

Maria Sobolewska
(Manchester)

GOOD MUSLIM CITIZENS? CONCEPTUALISATION OF BRITISH CITIZENSHIP AMONG MUSLIMS

After September 11th the European Muslim minorities became subject to increased hostility, suspicion and prejudice. Since then, following the war in Iraq, 7/7 London bombings, 21/7 attempted London bombings, and the affair over the Danish cartoons, it has gotten progressively worse. Increasingly, the ‘strongly voiced if imprecise doubts (...) on their loyalty as citizens’¹ became a huge part of this prejudice. Numerous surveys questioning Muslim Britons on issues of Sharia law and freedom of speech were published and despite being most seriously flawed in their methods, gained mainstream influence and fuelled the fear-mongering atmosphere surrounding the Muslim minorities in Britain (all these surveys aside from the policy exchange). The left wing media has been particularly critical of Muslims as a result of the assumption that Islam is inherently illiberal.² Islam is often perceived as a threat to British values and as incompatible with British democracy – the wider public supports this view in surprisingly large numbers: a MORI poll from August 2005 showed 27% Britons believed in such incompatibility, and

¹ T. Modood, *Muslims and the Politics of Difference*, The Political Quarterly, 2003, Vol. 74, pp. 101.

² E. Poole, *Media Representations of British Muslims: Reporting Islam*, I.B. Tauris, London 2002; M. Sobolewska, S. Ali, *Who speaks for Muslims? The role of the press in creating and reporting of Muslim public opinion polls in the aftermath of London bombings in July 2005*, unpublished paper presented at the Political Science Association Conference in London 2010.

a PEW GLOBAL poll from June 2006 confirmed that 54% of Britons saw a conflict between being a devout Muslim and in living in a modern society. Fuelled by the ever-popular notion of the clash of civilisations,³ doubts over how the allegedly illiberal and culturally alien Islam will fit into modern British democratic values are growing.

One consequence of this perception of Islam is the suspicions that British Muslims are not 'good citizens'. There are two reasons why this is not only interesting but also important to address. Firstly, the notion of British citizenship is at best fluid and under much debate as to what its content and meaning was, is and should be.⁴ Under this continuously reinvented concept, how can we conceptualise British citizenship? What are the differences between the ways in which Muslims and non-Muslims understand British citizenship?

The conceptualisation of citizenship rests mostly within the relationship between citizens' rights and responsibilities, and the different weight attached to different kinds of rights or responsibilities. The traditional understanding of citizenship as a formal guarantee of rights underpins the liberal concept of citizenship. It is a state-centred understanding with freedom (to certain behaviours outside of state control) and equality (of citizens in relationship with state) guarantees are issued by the state to the citizens as counter-balances to the states' monopoly of coercion of these citizens. In Britain, because of its history of parliamentary democracy and a birth-place of liberal ideology, the liberal rights to freedom of thought and expression may be particularly fundamental to the popular understanding of British citizenship among the British. In a way, the often assumed criticism of Muslims as illiberal may in fact be as much a sign of Muslims truly being less liberal than the British as it is of the great value and weight that the British place of these fundamental liberal rights.

This liberal, stripped-back understanding of citizenship has been challenged by more extensive concepts of citizenship where citizens rights extended beyond the protection from state-coercion and included social along the classic political and civil rights of the liberal understanding.⁵

3 S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, New York 1996.

4 O. Heath, *Explaining Turnout Decline in Britain, 1964–2005: Party Identification and the Political Context*, *Political Behavior*, 2007, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 493–516.

5 T.H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1950.

The inclusion of socio-economic well-being of citizens in the concept of citizenship is in fact a fundamental building block of a welfare state, and in Britain may very well be an issue of some contention with a society heavily divided over those in support of greater, state-centred, redistribution and those who adopt a market-centred, neoliberal approach to economic well-being of individuals. Since the two main parties in Britain divide over this issue, one would expect that the consensus around this aspect of citizenship will be less pronounced among British citizens than around the liberal rights. However, one could also plausibly expect that Muslims, as they are in large proportion economic migrants, will weight this benefit of British citizenship more heavily than the British who do not share this immigrant background.

