely as a result of our own madness, accepting the establishment of schools and colleges. We should not repeat post-Christian mistakes, when the establishment of various types of schools led to the spread of the English language and consequently to a mental revival. Thanks to the traditional model of British education, the Hindus, having familiarised themselves with the classical European culture, came to appreciate its value. Occidental, i.e. pro-European groups consisting of representatives of higher castes, maintained close contacts with the colonists and embraced the conviction of the superiority of European culture imposed by the English. The European models imposed on them were easily assimilated through education[3].

The British Crown needed senior and junior officials as instruments for managing the Indian Empire. There was no need to educate scientists or engineers; general humanistic knowledge was sufficient for the British administration. In 1857 the Universities of Mumbai, Calcutta and Madras were established as branches of British universities and their unified curricula were adapted to the requirements of the University of London. There was therefore no domestic education system in India and the British did not try to distinguish between the way of education in and outside the British Isles within the empire. The British did not see the need for establishing primary schools, either. Parents wishing to educate their children employed private teachers. The British administration did not want to spend money on education and did not change this position until the end of its rule[4].

[3] Z. Krawczyk, *Rabindranath Tagore – poszukiwanie prawdy i piękna w teorii i praktyce wychowania*, Warszawa 1990, p. 22.

[4] See D. Rothermund, *Indie. Nowa azjatycka potęga*, Warszawa 2010, p. 228 (English edition: D. Rothermund, *India: The Rise of an Asian Giant*, Cambridge 2009).

Under British rule, the prevailing belief was that proper Indian education should include the humanities, natural sciences and English, i.e. subjects that could bring economic benefits to the British Crown. The main problem for the Indians was the introduction of discipline into schools to which the Indians were not accustomed. Benches, exams, classes taking place according to a fixed schedule and the omniscient teacher were unknown in traditional Indian gurukul-based education. The aim of essentialist teaching was to prepare people to take up intellectual challenges, to act as good citizens of the British Crown and to dedicate their careers to the British. Even the demand to facilitate the education of the Indians with outstanding intellectual skills in England found its confirmation. Those who wanted to hone their skills had the chance to study at the best universities in Britain, the best examples of which were Gandhi and Tagore.

In line with the principles of essentialism, British teachers sought to pass on to their Indian students the cultural models they had themselves inherited from their ancestors. These were, then, not Indian but European models, often misunderstood and not internalized by the pupils. The traditional teaching model was based on both encyclopaedic knowledge that the student had to assimilate and on cultural transmission, without any confrontation with current economic, social or political issues.

Over the last few decades, India has experienced a crisis in the traditional model of teaching. In 2009, the Indian Parliament mandated the state with providing a place at school to all Indian children. The right to education was granted to children who had never attended school; some due to their parents' insufficient interest in this matter, others due to lack of space in schools. In poorer, overpopulated neighbourhoods or villages, the school network is insufficient and children have difficulty enrolling. They often do not have the documents required by the school authorities, not least because they were born in a place where no one issued birth certificates. The level of education in unpaid primary schools is very low. There are no qualified teachers, teaching aids, electricity, toilets, classrooms, and drinking water. Most children do not pass state exams, many resit them, which disqualifies them and pushes them to the margins of society. Primary education has been affected by high drop-out rates of pupils who have

completed just a few classes or have repeated the same class for many years to eventually leave school and join an army of cheap, uneducated labour or the unemployed. The ideology of essentialism cannot, therefore, meet such demands[5].

In modern times, there has been a confrontation in India between two concepts of man, two concepts of education: essentialism and reconstructionism. The philosophy of essentialism with its concepts of the micro-world, the human being and the goals of existence has clashed with social reconstructionism oriented towards action and rebuilding of social and economic life. As Brameld states, the world, and therefore India, are at a crossroads. Social struggle takes place between conservative and progressive forces, represented by the countless poor from the Third World[6]. In the second half of the 20th century, with decolonization, marginalised people began to come to the fore; the voiceless and invisible became audible. As a result, the traditional model of education, in line with the principles of essentialism, ceased to meet the needs of Indian society. Researchers began to wonder how the world should look like in a crisis, what to do with the multitude of illiterate people and children not attending schools, what place the teacher occupies in this discourse and to what extent state institutions are responsible for it. The ideology of reconstructionism can provide answers to such questions. By changing the discourse of the majority groups in favour of the marginalised, educational strategies and programmes should be developed aimed at reforming the society. This will not be possible unless people are made aware of the importance of developing adult education and lifelong learning.

To overcome the crisis, one should not blindly stick to the cultural models inherited from the British; the Indians must examine their heritage carefully and identify the most valuable elements that will allow them to find their bearings in the new reality. The task of the school, according to the idea of social reconstructionism, is to critically examine the legacy of a civilization and to indicate those components that will be useful during the reconstruction of the society.

[5] See *Economic Survey* 2010, Government of India.

[6] See H. Zielińska-Kostyło, *Rekonstrukcjonistyczne koncepcje zmiany społecznej poprzez edukację*, Toruń 2005.

Education in the spirit of reconstructionism should include not only a critical review of cultural heritage, but also the introduction the lifelong learning process, the instilling of planning skills to guide cultural conversion and the testing of cultural change projects through the implementation of planned social reform. According to Counts, all aspects of human existence, i.e. work, pay, property, sexual life, family, political system, ethnic or racial origin, war and peace, should be reconstructed via education. Reconstructionists assume that all differences, whether in terms of wealth, race, colour of the skin or religion, should not generate inequality of opportunity, as this would contradict the fundamental principles of democracy[7].

According to the theory of social reconstructionism, universal education is to awaken in the individual a hitherto marginalized sense of competence and social usefulness, to instil attachment to the ideals of equality, dignity, fraternity, and freedom, to encourage respect for democratic processes in initiating discussion, for making critical assessments and taking decisions, to foster a mentality characterized by honesty and an academic approach, and to cultivate the conviction that talent, qualifications and virtues of character should be valued. The only way to unlock the potential of the Indians is not to tear them out of the shackles of tradition, but to introduce them to a living and evolving culture[8].

The National Literacy Mission (NLM) was established in the 1980s to combat adult illiteracy. Its main task is to teach adults how to write and read as well as to implement the idea of continuous education. The most popular forms of adult education in India are: religious festivals, processions, local art, puppet theatre, and folk songs. NLM activities are focused on the problems of adults, women, states with the highest illiteracy levels, tribal areas and ethnic minorities, the untouchables, and marginalized groups. In 1999, UNESCO awarded the NLM for outstanding achievements in fighting illiteracy.

The theory of development is akin to reconstructionism; the former's educational theorists want to hand over power to the ecologically and politically handicapped population. Unlike the theories

[7] See G. L. Gutek, *Philosophical and Ideological Perspectives on Education*, Boston 1997, p. 308–309.

[8] See Ibidem, p. 315.

formulated in the 1960s, when top-down modernisation by central government was promoted, currently emphasised is the importance of grassroots initiatives taken by people who want to put their ideas and plans into practice at the local level. School can spearhead social change and reform. Teachers and pupils should engage in action- and solution-oriented research. This is based on the belief that there is a close relationship between school and society. Unresolved conflicts and tensions within the wider community are transferred to the school, teachers and pupils. For example, if Indian students are poor, hungry or discriminated against, their attitudes, aspirations and expectations about education can be distorted and lead to dropping out of school. The role of this institution is therefore to help diagnose society, to identify the key problems which contribute to the cultural crisis, as well as to instil the skills and attitudes which will successfully tackle these problems.

The discrepancy between the official rhetoric of the Indian authorities and the actual education policy is intriguing. The Constitution recommends the introduction of compulsory primary education, but no one has abolished child labour. Politicians call it a sad necessity; according to experts, children work in every third family and the income earned by minors accounts for 20 percent of India's GDP. The regulation that prohibits the employment of children under the age of fourteen is not enforced. It is common for children to be employed as servants even if they are under the age of ten[9].

Will the social reconstructionists manage to change the sad reality of the Indian citizen? The British educational programme and the spread of Western education were intended to install and strengthen the imperial power. The British did not intend to raise leaders or to educate people for industry or those able to defend their homeland; they did not try to educate a self-determined nation. This opportunity is offered by social reconstructionism. Citizens of India have the opportunity to decide for themselves, to give voice to those who have been marginalised so far, to reform their education on their own terms, according to their own ideas and values. Instead of translating

[9] See K. Dębnicki, *Konflikt i przemoc w systemie politycznym niepodległych Indii*, Warszawa 2006, p. 101.

Rousseau, Pestalozzi, Dewey, etc., they can take a closer look at the view of Krishna, Buddha, Mahavira, Tagore, Gandhi, Giju Bhai, Vivekananda, Aurobindo, and Radha Krishna.

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Abstract:

In modern times two conceptions of man and two concepts of education, essentialism and reconstructionism, clashed in India. The philosophy of essentialism with the concept of man and the purpose of existence collided with a reconstructionist-oriented social action and transformation of social and economic life. As indicated by Brameld, the world and therefore India are at a crossroads. Social struggle takes place between the conservative and progressive forces, represented by the poor in the Third World countries.

Keywords:

essentialism, social reconstructionism, Theodore Brameld, pedagogy, India

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IDENTIFYING THE DETERMINANTS AND EFFECTS OF EDUCATION BASED ON THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM THEORY[1]

INTRODUCTION

When one analyses the functioning of a fragment of the educational reality, for example, when one tries to identify why the intentional influence of teachers often brings about effects different from those expected, one of the possible ways is to look at educational processes from a sociological perspective. It seems that there is no need to justify this approach in detail, because the interconnections between sociology and pedagogy have long been a source of theoretically and empirically fertile ideas[2]. Furthermore, it should be recognized that

[1] Originally published: Wiktor Żłobicki, "Rozpoznawanie uwarunkowań i skutków edukacji na podstawie teorii ukrytego programu", [in:] *Wokół problemów socjologii edukacji i badań młodzieży*, ed. B. Wiśniewska-Paź, Wydaw. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2011, p. 53–71. Some of the statements in this article have been earlier published in my monograph: W. Żłobicki, *Ukryty program w edukacji. Między niewiedzą a manipulacją*, Kraków 2002.

[2] Interconnections between pedagogy and sociology are addressed by e.g. S. Wołoszyn, *Nauki o wychowaniu w Polsce w XX wieku. Próba syntetycznego zarysu na tle powszechnym*, Kielce 1998, p. 50–61; M. J. Szymański, "Pedagogika socjologiczna", [in:] *Pedagogika*, Vol. 4. *Subdyscypliny i dziedziny wiedzy o edukacji*, ed. B. Śliwerski, Gdańsk 2010.

modern educators have a chance to improve instruments for describing and understanding the educational reality and designing its changes, if they consider it a norm to cross the boundaries of their own discipline and use the achievements of many other disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, philosophy, anthropology, etc. As Teresa Hejnicka-Bezwińska has rightly pointed out, contemporary pedagogy analyses

> (pluralistic) educational practice in all its complexity and entanglement and, for this reason, must go beyond the purposeful processes of education and upbringing towards the processes of growth and natural ingrowth of the individual into the existing world and broadly understood processes of socialization. Therefore, we can speak of a broadening of the subject of research in contemporary pedagogy[3].

