

UTOPIA, IDEOLOGY AND/OR EVERYDAY EDUCATION PRACTICE

EDITOR
WIKTOR ŻŁOBICKI

INSTYTUT PEDAGOGIKI
UNIwersYTETU
WROCLAWSKIEGO

WROCLAW 2019



UTOPIA, IDEOLOGY AND/OR EVERYDAY EDUCATION PRACTICE

**PUBLICATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF GENERAL
PEDAGOGY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WROCŁAW – ISSUE I**

UTOPIA, IDEOLOGY AND/OR EVERYDAY EDUCATION PRACTICE

EDITOR WIKTOR ZŁOBICKI

INSTYTUT PEDAGOGIKI UNIWERSYTETU WROCŁAWSKIEGO
WROCŁAW 2019

Editor	Wiktor Żłobicki
Review	prof. zw. dr hab. Zbyszko Melosik
Translated by	Katarzyna Turska Marcin Turski
Proofreading	Marcin Turski Rafał Włodarczyk
Cover design	Monika Humeniuk
Typesetting	Hanna Włoch

ISBN 978-83-62618-48-4

Electronic version: <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/dlibra/publication/103005>

© Instytut Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego
Wrocław 2019

Instytut Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego
ul. Dawida 1, 50-527 Wrocław
tel. 71 367 32 12, biblioteka.iped@uwr.edu.pl

TABLE OF CONTENTS

From the Editor 7

Part I **Utopian Thinking on Education**

Rafał Włodarczyk
Democracy, Utopia, Education 13

Monika Humeniuk
Religion and Critique – Jacques Ellul’s Concept in the Perspective of
General Pedagogy 37

Grażyna Lubowicka
Figurative Language in Symbolic Space – Interpretation and Imagination
in Understanding Meanings 59

Part II **Ideological *Leading* of Education**

Grażyna Lubowicka
Ideology and Utopia in Social Imaginaries 73

Wiktor Żłobicki
Holistic and Transdisciplinary Character of Contemporary Academic
Education 87

Rafał Włodarczyk
Schools “Detached” from Reality. On the Architectonics and Dynamics
of Contemporary Educational Space 105

Jacek Gulanowski
New Pole in New Poland. Upbringing According to Jan Stachniuk 121

Part III

On the Experience of Educational Everyday Reality

Iwona Paszenda

Routine as an Extraordinary Educational Experience in the Perspective of Pragmatism 141

Iwona Paszenda

Between "Healthy-Mindedness" and a "Sick Soul" – on Pragmatism and Consequences of Religious Experience in Everyday Life 153

Monika Humeniuk

Transgressions in the Pedagogy of Religion – Between Instrumentalization and Emancipation of Religious Education 169

Wiktor Żłobicki

Teachers vs. the Uniqueness of Their Occupational Role. On the Need for Supervision in Educational Work 185

Team of the General Pedagogy Department at the Institute of Pedagogy of the University of Wrocław 193

FROM THE EDITOR

The collection of texts by scholars of the Department of General Pedagogy at the University of Wrocław is, on the one hand, an expression of the contemporary approach to general pedagogy as a reflection on multidisciplinary upbringing – mainly of philosophical, sociological and psychological nature, and, on the other hand, a reference to the name of pedagogy and its Greek source of the concept of *paidagogos*, which describes a slave in ancient Greece who led the sons of free citizens to a place of physical exercise and games. A number of vital questions arise in reference to the Greek idea of *leading*: how can contemporary pedagogues *lead* a student? Why *lead*? What for? With whom? Where? *Lead* towards what? These questions have been posed many a time and it might seem that the reader of this volume may expect methodical answers. However, as we have already indicated, our reflection on upbringing is oriented differently. Creating the conceptual framework of this volume, also reflected in its title, we decided that it is worth pointing out the significance for both theory and educational practice of the phenomena at the intersection of the utopia, ideology and/or everyday upbringing. If we decide that upbringing is an element of the aspiration for a sufficiently well-functioning society, then the intentionality of this upbringing is strongly influenced by utopia and ideology. That is why it is necessary to emphasize the appropriateness or even the necessity, of referring in pedagogy to educational ideologies understood as a broad and very diverse set of ideas and views that create education on a daily basis. Similarly, it seems important to recall the ideal image of the world of upbringing expressed in utopia, thinking about dystopia, pessimistic vision of upbringing space and its opposite, i.e. eutopia and heterotopia. All of that will allow us not to lose sight of places and spaces of upbringing different from the mainstream of social life, to follow the recommendations of Michel Foucault.

Among the texts that make up this volume there are theoretical studies, whose Authors address in the first part the theme of utopia, in the second part of ideology, while texts inspired by the everyday pedagogical practice make up the third part of the work.

Part One, under the title “Utopian Thinking on Education”, is launched by an article by Rafał Włodarczyk *Democracy, Utopia, Education*, highlighting relations between selected theories of democracy, the concept of utopia and education. In her text *Religion and Critique – Jacques Ellul’s Concept in the Perspective of General Pedagogy*, Monika Humeniuk highlighted the position of a representative of a radical current of the pedagogy of religion, which saw both the need and value of connecting critical and emancipation engagement with religious belief. *Figurative Language in Symbolic Space – Interpretation and Imagination in Understanding Meanings* is the third text of this part by Grażyna Lubowicka; taking the perspective of philosophical reflection, it focuses on rhetorical patterns in language and demonstrates the meaning of interpretation and imagination in figurative speech.

Part Two, titled “Ideological Leading of Education”, is composed of four articles. The first one, *Ideology and Utopia in Social Imaginaries* by Grażyna Lubowicka, shows the social shift determined by the dialectics of ideology and utopia. Wiktor Żłobicki in his text *Holistic and Transdisciplinary Character of Contemporary Academic Education* focuses on the need to take into account the holistic and transdisciplinary nature of knowledge used in present-day academic education so that university graduates might meet the challenges of the future. In his second text, *Schools “Detached” from Reality. On the Architectonics and Dynamics of Contemporary Educational Space*, Rafał Włodarczyk warns against the dangerous gap between school education and social reality. Jacek Gulanowski in the article *New Pole in New Poland. Upbringing According to Jan Stachniuk* shows the uniqueness of a pedagogical reflection from the early 20th century.

Part Three of the publication is called “On the Experience of Educational Everyday Reality” opens up with Iwona Paszenda’s article *Routine as an Extraordinary Educational Experience in the Perspective of Pragmatism*, who urges a confrontation with the views of two different representatives of pragmatism on the role of routine in everyday educational practice. Two other texts concern manifestations of religious beliefs in this practice. Iwona Paszenda continues reflection on pragmatism interlinked with spirituality in *Between “Healthy-Mindedness”*

and a “Sick Soul” – on Pragmatism and Consequences of Religious Experience in Everyday Life, while Monika Humeniuk in the article *Transgressions in the Pedagogy of Religion – Between Instrumentalization and Emancipation of Religious Education* reconstructed paradigms and models of religious education from the perspective of Habermas’s theory of interests that make up cognition. This part of the publication concludes with a text by Wiktor Żłobicki *Teachers vs. the Uniqueness of Their Occupational Role. On the Need for Supervision in Educational Work*, which shows the unique complexity of everyday reality of teachers and the value of offering them support via supervision.

It is worth stressing once more that the articles in the volume are related to papers delivered by scholars of the Department of General Pedagogy at the University of Wrocław during conferences held by leading Polish scholarly centres, including the Pedagogues’ Forum, or annual nationwide scholarly meetings organized for over three decades at the Institute Pedagogy of the University of Wrocław.

Wiktor Żłobicki

PART I

UTOPIAN THINKING ON EDUCATION

RAFAŁ WŁODARCZYK

University of Wrocław

DEMOCRACY, UTOPIA, EDUCATION¹

*The power of religion
depends, in the last resort,
on the credibility of the banners
it puts in the hands of men
as they stand before death*

Peter L. Berger

*A utopian society without
criminals cannot be achieved,
but only by striving for an
unattainable utopia can
one achieve anything*

Piotr Sztompka

INTRODUCTION

In April 1831, Alexis de Tocqueville, a twenty-six-year-old aristocrat embarked on a voyage to the United States on a mission entrusted to him by Louis-Filip, the French king in charge of the government of the July monarchy. Tocqueville was to investigate US prisons. His friend Gustave de Beaumont, also designated for this task, accompanied him both during the ship's voyage and during the several months of wandering around America. On the spot, Tocqueville's attention was

¹ Originally published: Rafał Włodarczyk, "Demokracja, utopia, wychowanie", [in:] *Utopia a edukacja*, vol. 3, ed. K. Rejman, R. Włodarczyk, Instytut Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2017, p. 11-31, <http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/92821>.

absorbed not so much by the US prison system as by the whole way of organizing social life, in which he saw the direction of evolution of the modern world. On his return to France, in addition to his report *Du système pénitencier aux Etats-Unis, et de son application en France*, he published two volumes of an equally comprehensive dissertation on Democracy in America, which will make him famous as one of the most insightful researchers in Western societies. In the *Introduction* to the first volume, published in 1835, he expresses with undisguised passion the feelings that accompany him in creating his narratives and analyses. In a prophetic tone, the philosopher and future politician confesses: "The whole book which is here offered to the public has been written under the impression of a kind of religious dread produced in the author's mind by the contemplation of so irresistible a revolution, which has advanced for centuries in spite of such amazing obstacles, and which is still proceeding in the midst of the ruins it has made"². What Tocqueville means here is the progress of equality and the spread of democracy. As he accounts for his interest in the situation in the United States:

I have acknowledged this revolution as a fact already accomplished or on the eve of its accomplishment; and I have selected the nation, from amongst those which have undergone it, in which its development has been the most peaceful and the most complete, in order to discern its natural consequences, and, if it be possible, to distinguish the means by which it may be rendered profitable³.

The enthusiasm of the descriptions and images of the first volume can be compared with the passion with which in chapter two of *A truly golden little book, no less beneficial than entertaining, of a republic's best state and of the new island Utopia* Raphael Hythlodæus shared with his Thomas More the organisation of its residents' lives. Their country was also the work of the newcomers and the incarnation of ideas as well as the result of violence against the natives, which was mentioned by the interlocutor of the Renaissance thinker. Tocqueville excitedly develops the first element of this parallel:

² A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Hazleton 2002, p. 16. In the Foreword to the twelfth edition, which appeared after the fall of the July monarchy in 1848, Tocqueville in a way repeats his earlier declaration: "This book was written fifteen years ago under the influence of one thought: the imminent, inevitable and universal advent of democracy".