More recently, another challenge to the state-centred liberal concept of citizenship came from post-national conceptualisations, mostly in response to increasing diversity of states and their international inter-connectedness. As a result a multicultural and a post-national understanding of citizenship have been developed. A multicultural citizenship, where rights are bestowed on groups in addition to individuals, changes the focus from individual-state relationship, to include more intermediate entities such as groups, communities, and society. This communitarian view of citizenship includes responsibilities towards and of communities in addition to liberal, individual rights. Finally, post-national concepts of citizenship change the focus from the individual-state relationship to the relationship between an international community and both the state and the individual. First of all, an international community is an additional, to the state, source of citizens' rights and state's obligations. Secondly, additional obligations may emerge for both the state and its citizens as a result of global changes, such as climate change most recently. It is hard to say how Muslims and non-Muslims will differ in respect to these new conceptualisations of citizenship. However, since Muslims are often presented as a major beneficiary of multi-cultural policies, perhaps the understanding of citizenship in terms of community-oriented responsibilities may be stronger among Muslims than the more individualistic obligations of citizens.

The existing literature does not usually consider these various conceptions of citizenship, but instead simply compare British native population and Muslim Britons on any available measure of citizenship. As a result we know that Muslim Britons identify with Britain as much or

more than other British people,⁶ that they trust political institutions as much as anyone else⁷ and that they vote as much as others.⁸ However, none of these reassuring findings answers the question whether Muslims are less liberal as a result of their religious heritage – as is often alleged⁹ – and whether their understanding of British citizenship is comparable to this of the one preferred by the native British population. On the contrary, political alienation, as a contrast to active citizenship, would have suggested a more general apathy towards citizenship, and not specific to any particular concept of citizenship such as liberal rights and responsibilities. Therefore, the logic for this paper would be to see if Muslims show signs of political alienation from British citizenship – as expressed by showing less support for British citizenship rights and responsibilities overall, or whether they support less – or more – a particular understanding of citizenship.

Looking at how Muslims and non-Muslims balance the relationship between rights, responsibilities, and the kinds of rights and responsibilities will help to answer the question whether they are – as citizens – fundamentally different. The Citizenship Surveys from 2001, 2003 and 2005 asked British people which rights and responsibilities they thought a British citizen has. I will analyse their answers in order to establish whether they form any coherent groupings, and whether they correspond to any existing theories of citizenship.

Another issue that has never been considered by the existing literature is the stability of understanding of citizenship. During the last decade, with many critical events undermining the place of British Muslims in the British society, one could expect Muslims' perceptions of British citi-

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- 6 R. Maxwell, *Muslims, South Asians, and the British Mainstream: A National Identity Crisis?*, *West European Politics*, 2006, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 736–756.
 - 7 M. Sobolewska, *Religious Extremism in Britain and British Muslims: Threatened Citizenship and the Role of Religion*, in: R. Eatwell, M. Goodwin (eds) *The New Extremism in 21st Century Britain: Extremism and Democracy*. Routledge, London 2009; R. Maxwell, *Trust in Government among British Muslims: The Importance of Migration Status, Political Behaviour*, 2010, Vol. 32, No. 1, pp. 89–109.
 - 8 A.F. Heath, S. Fisher, D. Sanders, M. Sobolewska, *Ethnic Heterogeneity in the Social Bases of Voting at the 2010 British General Election*, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 2011, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 255–277.
 - 9 A.F. March, *Liberal Citizenship and the Search for an Overlapping Consensus: The Case of Muslim Minorities*, *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 2006, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 373–421.

zanship to change in response to these crises. Considering the high levels of political trust among Muslims, the experience of Muslims' protests against the Iraq war in 2003 being ignored and defied, could have had a negative impact of the faith in the British government to do 'the right thing' (wording used in most political trust questions). I will investigate whether such a formative experience of a failure of citizen's mobilisation changed Muslims' perceptions of British citizenship.