Therefore, I will take up the issue of the "hidden curriculum" in education, which is increasingly the topic of research, in order to indicate its usefulness in the analysis of educational phenomena.

UNDERSTANDING THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM

If a debate on how to teach cooperative behaviour at school were to be initiated, the teacher could exemplify this by organising the teaching process in such a way that the pupils team up to address the problems to solve and gain positive experiences from the joint action. But the same pupils will cooperate with each other equally effectively if in another lesson, forced to recreate some parts of the material during a test, they pass on crib notes to one another. In both situations, they will improve cooperative behaviour, but the former one has all the features of a properly conducted education process, while the latter denies it completely. In this way we see the existence of something that fits into the continuum between intentionality and random action, something that exists next to every official action, independently from the nature of this action. Teresa Bauman commented on this,

[3] T. Hejnicka-Bezwińska, *Pedagogika ogólna*, Warszawa 2008, p. 68–69.

assuming that "each phenomenon (including an educational phenomenon) has its obvious (overt) meaning, which is easy to read by anyone, as well as its covert meaning, hidden behind the obvious"[4]. The author refers here to the hidden curriculum, which has since the late 1960s become one of the instruments of scholarly exploration of the imperfections of the school environment. Educational research, as a result of which this concept has made its way to sociology and pedagogy, is considered one of the most important steps in the development of social sciences. However, before more or less successful attempts were made to define the hidden curriculum, the term was first used by Philip W. Jackson, who claimed that in order to survive in the classroom, students very often have to adapt to rules, routines and regulations and create survival strategies. In most considerations and theoretical approaches, the hidden curriculum is regarded in the school context and states that it is in conflict with the adopted or explicit curriculum, i.e. with a course or series of activities designed to achieve learning outcomes[5]. In a nutshell, the hidden curriculum is "all the things that are learnt during schooling in addition to the official curriculum"[6]. Jane R. Martin extends this definition, to encompass "the outcomes or by-products of schools or of non-school settings, particularly those states that are learned yet are not openly intended"[7]. From this point of view, what happens outside school is also important for educational outcomes. We also must agree with David Head that the hidden curriculum is related to the effects of staying at school, not only contacts with teachers[8]. Although teachers also sometimes have to be attributed to unconscious feelings, attitudes, needs, beliefs and

4 T. Bauman, "Ukryte aspekty edukacji", [in:] *Kontestacje pedagogiczne*, ed. B. Śliwerski, Kraków 1993, p. 203.

5 See E. Eisner, *The Educational Imagination*, Macmillan, New York 1985, [after:] M. B. Ginsburg, R. T. Clift, "The Hidden Curriculum of Preservice Teacher Education", [in:] *Handbook of Research on Teacher Education*, ed. W. R. Houston, M. Haberman, J. Sikula, New York, London 1990, p. 451.

6 R. Meighan, A *Sociology of Educating*, London 1981, p. 52.

7 J. R. Martin, "What Should We Do with a Hidden Curriculum When We Find One?", [in:] *The Hidden Curriculum and Moral Education: Deception or Discovery?*, ed. H. Giroux, D. Purpel, Berkeley 1983, p. 124, [after:] M. B. Ginsburg, R. T. Clift, "The Hidden Curriculum of Preservice Teacher Education", op. cit., p. 451.

8 See D. Head, *Free Way to Learning*, Harmondsworth 1974, [after:] R. Meighan, A *Sociology of Educating*, op. cit., p. 52.

views, which in interactions with students may have a greater impact on education than the established and adopted official programme of action[9]. The way in which teachers perceive themselves and their students as well as their beliefs about the regularity of learning and teaching processes have a significant impact on the final outcome of school work. In interpersonal contacts with students, not only the level of teacher self-assessment and self-knowledge, the state of emotions, awareness of mechanisms disturbing personal communication, but also beliefs about students as partners and views on teaching and learning play an important role. It is in order to note the views of Elizabeth Vallance on the hidden curriculum, who pays attention to "nonacademic but educationally significant consequences of schooling that occur systematically but are not made explicit at any level of the public rationales for education"[10].

The hidden curriculum was noticed, defined and accounted for by Polish pedagogues and found itself in the second edition of *Słownik pedagogiczny* [*Dictionary of Pedagogy*] by Wincenty Okoń, in the entry "latent program", or the hidden curriculum:

> a 'program' that actually impacts school pupils yet is not registered; its impact, both good and bad, varies depending on the level of the pupils, the educational community and the influence of planned educational work of the school and the implementation of actual → school curricula[11].

Thus, unlike many other ways of defining the hidden curriculum, Okoń observes that its effects are both negative and positive. In his commentary, the author emphasizes the broad understanding of this term and indicates that the hidden curriculum

> is composed of multiple factors, e.g. the atmosphere at home and at school, opinions of parents and peers about the school, peer impact, style of work

9 See H. Rylke, G. Klimowicz, *Szkoła dla ucznia. Jak uczyć życia z ludźmi*, Warszawa 1992, p. 34.

10 E. Vallance, "Hiding the Hidden Curriculum. An Interpretation of the Language of Justification in Nineteenth-Century Educational Reform", [in:] *The Hidden Curriculum and Moral Education*, op. cit., p. 11.

11 W. Okoń, *Słownik pedagogiczny*, Warszawa 1987, p. 244–245.

> of significant teachers, impact of the outside social environment, including mass communications media[12].

This interpretation places the educations outcomes in the context of intentional versus unintentional activities, not only at school itself but also outside of it. Such a broad understanding of the essence of the hidden curriculum may be the basis for identifying the possible consequences of the clash of intentions contained in official, open curricula with activities outside the set goals. Krzysztof Kruszewski saw the hidden curriculum as

> a recurrent element of the pupil's experience at school, which exerts influence on the pupil although it is not commanded by the documents that regulate school operation, is not publicly manifested as the intention of the teacher, administration and textbook authors[13].

The author highlights the fact that the phenomenon is a result of social reproduction of knowledge and limits it to the school institution. A slightly different approach to the hidden curriculum is presented in *Leksykon pedagogiki* [*Lexicon of Pedagogy*], which sees it as

> an educational program not contained in curricula documentation (e.g. core curriculum or the school statute) and not recognised by students and teachers, taking place at school, arising from the fact that educational institutions are not neutral and independent of the political, economic, social, and cultural situation[14].

The theatre metaphor used by Andrzej Janowski can be considered as a reflection of the hidden dimension of the school's operation[15]. The school classroom symbolically resembles a stage where a performance with pupils and teachers as actors takes place. Each of the actors plays his or her part on stage and then goes backstage, which can be the school lavatories and the playground for the pupils, and the

12 Ibidem.
13 K. Kruszewski, *Zrozumieć szkołę*, Warszawa 1993, p. 112.
14 *Leksykon Pedagogika*, ed. B. Milerski, B. Śliwerski, Warszawa 2000, p. 253.
15 See A. Janowski, *Uczeń w teatrze życia szkolnego*, Warszawa 1989.

teachers' room for the teachers. There, the actors rest after the performance and relieve tension.

Referring to the considerations about the manifestations of the hidden program, one can look at the exemplary phenomena present in the school reality[16]. We will see situations where students learn how to "survive" boring lessons, how to please the teacher; they will learn that there is "one correct answer" to every question, that competition with others is more expected than cooperation, etc. Students are forced to learn to deal with the following:

- delays, i.e. constant waiting for the beginning of the lesson, access to instruments or teaching aids, contact with the teacher during the lesson (e.g. by raising a hand and waiting for the permission to speak);
- refusal and prohibition in situations when, for example, they want to ask questions thy consider important, to talk, to cooperate, to take care of the chosen activity, etc.;
- interruption, when a bell rings for recess during class or the teacher decides that the student's utterance should end.

Faced with such difficulties in school, students begin to use survival strategies such as apparent engagement, patience, and abandonment of potential opportunities for capacity development. Although they bring spectacular benefits in terms of good relations with teachers, in fact they also reduce the effectiveness of learning. Students of higher education institutions (and more and more often also secondary school students) are familiar with the strategy used to pass certain exams known as "cram, pass and forget". Increasingly, these activities are followed by another one – excessive drinking. This and other observable facts lead to a belief, as Donald R. Green claims, that the knowledge gained by a student during a dozen or so years of school education may include, for example, knowledge of history, but it may also include knowledge of the fact that some statements please and others irritate the subject teacher[17]. While the author does not use the concept of the hidden curriculum, in fact this is the program he describes. All the knowledge gained at school may serve the understanding of many complex problems, but

16 See R. Meighan, A *Sociology of Educating*, op. cit., p. 58–63.
17 See D. R. Green, *Educational Psychology*, New Jersey 1964.

it may also not have such a meaning for an individual. Certainly, however, as the author states, learning at school is accompanied by changes in the thinking processes, judgements, attitudes towards the presented material, attitudes towards the school and teachers. Moreover, these changes can have a significant impact (both positive and negative) on personal and social development. In this sense, modifications of the teaching and learning process can be seen as a result of the existence of a hidden curriculum in the work of teachers, organisational systems and school regulations, teaching content, etc.[18] It is therefore important to note that students' characteristics such as e.g. capabilities, expectations and value systems do not so much influence learning as they can become a consequence of learning at school.

Similarly, Catherine Cornbleth believes that ultimately the hidden curriculum consists of sets of mutually exclusive, contradictory expectations, rules and messages[19]. I found confirmation of this hypothesis in one of the schools I have studied, in which the problems of unstable ecological balance on our planet were an element of the educational and upbringing programme[20]. In this school, separate containers for paper, used batteries, glass and plastic were placed at the entrance to encourage and accustom pupils to separate waste. At the same time, due to sanitation authorities' recommendations, the school's canteen used disposable plastic dishes, which are known to decompose over hundreds of years.

To sum up, therefore, the hidden curriculum should be understood as all the experiences of the participants in education, which accurately reflects the view that education is what remains when we forget everything we have been taught. It is assumed that the knowledge gained from the clash of an official and hidden program is based on familiarity with rules, rejection or acceptance of their existence, pretended obedience, etc., which is reflected in the student's adage: "school must be survived like the flu".

18 Many such examples are included in: M. Nowak-Dziemianowicz, *Oblicza szkoły. Oblicza nauczyciela*, Toruń 2001.

19 See C. Cornbleth, "Beyond Hidden Curriculum", *Journal of Curriculum Studies* 1984, Vol. 16, No. 1, [after:] A. Janowski, *Uczeń w teatrze życia szkolnego*, op. cit., p. 80.

20 I presented relevant research in the monograph: W. Żłobicki, *Ukryty program w edukacji*, op. cit.

AREAS OF ANALYSIS OF THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM

In addition to the above authors, there are also newer publications allowing for a broad view of the hidden curriculum in: pre-school education (Elżbieta Siarkiewicz), school environment (Aleksander Nalaskowski), academic education (Martyna Pryszmont-Ciesielska), education of students with disabilities (Andrzej Lis-Kujawski)[21]. The table below offers a review of selected publications and in the further part of the article I wish to introduce some of the issues raised in the books.