³ *Ibidem*, p. 23–24. See M. Zetterbaum, "Alexis de Tocqueville", [in:] *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. L. Strauss, J. Cropsey, Chicago and London 1987, p. 761–783.

The emigrants who fixed themselves on the shores of America in the beginning of the seventeenth century severed the democratic principle from all the principles which repressed it in the old communities of Europe, and transplanted it unalloyed to the New World. It has there been allowed to spread in perfect freedom, and to put forth its consequences in the laws by influencing the manners of the country⁴.

Both travellers, having traversed the ocean and having scrutinised with their foreigners' eyes American laws, customs, beliefs, upbringing, economic life, etc., bring in a model of a political system written down in full detail in images of everyday life. It is true that the organization of Utopian life from Hythlodæus' story is fictional, as is the figure of the traveller himself. However, with respect to the United States as accounted for by Tocqueville, one can say that the country was subjected to insightful, factual research and sober analysis. Still, the United States is idealised. In other words, both overseas countries in their book versions resemble what their contemporary readers knew, but are more efficiently and sensibly arranged. In both cases, they provide the imagination with a pretext to compare the imaginary visions to the current condition of indigenous political communities and to create a vision of a possible future. In the *Introduction* to the first volume, the young aristocrat gives vent to this dream of sorts:

I can conceive a society in which all men would profess an equal attachment and respect for the laws of which they are the common authors; in which the authority of the State would be respected as necessary, though not as divine; and the loyalty of the subject to its chief magistrate would not be a passion, but a quiet and rational persuasion. Every individual being in the possession of rights which he is sure to retain, a kind of manly reliance and reciprocal courtesy would arise between all classes, alike removed from pride and meanness. The people, well acquainted with its true interests, would allow that in order to profit by the advantages of society it is necessary to satisfy its demands. In this state of things the voluntary association of the citizens might supply the individual exertions of the nobles, and the community would be alike protected from anarchy and from oppression [...] If there be less splendour than in the halls of an aristocracy, the contrast of misery will be less frequent also; the pleasures of enjoyment may be less excessive, but those of comfort will be more general; the sciences may be less perfectly cultivated, but ignorance will be less common; the impetuosity of the feelings will be repressed, and the habits of the nation softened; there will be more vices and fewer crimes⁵.

⁴ A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, op. cit., p. 23.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 19.

The image of what Tocqueville believed to be a perfect social order and exemplary interpersonal relations, a mature form of crystallization of collective hopes, growing out of dissatisfaction with the present situation and which can function as a model for the future, is not devoid of reflection on the conditions and ways in which it can become a reality. In the first book of *Utopia*, More – the interlocutor of Hythlodæus – considers in the context of criticism of current social relations, the possible ways of reform and at the same time does not hide his scepticism:

Though it must be confessed that he is both a very learned man and a person who has obtained a great knowledge of the world, I cannot perfectly agree to everything he has related. However, there are many things in the commonwealth of Utopia that I rather wish, than hope, to see followed in our governments⁶.

Similarly, the French aristocrat in the Introduction of his book puts forth a path of the right and proper conduct of the local government:

The first duty which is at this time imposed upon those who direct our affairs is to educate the democracy; to warm its faith, if that be possible; to purify its morals; to direct its energies; to substitute a knowledge of business for its inexperience, and an acquaintance with its true interests for its blind propensities; to adapt its government to time and place, and to modify it in compliance with the occurrences and the actors of the age⁷.

The image of a decent society that grew out of Tocqueville's business trip thus reveals a clear link between the utopia of democracy and education. The accumulated excess of expectations that Tocqueville confronts and becomes accustomed to, introduces into the hopes of an era understood by us from the perspective of a distant and unfamiliar history, which knows no repetitions. Nevertheless, the events of the July Revolution and the predictions of the young philosopher bring to mind the situation of the Polish political transformation of the 1990s, along with its horizon of expectations towards democracy, education and upbringing, in which the United States was an important point of reference. In both cases, the utopia was created by the image of a model of an order which had already been embodied and achieved.

⁶ T. More, *Utopia*, Stilwell 2005, p. 88.

⁷ A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, op. cit., p. 16-17.

ON TWO NOTIONS OF UTOPIA

Utopia as a literary genre, frequently practiced by the intellectual elites of Europe since the publication in 1516 of More's *A truly golden little book, no less beneficial than entertaining, of a republic's best state and of the new island Utopia* through to the 20th century, does not seem to produce too many images of sufficiently perfect societies with a democratic system. The link between the two phenomena is therefore not obvious. But the notions of utopia and democracy are not clear and indisputable, either.

In common understanding, the first of them is taken as a synonym for a fantasy, caprice or delusion, which comes close to one of the possible etymologies of the word, according to which the name of the island in More's work refers to a non-existent place (Greek *ou-tópos*). On the other hand, an essential distinguishing feature of the literary genre should be the depiction of fictitious societies developed by their authors in order to imagine the perfect organisation of their entire lives. In this sense, utopia is a peculiar continuation of the main issue of classical political philosophy, developed since the times of Plato and Aristotle, i.e. the shape and conditions of the ideal of the political system. Within this genre, as well as within the tradition of political philosophy, the reported subject of education took a form similar to one of three ideal types: the ideal of upbringing as a factor enabling social reproduction of expected patterns of behaviour and models of social organization, radically innovative pedagogies and elements of education organisation and the principles of education of the future, of revolutionary impact on society. Aristotle's concept from his *Politics* of upbringing conducive to the needs and aspirations of the citizen of the polis to optimally serve the proper good of the political community, Salomon's House in Bensalem from Francis Bacon's *The New Atlantis*: a university focused on learning through experience and technical progress, or finally a vision of folk education serving the goals of all humanity from Janusz Korczak's *Szkoła życia* (*School of Life*)⁸ are exemplary cases of implementation of each of the above types, although we must bear in mind that in many texts they successfully co-exist.

⁸ See Aristotle, *The Politics*, books VII, VIII, London 1992, p. 359-450; F. Bacon, *The New Atlantis*, New York, 1914; J. Korczak, "Szkoła życia", [in:] J. Korczak, *Pisma wybrane*, vol. III, Warszawa 1985, p. 63-199.

Since utopian thinking goes far beyond the convention and form of the literary genre developed since the Renaissance, the term itself is also used more widely to accentuate the link between utopia and political practice⁹. According to Jerzy Szacki, “It is born when a gap appears in human consciousness between the world that exists and the world that is conceivable”¹⁰. According to the findings of this scholar, in order for the phenomenon to attain its idea, in which the second etymologically-based reading is enclosed i.e. the land of happiness (Greek *eu-tópos*), the split must be radical:

There is a difference between a utopist and a reformer, i.e. someone who improves the existing world, instead of creating a new one in its place. [...] The utopist does not need to know what to do. His affair is to question the old world in the name of the vision of another one. The reformer accepts the old world as the basis of the new world, seeing in it only another phase or another form of the same order. In the depths of his soul, the latter may sometimes cherish a utopia, but he does not identify with it. His element is compromise, which the utopist flatly rejects¹¹.

Therefore, utopian thinking is predicated on a strong tension based on the contrast between what Irena Pańków terms the critical and destructive moment and the positive and constructive one¹².

This does not mean, of course, that utopia is a kind of action plan with a predetermined effect, but that it plays an important role in the formation of a social object of aspiration. According to Bronisław Baczko, in their various forms,

Imaginary visions of a New Society become one of the places, sometimes the most important, of the influence of social imagination. They are a sphere in which social dreams are collected, developed and produced. Thus, these imaginary visions constitute a kind of arrangement of variable effectiveness, enabling the creation of a uniform collective scheme of both interpretation and integration of the field of *social experience* and the *horizon of expectations*, as well as objections, fears and hopes that surround this field¹³.

⁹ See R. Włodarczyk, “Utopia w perspektywie pedagogiki współczesnej”, [in:] *Utopia a edukacja*, ed. J. Gromysz, R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2016, p. 66-70, <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/publication/81184>, 29.06.2016.

¹⁰ J. Szacki, *Spotkania z utopią*, Warszawa 1980, p. 28.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 31-32.

¹² See I. Pańków, *Filozofia utopii*, Warszawa 1990, p. 171-174.

¹³ B. Baczko, “Utopia”, [in:] B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne. Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej*, Warszawa 1994, p. 91.

After Karl Mannheim we can say that utopia is a component of a political conflict, escalating towards the transformation of reality, and its participants can be described as those who, reacting to oppression and orienting themselves to factors that are currently outside this reality, in experiencing, thinking and acting manifest an interest in abolishing and rebuilding the existing social order, perceive at the same time mainly those elements of the situation that they wish to negate. They have to confront those who, in an effort to maintain an arrangement that is beneficial to them, mostly emphasize the links of the vision of the location and circumstances that they wish to preserve in the future¹⁴. In this way utopias are analytically separate part of political ideologies which, as Andrew Heywood notes, “offer an account of the existing order” and “explain how political change can and should be brought about” and first and foremost “advance a model of a desired future, a vision of the ‘good society’”¹⁵. Therefore, the alternative communities or political and pedagogical experiments follow reactions inspired by utopia; this applies to both whole states¹⁶ and bigger and smaller communities, all kinds of religious orders, associations and all kinds of islands of educational resistance¹⁷. Ernst Bloch offers a development of this category towards its broad understanding. The author sees “utopia as a characteristic feature of the human being”¹⁸, who is, according to the philosopher, “*per se ipsum* an anticipatory being”, marked with insufficiency whose “working will of meeting needs becomes objectivised through planning”. In other words, utopia is for human beings a way of “a sensible approach to the future, a rationalization of the content of hope”¹⁹.

¹⁴ See K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York 1954, p. 173-190. It should be noted that Mannheim, unlike in the further parts of this article, presents the relation between ideology and utopia, which is justified in his theory of political conflict (see *ibidem*, p. 49-96), but this is not a subject of our interest here.

¹⁵ A. Heywood, “Introduction: Understanding Ideology”, [in:] A. Heywood, *Political Ideologies. An Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 10-11.