This paper will therefore ask three main questions:

- 1) Do people organise the way in which they think of citizens' rights and responsibilities around coherent values and concepts of citizenship?
- 2) Are Muslims conceptualising their citizenship less in terms of liberal values than other British people? Is their understanding of British citizenship different?
- 3) Did the failed Muslim protests against the Iraq war in 2003 influence the Muslims' understanding of British citizenship?

Citizens' understanding of British citizenship

To establish whether people organise their perceptions of British citizenship around coherent sets of values and concepts, I use two questions from the Citizenship Surveys that asked respondents to say which rights and responsibilities British citizens have. The questions on rights and responsibilities of British citizens are available from the four rounds of Citizenship Survey conducted between 2001, 2003 and 2005 (2001 had a different question format, the consequences of which will be discussed later). The Citizenship Survey is a nationally representative sample of British population and contains a large over-sample of ethnic minorities – including Muslims. The two questions I use here asked which rights and which responsibilities a UK citizen should have (full wording in appendix).

I pre-coded the rights and responsibilities that were given as options according to the various concepts of citizenship discussed above, with some categories being not mutually exclusive, and others outright overlapping. The rights to free speech, free thought, religion and consciousness, equal and fair treatment and free elections, together with the responsibility to obey law, treat all races equally and vote were coded

as liberal. The rights and responsibilities considering fair and equal treatment (including racial groups) were considered to relate to the liberal principle of equality of citizens in the face of law. The other rights and responsibilities fit less controversially into the liberal paradigm. The freedom of thought, religion and consciousness and the responsibilities to protect one's family, raise children well and work, to help others, behave responsibly and treat others with respect, as well as protecting the environment, were coded as communitarian as they all underline the relationship between individual freedom and the responsibilities to the community. The communitarian citizenship was understood to place more weight on responsibilities and duties than the classic liberal formulation.

Looking beyond the liberal-communitarian divide, I also referred to Marshall's influential triptych of citizenship: political, civil and social. As measurement of political citizenship I coded the right to and the responsibility to vote. The rights to free speech, thought, and equal treatment were coded as falling within civil citizenship, as were the responsibilities to: behave responsibly, treat others with respect and fairness, obey law, protect environment and treat all races equally. Finally, to measure social citizenship we put together all the rights to social welfare such as: state support in need, access to education, free healthcare, work and protection from crime; and the responsibilities which were assumed to follow from the social rights: to protect one's family, to raise children well and to work.

The rights and responsibilities that did not fit into any of the theoretical perspectives on citizenship were left blank. The matrix of how the different rights and responsibilities named fall within the theoretical classifications is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Theoretical classification of different values underlying the concept of citizenship

	Rights & Responsibilities	Concepts of citizenship	
<i>Rights</i>	Free speech	Civil	Liberal
	Freedom of thought, religion, consciousness	Civil	Liberal, Communitarian
	Equal and fair treatment	Civil	Liberal
	Free elections	Political	Liberal

	Rights & Responsibilities	Concepts of citizenship	
	State support in need	Social	-
	Access to education	Social	-
	Free healthcare	Social	-
	Right to work	Social	-
	Protection from crime	Social	-
<i>Responsibilities</i>	To behave morally	-	-
	To protect one's family	Social	Communitarian
	To raise children well	Social	Communitarian
	To work to provide for yourself	Social	Communitarian
	To help others	-	Communitarian
	To behave responsibly	Civil	Communitarian
	To treat others with respect and fairness	Civil	Communitarian
	To obey law	Civil	Liberal
	To protect environment	Civil	Communitarian
	To treat all races equally	Civil	Liberal
	To vote	Political	Liberal