EXAMPLES OF STUDY AREAS ON THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM	SELECTED PRIMARY SOURCES
Educational space management	A. Janowski A. (1989); R. Meighan (1993); M. Karkowska, W. Czarnecka (1994); E. Siarkiewicz (2000); A. Nalaskowski (2002); W. Żłobicki (2002); M. Pryszmont-Ciesielska (2010); A. Lis-Kujawski (2010)
Interpersonal relations	A. Janowski A. (1989); R. Meighan (1993); H. Rylke, G. Klimowicz (1992); M. Karkowska, W. Czarnecka (1994); E. Siarkiewicz (2000); W. Żłobicki (2002); M. Pryszmont-Ciesielska (2010); A. Lis-Kujawski (2010)
Organisation conditions	A. Janowski A. (1989); R. Meighan R. (1993); M. Karkowska, W. Czarnecka (1994); E. Siarkiewicz (2000); W. Żłobicki (2002); M. Pryszmont-Ciesielska (2010); A. Lis-Kujawski (2010)
Violence (structural and symbolic)	R. Meighan (1993); Z. Kwieciński (1995); B. Śliwerski (1998); E. Siarkiewicz (2000); W. Żłobicki (2002); M. Pryszmont-Ciesielska (2010); A. Lis-Kujawski (2010)

[21] See E. Siarkiewicz, *Ostatni bastion. Jawne i ukryte wymiary pracy przedszkola*, Kraków 2000; A. Nalaskowski, *Przestrzenie i miejsca szkoły*, Kraków 2002; M. Pryszmont-Ciesielska, *Ukryty program edukacji akademickiej*, Wrocław 2010; A. Lis-Kujawski, *Moje „ja" i szkoła integracyjna. Zjawiska ukrytego programu w nauczaniu uczniów niepełnosprawnych*, Kraków 2008.

EXAMPLES OF STUDY AREAS ON THE HIDDEN CURRICULUM	SELECTED PRIMARY SOURCES
Textbooks, curricula and education and upbringing expected outcomes	R. Meighan (1993); E. Siarkiewicz (2000); W. Żłobicki (2002); M. Pryszmont-Ciesielska (2010); A. Lis-Kujawski (2010); A. Jurek (2011)
Professional role of the teacher, teacher training	A. Janowski (1989); H. Rylke, G. Klimowicz (1992); R. Meighan (1993); M. Karkowska, W. Czarnecka (1994); M.B. Ginsburg, R.T. Clift (1997); R. Kwiecińska, Z. Kwieciński (1997); B. Śliwerski (2001); E. Siarkiewicz (2000); W. Żłobicki (2002); A. Lis-Kujawski (2010); M. Pryszmont-Ciesielska (2010)

Table 1. Review of selected publications on the hidden curriculum (source: author's study)

SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT

Speaking of the hidden curriculum of the school environment, it is worth considering how the building itself is perceived by different groups of people connected with it. It can be assumed that for pupils it is a meeting place with other pupils; it is the venue where they spend a significant part of the day and experience the diverse, sometimes toxic activities of teachers; it is where survival strategies are often resorted to[22]. For teachers, the school building is a few selected rooms: the teacher's room where the time at school usually starts and ends; the classroom(s) where students sit in a fixed arrangement of benches, but no one can predict the course of events that will take place during the lesson. For parents, this will be the school classroom they know from their periodic meetings with teachers, the principal's office, and the school auditorium where the celebrations take place. Parents are rarely really "invited" to come to a school other than for parent-teacher conferences, where they sit on the same side of the room as their children, while the teacher takes his or her privileged position at the front. Staying in the school building at the

[22] See A. Janowski, *Uczeń w teatrze życia szkolnego*, op. cit., p. 199–222.

parent-teacher conference may be associated with feeling discomfort not only mentally, but also physically, because parents are often forced by circumstances to spend the meeting in uncomfortable, too small chairs, and in winter they sit in outer clothes for lack of a cloakroom. For administrative staff, school can be a place of complications in the form of cleaning classrooms, repairing benches and chairs, replacing broken windows and broken power switches. For the visitor, the school consists of several selected rooms, which can be proudly shown during meetings of educational professionals. A politician, in turn, may associate the school with the assembly hall, the venue of major events and being cast in the role of a *guest of honour*. It can be assumed that all the above participants in the process of using the school building have their own, very specific image of it. At the same time, each of them feels or creates some barriers or difficulties in using specialised rooms. For example, the teacher's room and the principal's office are usually difficult to reach for students. A politician rarely looks into the school classroom and a visiting teacher-pedagogue rarely looks into the room of a school janitor. Even the school principal, depending on his or her own pedagogical competence, can bypass pupils' locker rooms or corridors during breaks. Security companies and camera systems, which are becoming increasingly common in school buildings and are supposed to provide security for students and teachers, add to the image of secrecy of the school environment. Restrictions on the availability of school premises for its customers (students and parents) may therefore justify associations with a fortress, a defensive and inaccessible place. However, there are also examples of the school being sensitive to the needs of students and arrange the school space in such a way that common, typical inconveniences and difficulties disappear.

In the context of giving meaning to school premises, let's try to explain the functions that school lavatories can perform. Stereotypically commenting on the lamentable condition of many of them, the most common opinion is that students lack personal culture and that their manners have reached the bottom. But from the point of view of the hidden curriculum one can hypothesize that the school is a place of permanent control of students by teachers, while the restrooms are one of the few enclaves free from such control. It seems that students

consider lavatories as their territory, as opposed to classrooms, corridors and offices. The size of the sanitary facilities in the school is probably also important. It is hard to imagine a group of friends meeting in a home toilet, but such opportunities are provided by the school's large-room sanitary facilities. The difference between school and home toilets is not only the size, but often the house one is clean, there is no shortage of toilet paper and soap. If there is a shortage of cleaning products in these places at school, not only does this have unpleasant visual and olfactory consequences but it also leads to the perception of contradictions with the functions they are supposed to perform – students among them particularly emphasize the acute lack of intimacy and poor hygiene. Here, in particular, frustration with bad grades and conflicts with teachers can be vented and school subculture can develop. This also explains the circumstances under which this place changes its original purpose. The credibility of this claim is enhanced by clean, intimate teachers-only lavatories which are inaccessible to students.

It is also worth noting the research of Aleksander Nalaskowski, who together with his team conducted a survey among 98 students, 35 teachers and 45 parents in junior high schools. The nature of the research did not justify far-reaching generalizations, but it helped to compare the perception of the school by educational entities. It turned out that nearly half of the students did not like the school the most, followed by teachers (41 percent) and about a third of the surveyed parents. This means a clearly low level of acceptance of the institution in which the teachers and the learners live. Clear discrepancies can also be noticed when we look at the comparison of parents', pupils' and teachers' opinions on the places where students feel good. According to 63 percent of parents, the classroom is such a place, yet only 9 percent of pupils share this view. Moreover, every fourth pupil signals that they would rather spend time in the corridor, yet only every twelfth parent believes that the children feel well there. The reality described by pupils is therefore not in line with the parents' opinion that school (identified with the classroom and lessons) is a child-friendly space.

	LOCKER ROOM	WC	PLAY-GROUND	AREA OUT-SIDE THE SCHOOL	OFFICE[23]	NOOKS AND CRANIES[24]
STUDENTS	11%	17%	4%	18%	0%	48%
TEACHERS	8%	34%	18%	0%	7%	0%
PARENTS	0%	0%	28%	6%	39%	0%

Table 2. Where students go when they feel bad? (source: A. Nalaskowski, *Przestrzenie i miejsca szkoły*, op. cit., p. 18)

If we look at the above table, we will see that the parents' and teachers' image of the use of school space by students is disturbingly different from the truth revealed by the kids themselves. According to nearly 40 percent of parents, in difficult situations their children go to school to get help from a school pedagogue, teachers, etc. Such belief in the effectiveness of school authorities is undermined by students, every other one of whom hides in the nooks and crannies, and every fifth one goes outside the school grounds or to the toilet. Every third teacher thinks that the place where the students experiencing problems meet is the school toilet, which, according to Aleksander Nalaskowski[25], can be considered a kind of an opinion about the kids. The above discrepancies in the perception of school space can be seen as another proof of the existence of a hidden curriculum in the school.

A. Lis-Kujawski's research on the functioning of students with disabilities also provides examples of a hidden curriculum of school space[26]. For example, students who use a wheelchair and stay in the classroom during recess (often for safety reasons) may be perceived as isolating from informal contacts with their peers. Contradictions can also be found in the school's separate toilets for students with disabilities. They see it as a convenience, provided that it is not accompanied

[23] The overall term "office" means contact with the school pedagogue, principal, teachers, etc.

[24] For the purposes of this interpretation, "nooks and crannies" means places that are under permanent supervision of teachers and school staff. These may be window niches, wall bends, distant and darkened corners, mezzanines, etc.

[25] A. Nalaskowski, *Przestrzenie i miejsca szkoły*, op. cit., p. 19.

[26] A. Lis-Kujawski, *Moje „ja" i szkoła integracyjna*, op. cit., p. 166–167.

by a whole series of difficulties in the form of searching for the key to the toilet, the behaviour of auxiliary staff, etc.

Analyses of Martyna Pryszmont-Ciesielska on the hidden curriculum of academic education also provide multiple intriguing conclusions about the arrangement of the teaching and extra-curricular space of the university[27]. It turned out that dominant in seminar rooms was the traditional frontal arrangement of chairs and benches, which made it easier for academics to communicate with their audiences, but which also made discussion and exchange of views between students more difficult. In the case of large rooms, it cannot be ruled out that the fact that students occupy the last benches makes it easier for them to participate passively in class. Formally increasing the distance between academic education actors and even strengthening the teacher's domination over students is also fostered by the specific location of the teacher's desks, which clearly emphasises the division of the classroom into student zones and teacher sections.