¹⁶ J. Szacki, *Spotkania z utopią*, *op. cit.*, 136-151; B. Baczek, “Utopia”, *op. cit.*, 135-157; Z. Bauman, *Socialism. The Active Utopia*, London 2009.

¹⁷ On the current examples of societies organised around utopian visions: see H. Cyrzan, *O potrzebie utopii. Z dziejów utopii stosowanej XX wieku*, Toruń 2004; T. Jones, *Utopian Dreams. In Search of a Good Life*, London 2007; W. Okoń, *Dzieśięć szkół alternatywnych*, Warszawa 1999.

¹⁸ E. Bloch, “Rzeczywistość antycypowana, czyli jak przebiega i co osiąga myślenie utopijne”, *Studia Filozoficzne* 1982, No. 7-8, p. 52.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 49, 50, 52.

ON THE NOTIONS OF DEMOCRACY AND THEIR PEDAGOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE

The image of Tocqueville's decent society, created after his return from a business trip, placed in the above reconstructed framework of political thinking about utopia, prompts us to recognize the notion of democracy, and then to outline more clearly the role of upbringing in this context. It cannot be denied that all three categories are far from being unambiguous. For the purposes of this article, while escaping from simplifications that go too far, it is enough for us to dispose of their deep and critical understanding.

PASSIONS OF ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE AND JOHN DEWEY – DEMOCRACY AS A WAY OF BEING AND ACTING IN ASSOCIATIONS

The concept used by Tocqueville is the result of readings, interviews, many months of observations and reflections. At the centre of the phenomenon there is the equality of opportunity provided to citizens. He then discusses how it is used by them in everyday life and what the potential risks might be. According to Martin Zetterbaum, who comments on the researcher's achievements:

Tocqueville's purpose in the *Democracy* is to show men how they might be both equal and free, and by not equating democracy with any institutional form associated with it – government of the people, representative government, separation of power – Tocqueville underscores his fear that the real driving force of democracy, the passion of equality, is compatible with tyranny as well as with liberty. Tyranny may very well coexist with what appear to be democratic institutions. Unlike some of his contemporaries who believed that the gradual development of equality went hand in hand with final destruction of the possibility of tyranny on earth, Tocqueville understood that the democratic principle was prone, if left untutored, to a despotism never before experienced²⁰.

This worrying consequence is related to the observation of a young aristocrat that a characteristic feature of this type of society is atomisation, loosening social ties. Equality makes everyone become the centre of the private world with his or her aspirations for prosperity, concern for individual success and the tendency to plunge into mediocrity. At the same time, this is accompanied by the softening of morals

²⁰ M. Zetterbaum, "Alexis de Tocqueville", op. cit., p. 763.

and the development of a spirit of compassion and empathy. Still, according to Zetterbaum: “The gentleness, softening of manners, and air of humanity which characterize democratic societies are apt to be felt most strongly within the family unit rather than between citizens”²¹. Tocqueville demonstrates that “Democracy loosens social ties, but it draws the ties of nature more tight; it brings kindred more closely together, whilst it places the various members of the community more widely apart”²². Freedom can be threatened because equality and individualism – by pushing people towards the satisfaction of material needs to which access has been opened to them – open humans up to competition, which prevents them from reaching the expected level of satisfaction comparable to the satisfaction of others. The growing frustration about the failure to achieve wealth, giving rise to envy and attrition of mutual respect, is offset by passing the burden of ensuring comfort and prosperity to the authorities. The authorities, in turn, who developing their caring powers, accept a kind of new oppression and a new pedagogy. At the end of the second volume, published in 1840, Tocqueville evocatively writes:

The supreme power then extends its arm over the whole community. It covers the surface of society with a net-work of small complicated rules, minute and uniform, through which the most original minds and the most energetic characters cannot penetrate, to rise above the crowd. The will of man is not shattered, but softened, bent, and guided: men are seldom forced by it to act, but they are constantly restrained from acting: such a power does not destroy, but it prevents existence; it does not tyrannize, but it compresses, enervates, extinguishes, and stupefies a people, till each nation is reduced to be nothing better than a flock of timid and industrious animals, of which the government is the shepherd²³.

According to Tocqueville, citizens of a democratic society, in the name of maintaining equality, are willing to give in to this kind of pedagogy and sacrifice their freedom. Their persecutors are becoming stronger and stronger, while they themselves cannot find any consolation.

In the face of these possible dangers arising from the acceptance of the administrative despotism of the caring authorities, which oscillate towards centralisation, as well as the tyranny of the majority over the opinions, intelligence and wealth of those less numerous, the French philosopher notes that the democratic society has

²¹ Ibidem, p. 768.

²² A. de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, op. cit., p. 660.

²³ Ibidem, p. 771.

recourse to certain remedies, which include “local self-government, the separation of church and state, a free press, indirect elections, an independent judiciary, and the encouragement of associations of all descriptions”²⁴. They act in different ways but are linked by the fact that they awaken in citizens the awareness of the needs of others, mutual assistance, create conditions in which it is possible to exceed their own interest, help to counteract tyranny and overcome mediocrity. In other words, “men must be taught that out of an enlightened regard for themselves they need constantly assist one another and sacrifice some portion of their time and wealth to the welfare of the state or community”, since, as Zetterbaum writes about Tocqueville’s approach, “The problem of democracy is to re-create a sense of public morality on the basis of equality and individualism”²⁵.

John Dewey read the issue of democracy in the first decades of the 20th century along similar lines, seeing it primarily as a way of being a citizen, who is to be provided security by legal and political frameworks²⁶. Starting from the classical pluralistic theory and taking the concept of comprehensive growth as a fundamental value and measure as a progressive realisation of human capabilities, he saw the role of the state in improving the operation and regulation of relations in situations of conflicting goals or mutual conflict between various communities: families, neighbourhoods, schools, associations, clubs, companies, enterprises, thanks to which the development expected by the state is achieved by people in general. Moreover, in the case of possessive, criminal and destructive communities which constrain growth as well as inefficient communities, the state should retain the prerogative to evaluate these associations and intervene²⁷. In other words, as the critic of Stalinism observes:

An undesirable society, in other words, is one which internally and externally sets up barriers to free intercourse and communication of experience. A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all its members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment

²⁴ M. Zetterbaum, “Alexis de Tocqueville”, op. cit., p. 773. See also: L. Koczanowicz, R. Włodarczyk, *Współczesna filozofia społeczna. Rozmowy i eseje o społeczeństwie obywatelskim i etyce demokracji*, Sopot 2009; *Ani książkę, ani kupiec: obywatel. Idea społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w myśli współczesnej*, selection J. Szacki, Kraków 1997.

²⁵ M. Zetterbaum, “Alexis de Tocqueville”, op. cit., p. 776, 778.

²⁶ See R. Horwitz, “John Dewey”, [in:] *History of Political Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 851-869.

²⁷ See J. Dewey, “The Democratic Conception in Education”, [in:] J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, Hazleton 2001, p. 85-104.

of its institutions through interaction of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder²⁸.

It is true that the state and shape of democracy depend on the level of education and involvement of citizens, but according to the concept of growth, every generation can and should create better conditions for its functioning than before. Therefore, Robert Horwitz notes that

Uncooperative men would threaten the democracy of Dewey's dream, as would men inclined to grasp coldly for wealth or power and men who do not wish to grow in every direction. Therefore, in their impressionable years children should be conditioned by life in their classrooms to strive without "competing", to study and work cooperatively in groups, and to acquire the expansive habits of self-expression that will fit them for life in ever more perfect democracy²⁹.

The understanding of democracy, both by Tocqueville and Dewey, emphasizes the special way of life of citizens, shaped and strengthened by participation in associations - families, unions, religious groups, schools, and companies. It seems that in particular their properly organized voluntary forms, as highlighted especially by the 20th century supporters of participatory or association democracy³⁰, have a major educational potential. They teach cooperation, collective opposition to the will of the majority, the needs of others, the sense and ways of exceeding one's own interest, overcoming mediocrity, developing non-material interests, devoting a part of one's wealth and free time to public matters, understanding and protecting equality and freedom. They moreover develop a habit of mutual assistance, which, according to Tocqueville, is particularly needed by citizens in a democracy. At the same time, he sees the educational role of the state in the fact that by counteracting the atomisation characteristic of this system, it is to create favourable conditions for the restoration of social ties. Both the state acting through its institutions and public associations of civil society can build on and deepen the sensitivity, benevolent customs, humanitarianism and trust generally developed by families. This is because there is a need for educational activities which will help to reduce

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 104.

²⁹ R. Horwitz, "John Dewey", op. cit., p. 866.

³⁰ See D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, Cambridge 2008, p. 209-216; M. Saward, *Democracy*, London 2003, p. 86-96, 163-166.

the focus on satisfying one's own material needs, competition and individualism, as indicated in this concept, and to strengthen cooperation, respect and tolerance towards differences. However, according to Tocqueville, the administration of the state as a provider of services and assistance to citizens and the very development of citizens' demands create a danger of a kind of tyranny, which should also be counteracted. Essentially, a number of Dewey's works, especially his book *Democracy and Education*, published in 1916, can be treated as his vision of the role of education in this type of political system. The American philosopher focuses on what is conducive to individual and collective development of experience, its communication and ability to cooperate. In other words, educational activities are to support the creation of conditions for the emergence of a democracy that is yet to come.

THE CORSET OF JOSEF SCHUMPETER – DEMOCRACY AS A PROCEDURE FOR THE EMERGENCE OF ELITES AND A CULTURE OF POLITICAL STRUGGLE

In 1942, Josef Schumpeter, an eminent Austrian economist who had for over a decade been in the United States, far from the totalitarianisms ravaging Europe, published his influential text *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. He preceded his findings on the understanding of democracy in the fourth part of the book with a one-sentence description and extensive commentary on the eighteenth-century model of the political system, rooted, as he suggested, in the theoretical foundations of utilitarian rationalism, which, according to his critics, is an awkward mixture of approaches of philosophers really important for the development ideas, such as Jeremy Bentham, James Mill and Jean Jacques Rousseau³¹. Schumpeter observes that the “democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to carry out its will”³². The economist considers the model to be inadequate for the current conditions; moreover, he expresses doubts about the distribution in a given population of the competence to define the

³¹ See D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, op. cit., p. 146-157; M. Saward, *Democracy*, op. cit., p. 56-61, 77-86. See also: A. Heywood, “Democracy and Legitimacy”, [in:] A. Heywood, *Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 80-107.