These theoretical classifications are not reflected in the understanding of the average British citizen. Looking at the structure of the responses in Citizenship Survey from 2005, using factor analysis, shows that respondents not only did not differentiate between rights and responsibilities, let alone the different kinds of rights and responsibilities. The factor analysis shows that all the rights and responsibilities form a single factor with the Cronbach's alpha of .84, which is caused by the more than 80 percent of all respondents naming all responsibilities and all rights are implicated in British citizenship. This could indicate the 'greedy' approach to citizenship, which is expected to include all possible aspects of citizenship, regardless of their ideological origin and theoretical incompatibility. This is somewhat surprising as the social rights, especially, do fall within the mainstream ideological divide between the two major British political parties, with the Labour party supporting social rights very much more than the Conservative party. Perhaps it does help to explain the perceived convergence of parties on some social issues such as the National Health Service.

The question therefore is whether Muslims are significantly over-represented among those who name fewer than all responsibilities and rights of British citizenship, whether they do name fewer liberal rights, specifically because they have a different understanding of British citizenship. Tables 2 and 3 present a mean number of rights and responsibilities named by respondents of various religions, in order to correctly approach the question whether it is Islam that causes British Muslims to differ in their conceptions of citizenship. The previous research using the items on citizens' rights and responsibilities have compared the average number of rights and responsibilities mentioned by Muslims and non-Muslims. This analytical approach suffers from a major limitation as comparing Muslims to a larger category of non-Muslims is a case of using the wrong frame of comparison. To see whether Muslims subscribed to any of these concepts of citizenship more or less than the other groups within the British population we compare them not to the native Britons, but to those of differing religions. Since Islam is the main factor quoted for the illiberalism of Muslims, it is other religions that are relevant for comparisons. Hence we compare Muslims to Christians (who mostly comprise of native Britons, but also some Britons of Caribbean and African origin), and other minority religions (mostly comprising of Sikhs and Hindus).

Muslims' understanding of British citizenship

The results of the comparisons presented in tables 2 and 3 show that Muslims do not name fewer responsibilities than rights (or the other way round), nor any particular rights and responsibilities reflecting the different concepts of citizenship. Instead, they name fewer of all rights and all responsibilities, across all the different understanding of citizenship. There are two consequences of this result. Firstly, it underlines that Muslims are not particularly opposed to the liberal concept of citizenship and that it is unlikely that cultural and religious differences are behind the differences in rights and responsibilities mentioned. Secondly, since it is not a rejection of certain concepts, but the instance in which fewer rights and responsibilities are named across the board, the likeliest explanation for it will be political alienation.

Table 2. Mean number of rights and responsibilities named by religious belonging

	Rights	Responsibilities
Christians	8	10.3
Muslims	7.8	9.9
Other minority religions	7.9	10.3
No religion	8	10.1
All	9	11

Table 3. Mean number of rights and responsibilities named by religious belonging and the five conceptions of citizenship

	Liberal	Communitarian	Civic	Political	Social
Christians	6.4	7.5	3.7	1.7	4.4
Muslims	6.2	7.2	3.6	1.6	4.3
Other minority religions	6.3	7.5	3.7	1.7	4.4
No religion	6.3	7.4	3.7	1.6	4.4
All	7	8	8	2	8

Political alienation is usually measured by two indicators: political trust and political efficacy. Political trust has been defined as a more diffuse attitude towards the government rather than an evaluation of government of the day,¹⁰ this measure was initially designed to capture 'basic evaluative orientations' towards the political system.¹¹ The claim of political trust's underlying nature has been criticised on the basis of some evidence pointing to the fact that identification with the party of government¹² and evaluations of the government's performance influence

10 G.A. Almond, S. Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations, an Analytic Study*, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1963; D. Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis*, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1965.

11 D. Stokes, *Popular Evaluations of Government*, in: H. Cleveland and H.D. Lasswell (eds.), *Ethics and Bigness*, Harper, New York 1962.