TEXTBOOKS, CURRICULA AND EDUCATION AND UPBRINGING EXPECTED OUTCOMES

Reflections on the hidden curriculum of textbooks are supposed to sensitise teachers, parents and pupils to the incongruency, manipulation and negligence that may be characteristic of the books currently used in schools. This may make it easier to mitigate the negative effects of the hidden curriculum. In mass schools, books (textbooks, compulsory reading) continue to be the most important and widely used teaching resource. Depending on the concept of didactic work, they can serve as the sole and most important guide to the subject, or they can be only one of the many elements through which students gain knowledge. The existence of a curriculum hidden in textbooks for many post-war years was related to the practice of ideological treatment of the servant role of school textbooks in relation to the often similarly servant ideological agenda. In practice, there was only one curriculum for a given subject which was assigned one single

[27] M. Pryszmont-Ciesielska, *Ukryty program edukacji akademickiej*, op. cit., p. 199–205.

textbook. Furthermore, the stigma of ideology had an impact on every innovation in Polish education, since the majority of changes, both concerning the curricula and the textbooks, were the result of political changes. The social and political breakthrough after 1989 restored "textbook pluralism" which was present in the interwar period. The growing number of textbooks admitted for school use does not mean that the problem of unintentional messages or deliberate manipulations contained in them has disappeared. *Słownik języka polskiego* [*Dictionary of the Polish Language*] defines a textbook as a "a book used for education, containing a set of fundamental information from a specific discipline, presented in a clear and transparent manner". In the context of the hidden curriculum, we may actually take interest in the clarity and transparency of the presented knowledge and the educational outcomes that may result from the student's contact with the textbook. In classical analyses, we would rather evaluate the informational, transformational, research, self-education, control, and corrective functions[28]. However, let us look at it from the point of view of the credibility of knowledge, the substantive reliability of the information provided and the attractiveness and aesthetics of the content provided, both in terms of language and visuals (quality of paper, print, drawings, illustrations, etc.). The results of Anna Jurek's research, whose PhD thesis on "Methods of learning to read and write from the perspective of students' difficulties" can be considered a great example of revealing the hidden curriculum of Polish language teaching in early childhood education, are shocking, indeed[29]. Although the author herself does not use the concept of the hidden curriculum, she claims that the lack of thinking about reading and writing as a long-term process, requiring systemic methodological solutions, is the main cause of difficulties in mastering reading and writing skills for many students. This is confirmed by the far, 29th position of Polish students in the 2006 PIRLS International Reading Literacy Study, where 45 countries participated[30]. The doctoral dissertation showed that there are

[28] C. Kupisiewicz, *Podstawy dydaktyki ogólnej*, Warszawa 1976, p. 106–110.

[29] See A. Jurek, *Metody nauki czytania i pisania z perspektywy trudności uczniów*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wrocław, Wrocław 2011.

[30] See PIRLS 2006. *Jak czytają dzieci w Polsce i na świecie*, ed. K. Konarzewski, Warszawa 2007.

many inconsistencies, contradictions and errors in the textbooks and exercises of integrated education used in Polish schools.

It is worth noting at this point the theory of reconstructing culture presented by Basil Bernstein[31]. The author emphasizes that textbooks play a singular role in exercising symbolic control over education. From the moment a child has acquired reading and writing skills, in a sense he becomes independent of the teacher and enters a personal, unique educational pathway. Books can be used to search for knowledge in an individual way. However, textbooks often impose and organize knowledge according to a clearly outlined scheme of learning progress, establish relatively clear, simplified criteria, show hierarchies and seemingly remove uncertainties. In the structure of the classroom team, they become a source of specific information for each child about their learning progress in relation to other students. Thus, a hierarchy is created in the classroom, with the teacher as the manager of the textbooks at the top. Roland Meighan looked at the problem from a different perspective, claiming that "The classroom may also be said to be haunted by the book writers [...]"[32]. In order to prove this claim, he presents the results of analyses according to which in the readings of early school education, which are aimed at improving reading skills and gaining knowledge about the world, nationalistic and racist content was also conveyed, containing elements of gender discrimination and social prejudices. Radical views on this issue were expressed by John Holt, who scathingly denounced traditional education, claiming that "even in the most uncontroversial areas of our teaching, the books and textbooks we give to children represent a dishonest and distorted image of the world"[33]. In the transmission of knowledge, the category of truth is replaced by immediate usability or even manipulation. The aim is to ensure that children at school think, live and act in a way that is consistent with the aims adopted by adults. Similar tendencies were noted by Andrzej Janowski in his multifaceted study of school class, based on analyses of Western literature[34]. He pointed out that in school, myths

31 See B. Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control*, Vol. 3, London 1977, p. 118.

32 R. Meighan, *A Sociology of Educating*, op. cit., p. 56.

33 J. Holt, *How Children Fail*, Harmondsworth 1970, p. 168, [after:] A. Janowski, *Uczeń w teatrze życia szkolnego*, op. cit., p. 197.

34 See A. Janowski, *Uczeń w teatrze życia szkolnego*, op. cit., p. 66–69.

and fairy tales are used to convey some moral, although sometimes they may carry messages that contradict the intentions of teachers.

The choice of content in textbooks can be considered as a measure of the presence of the hidden curriculum. A specific example of this hidden curriculum in books is also content that makes it difficult for students to recognize the cultural aspects of gender identity. Sara Delamont described this as "sexism", which is "stereotypical judgement of people, using their sex as the principal factor"[35]. Like racism, based on biased thinking about people's characteristics according to their skin colour, sexism perpetuates and reinforces cultural differences in the perception of women and men. The author points to many examples of stereotypical gender division in mother tongue primers: e.g. doctors are men and women are nurses; garden work is done by the father rather than the mother; arithmetic tasks refer not to the father but to the mother, who sends the child to a shop for purchases. Stereotypes of male and female behaviours are also present in the context of aesthetic values belonging to the sexes. The integrated education textbook introduces the notions of order and mess, emphasizing the educational significance of caring for the aesthetics of the environment. This is illustrated by two drawings depicting a girl playing with dolls in a tidy, spic and span room, while a boy's room is in total disorder. Both illustrations may imply that the love of order is typical of girls, while boys typically lack aesthetic sense and adore mess[36].

INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION

As Hanna Rylke and Grażyna Klimowicz have indicated, of more importance in interactions with students than the established and adopted official curriculum may be teachers' unconscious feeling, atti-

[35] See S. Delamont, *Sex Roles and the School*, London 1980, [after:] A. Janowski, *Uczeń w teatrze życia szkolnego*, op. cit., p. 67–69.

[36] See S. Łukasik, H. Petkowicz, H. Dobrowolska, P. Karaszewski, J. Straburzyńska, E. Witkowska, *Wesoła szkoła. Kształcenie zintegrowane w klasie 1. Podręcznik, Część 4*, Warszawa 2000, p. 53; S. Łukasik, H. Petkowicz, H. Dobrowolska, P. Karaszewski, J. Straburzyńska, E. Witkowska, *Wesoła szkoła. Kształcenie zintegrowane w klasie 1. Podręcznik, Część 1*, Warszawa 2000, p. 30.

tudes, needs, believes, and views[37]. In other words, the level of teachers' self-assessment and self-knowledge, emotional state, awareness of the mechanisms that distort personal communication has a major impact on the education process.

Among many attempts to determine the role of interpersonal relations in building a hidden educational curriculum, one should indicate e.g. the study by Magda Karkowska and Wiesława Czarnecka, which described the interactions between teachers and students in everyday school life, i.e. during classes[38]. The ethnographic research of school lessons helped to distinguish between the different stages of the lesson and the corresponding specific interactions. Thus, in the first part of the lesson, the pupils waited for the arrival of the teacher (it took from 5 to 15 minutes), who then checked for a few minutes who was present, tried to silence the pupils and commented on their behaviour. These were some of the statements made at that time:

– "*Oh, Jesus, how many are absent!*" "*Be quiet, it's not a village fair!*" "*You're not in the woods*".

The following section of the class was usually dedicated to knowledge control, ushered in with such phrases:

– "*And now we'll revise our last lesson. Who has few grades here? Krawczykówna, here we go*";
– "*Close your textbooks and copybooks. Let us revise our last lesson*".

The pupils giving answers heard often ironic comments:

– "*He's grunting here, o my! I have a supplementary question. Are you prepared? Because it seems to me that you're not*";
– "*Do not pull the wool over my eyes; just answer the questions*".

During assessment, such opinions were uttered, among others:

– "*Marek! I am giving you a C plus. I can tell you that you can learn, but you need to be present in class. Yet you can be found more often in the canteen than in the classroom*".

Only after the completion of the audit phase did the lesson proper start, during which the teachers often gave lectures or dictated the content to be noted down. This was accompanied by authoritative opinions and interpretations that took the initiative away from the pupils:

[37] See H. Rylke, G. Klimowicz, *Szkoła dla ucznia. Jak uczyć życia z ludźmi*, op. cit., p. 34.
[38] See M. Karkowska, W. Czarnecka, *Przemoc w szkole*, Kraków 1994, p. 53–62.

– "*What did the poet mean here? Listen up!*
– (here the teacher reads out a fragment of a hymn by Słowacki) – *In front of me you're putting out a flaming star in azure waters...*
– A *flaming star – what did the poet mean here? – Come on?* (there is silence in the classroom) – *The sun! In other words, instead of using the word sin he used a feature of the sun, the most characteristic one, or the luminosity, and referred to the luminous star, or a flaming star* [...]"

The study found far more observations of the teacher's verbal behaviour that can be considered as hampering student work at school. The few examples presented above are only an illustration of the problem.

The analysis of the hidden curriculum was also undertaken by Elżbieta Siarkiewicz, who recorded radically different relations in the sphere of communication in the kindergarten environment, in two groups of children functioning in very similar conditions[39]. Based on the observation of communication processes in two groups of preschool children with similar characteristics (six-year-old children, teachers with similar work experience and education backgrounds, classes in rooms with similar spatial arrangement, the same observation hours from 6.00 a.m. to 8.30 p.m.), the author pointed to a significant difference in the educational outcomes of the work of two teachers. In group A, the teacher's communication with children was based on the following: statements about the legitimacy of her own actions and the need to comply with directives; threats, mocking, questions. The teacher's use of rewards, suggestions or deceptions was clearly instrumental. In group B, on the other hand, the communication between the teacher and the children was based on the rules in force in the kindergarten, but in the area defined by the norms (orders and prohibitions) the children were free to create their own rules. The teacher's communication with children showed: information and directives, justifications for action, incentives, positive assessments, questions. In this group, external impact was replaced by agreement. The table below shows the different effects of the acts of communication as registered by Elżbieta Siarkiewicz.

[39] See E. Siarkiewicz, *Ostatni bastion*, op. cit., p. 160–175.

GROUP A	GROUP B
Learning to wait, be patient and do nothing.	Learning to wait.
Exercise in taking a submissive or rebellious attitude (giving at least a temporary profit).	Learning shared decision-making.
Learning to look for illegal ways of avoiding imposed rules (picking up toys, using the teacher's inattention).	Getting used to asking the teacher about all intentions and appealing to the teacher as an authority in all matters.
Becoming convinced that nothing depends on them (the kids themselves), that they have very limited influence on what can be done, sometimes even teaches helplessness.	Children explore a clearly defined area in which they can make their own decisions, and clearly defined limits.
Acquiring resistance to prohibitions, orders and shouting, a growing sense of own helplessness.	Learning to obey prohibitions and instructions.
Strengthening the belief that the teacher's decisions are valid only in the situation of control.	Learning to respect the teacher and his or her decisions, developing a belief in the existence of constant control and real consequences of decisions.
Acquiring the conviction of impunity for reprehensible actions when the controller is inconsistent (washing hands).	Training in basic social skills (washing hands before and after meals, greeting, avoiding noisy conversations).
Feeling threatened in non-transparent situations.	Ensuring a sense of security thanks to the constant presence of a teacher with children.
Increasing shyness or aggression in children.	Learning to respect one's own individuality and identity.