³² J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, New York 2008, p. 250.

common good, to translate it into problems resulting from everyday life and current politics, and about the relationship between compromises, decisions, opinions, reactions and intentions of voters and the “will of the people”³³. Still, he believes that the rationality of decisions concerning political matters is debatable, as he finds these matters often outside the immediate field of observation of the voters, their professional or everyday life, where they gain hands-on knowledge, a guarantee of their independence and intellectual prowess. Furthermore, as David Held notes when commenting on the concept of the Austrian economist living in the US,

First, irrational prejudice and impulse govern a great deal of what passes for the average citizen’s contribution to politics, second, the ‘public mind’ becomes highly vulnerable to groups with ‘an axe to grind’: self-seeking politicians, business interests or ‘idealists of one kind or another’³⁴.

Schumpeter reverses the order of the “classical theory” he has indicated, making “the deciding of issues by the electorate secondary to the election of the men who are to do the deciding”. As a consequence, he puts forth a definition differing from the “classic” one presented earlier: “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”³⁵. The concept of competition for leadership and the cyclical exchange of elites in elections, proposed by the Austrian economist, reminiscent of the competition for consumers between producers, is indicative, in his opinion, of the procedure that exists in every democracy. The criterion obtained on this basis is so clear that, in the opinion of its author, it makes it possible to effectively distinguish democratic governments. As Held points out,

³³ See *ibidem*, p. 250–256. On another occasion he writes: “the will of the majority is the will of the majority and not the will of ‘the people’. The latter is a mosaic that the former completely fails to ‘represent’” (*ibidem*, p. 272).

³⁴ D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

³⁵ J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 269. See A. Heywood, “Democracy and Legitimacy”, *op. cit.*, p. 101–103. In the assumptions adopted by Schumpeter, we can see the continuation of Max Weber’s diagnosis of a modern representative democracy called by him a “plebiscitary leader democracy”. According to Weber, it is mainly based on a competitive political struggle between parties that become bureaucratic and struggle for their qualified leaders to be mandated to exercise power (see M. Weber, “Politics as a Vocation”, [in:] *From Max Weber. Essay in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth, C.W. Mills, New York 1946, p. 77–128; D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 125–141

Far from democracy being a form of life marked by the promise of equality and the best conditions for human development in a rich context of participation, the democratic citizens lot was, quite straightforwardly, the right periodically to choose and authorize governments to act on their behalf. Democracy could serve a variety of ends [...] ³⁶.

Recognising the dependence of his method on the personal freedom of voters, Schumpeter stresses the fragility of the link between politics and the ability of citizens to influence it.

One could think that the voters both elect to an office and control. Since, however, electorates normally do not their political leaders in any way except by refusing to re-elect them or the parliamentary majorities that support them, our ideas concerning the control could be reduced in a manner shown in our definition ³⁷.

The Austrian economist shifts the focus to the functioning of political elites, parliament, leadership, creating external and internal party policy, which includes e.g. the impact on the choices made by the electorate, awakening group acts of intent and their development. He is aware that the democratic method he indicated does not exclude “the cases that are strikingly analogous to the economic phenomena we label “unfair” or “fraudulent” competition or restraint of competition” ³⁸.

Establishing a feature common to industrial democracies is not yet the “realism” of the concept that Schumpeter is striving for. He therefore points to four conditions which, in his opinion, allow democracy to flourish in social systems and, in principle, enable it to continue despite the consecutive successions of power and crises ³⁹. The Austrian émigré stresses the importance of creating a quality political stratum, which is a matter of feeling rather than measuring the extent to which the democratic process entails recruitment by means of selection ⁴⁰. Its existence and level, he claims, “it will also increase their fitness by endowing them with traditions that embody experience, with a professional code and with a common fund of views” ⁴¹. At the same time, Schumpeter is aware that in a competitive environment, politicians must first and foremost take into account the principles of the

³⁶ D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, op. cit., p. 142.

³⁷ J. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, op. cit., p. 272.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 271. “A party is a group whose members propose to act in concert in the competitive struggle for political power” (*ibidem*, p. 283).

³⁹ See *ibidem*, p. 289-296.

⁴⁰ See *ibidem*, p. 290-291.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 291.

career, the interests of their own social stratum and the rules of political struggle in which they participate in order to win and defend the positions, while in the selection process, intellectual and character issues are not basic criteria. In other words, on the one hand, “a politician who is a good tactician can successfully withstand any number of administrative errors”, but on the other hand, “It is not quite true that in the average case political success proves nothing for a man or that the politician is nothing but an amateur”⁴².

The Austrian mentions as a second condition for the success of democracy is that “the effective range of political decision should not be extended too far”⁴³. He points out that there are areas of state functioning and problems, such as autonomy of judges from political agendas, supervision of central banks, universities, which cannot be dispensed with without independent expert opinions, but which cannot be guaranteed in advance by law. “A rational treatment of it requires that legislation in this matter should be protected from both the fits of vindictiveness and the fits of sentimentality in which the laymen in the government and in the parliament are alternately prone to indulge”⁴⁴. In matters of this kind, politicians should make decisions only formally, but this depends on the patterns of political culture.

Another condition for the success of democracy, in which the decisive factor is the difference in the degree, difficult to measure, is related to the administrative base. According to Schumpeter, it is important whether a democratic government in a modern industrial society can have at its disposal “the services of a well-trained bureaucracy of good standing and tradition, endowed with a strong sense of duty and a no less strong *esprit de corps*”⁴⁵. What is more, “It is not enough that the bureaucracy should be efficient in current administration and competent to give advice. It must also be strong enough to guide and, if need be, to instruct the politicians who head the ministries”⁴⁶.

The last condition is “democratic self-control” of both the electorate and politicians, with the aim of limiting any kind of hasty reactions, disintegration of the division of labour between them, fierce attacks against opponents, disregard for opposing opinions and for the situation in the country. This condition reveals, more than any other, the

⁴² Ibidem, p. 289.

⁴³ Ibidem, p. 291.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 292.

⁴⁵ Ibidem, p. 293.

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

reversal of roles announced by Schumpeter, indicating the position of the “will of the people” (in which he doubts) vis-à-vis the success of democracy; this reveals as well the utopian nature of its model:

But even the necessary minimum of democratic self-control – he notes – evidently requires a national character and national habits of a certain type which have not everywhere had the opportunity to evolve and which the democratic method itself cannot be relied on to produce [...] democratic government which will work to full advantage only if all the interests that matter are practically unanimous not only in their allegiance to the country but also in their allegiance to the structural principles of the existing society⁴⁷.

Translating the notion of the political system indicated by Schumpeter into educational issues, the forefront of the list seems to be occupied with the task of shaping a proper democratic culture and preparing three types of actors to participate in it in terms of their respective roles: electorate, professional administration and experts, as well as politicians embedded in the political parties. At the core of his concept are decision-making elites, which are only periodically influenced by the voters, and their selection. According to Schumpeter, however, it is not external pressure that is the main factor in increasing the competence of the political class, but its existence and relatively stable membership of individual activists, which enable them to learn through the exchange of experience and the acquisition of professional ethos and may promote intelligence and character among candidates for offices within individual parties. According to the Austrian economist, a test of the internal policy of a party, which shapes electoral lists, does not necessarily mean career advancement; it can create more demanding conditions for learning to make politics than the general public of the electorate. However, voters’ understanding of their role and raising their political competence is an important goal of civic education. Above all, it is supposed to reduce as much as possible the submission to superstitions, impulses, demagogues and public sentiments. It can moreover foster the development of positive models and customs of political practice, especially important conditions, which, according to Schumpeter, are patriotism and fidelity to the ideals of democracy. On the other hand, as in the case of politicians, the particular value of experts and employees of public administration is their professionalism, ability to cooperate and influence

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 295-296.

the decision-makers. Preparation of competent personnel and experts requires access to specialist training, a system of personnel selection and implementation of professional ethos standards. The future of democratic systems - different from the fate of the Weimar Republic, as can be deduced - therefore, according to the Austrian emigrant, requires the creation, support and development in this type of modern nation state by means of education of a proper political culture and an appropriate political division of labour of their citizens.

ROBERT A. DAHL'S POLYARCHIES – DEMOCRACY AS A PROCESS AND THE INSTITUTIONS WHICH FOSTER IT

American political scientist Robert A. Dahl believes that the four most important historical sources which significantly contributed to the shaping of the contemporary practice of democratic states include e.g. the concepts of the idea and institutions of the classical Greek period, the tradition of the Republican Rome and Italian medieval and Renaissance city-states, then the modern idea and institution of the representational government, as well as the logic of political equality⁴⁸. In his book *Democracy and its Critics*, published at the end of the Cold War, in which he collects his theoretical experiences accumulated since the 1950s, he highlights the nature of these sources and the two profound transformations that they underwent before being applied in the context of nation states. After the “unquestionable view that democracy must be representative”, which greatly increased the distance between the demos and the government, and also brought with it a new and complicated system of political institutions, which we are only just beginning to understand⁴⁹, such as the division of powers described by John Locke and Montesquieu, for example, it is hard not to notice that the same term refers to phenomena very distant from each other. According to the American political scientist, the application of these ideas to large nation states requires their re-development.

Dahl focuses his attention, on the one hand, on indicating the criteria of the democratic process and, on the other hand, on the institutions necessary for its functioning. The model of decision-making

⁴⁸ See R.A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, New Haven 1989, p. 13-33. See also: D. Held, *Models of Democracy*, op. cit., p. 11-95.