12 J. Citrin, *Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government*, *The American Political Science Review*, 1974, Vol. 68, No. 3, pp. 973–988; O. Listhaug, *The Impact of Modernization and Value Change on Confidence in Institutions*, in:

political trust in the American setting and other countries.¹³ However, while it has been found that political trust may be negatively influenced by feelings of dissatisfaction as a result of short term political factors such as the Vietnam War or Watergate scandal in America,¹⁴ it also did not return to previous levels when such factors passed, as would be expected if it was a simple evaluation of the government of the day.¹⁵ Not only was it a more stable orientation in terms of showing more long term effects, but also it has been shown that its effects are cumulative over more than just one government. This means that the rise of trust experienced at the time one government was in office is reflected in higher levels of trust in the next government, even of a different party.¹⁶

Political efficacy on the other hand is an individual's feeling of influence over political outcomes. Political efficacy is often included as a measure of psychological engagement in politics, although it has been explicitly designed to measure a more underlying orientation towards the political system, similarly to trust.¹⁷ Efficacy usually correlates with other measures of political engagement such as knowledge of politics, politi-

R. d. Moor (ed.), *Values in Western Societies*, Tilburg: Tilburg University Press, Tilburg 1995, vol. 2, pp. 163–177.

- 13 P.R. Abramson, A.W. Finifter, *On the Meaning of Political Trust: New Evidence from Items Introduced in 1978*, *American Journal of Political Science*, 1981, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 297–307; J. Citrin, D.P. Green, *Presidential Leadership and the Resurgence of Trust in Government*, *British Journal of Political Science*, 1986, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 431–453; M.J. Hetherington, *The Effect of Political Trust on the Presidential Vote, 1968–96*, *The American Political Science Review*, 1999, Vol. 93, No. 2, pp. 311–326.
- 14 A.J. Damico, M.M. Conway, and S.B. Damico, *Patterns of Political Trust and Mistrust: Three Moments in the Lives of Democratic Citizens*, *Polity*, 2000, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 377–400.
- 15 P.R. Abramson, *Political Attitudes in America*, WH Freeman, San Francisco 1983.
- 16 A.H. Miller, *Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970*, *American Political Science Review*, 1974, Vol. 68, No. 3.
- 17 A. Campbell, G. Gurin, and W.E. Miller, *The American Voter*, John Wiley & Sons, New York 1960; A.H. Miller, *Political Issues...*, p. 951; A.H. Miller, O. Listhaug, *Political Parties and Confidence in Government: A Comparison of Norway, Sweden and the United States*, *British Journal of Political Science*, 1990, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp. 357–386; R. Erber, R.R. Lau, *Political Cynicism Revisited: An Information-Processing Reconciliation of Policy-Based and Incumbency-Based Interpretations of Changes in Trust in Government*, *American Journal of Political Science*, 1990, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 236–253.

cal interest and partisanship, and with the socio-economic position,¹⁸ and this combination makes it a good proxy for a generally more active and empowered (in contrast to more passive and submissive) attitude towards the political system.

However, before we assess whether it is alienation that caused Muslim Britons to name fewer rights and responsibilities – in the multivariate analysis – we need to reflect on the possible sources of alienation. The first possible source of political alienation is the monotonous state of withdrawal and lack of engagement caused by a general disadvantage and anomy. The second source of alienation could be a shock in the political context, which persuades citizens that they do not have influence over political decision and that they cannot trust their governments. This mechanism has been observed for political trust in the US.¹⁹ The questions of citizens' rights and responsibilities in the Citizenship Survey offer a rare opportunity to study the influence of such a shock as the data exists from 2001, 2003 and 2005, and 2003 was the year that saw the large protests against war in Iraq, and their failure to deter the government at the time from going to war.