Table 3. Intended and "side" educational outcomes in the work of a nursery in two observed groups (source: E. Siarkiewicz, *Ostatni bastion*, op. cit., p. 170)

Analysing the above table we can see that we are dealing with the consequences of the hidden curriculum (contrary to the official one), implemented by the teacher of group A. An additional argument in favour of such an interpretation of the effects of interpersonal behaviour may be the recording of free conversations with children from both

groups[40]. Asked: "*Do you like being to the nursery*?" – kids from group A responded briefly: "*well*; *so-so*; *yet*, *I do*; *it is great*". What is striking is the lack of spontaneous development of these statements. The answers of the group B children were radically different and offered reasons: "*there are a lot of toys here*; *it's funny*; *in kindergarten I have Tomek, Jarek and other friends*; *here you can fool around*; *I'm not bored*; *our teacher is nice*; *she sings us songs*; *she reads fairy tales*; *we can talk to her and play charades*; *the teacher only shouts when someone messes up*; *our teacher likes children*". It is therefore clear that the hidden dimension of interpersonal communication also has a clear negative impact on the pre-school education process.

STRUCTURAL AND SYMBOLIC VIOLENCE

The claim that educational outcomes are politically, socially and economically conditions is not new. This conditioning makes "Every educational system is a political means of maintaining or modifying the appropriateness of discourses with the knowledge and power they bring with them"[41]. The discourse referred to above should be understood as a system of knowledge, concepts or thoughts legitimized in social practices. Thus, an indivisible configuration of power and knowledge is created, because whoever holds power has knowledge and vice versa. This phenomenon is referred to as structural violence to emphasize that we are dealing, generally speaking, with the dependence of education and teaching on the political, social and economic context of the functioning of the state[42]. In education, this is reflected, among other things, in the imposition of organisational structures by the state authorities, which enable the implementation of a centralist model of management and supervision. Management of this nature is initiated at the central level and has a clear hierarchical character.

40 Ibidem, p. 176.

41 M. Foucault, [after:] *Foucault and Education. Disciplines and Knowledge*, ed. S. J. Ball, London 1990, p. 3.

42 See J. Galtung, "Violence, Peace and Research", *Journal of Peace Research* 1969, Vol. 6, [after:] Z. Kwieciński, *Socjopatologia edukacji*, Olecko 1995, p. 124–125.

The reflections on the involvement of people working in schools in the mechanisms of secret violence in no way attempt to discredit the competences of teaching professionals. It is rather a matter of indicating phenomena dangerous for the participants of education, i.e. students, parents and teachers. Consideration of the possibilities of "softening" the violence transmitted by the school can be concluded with a sceptical conclusion. When we think about school and relations between generations that meet within its walls, a conviction about limited possibilities of experiencing creative confrontation between younger and older people is inexorably revealed. According to Heinrich Dauber, adults since Hammurabi deprived the emerging generation to impart meaning and sense to their own experiences[43]. Has the inscription engraved in cuneiform about four thousand years ago, attributing laziness, stubbornness and disrespect for tradition to the "youth of the time", become obsolete? It turns out that it has not, because the school has been using behavioural assessments, an effective tool for structural violence, for years[44].

Taking up the topic of the phenomenon of symbolic violence, it is worth mentioning Basil Bernstein's view that the educational knowledge disseminated and its methods of selection, classification, distribution, transmission, and evaluation reflect both the distribution of power and the principles of social control[45]. From this point of view, class relations permeate in a covert way to the " assumptions, rules and practices of the school, differentiating and contrasting students according to their class origin, giving privilege to the few, and many refusing it"[46]. The author therefore drew attention to the relationship between communication and the effectiveness of educational processes. As a teacher in one of London's districts, he noticed a discrepancy between the forms of communication characteristic of the school institution and those spontaneously practiced by some students. As a sociolinguist, he began a pioneering research in which he tried to answer the question why children from working class backgrounds

43 See H. Dauber, *Podstawy pedagogiki humanistycznej. Zintegrowane układy między terapią i polityką*, Kraków 2001, p. 35–36.

44 B. Śliwerski, *Program wychowawczy szkoły*, Warszawa 2001, p. 135–147.

45 See B. Bernstein, *Class, Codes and Control*, Vol. 3, op. cit., p. 77.

46 B. Bernstein, *Odtwarzanie kultury*, Warszawa 1990, p. 277.

displayed relatively weaker school performance compared to middle class children (they achieved lower school results, dropped out earlier, had poorer test results, had a low percentage of "academic success", etc.). The sources of these inequalities were found in the existence of two types of communication codes: an advanced on (characteristic of the school) and a limited one (characteristic of some students). Social conditions were closely related to them and therefore the essence of the restricted code is, among others, its small linguistic complexity. The majority of working families, due to their cultural position, use the limited code and the socialization of the child takes place in a very simple language, while the school created by the middle class, by definition, uses the advanced code[47].

Contemporary critical pedagogy analyses the conditions of school activity, taking into account the forms and content of educational codes, organizational solutions, working methods, etc. It would be worthwhile to answer the question whether theoretical and empirical aspects of the analysis of the hidden curriculum of the school itself should not be used more widely in research on the educational context of social phenomena in general. Assuming that the hidden curriculum exists not only in the school but also in every institution or group of people, perhaps it should be treated as an element of the surrounding reality. For the educator, a meaningful example of this is what can be termed a discriminatory treatment of children by public television (in comparison with the treatment of adults). Most TV news and commentary programmes are accompanied by subtitles visible on the screen with the speaker's given name and surname. Especially when well-known politicians speak, subtitles appear shortly afterwards and we can read the speaker's name, even when they are well-known and sometimes too frequently appear on the silver screen. This is not

[47] Scientists taking into account Polish social realities also spoke on this issue. The works of Maria Dąbrowska-Bąk (See *Szkoła w systemie przemocy strukturalnej*, Poznań 1999), Zbigniew Kwieciński (See *Socjopatologia edukacji*, op. cit.), Anna Sawisz (See "System oświaty jako system przemocy symbolicznej w koncepcji Pierre Bourdieu", *Studia Socjologiczne* 1978, No. 2), and Bogusław Śliwerski (See *Edukacja autorska*, Kraków 1996; *Jak zmieniać szkołę? Studia z polityki oświatowej i pedagogiki porównawczej*, Kraków 1998) provide many valuable theoretical and empirical analyses that show the problem of covert structural and symbolic violence in Polish education. In the above publications one can find a considerable amount of knowledge on this subject.

the case when young people speak. They usually remain anonymous for the viewer. A similar phenomenon can also be found in many programmes directed especially at children. In theatre performances with the participation of children and professional actors, the names of adults are always indicated, while the participation of children is usually confirmed by a succinct phrase "and children". This impersonal treatment of children in TV programs should be considered another manifestation of the hidden curriculum.

CONCLUSION

The above considerations can be seen as an example of radical criticism of education and its conditions. In fact, however, the concept of the hidden curriculum seems to make it easier to diagnose and verify empirically the discrepancies between what is official and declared and what is implicit and real. It is also necessary to mention the strategies that can be adopted in relation to the hidden curriculum in education[48]. First of all, to recognise its existence, but not to use it to study and interpret reality. Secondly, to take a completely different view: taking advantage of the concept of the hidden curriculum, changing school practice, the environment and the way teachers act. Thirdly, to consider the radical idea of de-schoolers, thanks to which the liquidation of the school institution will obliterate the hidden curriculum as well. Fourthly, to recognise that if the school creates neat, obedient and polite people who are at the same time focused on individual competition, there is no need to argue and fight because this is probably what society needs.

Observation of the educational reality leads to the conclusion that passivity is the dominant approach to the existence of the hidden curriculum; attempts are made to maintain a specific status quo or to completely ignore this phenomenon. In this article I have tried to show, like some researchers and practitioners involved in the mainstream of humanistic approach to education, that I tend to recognize various contradictions and deformations of education and creative involvement in designing changes.

48 See E. Vallance, "Hiding the Hidden Curriculum", op. cit.

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Abstract:

The hidden curriculum concept is an example of an interdisciplinary approach in which educational processes were analysed from a sociological perspective. It turns out that education is not neutral to political, economic, social, and cultural influences. This results in the emergence of phenomena that disrupt the teaching and learning process in the entire education system, not excluding kindergartens, schools of all types and universities. As a consequence, we can talk about limiting the subjectivity of man and strengthening in education the tendency to authoritarianism and symbolic violence.

Keywords:

education, school, student, teacher, hidden curriculum

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STRATEGIES OF POWER, TACTICS OF EMANCIPATION. HIDDEN CURRICULUM AND PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE EDUCATION OF TEACHERS[1]

One sounds the words of the master and the words of the student; so who to listen?
Kiddushin 52

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES. THEORY VERSUS PRACTICE AND PROBLEMS WITH CONDITIONS OF EMANCIPATION

The dichotomy of the official and hidden curriculum seems to duplicate the specific perception of the relationship between theory and practice prevailing in humanities, and thus inherit the troublesome permeation and mutual conditioning of the opposing dimensions observed by researchers. It is difficult to describe the position of subjects

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in the face of such a divided educational reality, i.e. their position in the face of conditions which, on the one hand, should remain inaccessible to the consciousness of actors operating in school in order to have a hidden but effective influence on their behaviour, shape their attitudes, and, on the other hand, constitute a permanent component of the practice of those actors, the practice they co-create and reproduce adapting each time to the requirements of the constantly changing situation. The ambiguity of the impact of the hidden curriculum is that, in order to move smoothly and successfully within their own area, participants in school activities need to have a certain amount of knowledge about which they cannot know. Therefore, it is difficult to decide whether the critical approach demystifying the hidden curriculum includes the conditions created by the institution or the knowledge resources, attitudes and motivations of the participants of the events taking place in it. Critical pedagogy, closer to Marxism-related sociology in this sociology, in its commitment to the interests of diagnosis tends to ontologize the hidden curriculum, placing it on the side of the reality of the institution, rather than trying to answer the question why there is a circulation, shifts and displacements within it and between it and the officially established school practice, or why the diagnosed hidden curriculum remains without any effect on some school education participants. In this tendency to establish the ontology of the hidden curriculum, there would be nothing perverse if it were not for the fact that such a critical approach and deterministic definition of the situation blocks the emancipatory initiative. It assumes that the participants of the school practice are not able to free themselves from the factors implicitly moulding them without changing the external conditions and ontologies of the situation. However, imposing these changes does not lead to the empowerment of the subject, he/she will still remain controlled from the outside. One can only guess that the content of the hidden curriculum will undergo a metamorphosis.

Similarly, the research and analyses of the hidden curriculum presented to the students of the art of education takes the form of parallel official documents, such as general statements or norms which, not realized and disintegrating the established school routine, are derived from and accompany the legally accepted conditions of school practice. The disclosure of these norms in accordance with the intention

of emancipatory pedagogy would motivate to change the practice, its transformation, accepting as the norms new directives determining the conduct , leads again to the routine, habit and creation of the area of what is unaware in action. At the same time, it is assumed that this 'new' hidden agenda will not be disintegrating and motivating to take a critical stance by researchers of the hidden curriculum, but it will be coordinated in a modernist way, eliminating numerous discrepancies with what is intentional and officially allowed to participate in school practice. From the point of view of emancipatory pedagogy, the critical reference to the content of the hidden curriculum and the adoption of new directives of procedure, on the basis of the current state of affairs, cannot provide a credible answer to the question of what side effects the change in practice will entail, dictated by the desire to prevent the effects of the hidden curriculum diagnosed in other conditions. The research interest seems to be critically secured, but is unable to serve as a basis for emancipatory school practice. The new situation requires new research, which for teachers and students may mean a constant regression. The intentions of studying the hidden curriculum do not seem to be so much erroneous as distorting the roles of power, subject and significance of the dynamics of practices taking place in the school space.