⁴⁹ See R.A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, op. cit., p. 29.

in a democratic association or a state as proposed by Dahl assumes⁵⁰ that a prerequisite for effective participation in the process is that, firstly, all citizens should be able to participate effectively – expressing preferences for future decisions, influencing the setting of the agenda and making their voices heard. Secondly, while recognising the equality of all votes that will make up the outcome, at the settlement stage, every entitled citizen should be able to benefit without hindrance from this means of expression of preference. Thirdly, the criterion of enlightened understanding requires that each of the parties involved in the decision-making process must be able to obtain information about their subject matter and likely consequences within certain time limits. Fourthly, supervision of the tasks undertaken, control of the agenda requires that the way in which the agenda is set should be a right which belongs exclusively to the entire assembly of citizens. Fifthly, in connection with the temporary acquisition of full rights as a result of the requirements mentioned above, the criterion of adult inclusion is still necessary. Dahl recognises that the five criteria he sets out define precisely which procedure can be considered democratic:

A political process that meets only the first two criteria, I have suggested, might be regarded as *procedurally democratic in a narrow sense*. In contrast, one that also meets the criterion of enlightened understanding can be regarded as *fully democratic with respect to an agenda and in relation to a demos*. At a still higher threshold, a process that in addition provides for final control of the agenda by its demos is *fully democratic in relation to its demos*. But only if the demos were inclusive enough to meet the fifth criterion could we describe the process of decisionmaking as *fully democratic*⁵¹.

Like Schumpeter's theory, Dahl's apology of democracy also contains indications as to the conditions necessary for the organisation of the democratic process in large nation states. Introducing the term polyarchy, he distinguishes only those of modern countries where the institutions necessary for the democratic process function above a certain minimum threshold of efficiency. Yet, as he points out, they are the highest achievement of democracy from a practical, but not from a theoretical point of view⁵². According to him, they enable the exercise of the rights of a relatively large population, as well as opposing the highest officials and overturning them in the vote.

⁵⁰ See *ibidem*, p. 106-131; R.A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, New Haven 1998, p. 37-40.

⁵¹ R.A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

⁵² See *ibidem*, p. 194.

Thus, “polyarchy is a political order distinguished by the presence of seven institutions, all of which must exist for a government to be classified as a polyarchy”⁵³: elected officials – it is a constitutional institution entitled to exercise control over government decisions; free and fair elections during which representatives are elected and where “coercion is comparatively uncommon”; an inclusive suffrage, entitling virtually all adults to participate in them; the right of citizens to run for office; freedom of expression – an institution granting the right to air views on political subjects and criticise the system and the government without fearing punishment; alternative information – an institution granting access to alternative and independent news from legally protected sources; associational autonomy – to exercise one’s rights. Pointing out that he means real rather than nominal rights, institutions and mechanisms, Dahl recognises the possibility of creating a ranking of the degree of their satisfaction in individual countries, which offers the above institutions the criteria for proving which of these countries is a polyarchy⁵⁴.

Furthermore, the US political scientist provides and discusses in his book five conditions that must be met by a polyarchy that is additionally stable⁵⁵. According to the author, it becomes stable when leaders do not take advantage of the apparatus of coercion – the military and the police – to gain and retain power; there is a modern, dynamic pluralist society; potential conflicts between subcultures do not exceed a certain level of intensity; the political culture of the population, and in particular of the politically active strata, favours democracy and the institutions of the polyarchy; finally, external influences are negligible or, possibly, promote democracy⁵⁶.

Although the end of Dahl’s work published in 1989 is dominated by the tone of prophecy, the spirit of utopia, as we have seen before, of a decent, sufficiently perfect society is also present in it. He states that the idea of a democratic process which he described in the book sets maximum requirements and may actually be beyond human capacity⁵⁷. In various sections of the book one sees the reiterated motif of

⁵³ Ibidem, op. cit., p. 221. See also: R.A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, op. cit., p. 83-99 (the list of institutions in the later publication differs from that in *Democracy and its Critics*).

⁵⁴ See. R.A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, op. cit., p. 221-222.

⁵⁵ See ibidem, p. 232-264. See also: R.A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, op. cit., p. 145-159.

⁵⁶ See R.A. Dahl, *Democracy and its Critics*, op. cit., p. 314.

⁵⁷ See ibidem, p. 322.

opposing authoritarianism by democracy. Defending the moral superiority of the latter, Dahl observes that “Imperfect democracy may lead to failures yet perfect authoritarianism may result in a calamity”, yet “At its best, only the democratic vision can offer the hope, which guardianship can never do, that by engaging in governing themselves, all people, and not merely a few, may learn to act as morally responsible human beings”⁵⁸. In his book *On Democracy*, published 8 years later and summarising and extending the selected elements of the previous work, when responding to the question why we should support it, he indicates that it helps to avoid tyranny, the government of cruel and vicious autocrats, guarantees to citizens many fundamental rights, which are hard to come by in non-democratic systems, helps to further their fundamental interests, ensures a broader scope of individual freedom, moral independence, and development⁵⁹. Furthermore, as he observes, modern states of representational democracy do not wage wars on one another and fare better than others economically.

The question of civic education in line with his theory and expectations is addressed by Dahl only in the concluding sections of *On Democracy*⁶⁰. He makes the starting point one of its basic criteria, i.e. an enlightened understanding. For the sake of commitment and effective action, it requires citizens to be able to know what political decisions are important to them and what their consequences are. Thanks to the foundations acquired at school, the mass media, the information campaigns of their parties, associations and interest groups in which they are involved, and the gradual adoption of serious governmental decisions, the citizens of democratic countries, according to the American political scientist, have so far achieved a level of awareness that is generally appropriate to the political challenges. However, the increasing internationalisation, the increase in the number and complexity of public matters requiring knowledge beyond the pace at which the educational system assimilates it, and the development of means of communication, which increase the information resources, according to Dahl, require going beyond these typical solutions. He is convinced that “in the years to come these older institutions will need to be enhanced by new means for civic education, political participation,

⁵⁸ Ibidem, p. 79.

⁵⁹ See R.A. Dahl, *On Democracy*, op. cit., p. 44-61.

⁶⁰ See ibidem, p. 185-188.

information, and deliberation that draw creatively on the array of techniques and technologies available in the twenty-first century”⁶¹. Taking into account also the specific nature of Dahl’s theory of democracy, civic education should focus on knowledge of procedures, knowledge of institutions and rights and the development of the skills needed for self-governance and participation in the democratic process, including knowledge of procedures and preferences, preparation for shaping the agenda and involvement in political struggle, presenting and discussing arguments, criticism, defending freedom, pluralism and power, information on public affairs and their possible consequences, preferable and acceptable ways to control the authorities and participate in a democratic culture. The polyarchy that Dahl expects, which is the highest practical achievement also from a theoretical point of view, assumes the education of citizens who benefit responsibly and honestly from the institutions that determine the proper course of the democratic procedure and their participation in it.

CONCLUSION

Contemporary democratic-liberal societies, which tend to mythologize their ancient sources rather than derive their political practice from them, assume as their main characteristic their orientation towards the change that creates them and their possible participation in it. They put forth a vast number of ideas rationalising the hopes placed in its preservation and improvement, which is reflected in the theories of the political system and the education supporting it, inherited by the 21st century, which however has adopted a different focus. For pedagogy, the important link is that related to education within a given model of democracy, with its specific features. These two dimensions of social practice must be aligned. Depending on the way in which democracy is referred to, there is a different image of what is required to make its educational assumptions come true. In addition to the aforementioned theories, closely tied with the political practice in the US, there are also theories of radical, social, participatory, deliberative or cosmopolitan democracy, which have been widely discussed and criticized for many years⁶². We

⁶¹ Ibidem, p. 188.

⁶² See A. Gutman, “Democracy”, [in:] *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, vol. 1, ed. R.E. Goodin, P. Pettit and T. Pogge, Oxford 2007, s. 521-531; A. Heywood, “Democracy and Legitimacy”, op. cit., s. 80-107; M. Saward, *Democra-*

cannot exclude at the same time that all of them are practiced by different groups, regardless of the model prevailing in state bodies, and that different educational ideologies, such as critical, type, humanistic, ecological or personalistic pedagogy, are oriented towards different visions of democracy, and the activities of the groups implementing them, although they cannot achieve the state of the imaginary system, significantly contribute to the democratization of society and its institutions. In the context of the Polish political transformation, a change initiated almost thirty years ago, a question arises about the gap between utopias - the images of democracy and the plexus of pedagogy that creates the future of society - which is special for pedagogy, which informs the future of the society. As a result, it seems that the created democratic reality is socially highly unsatisfactory, so much so that one should expect an eruption of images of a decent, sufficiently perfect society, and of the democracy that is to come.

The dreams of Tocqueville, as well as those of Dewey, Schumpeter or Dahl, were accompanied by a long shadow of tyranny - attempts to reinstall absolutism, thwarted by the July Revolution, an ominous murmur of Stalinism, echoes of the Nazi blaze, and the Cold War rivalry. Morus failed to maintain his independence in the face of Henry VIII's political plans, was accused of treason, tried and sentenced to death, and his head was stuck on the only bridge over the Thames at the time. The first volume of *Marie ou l'esclavage aux États-Unis*, written by Beaumont after his return from a business trip, published in 1835 as an essay-novel and describing racial segregation and conditions of slavery in America, the love of a Frenchman and an American girl with an African background who find a haven from prejudice, humiliation and violence among the Cherokees, was not met with an interest commensurate to that created by the book of his friend, published in the same year.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Agamben G. et al., *Democracy in what State?*, transl. W. McCuaig, Columbia University Press, New York 2011.

Ani książkę, ani kupiec: obywatel. Idea społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w myśli współczesnej, selection J. Szacki, Znak, Kraków 1997.

Aristotle, *The Politics*, transl. T. A. Sinclair, Penguin Classics, London 1992.

Bacon F., *The New Atlantis*, P. F. Collier&Son Co., New York 1914.

cy, dz. cyt.; G. Agamben et al., *Democracy in what State?*, New York 2011.