Figure 1 will help us see whether the political context of the 2003 Iraq war protests did have an impact on rights and responsibilities mentioned, and whether the second source of political alienation is likely to have taken place among British Muslims. In this figure we present the difference between how many members of a religious group named less rights and responsibilities than average. This formulation is designed to deal with the differences in the question format between 2001 and 2003 and 2005. In 2003 and 2005 these were closed ended questions to which a respondent had a multiple choice from a set of responses. In contrast, in 2001, they were open ended questions to which respondents needed to offer answers without prompting and these spontaneous responses were subsequently coded by the pollster. However, comparing the number of rights and responsibilities named to the mean specific to that year overcomes this problem by making the variables comparable

¹⁸ J. Citrin, *Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government*, *The American Political Science Review*, 1974, Vol. 68, No. 3, pp. 973–988; F. Templeton, *Alienation and Political Participation: Some Research Findings*, *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1966, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 249–261.

¹⁹ A.J. Damico, M.M. Conway, and S.B. Damico, *op. cit.*, pp. 377–400.

over time. The comparison of thus calculated number of rights and responsibilities named – relatively to the mean that year – is presented in Figure 1. The formula for this calculation was as follows:

$$Rights\ and\ responsibilities\ named = Individual_{Nr\ \acute{c}r} - MeanYear_{Nr\ \acute{c}r}$$

As Figure 1 shows, in 2003 all minority groups experienced a bit of a crisis of citizenship, which can be clearly attributed to the unpopular decision to go to war taken by the government at the time. As a result, the Christians were well above the average in 2003. However, for Muslims this effect has been much larger than for any other religious group. Most importantly, all minority religious groups experienced a ‘bounce back’ of their faith in British citizenship by 2005. For Muslims however this ‘bounce back’ has been smaller than for the other groups, and so whereas for all the other groups the difference between 2001 and 2005 is barely noticeable, it is a lot more pronounced for Muslims.

Turning now to multivariate analysis, I will attempt to answer the question whether naming fewer rights and responsibilities by Muslims can be accounted for by alienation, and whether the crisis of citizenship




Figure 1. 2003 and its effect on the number of rights and responsibilities mentioned by religious group

in 2003 had a significant and lasting impact on Muslims perceptions of British citizenship. The dependent variable used in this analysis is a binary variable indicating whether the respondent named fewer rights and responsibilities than average. Table 4 presents two models: one trying to answer the question whether political alienation and the citizenship crisis of 2003 explain the differences between Muslims and other religious groups in Britain and the second one whether alienation and 2003 had a different impact on Muslim citizens than other Britons.

The logistic regression of below-average mentions of rights and responsibilities sheds some light on these differences. First of all, even after controlling for such measures of political alienation such as political trust, efficacy, and political participation, the Muslim respondents were a little more likely to fall in the group naming a below-average number of rights and responsibilities. Model 1 shows that perception of racial prejudice also increased the likelihood that a respondent will name a below-average number, and that being well educated, middle class and being born in the UK all contributed to respondents naming an average or above number of rights and responsibilities. Curiously being older and a male also contributed to respondents naming fewer rights and responsibilities. Survey year was not a significant predictor, suggesting that for the general population, 2003 anti-war protests did not have a negative impact on their conceptualising of citizenship.

To confirm that all the predictor variables, which were significant in Model 1, worked in the same way for Muslim Britons as well as for all the other respondents, in Model 2 I run interactions of these variables with being Muslim. As a result, I found that most of the variables worked differently for Muslims: with differences in degree as well as in direction being present. Firstly, whereas the year 2003 did not have any predictive power for the general model (Model 1), for Muslims, the respondents from this year were much more likely to be below this year's average. This strongly supports the hypothesis that the government's refusal to act on the anti-war protests did backfire and resulted in lowering Muslims' support for British citizenship. Similarly, trust was not significant in model 1, but for Muslim respondents high institutional trust predicted naming less than average rights and responsibilities. Being born in Britain, efficacy and perception of prejudice all were stronger predictors, acting in the same direction, for Muslim respondents than for the general sample.