KORCZAK THE ANTHROPOLOGIST

In October 1912, new residents moved into the unfinished Orphanage House at 92 Krochmalna Street, where Henryk Goldszmit became the director. Within a short period of time, the director, known from numerous publications as Janusz Korczak, instilled a number of innovative solutions in the organization of the House, including the establishment of the Peer Court. The Court applies to everyone, both staff and children. It shall meet once a week and five judges shall be chosen by random drawing for each fifty cases to be tried. Sentences are passed on the basis of the Code, which is regulated by the Judicial Council appointed in a secret ballot. Within six months, Korczak submits himself to the court five times. He writes down as follows:

> I assessed the value of the Court and the usefulness of the code during the one-year trial period. The smallest number of cases during a week – fifty; the largest – a hundred and thirty. Twenty five issues of the Court Gazette were published in that year. The first [...] was issued after the first month of the experiment. The ninth issue appeared six months later when the Court was suspended for four weeks. After the intermission, the Judicial Board was set up and Court Gazette No. 19 reported on its activity. It will be best, it seems to me, to tell how things went [...][2].

So he does.

ROUTINE, PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND DISCIPLINARY POWER IN THE LIGHT OF THE STRUCTURATION THEORY BY ANTHONY GIDDENS

Emphasizing the role of individual reflection and practical consciousness in the constitution of social actions is an essential feature of the structuration theory developed by Anthony Giddens. It also assumes that most of the social interactions in which we participate in everyday life take the routine character because of our specific need to maintain a sense of ontological security[3], stabilisation and synchronisation of identity, actions and situations. Routine characterizes both the subject as social situations in which he or he is involved.

> Routine – according to Giddens – is integral both to the continuity of the personality of the agent, as he or she moves along the paths of daily

[2] J. Korczak, "How to Love a Child", [in:] J. Korczak, *Selected Works*, Warsaw 1967, p. 371–372.

[3] A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration*, Cambridge 1984, p. 60. "A sense of trust in the continuity of the object-world and in the fabric of social activity [...] depends upon certain specifiable connections between the individual agent and the social contexts through which that agent moves in the course of day-to-day life" (Ibidem). Gidden draws the notion of ontological security from the theory of identity development by Erik H. Erikson (see Ibidem, p. 51–64). To read more on ontological security see also: A. Giddens, "The Self. Ontological Security and Existential Anxiety", [in:] A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge 1991, p. 35–69.

> activities, and to the institutions of society, which are such only through their continued reproduction[4].

Routine does not lead to the automation of social interactions, and through them social life, reminiscent of the monologues of characters from Eugene Ionesco's works. However,

> Routine is founded in tradition, custom or habit, but it is a major error to suppose that these phenomena need no explanation, that they are simply repetitive forms of behaviour carried out 'mindlessly'[5].

Reconstructing the identity of the subject and social institutions has to cope with the space-time uniformity of daily reality, in which nothing remains inseparable and permanent. According to Giddens, the introduction of such continuity by finding an appropriate time and place for the realization of the remembered patterns of behaviour, cleared of the dense context of past experiences, is an inalienable effort of entities trying to maintain, in spite of numerous obstacles, the relative predictability of the co-created situation. Each reincarnation of behaviour patterns present in the memory, placing them in a new context, requires from the actor a social creative initiative, sensitivity to incompatibilities, as well as a constant responsive observation of the reactions of others to the actions initiated by him/her.

> Ordinary day-to-day social life, by contrast – in greater or lesser degree, according to context and the vagaries of individual personality – involves an ontological security founded on an autonomy of bodily control within predictable routines and encounters. The routinized character of the paths a long which individuals move in the reversible time of daily life does not just 'happen'. It is 'made to happen' by the modes of reflexive monitoring of action which individuals sustain in circumstances of co-presence[6].

4 A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 60. The main assumptions of the theory of structuration are listed by Giddens in the last chapter of the book *The Constitution of Society*, entitled: "Structuration Theory, Empirical Research and Social Critique" (see Ibidem, p. 281–288).

5 Ibidem, p. 86.

6 Ibidem, p. 64. I try to approach reflexivity in the categories of translation hermeneu-

Thanks to a skilful adaptation, the subject can feel safe with himself or herself, stimulate self-confidence in others, thus encouraging to adopt an equally open attitude. Cooperation in such conditions can foster coordination and the achievement of mutually non-translatable goals set by the individuals who contribute to the course of the meeting. Maintaining the developed together definition of the situation[7] of a meeting as a dialogue depends then on the mutual decision. The meeting may any time be cancelled or drastically change its character. Sometimes once and for all.

Giddens does not assume that the conditions of the meeting are transparent to the participants or to third parties or researchers. The participants of the meeting are not united by unanimity of consciousness, in their autonomy the subjects must remain inaccessible to each other, they communicate, but they are separated from each other. Also, the scenery of the meeting is perceived selectively and differently by each of the actors, used and interpreted in varying ways – it should be noted that these acts of perception and reading the details of the scenery are also subject to routine processes. Similarly, despite the fact that the actor monitors the course of the meeting in a reflective way, certain areas of his own participation in it are not directly and discursively

tics proposed by George Steiner and individual power of judgment by Hannah Arendt, see G. Steiner, "Understanding as Translation", [in:] G. Steiner, *After Babel. Aspects of Language and Translation*, Oxford 1992; H. Arendt, "Some Questions of Moral Philosophy" and "Thinking and Moral Considerations", [in:] H. Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*, ed. J. Kohn, New York 2003.

7 "Whenever individuals come together in a specific context they confront [...] the question 'What is going on here?' 'What is going on?' is unlikely to admit of a simple answer because in all social situations there may be many things 'going on' simultaneously. But participants in interaction address this question characteristically on the level of practice, gearing their conduct to that of others. Or, if they pose such an question discursively, it is in relation to one particular aspect of the situation that appears puzzling or disturbing" (A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 87). This term is used by Erving Goffman, on whose concept Giddens bases his structuration theory to a large extent. Goffman observes: "Regardless of the particular objective which the individual has in mind and of his motive for having this objective, it will be in his interests to control the conduct of the others, especially their responsive treatment of him. This control is achieved largely by influencing the definition of the situation which the others come to formulate, and he can influence this definition by expressing himself in such a way as to give them the kind of impression that will lead them to act voluntarily in accordance with his own plan" (E. Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, Edinburgh 1956, p. 2-3; see also: Ibidem, p. 1–9).

available to him. Giddens divides the knowledge of a single actor between three instances, the discursive consciousness, the practical consciousness and the unconscious, thus arranging the triad developed by Sigmund Freud for the needs of structuration theory. As he explains,

> Practical consciousness involves recall which the agent has access in the *durée* of action without being able to express what he or she thereby 'knows'. The unconscious refers to modes of recall to which the agent does not have direct access because there is a negative 'bar' of some kind inhibiting its unmediated incorporation within the reflexive monitoring of conduct and, more particularly, within discursive consciousness[8].

The theory of structuration assumes that a significant part of the knowledge, including, among others, patterns of action, being deposited within the bodily space-time continuum of a living organism, is not subject to the full disposition of discursive consciousness. The actor does not need to be able to express this knowledge in order for the interaction to run smoothly, but has to use it properly, so Giddens focuses his attention on the practical consciousness on which the outcome of the meeting depends.

> Practical consciousness consists of knowing the rules and the tactics whereby daily social life is constituted and reconstituted across time and space. Social actors can be wrong some of the time about what these rules and tactics might be – in which cases their errors may emerge as 'situational improprieties'. But if there is any continuity to social life at all, most actors must be right most of the time; that is to say, they know what (hey are doing, and they successfully communicate their knowledge to others. The knowledge ability incorporated in the practical activities which make up the bulk of daily life is a constitutive feature (together with power) of the social world[9].

The rule of routine is to place beyond discursive consciousness some factors that can lead to social interaction in everyday life. They are not

[8] A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 49; see also: M. de Certeau, "The Arts of Theory", [in:] M. de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1988.

[9] A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 90.

problematic, but they are revealed to the actors successively during the course of the meeting. The situation is different in the case of violation or destruction of the definition of a situation developed together with others, when "protective measures" cease to inspire trust.

> The swamping of habitual modes of activity by anxiety which cannot be adequately contained by the basic security system is specifically a feature of critical situations[10].

Sensing such moments, called by Giddens "critical situations", is neither completely individual nor extraordinary.

> However, forming as they do an intrinsic part of the continuity of social life, even though they are discontinuities for individuals, such situations tend themselves to have a definitely routinized character[11].

Deviations from routine or its severance are an important circumstance in defining the situation that triggers a critical procedure. By monitoring the difference with the expected course of routine action, they allow the actors to outline the limitations of the knowledge used so far and to find alternative ways to exceed it. Actors must be more inventive than usual to give their actions, oscillating to regain the sense of ontological security, and at the same time the whole sequence of interactions the desired continuity, but also the margin of freedom turns out to be wider. Like Socrates, the "critical situation", by challenging routine solutions, undermines the actors' definition of a situation, forces them to search for a basis for a new definition, and thus to look closer at the determinants of the encounter. This strengthens both the discursive and practical consciousness of the subjects. It is worth noting that the subjective influence on the definition of a situation, which enables actors to learn through practice and reflective monitoring of the conditions and course of interaction, is not only characterised by "critical situations". These, however, may deepen the

[10] Ibidem, p. 50–51.

[11] Ibidem, p. 61. "By 'critical situations' I mean circumstances of radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affect substantial numbers of individuals, situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of institutionalized routines" (Ibidem).

actors' insight into themselves and the complexity of the situation, and reveal its unnoticed threads and nuances.

Interaction loses its critical potential if any side dominates, controlling the definition of the situation and thus limiting the creativity of other actors, which contributes to undermining their sense of ontological security and, in the long run, despite the familiarization of the situation, impoverishing practical and discursive consciousness. In other words, from the point of view of structuration theory, it is not so much a routine that inhibits the potential for learning and change that opens up to actors with the development of interaction, but rather the effective imposition of a pattern that determines each course of interaction by either side.

> The study of power – as Giddens emphasizes – cannot be regarded as a second-order consideration in the social sciences. Power cannot be tacked on, as it were, after the more basic concepts of social science have been formulated. There is no more elemental concept than that of power[12].

The approach adopted by Giddens makes it possible to analyze the interactions occurring in schools from the perspective of the coercion measures applied in order to maintain domination and enforce subordination. As he points out,

> Disciplinary spacing is part of the architectural character of schools, both in the separation of classrooms and in the regulated spacing of desks that is often found inside them. There is no doubt that spatial divisions of this sort facilitate the routinized specification and allocation of tasks[13].