- Baczko B., "Utopia", [in:] B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne. Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej*, transl. M. Kowalska, Wydaw. Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1994.
- Bauman Z., *Socialism. The Active Utopia*, Routledge, London 2009.
- Bloch E., "Rzeczywistość antycypowana, czyli jak przebiega i co osiąga myślenie utopijne", transl. A. Czajka, *Studia Filozoficzne* 1982, No. 7-8.
- Cyrzan H., *O potrzebie utopii. Z dziejów utopii stosowanej XX wieku*, Wydaw. Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004.
- Dahl R.A., *Democracy and its Critics*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1989.
- Dahl R.A., *On Democracy*, Yale University Press, New Haven 1998.
- Dewey J., *Democracy and Education*, Pennsylvania State University, Hazleton 2001.
- Gutman A., "Democracy", [in:] *A Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy*, vol. 1, ed. R.E. Goodin, P. Pettit and T. Pogge, Blackwell, Oxford 2007.
- Held D., *Models of Democracy*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2008.
- Heywood A., "Introduction: Understanding Ideology", [in:] A. Heywood, *Political Ideologies. An Introduction*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
- Heywood A., "Democracy and Legitimacy", [in:] A. Heywood, *Politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
- Horwitz R., "John Dewey", [in:] *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. L. Strauss, J. Cropsey, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1987.
- Jones T., *Utopian Dreams. In Search of a Good Life*, Faber & Faber, London 2007.
- Koczanowicz L., Włodarczyk R., *Współczesna filozofia społeczna. Rozmowy i eseje o społeczeństwie obywatelskim i etyce demokracji*, GWP, Sopot 2009.
- Korczak J., "Szkoła życia", [in:] J. Korczak, *Pisma wybrane*, vol. III, Nasza Księgarnia, Warszawa 1985.
- Mannheim K., *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, transl. L. Wirth and E. Shils, Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York 1954.
- More T., *Utopia*, Digireads, Stilwell 2005.
- Okoń W., *Dziesięć szkół alternatywnych*, Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Warszawa 1999.
- Pańków I., *Filozofia utopii*, Wydaw. Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1990.
- Saward M., *Democracy*, Polity Press, London 2003.
- Schumpeter J., *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, Harper Books, New York 2008.
- Szacki J., *Spotkania z utopią*, Iskry, Warszawa 1980.
- Tocqueville A. de, *Democracy in America*, transl. H. Reeve, Pennsylvania State University, Hazleton 2002.
- Weber M., "Politics as a Vocation", [in:] *From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth, C.W. Mills, Oxford University Press, New York 1946.
- Włodarczyk R., "Utopia w perspektywie pedagogiki współczesnej", [in:] *Utopia a edukacja*, ed. J. Gromysz, R. Włodarczyk, Instytut Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2016, <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/publication/81184>, 29.06.2016.
- Zetterbaum M., "Alexis de Tocqueville", [in:] *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. L. Strauss, J. Cropsey, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1987.

Abstract:

“Every discussion of democracy”, says Giovanni Sartori, “revolves around three concepts: sovereignty of the people, equality and self-government”. In these discussions, the credible linkage of these ideas and their full development, that is to say, adequate to the needs, complexity of functioning and size of a modern nation-state, it creates the image, and at the same time, the political promise of a sufficiently perfect society that will be possible in the future through effective education. This article aims to develop an understanding of the relationship between selected democratic theories, the concept of utopia and education.

Keywords:

democracy theory, utopia, education to democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, John Dewey, Josef Schumpeter, Robert A. Dahl

MONIKA HUMENIUK
University of Wrocław

RELIGION AND CRITIQUE – JACQUES ELLUL’S CONCEPT IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF GENERAL PEDAGOGY¹

*Revelation is [...] an inquisitor's
manual. It is the granite throne
from which we are allowed to
pass judgments without the risk
of being in error, and without
which our pitiful skeleton will
not bear us. By supporting
ourselves through revelation,
we can do more than move the
Earth: we can stop its motion*

Leszek Kołakowski²

BETWEEN CRITICAL PEDAGOGY AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION – AN INTRODUCTION

“Have you been nice?” Santa Claus asks a boy. “Yes,” the little boy answers, lowering his eyes. “Have you been obedient?”, Santa continues to enquire. “Always” reassures the boy. “You won’t get anything until you’ve wised up,” shouts the angry Santa Claus.

¹ Originally published: Monika Humeniuk, “Religia i krytyka – koncepcja Jacquesa Ellula w perspektywie pedagogiki ogólnej”, *Forum Pedagogiczne* 2018, No. 1, p. 195-212, <https://czasopisma.uksw.edu.pl/index.php/fp/article/view/2341>.

² L. Kołakowski, *Nasza wesoła apokalipsa. Wybór najważniejszych esejów*, Kraków 2010, p. 62.

This satirical drawing by Jan Koza humorously captures the colloquial intuitions of pedagogical *praxis* in the field of its tensions between obedience and disobedience, necessity and freedom, submissiveness and resistance, and finally – compulsion and emancipation, becoming, unexpectedly, an inspiration to reflect on the tasks of general pedagogy as a kind of metatheory. This kind of dialectics, expressed by means of discipline-relevant categories, determines one of the possible ways of “rationalizing” and systematizing various pedagogical theories, revealing the underlying yet covert convictions of ontological, epistemological and ethical nature³. It makes it possible to reconstruct maps of “pedagogical thinking”, sub-disciplines, currents and directions, as well as concepts and theories.

Basically, they can be placed on a continuum between two poles. On the one hand there is positivism that grows out of epistemological realism⁴. Here, the cognitive subject is perceived as radically external to the object of cognition, autonomous and sovereign, not “polluting” the results of cognition with any individual, species or historical quality, thus guaranteeing the acquisition of “bare facts”, i.e. “true knowledge”⁵. On the other hand there is the intellectual heritage of postmodernism and critical theory⁶, where the cognitive subject is an entangled subject, unclear, constituting a space for the clash of various forces originating in the discourses of knowledge, power, language and ideology, and the knowledge produced in such a cognitive process is a particular, biased, local knowledge that grows, as Gianni Vattimo puts it, from “the experience of oscillation” rather than from stability and permanence⁷. In other words: on the one hand, we deal with a permanent and asymmetrical relation between the subject and the object of pedagogical thinking, clearly delineated fields of their mutual roles and interactions, and a clearly polarized pool of concepts (e.g. scholar vs. studied reality, educator vs. student, education for obedience vs. education for freedom). On the other hand, there are temporary, unclear, involved, dynamic approaches to the process of cognition and the categories

³ See B. Śliwerski, “Badania porównawcze teorii wychowania”, [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, vol. 2, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, Warszawa 2003, p. 52.

⁴ See S. Palka, *Pedagogika w stanie tworzenia*, Kraków 1999, p. 13.

⁵ See S. Amsterdamski, *Between History and Method. Disputes about the Rationality of Science*, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 145, 1992, p. 97.

⁶ See L. Witkowski, “Radykalne wizje podmiotu w dramacie współczesności”, [in:] L. Witkowski, *Edukacja wobec sporów o ponowoczesność*, Warszawa 1998, p. 107.

⁷ See G. Vattimo, *The Transparent Society*, Cambridge 1992, p. 11.

that make up the reconstructed pedagogical reality and the methodology of “reading” knowledge.

This framework and fields create contexts for developing notions, concepts and pedagogical theories, contexts of different philosophical references, rationality, epistemological and teleological justifications. Particular topographies will trigger different social ideas about pedagogical theory and practice; local research efforts to understand phenomena and their contexts will be different. The role of general pedagogy will be to compare, integrate, explain and locate pedagogical knowledge about such different etiologies, etymologies and various tasks on the map of pedagogical thinking in general.

For the deliberations, analyses and findings contained in the further part of the article, it will be important to locate the phenomenon under scrutiny in accordance with the topography of the discipline, which helps not only to identify its belonging to a given region, but also to highlight its essential features. I assume that in the case of Jacques Ellul’s ideas, the evident points of reference are simultaneously critical pedagogy and pedagogy of religion.

Ellul’s concept of Christian anarchy which will be presented in the following parts of the article, can be read as an interesting example of the use of perspective, logic and terminology specific to pedagogy built on the basis of critical theory. As its supporters and researchers Joe L. Kincheloe and Peter McLaren emphasize: “Whereas traditional researchers see their task [exclusively - M. H.] as the description, interpretation, or reanimation of a slice of reality, critical researches often regard their work as a first step towards forms of political action that can address the injustices found in the field site or constructed in the very act of research itself. [...] Research in the critical tradition takes the form of self-conscious criticism – self-conscious in the sense that researchers try to become aware of the ideological imperatives and epistemological presuppositions that inform their research as well as their own subjective, intersubjective, and normative reference claims. Thus, critical researchers enter into an investigation with their assumptions on the table, so no one is confused concerning the epistemological and political baggage they bring with them to the research site”⁸. This is how in his essay *Anarchy and Christianity*, Ellul clearly

⁸ J.L. Kincheloe, P. McLaren, “Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research”, [in:] *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. N.K. Denzin, Y.S. Lincoln, London, New Delhi 2005, p. 305-306.

defines the position he adopts, defines the social, religious and political position of his voice. Although he lacks consistency in following the path of continuous self-masking of his own epistemological and ideological limitations, he does not meet the critical postulate of being, as Lech Witkowski puts it, a “guardian of absence”⁹, who constantly feeds the concern to identify potential deficits, traps or threats resulting from ignorance of one’s own limitations, this is perhaps due to the fact that his text was not intended as a scientific treatise. Ellul writes an essay, personal and committed, in which he criticizes the dominant interpretation of Christian revelation, describing it as an unjustified and oppressive usurpation of religious institutions of power, exposing its ideological interests, which in his opinion have little in common with the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth. *Anarchy and Christianity* is a sort of theological manifesto in which the biblical text is used and its authorial interpretation is then embedded in a broader socio-cultural-historical context, thus constructing a peculiar “theology of anarchy”. Ellul, in order to explain the Christian message and to justify his own actions on the grounds of Christology, soteriology and social science, draws on the achievements of liberation theology and religious anarchism¹⁰.

The author does not define himself as a religious pedagogue in any place, however, religious pedagogy having the status of a specific direction within general pedagogy¹¹ is interested in this type of reconstruction of the texts of sacred books and the experiences built up in relation to them. As Bogusław Milerski emphasizes in his study on this subject: “If religious education should be oriented towards the specific hermeneutics of human existence, then in the learning process one should refer to issues which take into account everything that both the individual and society experience as significant for shaping one’s own life and self-fulfilment. For religious education is not primarily about the transmission of doctrinal truths, but about the development

⁹ See L. Witkowski, *Wyzwania autorytetu w praktyce społecznej i kulturze symbolicznej (przechadzki krytyczne w poszukiwaniu dyskursu dla teorii)*, Kraków 2009, p. 22.