Table 4. Logistic regression of below-average mentions of rights and responsibilities

	<u>Model 1</u>	<u>Model 2</u>
Muslim	0.07	-0.04
Minority religions	0.12	-0.11
<i>Reference: Christians</i>		
2003	0.006	0.06
2005	0.01	0.01
<i>Reference: 2001</i>		
Salaried middle class	-0.06	0.05
Petit bourgeois	-0.03	0.02
<i>Reference: working class</i>		
Degree and above	-0.10	0.09
High school leaving exams and higher	-0.06	0.06
<i>Reference: below high school exams</i>		
Male	0.04	0.04
Age (years)	0.01	0.02
British born	-0.09	-0.05
Perceives racial prejudice	0.04	0.04
Institutional trust	-0.009	-0.02
Civic participation (last 12 months)	0.04	0.03
Efficacy	-0.01	-0.007
<u>Interactions</u>		
Muslim* 2003		0.15
Muslim* institutional trust		0.13
Muslim* efficacy		-0.05
Muslim* British born		-0.06
Muslim* civic participation		0.04
N	14035	14035
Model fit: Adj R sq	.07	.09

*Effects printed in bold are statistically significant at the.001 level

Conclusions

This paper has two important conclusions. Firstly, Muslims in Britain do not represent a different, illiberal and incompatible with British

citizenship approach to British citizenship. They very much name the same rights and responsibilities as fundamental to British citizenship. The only difference between Muslim and non-Muslim Britons is that Muslims name fewer rights and responsibilities across the board, and with no systematic biases against liberal values, or against rights as opposed to responsibilities. Secondly, Muslims in Britain name fewer rights and responsibilities of British citizenship even if the levels of political alienation are controlled for. This suggests that political alienation is not the entire story with British Muslims, although it seems alienation has an even stronger impact on Muslims than other religions. In other words Muslims who are politically alienated name fewer rights and responsibilities than similarly alienated respondents of other religions. However, the analysis in this paper shows that the impact of 2003, a year of the anti-war protests, had a much more negative effect on the Muslims' perception of British citizenship.

These conclusions are crucial in over-turning the arbitrary myth that Muslims are illiberal and hold a different understanding of British citizenship. They also help to underline the part that the political context is playing in the British Muslims' perceptions of British citizenship. A year in which Muslims in Britain mobilised in large numbers to exercise their citizenship – 2003 – left them disenchanted with British citizenship. 2003 therefore represents a lost opportunity for the British government of the day to assert a positive place of Muslims in Britain.

Appendix: question wording

Now some questions about the rights of people living in the UK. By rights I mean the things that people are entitled to if they live in this country.

Which of the rights, if any, listed below do you think you **should** have as someone living in the UK? [*Eshould*]

- (1) To have access to free education for children
- (2) To have freedom of speech
- (3) To have freedom of thought, conscience and religion
- (4) To have free elections
- (5) To be looked after by the State if you cannot look after yourself
- (6) To be protected from crime

- (7) To be treated fairly and equally
- (8) To have free health-care if you need it
- (9) To have a job
- (10) None of the above

Now I would like you to think about the responsibilities of people living in the UK. I mean the things that all people are obliged to do.

To follow are things which some people feel should be the responsibilities of every person living in the UK. Which, if any, do you feel should be the responsibility of everyone living in the UK? [*EResp*]

- (1) To obey and respect the law
- (2) To behave morally and ethically
- (3) To help and protect your family
- (4) To raise children properly
- (5) To work to provide for yourself
- (6) To behave responsibly
- (7) To vote
- (8) To respect and preserve the environment
- (9) To help others
- (10) To treat others with fairness and respect
- (11) To treat all races equally
- (12) None of the above

STRESZCZENIE

Maria Sobolewska

DOBRY MUZUŁMAŃSCY OBYWATELE? KONCEPCJA OBYWATELSTWA BRYTYJSKIEGO W OCZACH BRYTYJSKICH MUZUŁMANÓW

Po zamachach terrorystycznych w USA w 2001 r., w Madrycie w 2003 r., oraz w 2005 r. w Londynie mniejszości muzułmańskiej na świecie traktowane są podejrzliwie i zadawane są pytania, czy mogą one być lojalnymi obywatelami państw zachodnich.