Nevertheless it means both discarding the troublesome dualism of the "hidden" and "official" curriculum.

> The disciplinary context of the classroom is not just a 'backdrop' to what goes on in the school class; it is mobilized within the dialectic of control[14].

12 Ibidem, p. 283.

13 Ibidem, p. 135.

14 Ibidem, p. 136. "A school is a 'container', generating disciplinary power. The enclosed nature of school life makes possible a strict co-ordination of the serial encounters in

HIDDEN CURRICULUM AS A RESULT OF THE AUTHORITIES' ACTIONS

Routine interests us here through its connection with the hidden curriculum. Structuration theory, which combines perspectives of sociology, psychoanalysis and cultural anthropology, criticism of functionalism and structuralism with existential phenomenology, philosophy of dialogue, of the late Wittgenstein, ethno-methodology, symbolic interactionism, critical theory of the Frankfurt School and poststructuralism of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu, seems to promise the integration of critical and emancipatory pedagogy. Assuming that the subject of the practice is contemplative, monitors his actions, and is a social researcher able to redefine social situation on the basis of gained experience, allows us to look at the issues of hidden curriculum not from a normative perspective, but from the perspective of control of social interactions, and with it the dynamics of learning processes. The framework for actions in a situation of control is only exceptionally negotiable. In other words, the subject is forced to reproduce norms that can be formulated discursively or that are appropriate to practical awareness, "official" as well as "confidential", because he or she cannot effectively influence, either spontaneously or in a planned way, the change of the framework of action established from above. It is not at all certain whether the actor identifies with these norms and, if so, whether the internalisation of new norms derived from the criticism of the hidden curriculum and the institutional, external to the subject, transformation of the conditions in which school education takes place, does not continue the fundamental problem of disciplinary authority, transferring subordination, the subject's lack of influence on the conditions of his or her operation and confusion on the newly defined field of interaction. It is not even certain whether the internalized norms of the hidden curriculum related to the school space-time continuum and the discipline adopted in it will be activated by the subject in other learning spaces, for example in the space of learning from everyday life, where such a discipline does not exist[15]. Reproduction of the norms

which inmates are involved" (Ibidem, p. 135); see also the whole analysis conducted by Giddens: Ibidem, p. 132–139.

15 K. Illeris, "Learning Spaces", [in:] K. Illeris, *The Three Dimensions of Learning. Contemporary Learning Theory in the Tension Field Between the Cognitive, the Emotional and*

of hidden curriculum is secondary in relation to the effects of the action of the authority.

Teachers education in the scope of the hidden curriculum, taking the form of reconstruction, recognition of its norms, is in line with the logic of disciplinary authority - it is determined in advance, which is a proper definition of a situation[16], subtly blaming those who are used to subordination for obeying the old law. The teacher does not appear here as a researcher, despite the fact that his or her discursive consciousness is broadened. Subjective participation of students in education is parallel to the problem of subjective participation of teachers. The teacher may not fully perceive the significance of the fact that it occurs from the perspective of students' practical awareness, less often discursive, as a representative of hierarchy, a visible carrier of disciplinary power, where his or her very presence becomes a sign of continuity of power[17], and also that his or her routine stemming from subordination organizes and enforces the routine, at least apparent, on the subordinated subjects. The core of the hidden curriculum is the habit of submission. The question whether the teacher can undermine the status given to him/her as a carrier of institutional power is whether the disciplining authority is really continuous or whether it penetrates the thresholds of the spaces separated in the school without disturbances. Doesn't the area in which the teacher operates guarantee him/her relative autonomy, which he/she could discover, study and use? Do such acts of questioning one's own routine and oneself as a carrier of power not release other subjects involved in the situation from the necessity of submission and do not open up new spaces for them, in which they could influence the definition of the situation, and thus, extending their subjective participation in the action, emancipate themselves through practice?

the Social, Roskilde 2002.

16 The definition of *hidden curriculum* is derived from the experience of a critic who does not participate in classroom activities in the same way as a teacher or pupils. Taking an "external" perspective, he makes a description of the state of his own discursive consciousness. The value of his reflection is therefore relative.

17 For example, we might ask if the principle of organising classes works for students invariably after the teacher leaves the classroom, or in what categories should the student's gesture be understood when he or she is telling the teacher that he or she is deviating from the routine?

KORCZAK THE ANTHROPOLOGIST

The introduction of the Peer Court redefines the situation in the Orphanage located on Krochmalna Street, exposes the areas and principles of functioning, distribution and role of power that were previously hidden, contrary to educational intentions and inaccessible to its director.

> I quickly realized during the first weeks that many petty matters, annoying to the children, creating a disturbance, did not and could not reach the teacher. A teacher who claims that he knows everything that goes on is deliberately lying. I have satisfied myself that the teacher is no expert on problems affecting children. I have satisfied myself that a teacher's power exceeds his competence. There exists an entire hierarchy among the children in which every older one has the right to humiliate, or at least to ignore a child two years younger than he, that willfulness is strictly apportioned according to the age of children. And the guardian of that edifice of lawlessness is the teacher. *Sic volo, sic jubeo*[18].

Astonished, he notices that not only he monitors the situation in a reflexive way:

> It is amazing how every problem left unsettled, every carelessly defined order or ban, every oversight, come to the surface and exert retribution in the Court[19].

An organized crisis of routine broadens its practical and then discursive consciousness.

> Sometimes a single matter better characterized a child for me than months of familiarity. Occasionally, one particular matter better characterized the social environment than detached observation over a number of months. As the Clerk of the Court I was learning my ABC's, perfecting myself,

[18] J. Korczak, "How to Love a Child", op. cit., p. 345.
[19] Ibidem, p. 348.

finally to become an expert on children's problems. [...] Those petty cases drove me to consider all the complex problems of communal life[20].

IN-BETWEEN. DISCONTINUITY OF POWER VERSUS AUTHORITY ACCORDING TO HANNAH ARENDT

Fear of power and loss of control, while at the same time ensuring a sense of ontological security, can effectively block the teachers' self-emancipation initiative. Importantly, this possibility of a teacher losing control of the situation should make us aware of the polarity of two phenomena, i.e. the authority and power, which, according to Hannah Arendt, merge into one in the commonly accepted optics.

> Since authority – Hannah Arendt writes – always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force is used, authority itself has failed. Authority, on the other hand, is incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of argumentation. Where arguments are used, authority is left in abeyance. Against the egalitarian order of persuasion stands the authoritarian order, which is always hierarchical[21].

The distinction emphasized by Arendt is important for us, because the school space we are talking about in terms of emancipation conditions assumes inequality and functioning of the hierarchy. What is equally important is that Arendt sees a link between the need for authority and the need, as Giddens calls it, to maintain a sense of ontological security, to counteract unpredictability[22], which accompanies numerous individuals undertaking activities in the daily reality that is common to them.

According to her, authority in fact inclines people to obedience, but it influences individuals in a different way than power, because it

20 Ibidem, p. 347.

21 H. Arendt, "What is Authority?", [in:] H. Arendt, *Between Past and Future. Six Exercises in Political Thought*, New York 1961, p. 92–93.

22 See H. Arendt, "Irreversibility and the Power To Forgive" and "Unpredictability and the Power of Promise", [in:] H. Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Chicago, London 1998.

is a derivative of the other party's decision, subjective recognition, and not enforced subordination that breaks all resistance. Perhaps having this in mind, Arendt writes as follows "Authority implies an obedience in which men retain their freedom [...]"[23]. It is the element of coercion that, as she analyses the issue, collides with authority. It might seem that where there is coercion, authority is no longer necessary, but in a classroom situation, when the source of disciplinary power is outside the classroom, it is the teacher who, with his/her ingenuity, maintains the effectiveness of its influence, using the authority vested in him, maintains the continuity of power[24], becoming at the same time its holder.

Although power and authority are in a direct relationship, their relationship can take on different forms. The discursive overlapping of these two phenomena seems to hide the space of the teacher's relative autonomy, the space in which he/she makes arbitrary decisions in practice. On the school grounds, the distribution of power and authority cannot completely overlap, and the statement "It's not up to me" awkwardly tries to hide only this fact. Students are not directly subordinate to external authority, but to its adaptation as proposed by the teacher. The difference of opinion between the successive levels of the school hierarchy and the points of its horizontal structure may give rise to a well-founded fear in students that direct reference to a higher, and therefore institutionally more important, order will undermine the authority of the teacher concerned, and their success depends on his or her definition of the classroom situation. This discrepancy can of course be settled for the benefit of the students. But what is important for us is that the teacher becomes the guardian of law in the absence of his/her superiors or impartial representatives in

[23] H. Arendt, "What is Authority?", op. cit., p. 106. "Discipline through surveillance is a potent medium of generating power, but it none the less depends upon the more or less continuous compliance of those who are its, subjects'" (A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 180). See also the article by Bogdan Szlachta who distinguishes the changes going in the history of European culture as regards the approach to authority: B. Szlachta, "Autorytet", [in:] *Słownik społeczny*, ed. B. Szlachta, Kraków 2004, p. 27–33. This condensed review reveals that cultural patterns have a major impact on what can and does be considered an authority and how it is practiced to subordinate its power.

[24] Its continuity in its own right is impossible, see A. Giddens, *The Constitution of Society*, op. cit., p. 138–139.

the classroom. He or she enforces the regulations there and, in order to be effective, must have a certain surplus of powers to adapt the numerous, often mutually exclusive, requirements, rules and regulations to the situations generated by the students or the situations created by them to the rules and regulations. As Martin Buber observes, when considering the question of the nature of authority,

> All forms of government have this in common: each possesses more power than is required by the given conditions; in fact, this excess in the capacity for making dispositions is actually what we understand by political power. The measure of this excess, which cannot of course be computed precisely, represents the exact difference between Administration and Government. I call it the 'political surplus'. [...] The political principle is always stronger in relation to the social principle than the given conditions require. The result is a continuous diminution in social spontaneity[25].

As in any more or less hierarchical institution, a teacher at school, while having a modest political power at his or her disposal, may prudently limit the strength of its "external" pressure, thus expanding the space for spontaneous student activity, subjective participation in defining social situations, reversing the tendency defined by the dialogue specialist. He or she may do it but does not have to.

> The demarcation would naturally have to be revised and improved continually to conform to the changing conditions. [...] Let us put it in this way: Efforts must be renewed again and again to determine in what spheres it is possible to alter the ratio between governmental and administrative control in favour of the latter[26].

DIVISION OF POWER, AUTHORITY AND EMANCIPATION

The teacher supports the power with his or her authority, prolonging its continuity. Power as compulsion limits authority, but does not

[25] M. Buber, "Society and the State", [in:] M. Buber, *Pointing the Way. Collected Essays*, New York 1957, p. 174–175.