¹⁰ Discussing the rich tradition of theology of liberation and religious anarchism falls outside the scope of this article. General orientation in this area can be given, among others, by the following publications: B. Mondin, *I teologi della liberazione*, Roma 1977; *Teologowie Trzeciego Świata: jedenaście szkiców biograficznych z Afryki, Azji i Ameryki Łacińskiej*, ed. H. Waldenfels, Warszawa 1987; *Leksykon wielkich teologów XX i XXI wieku*, vol. 1-3, ed. J. Majewski, J. Makowski, Warszawa 2003-2006.

¹¹ Cf. B. Milerski, “Pedagogika religii”, [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, vol. 1, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, Warszawa 2003, p. 261-277.

of a religious way of self-understanding, orientation and action”¹². Ellul’s manifesto seems to be a perfect example of a text which, growing out of the Christian religious tradition, at the same time significantly disrupts and deconstructs it. From a metatheoretical perspective, the author’s reconstruction and reinterpretation of classical and dogmatic interpretations of selected principles of the Christian faith (from the Catholic and Protestant perspectives) may constitute an interesting example of a creative dialogue with traditions, in which the source of the text remains in constant interpretative movement and cannot be permanently attributed to any of them. Thus, responsibility for the integration, formation and internalisation of the content of the faith remains the responsibility of the autonomous subject, not of institutionalised religious education. For the above reasons, I assume that Ellul’s theological and political proposal is a valuable inspiration for general pedagogy to reflect on the borderline zone of critical pedagogy and religious pedagogy.

JACQUES ELLUL AS A CHRISTIAN ANARCHIST

Jacques Ellul (1912-1994)¹³ is a French thinker whose writings are located at the intersection of philosophy, theology, sociology, and law. A lawyer by education, he earned his doctorate and post-doctoral degree in law in 1936 and 1943, respectively. Between 1944 and 1980 he lectured in law history, sociology and theology at the University of Bordeaux and the Institute of Political Studies there. He is known as a Protestant theologian and theoretician of Christian anarchism, an idea situated in the broad and internally diversified current of the Christian left, which combines Christian thought with a variety of social reform programs¹⁴. Parallel to his academic activity, Ellul was involved in the work of associations preventing crime among young people, as well as conducted

¹² Ibidem, p. 276.

¹³ Unless otherwise marked, the biographical information is provided after: Ł. P. Skurczyński, *Życie znaczy stawiać opór. Ellul dla początkujących*, <http://ewangelicki.pl/20162-3/zyc-znaczy-stawiac-opor-ellul-dla-poczatkujacych-lukasz-p-skurczynski/> (access: 23.12.2016).

¹⁴ This current included both reformist groups, referring to the social teaching of the Roman Catholic Church, as well as the ultra-leftist movements of Christian communists and anarchists. The story of one of them, the Catholic Worker movement, founded in the 1930s in New York by Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin, is the background to the biography of its co-founder, published by Jim Forest (cf. J. Forest, *Love is the Measure: A Biography of Dorothy Day*, New York 1994).

pro-ecological activities (he is considered to be one of the representatives of political ecology)¹⁵. As a member of the national council of the Reformed Church of France and a committed Christian, he worked for the benefit of his fellow-believers, making sure that, as he himself described it, they become an “active movement that changes society from within”¹⁶. From his early youth, i.e. the 1930s, he remained intellectually under the strong influence of Karl Marx’s works, researching and analysing them for more than thirty years of his academic career. He was also the first French scientist to teach Marx’s thought at the Institute of Political Studies since 1947.

However, he did not have good relations with the French communists. As he writes in *Anarchy and Christianity*: “They [communists – M.H.] viewed me as a little bourgeois intellectual because I did not show total respect for orders from Moscow, and I regarded them as insignificant because they seemed not to have any true knowledge of the thinking of Marx. They had read the 1848 Manifesto, and that was all! I broke with them completely after the Moscow trials”¹⁷. Over the years, he grew more and more estranged to Marxism in its “dogmatic” form, while remaining attached to Marx’s negation of capitalism.

Initially, as a committed Christian and Marxist, he found a place for himself in the mainstream of moderate socialism. Over time, however, as he himself repeatedly pointed out, biblical studies and analyses directed him towards anarchism.

Unfortunately, he was ideologically unacceptable to left-wing anarchists. Despite lively social contacts, the anarchist organizations to which he applied for membership decided against cooperation with him¹⁸. Ellul’s faith stood in the way of his recognition by circles that are suspicious of religious people and who are committed to ideas. It should be remembered that, as Christopher Hitchens, a famous protester and continuator of the Marxist tradition of criticism of religion stresses: “Religion is, and always has been, a means of control”.

¹⁵ As Łukasz P. Skurczyński observes, a posthumous publication came out of “pioneer” texts dedicated to political ecology from the 1930s by Jacques Ellul and Bernard Charbonneau: *Nous sommes des révolutionnaires malgré nous. Textes pionniers de l’écologie politique* (Paris 2014).

¹⁶ See J. Ellul, *A temps et a contretemps. Entretiens avec Mr Garrigou-Langrange*, Paris 1981, p. 78-79, after: Ł.P. Skurczyński, *Życie znaczy stawiać opór*, op. cit.

¹⁷ J. Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, Grand Rapids 1999, p. 2.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 4-5.

There is something irreducibly servile and masochistic about the religious mentality. And the critical and oppositional stance does ultimately rest on a belief in the capacity and pride of the individual, while religion tends to dissolve this into a sickly form of collectivism¹⁹.

The above viewpoint was shared by most of the anarchists Ellul knew. As a result, he was made to develop his ideology on his own, outside of the structures of the associations and groups he was familiar with. It is hardly surprising that the French philosopher and these circles were involved in this kind of conflict. Religion is the space generating probably the most criticism in the history of contestation and emancipation movements. The distinction between religion and faith, which Ellul also points to, does not solve the problems, perhaps even adds to them. While it is relatively easy, even from the perspective of a local believer, to dissociate oneself from the oppressive activity of religious institutions and colonization attempts of their dignitaries, showing without much difficulty the hypocrisy, wickedness and heartlessness of the mechanisms and regulations of most of them, it may prove impossible in the case of Ellul to gain a real distance to one's own internal constitution as a believer.

The question remains, however, as to the legitimacy of making fundamental distinctions between constructs: A "believing anarchist" and a "non-believing anarchist". If the basic accusation made to the former by the latter would be an unacceptable submission to and submission to a certain vision of the place and role of man in the imaginary reality, it would be a double-edged accusation: is not a non-believing anarchist in his actions motivated by the available vision of a better world, with the whole specific metaphysics and eschatology of this image, as Leszek Kołakowski would say? In the face of such a problem, the main reason for the mutual "mismatch" presented by Ellul does not seem to be fully convincing:

A true anarchist thinks that an anarchist society without the State, without power, without organization, without hierarchy is possible; that it would be possible to live in it and that it could be created, but I do not think so. In other words, it seems to me that the anarchist struggle and battle aimed at an anarchist society are fundamental, but it is not possible to create such a society [...] [because - M. H.] people are not good. [...] I am saying that their two great characteristics, no matter what their society or education, are covetousness and the desire for power. We find these traits always and everywhere. If, then, we give people complete freedom to choose, they will

¹⁹ C. Hitchens, *Letters to a Young Contrarian*, New York 2005, p. 58.

inevitably seek to dominate someone or something, and they will inevitably covet what belongs to others, and a strange feature of covetousness is that it can never be assuaged or satisfied. [...] No society is possible among people who compete for power or who covet and find themselves coveting the same thing [...]. As I see it, then, an ideal anarchist society can never be achieved²⁰.

Ellul presents here and justifies his doubts about the project of secular anarchists, although at the same time he himself does not abandon the social vision of reality which he would like to see - after all, he writes about the “possibility” of inventing from scratch or creating a new social model, where the new institutions would be free from the flaws of the old ones²¹. Do not the alleged accusations²² levelled against him by lay anarchists concern the “imaginary”, ascribed to Ellul’s relations to religion? Perhaps, therefore, a dispute between them is an apparent one. This problem is well illustrated by the words of Rafał Włodarczyk, a researcher of educational ideologies and utopias:

The principles of defining, organizing and interpreting knowledge about action in a social reality subject to numerous, unevenly occurring changes cannot be separated from evaluation; the fundamental issue here is the choice of a path whose direction can only be recognized and considered in relation to the goal. In both political and educational practice, current or long-term action- and change-oriented actors must be guided by non-verifiable ideas about the future, establish scenarios for upcoming events, but also choose the means of their implementation, taking into account the potential transformations to which social reality will be subject in the meantime²³.

Without prejudging the causes and reasons, Ellul was forced to act outside established structures, developing his own “program” of integration of Christian thought and anarchism. He presented its underlying assumptions in *Anarchy and Christianity*, which is why in the following part of the article I will undertake a reconstruction of the views presented there by the author. My main concern is to show his way of thinking, argumentation and interpretation of the biblical text, rather than to discuss in detail the historical and ideological sources of

²⁰ J. Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, op. cit., p. 20.

²¹ See *ibidem*, p. 21.

²² Ellul does not mention in his text too extensive discussions with circles that did not decide to cooperate with him. It remains for us to conclude how both sides justified their arguments from the few scanty fragments of mutual claims, which the author briefly reports on (see *ibidem*, p. 3, 10, 15-18).

²³ R. Włodarczyk, *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej*, Kraków 2016, p. 137-138.

religious anarchism as the context of the presented content. I think that from the point of view of the pedagogical potential of his concept, the potential resulting from the possibility of reading Ellul's thoughts from the perspective of critical pedagogy and religious pedagogy, its presentation, which will bear this affinity in mind, may turn out to be inspiring.

THE CONCEPT OF CHRISTIAN ANARCHISM BY JACQUES ELLUL

In his introduction to *Anarchy and Christianity*, Ellul refers to the relations between Christianity and anarchism²⁴. Referring to personal experiences related to the lack of understanding for his ideological formation on the part of leftist anarchist organizations due to his openly confessing the Christian faith as well as due to the mistrust of Christian circles towards his open anarchism, the author assures that his goal is the need to articulate his views and not being a practicing "missionary" or a "proselyte" towards any of the parties²⁵. In a personal tone, using expressive and emotional language, he emphasizes his readiness to accept possible criticism. Nevertheless, the following statement is a good example of the rhetoric characteristic of the author: "Thus anarchist readers might find in these pages many statements that seem shocking or ridiculous, but that does not worry me"²⁶ (highlight – M.H.). After this initial explanation of Ellul's expression of his views, we can now move on to the fundamental issues related to his concept of Christian anarchism.