W Wielkiej Brytanii duża liczba badań opinii publicznej przeprowadzanych wśród ludności muzułmańskiej i opublikowanych po 2005 r. zdawało się poświadczать te wątpliwości. Odpowiedzi na pytania dotyczące wolności wypowiedzi czy prawa szariatu wydawały się potwierdzać, że Muzułmanie w Wielkiej Brytanii po-

pierają wartości nieliberalne i że islam, jako religia, jest niespójny z wartościami brytyjskiej demokracji.

Autorka artykułu podjęła się szczegółowej weryfikacji tych twierdzeń. W tym celu na wstępie autorka przedstawia, na podstawie współczesnej literatury brytyjskiej, formułowane w niej koncepcje obywatelstwa. Następnie, opierając się na analizie statystycznej badań przeprowadzonych przez rząd brytyjski w 2001, 2003 i 2005 roku, dotyczących stopnia poparcia dla praw i obowiązków obywateli brytyjskich, dokonuje weryfikacji tych konceptów teoretycznych (liberalnych i komunitarystycznych; politycznych, obywatelskich i społecznych), stawiając sobie pytanie, na ile obywatele brytyjscy kształtują swoje postawy obywatelskie zgodnie z nimi. W dalszej kolejności autorka dokonuje porównania mniejszości muzułmańskiej z resztą społeczeństwa brytyjskiego, w szczególności sprawdzając tezę, czy wyznawcy Islamu opowiadają się za wartościami innymi niż liberalne w większym stopniu niż reszta społeczeństwa brytyjskiego. W rezultacie tych rozważań i analiz, autorka stawia tezę, według której główną przyczyną różnic pomiędzy Muzułmanami a resztą społeczeństwa brytyjskiego jest ich alienacja polityczna.

Niespodziewanym rezultatem tej analizy jest odkrycie, że koncepcja obywatelstwa w oczach Brytyjczyków nie odzwierciedla żadnej istniejącej teoretycznej koncepcji obywatelstwa. Jednocześnie potwierdzone zostało, że Muzułmanie akceptują średnio mniejszą liczbę praw i obowiązków obywatelskich niż reszta Brytyjczyków, ale równocześnie muzułmanie nie wyrażają mniejszego poparcia dla wartości liberalnych i że zasadnicza różnica nie tkwi w zaakceptowaniu lub niezaakceptowaniu przez nich określonego systemu wartości, lecz ogólnie – w bardziej ograniczonej koncepcji obywatelskich praw i obowiązków. Alienacja polityczna odgrywa pewną rolę, lecz nie do końca wyjaśnia ten fenomen, aczkolwiek czyni to w większym stopniu aniżeli różnice religijne. Wyjaśnienie tkwi być może w tym, że dostępne badania pochodziły z lat: 2001, 2003, 2005. Rok 2003 był rokiem szczególnym, ponieważ z początkiem tego roku w Wielkiej Brytanii odbyły się masowe protesty przeciw inwazji na Irak, które zakwalifikować należy jako jedną z największych w ostatnich latach mobilizacją obywateli przeciwko decyzjom rządu. W 2003 r. można było zaobserwować spadek poparcia dla praw i obowiązków obywatelskich u wszystkich Brytyjczyków, lecz regresja pokazuje, że wśród Brytyjczyków wyznania muzułmańskiego był on większy i że w 2005 r. spadek ten utrzymywał się tylko wśród ludności muzułmańskiej. Uwzględnienie roku w analizie wyjaśnia w dużym stopniu, dlaczego Muzułmanie kwalifikują mniej praw i obowiązków obywatelskich jako przynależnych do koncepcji obywatelstwa brytyjskiego.