[26] Ibidem, p. 175.

eliminate it. This gap accessible to practical consciousness is the beginning of emancipation, emancipation, which does not lead to the abolition of power, but to its just division. Power-sharing is a way of dealing with the risks of violence and coercion, but it should be noted that the legitimate disciplinary power of institutions is not their sole source. All too often, the weakness of an institution is exploited by its petitioners; individually and in groups, teachers, pupils and administrative staff bully, humiliate and exploit weaker individuals who have no support. Teachers who refuse to exercise their power cannot relinquish authority and responsibility for the consequences of allowing unfair practices that undermine the ontological security of the humiliated[27]. Accepting the administrator's position will not confuse the fluctuations-sensitive involuntary participants of adverse events. However, this is one of the measures commonly used to disguise the habit of subjugation. No wonder, then, that in situations perceived as a threat from the authorities, students resort to tested patterns, use the tactics available to them, devote more energy to restoring their sense of ontological security, exemplary fulfilment of external claims and examining the areas of predictability of teachers and institutions rather than to trusting learning practices that make knowledge available[28]. The greater the sense of ontological security, the greater the margin of tolerance for what is possible according to learning subjects to change within a routine, but which does not directly lead to an increase in activity or commitment.

The existence of a modern school, a herald of independence and autonomy, a vestibule of involvement in civil society, entails a systematic setting of requirements and hence the presence of both power and authority. Disciplinary authority, while leaving room for the teacher's authority, leaves the tools at his/her disposal to enable him/

[27] Hannah Arendt raises the question of personal responsibility for refusing to use individual power of judgment in radically oppressive conditions, but the moral issues raised in the context of politics – responsibility, freedom and justice – are analogous to the subject of this work, see H. Arendt, "Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship", [in:] H. Arendt, *Responsibility and Judgment*, op. cit., p. 51–79.

[28] In this way, a sphere is created which the researchers of the hidden curriculum, together with its elements, may consider autonomous and relatively constant. It should also be noted that research into the hidden curriculum does not have to be used for emancipation; its results may well be used to tighten control.

her, within the limits of the surplus available, to share power and redefine the situation of classroom meetings[29]. Regardless of who initiates the change of practice, new areas of knowledge, which could not be fully disclosed to any of the parties due to the established standard practice, are made available to the parties as reflexive monitors. Importantly, the teacher acts as an independent researcher of the hidden curriculum.

KORCZAK THE ANTHROPOLOGIST

The Director of the Orphanage House continues his studies. He writes down as follows:

> Barbarian customs in a respectable institution in the capital city of a civilized country. But until recently, not only would I have acquiesced in such a state of affairs but would even have found some enchanting aspects to it. I tended to take a light-hearted view of it since a gay little urchin appealed to me more than the somewhat awkward hussy. The fact that this disarming little rascal tyrannized a group of children, while at the same time making ,up to me, that a little pilferer was being reared in the spirit of the right to be lawless – those aspects escaped my attention, were below the threshold of my teacher's consciousness[30].

Korczak's studies lead him to reveal the relationship between morality and politics.

> the Court must defend the timid that they may not be bothered by the strong. The Court must defend the conscientious and hard working that they should not be annoyed by the careless and idle. The Court must see

29 Let's assume such a situation, a group of pupils takes the initiative to change the arrangement of the benches so that the pupils sit face to face with each other, the teacher agrees and discusses the issue with the class. It turns out, however, that the benches are attached to the floor. There was no change, but it cannot be said that the actors did not put themselves and the class conditions in a new light. Does the teacher know what they have learned?

30 J. Korczak, "How to Love a Child", op. cit., p. 347.

> that there is order because disorder does the most harm to the good, the quiet and the conscientious. The Court is not justice but it should try for justice. The Court is not the truth but it wants the truth[31].

The division of power reveals the fundamental importance of establishing the authority so than an individual power unit can be constituted to judge alumni, develop their independence and autonomy.

> It is true, the Court is not a pleasant place. But it was not set up for fun. Its business is to watch over law and order. The Court's purpose is to prevent the teacher's having to enforce obedience brutally with a cane, shouting like a rude cowhand or farm laborer. Instead, the teacher can calmly and reasonably consider, advise, assess the situation together with the children who frequently know better who is right or the extent to which one of their members is at fault. The Court's business is to replace arguments with thinking, violent outbursts with educational activity[32].

Limiting disciplinary power in favour of authority heralds the establishment of an area in which alumni can act responsibly, build new relationships, experiment with routine, and at the same time feel safe.

> I declare that these few cases have been the nub of my training as a new "constitutional" teacher who avoids maltreatment of children not because he likes or loves them, but because there is a certain institution which protects them against the teacher's law-lessness, willfulness and despotism[33].

ON THE OTHER HAND. TACTICS AND INTERCEPTION OF A PLACE ACCORDING TO MICHEL DE CERTEAU

The relative autonomy of the teacher in the classroom is a result of the hierarchy of power in the institution. He can treat the classroom area as 'his/her own' because of his/her powers to manage it and, as Giddens noted, the way in which the space is planned is conducive to the routine

31 Ibidem, p. 313.
32 Ibidem, p. 341.
33 Ibidem, p. 351.

definition and assignment of tasks. In this sense, the classroom area is not an ally of the autonomy of students and one should ask whether they have, apart from the possibility of reflection, an inner distance to the situation, a form of resistance practice independent of the authorities, with an emancipatory potential. The lack of such a potential in the practical awareness of the students would mean that emancipation would have to start for them ex nihilo or be enforced.

Michel de Certeau, a researcher of consumer practices in the world of everyday life, distinguishes two types of sets of practices, strategies and tactics that can be successfully combined with two types of roles in the classroom i.e. a teacher and a student. According to him, it is the strategies that "conceal beneath objective calculations their connection with the power that sustains them from within the stronghold of its own »proper« place or institution"[34]. Consumers whose practices are observed by de Certeau, who do not have the appropriate power and background, and who cannot directly oppose the strategies of power, use numerous, difficult to detect, more reminiscent of wandering rather than deliberate attempts, tactics to thwart and intercept the dominant forces.

> [...] because it does not have a place, a tactic depends on time - it is always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized "on the wing". Whatever it wins, it does not keep. It must constantly manipulate events in order to turn them into "opportunities". The weak must continually turn to their own ends forces alien to them[35].

In this secretive way, in conditions of complex loyalty, actors mark their minimum personal share of the situations defined by the authorities, allowing them to maintain an erroneous perception of their own continuity.

> The child still scrawls and daubs on his schoolbooks; even if he is punished for this crime, he has made a space for himself and signs his existence as an author on it[36].

34 M. de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, op. cit., p. xx.

35 Ibidem, p. xix. "The art of »pulling tricks« involves a sense of the opportunities afforded by a particular occasion" (Ibidem, p. 37).

36 Ibidem, p. 31.

Slightly beyond the control of authority, practicing on the margins of disciplinary space, students construct their own limited definition of the situation, taking advantage of every opportunity to realize the need for agency, subjective participation in education and regaining knowledge about what is currently happening with them.

> In numerable ways of playing and foiling the other's game (*jouer / déjouer le jeu de l'autre*), that is, the space instituted by others, characterize the subtle, stubborn, resistant activity of groups which, since they lack their own space, have to get along in a network of already established forces and representations[37].

This creative do-it-yourself activity of students is also an area of practice in which the teacher has no insight when implementing strategies. Similarly, from the point of view of "politics of the voice", practical awareness of tactics does not necessarily translate into discursive consciousness of the students, but if the resources available to the teacher were to make the classroom space hospitable to the students, it would establish a substitute for asylum, allowing for a dialogue that is conducive to learning, examination of the hidden curriculum and emancipatory changes, rather than a clash between strategy and tactics, political principle and social principle. The school classroom, thanks to its separation from other spaces, its distinction from them, a permanent, a well-known companionship that can give a sense of ontological security, is a good place to experiment with routine. Only a hospitable land as if it were 'no man's land' can become the promised land, as long as there is a struggle for territory, this kingdom remains out of this world.

[37] Ibidem, p. 18. "Dwelling, moving about, speaking, reading, shopping, and cooking are activities that seem to correspond to the characteristics of tactical ruses and surprises: clever tricks of the »weak« within the order established by the »strong«, an art of putting one over on the adversary on his own turf, hunter's tricks, maneuverable, polymorph mobilities, jubilant, poetic, and warlike discoveries" (Ibidem, p. 40). Also Giorgio Agamben writes about emancipation practices similar to the tactics proposed by de Certeau, see G. Agamben, "In Praise of Profanation", [in:] G. Agamben, *Profanations*, New York 2007.

KORCZAK THE ANTHROPOLOGIST – ANNEX

The situation in the Orphanage on Krochmalna Street is constantly changing as a result of the released emancipatory potential of the pupils. Korczak writes down:

> It would seem that the Court could have given the adults some respect for the children. But on the contrary, even those who formerly had some respect began to lose it. Still worse. The judges conspired either to acquit or to judge leniently. That was the line of least resistance. Finally, things reached the point where a judge hit another who wanted to conduct the trial according to his conscience. It is hardly possible to delay. The Court serves no useful purpose but is harmful. The Court does not introduce order but disorder. The Court does not improve anyone but, on the contrary, spoils the better ones. Such a Court cannot possibly be allowed to exist for even a day longer. Six months of hard work wasted. Whoever takes his job seriously will understand how much it hurts and saddens us[38].

The dynamics of changes teaches, but also undermines the sense of ontological security. The development of events and their investigations, which do not bring universal knowledge, lead the director to a conclusion that it is necessary to make necessary corrections in the way the court operates.

> I hate the Court; I would rather have hands and head smacked, anything rather than the Court. I can't stand the Court, hate it. I don't want to charge anyone, or anyone to charge me". There were several of them. The Court caught them unawares – an unforeseen and most dangerous enemy-recorder, enemy-propagandist, enemy-telescope. [...] Significantly enough, that handful overthrew the Court. When I decided to suspend the Court I had no doubt that ,there would be no more than a brief recess for a couple of weeks or so for the purpose of introducing certain modifications and additions. Even so, it was a grave setback to me. For I realized

[38] J. Korczak, "How to Love a Child", op. cit., p. 334–335.

then how hard it would be for Courts to prove themselves in educational establishments conducted by others[39].

The activity of the Colleague Court in the Orphanage House at 92 Krochmalna Street was suspended for four weeks.

Some children sighed with relief, they were rid of a vigilant watchdog. Others, anxious to prove that the Court was unnecessary, behaved better than before. There was a group which kept asking when the Court would be resumed. Moreover, a sizeable group displayed little interest in the Court, as is generally true in all human relations[40].

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Abstract:

The aim of this paper is to present the questions associated with hidden curriculum in the perspective of cultural and political anthropology. Focusing on division and distribution of disciplinary power and authority in the space of school, it explores the role of a teacher in the process of empowerment of pupils and regaining by them the subject position. The article develops studies undertaken in the book *Lévinas. W stronę pedagogiki azylu* (*Lévinas. Toward the Pedagogy of* Asylum).

Keywords:

authority, critical pedagogy, definition of the situation, discursive consciousness, division and distribution of disciplinary power, education of teacher, emancipation, empowerment, hidden curriculum, ontological security, practical consciousness, reflexivity, routine

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