Ellul organizes his argument around two fundamental themes. The first is the problem of anarchy from the perspective of Christian practice, the second is the presentation of selected biblical texts as sources for theses about anarchy pointed out by him²⁷.

²⁴ In his text, the author does not systematically explain the conceptual apparatus which he intends to use. In his work, he interchangeably uses terms such as "anarchism" and "anarchy". Wherever possible, my use of the terms will take into account the author's uses, i.e. when discussing the different parties of the essay or the author's arguments, I will use the exact term he uses in a given place.

²⁵ See J. Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, op. cit., p. 4.

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 6.

²⁷ From a theological perspective, Ellul's interpretations could certainly bring to mind convergent or very similar concepts and themes in the history of various Christian traditions. However, as previously suggested, the aim of the article is not to establish the exact location of the author's theological views, but the way in which the author addresses the source text and orientates around it his own

The Judeo-Christian God Ellul speaks of is Almighty God, but, as the author of the essay notes, only to a very limited extent “makes use of his omnipotence in his dealings with us [...] (except in the biblical stories of the Flood, the Tower of Babel, or Sodom and Gomorrah)”²⁸. The image of God as King and Lord of Lords, as the French thinker proves, was constructed under the influence of Roman and Greek traditions, where the divinity of the ruler and the attributes of perfection and omnipotence associated with it were to serve political rather than religious purposes. Ellul emphasizes that the monarchical feature deeply rooted in Christian culture is the result of an unjustified shift in emphasis in the reading of the biblical revelation. The image of God as a ruler unjustly precedes the image of God as love, while “beyond power, the dominant and conditioning fact is that the being of God is love [...] When God creates, it is not to amuse himself, but because, being love, he wants someone to love other than himself! [...] The true face of the biblical God is love”²⁹. But love is rather a principle of God’s action than an attribute of God. He himself, according to the apophatic theology to which the philosopher refers³⁰, remains unrecognizable, escaping all cognitive and linguistic efforts of human description.

The decisive contention of the Bible is always that we cannot know God, that we cannot make an image of him, that we cannot analyse what he is [...] Hence the qualities that we attribute to God come from human reason and imagination. Perhaps it is the great merit of the Death-of-God theologies not to have killed off God but to have destroyed the images that we have made of God³¹.

The author criticizes this shift in emphasis to the aspect of divine power.

In reinterpreting biblical sources³², he argues that in its main message the Judaeo-Christian revelation, contrary to the dominant tradition of interpretation, leans not towards monarchy, but anarchy understood as a postulate of a fundamental lack of domination in the desired model of social relations. He makes the following remark to confirm his theses:

self-understanding and subjective action, categories important both for religious and general pedagogy.

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 33.

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ See ibidem, p. 36.

³¹ Ibidem.

³² Ellul refers to and discusses in this context e.g. excerpts from The First Book of Samuel, chapter 8, The Book of Judges, chapter 9, and from The Ecclesiastes.

We can say that in the biblical accounts ‘good’ kings are always defeated by Israel’s enemies, and the ‘great’ kings who win victories and extend their borders are always ‘bad.’ ‘Good’ means that they are just, that they do not abuse their power, and that they worship the true God of Israel. ‘Bad’ means that they promote idolatry, reject God, and are also unjust and wicked³³.

As he stresses,

for every king there was a prophet. The prophet [...] was most often a severe critic of royal acts. He claimed to come from God and to carry a word from God. This Word was always in opposition to royal power. [...] None of them came to the aid of a king; none was a royal counsellor; none was ‘integrated’³⁴.

And though the kings sometimes listened to the prophets who were sympathetic to them, claiming to be messengers of God, “none of the false prophecies that were favourable to the kings has been preserved in the holy scriptures”³⁵. This radical claim of an “anti-royalist stand”³⁶ of the biblical message becomes, as is natural, the reason why Ellul calls himself a Christian anarchist. At this point, however, it seems more important that the reinterpreted biblical events should give the reader an idea of the nature and intentions of God’s action in the world. God, who can be recognized throughout history, shows man a desirable order. It is an order based on freedom and love, not on hierarchical relationships of power and blind obedience. This order is a reflection of God’s nature, its specific emanation, and in the practice of the believer it is about practicing “truth”, by no means imposing it.

By rejecting the idea of God as master, Ellul rejects likewise the concept of Providence:

The idea of a power which foresees and ordains and controls all things is a curious one that has nothing Christian about it. There is no providence in the Bible, no God who distributes blessings, sicknesses, wealth, or happiness³⁷.

Such an idea, strengthening the dominance of the God-King, would be incompatible with human freedom: “If God foresees all things, if he is ‘providence,’ this rules out all human freedom”³⁸. A believer may interpret

³³ Ibidem, p. 50.

³⁴ Ibidem, p. 51.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 51-52.

³⁶ Ibidem, p. 52.

³⁷ Ibidem, p. 36.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 35.

events in his or her life as gifts, warnings or punishments, but there can be no predestination force that determines his or her fate. Human life depends chiefly on the human person. God, on the seventh day of the work of creation, went to rest, passing on the further creation of history to him. God did not give up accompanying man, but only gave justice to his freedom, making him a causative subject and responsible for the actions of the world. He is still in dialogue with him, sometimes he intervenes – but only when human wickedness in relation to others becomes so intolerable that he has to intervene³⁹. The “intermingling of human history with God’s history”⁴⁰ is according to Ellul one of the tenets of the faith which is the hardest to fully comprehend:

We are confronted here by a divine-human dialectic. We ourselves are free to act and are responsible for our acts. But God also acts in each situation. The two actions then combine or oppose one another. In any case, we are never passive. God does not do everything⁴¹.

In Ellul’s theology there is no place for the ontologically grasped evil. Figures of the “evil god”, Satan or the Devil, are mythical representations of evil present and experienced in the world for which man is responsible. Man, the crown of divine creation, free and empowered, can make his own choices. Called to the love of God, he can oppose his will, doing harm and wreaking havoc. Every intervention of God would be an expression of man’s subjection, would cancel his inherent responsibility and would make him a puppet in the hands of the Creator. There is no form of evil, but there are forces acting, says Ellul:

All that which causes division between people (the very opposite of love) is the devil. Satan is the accuser, that is, that which causes people to bring accusations against one another. Evil derives from us in the twofold sense that we wrong ourselves and others and harm our neighbours, nature, etc.⁴².

When trying to show the working of the devil and to once again illustrate the evil of the state and authority, Ellul refers to the story of Jesus being tempted in the desert (Lk 4: 1-13). In this story, the devil is the one who promised to deliver to Jesus all power and authority

³⁹ See *ibidem*, p. 38. Ellul stops with a rather superficial explanation of „God’s interventions” in the situation of human wickedness. In its general discussion of theodicy, he does not deal with important questions posed in contemporary theology and philosophy (e.g. about the death of infants and children, about God’s silence during the Shoah, about the meaning of suffering and illnesses).

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 41.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

over dominions in return for his homage to him. Jesus, as the French thinker stresses, does not question the fact that the devil wields power, but refuses to bow to him. As Ellul observes in a commentary to the biblical story:

what is at stake here is 'all the dominions of the world' [...]. And what these texts say is simply extraordinary: all power and glory of these kingdoms, and therefore all that concerns politics and political power, belongs to the 'devil'. All this has been given to him, and he gives it to whom he wants. Thus, those who hold political power have received it from the devil and are dependent on him! [...] The *diabolos* is etymologically the 'divider' (not a person). The state and politics are thus primary reasons for division. This is the point of the reference to the devil⁴³.

It is worth making a digression at this point. Its aim will be to show a certain tradition of thought, in which the theological motifs presented by Ellul can be located. This tradition is founded, among other things, on such categories of critical pedagogy as empowerment and emancipation. Although these themes do not constitute a coherent interpretation of Christological, soteriological or eschatological assumptions in Ellul's work, they help to reconstruct a certain permanent philosophical orientation of the author through consistent references to freedom, involvement, agency, or responsibility of the individual. The way in which he presents in the text the nature of God and man and their interdependence corresponds to the tradition of process theology⁴⁴. God is understood here as the primary cause and condition of events taking place in the world. However, the essence is the dialogue between God and man, in which the motifs of personalism⁴⁵ as well as pedagogical hermeneutics manifest themselves⁴⁶. As Mirosław Patalon, a Polish expert in process theology, writes:

⁴³ Ibidem, p. 52.

⁴⁴ See e.g. A.N. Whitehead, *Religion in the Making*, New York 1926; M. Patalon, *Teologia a pedagogika. Teologia mediacji H. Niebuhra jako źródło inspiracji pedagogicznych*, Słupsk 2002; M. Patalon, *Pedagogika ekumenizmu. Procesualność jako paradygmat interkonfesyjnej i interreligijnej hermeneutyki w ujęciu Johna B. Cobba Jr.*, Gdańsk 2007; W. Hryniewicz, *Hermeneutyka w dialogu. Szkice teologiczno-ekumeniczne*, vol. 2, Opole 1998.

⁴⁵ See e.g. S. Chrost, *Homo capax Dei jako ideał wychowania*, Kraków 2013; C.S. Bartnik, *Personalizm*, Lublin 2008; W. Granat, *Personalizm chrześcijański. Teologia osoby ludzkiej*, Poznań 1985.

⁴⁶ See e.g. B. Milerski, M. Karwowski, *Racjonalność procesu kształcenia. Teoria i badanie*, vol. 2, Kraków 2016; B. Milerski, *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna. Perspektywy pedagogiki religii*, Warszawa 2011; K. Mech, *Człowiek – Natura – Transcendencja*, Kraków 2014.

The historical process co-created by God has the character of a sequence of events – one update results from the previous one and at the same time initiates the next one, while preserving their local and momentary identity. [...] Christianity is understood as dynamic and developing [...] this process [has a character – M.H.] of reconstruction and is the effect of a creative divine-human relationship. It consists in the constant building up of the organism. Thus, on the one hand, we deal with the same religion, but on the other, it is continuously fresh and new. Questions about the purpose of this development are less important because the most important thing is not the destination of the pilgrimage, but its companion; it is certain that wherever a believer goes, he will be there with God⁴⁷.

Love as a principle of God's action both in Ellul's view and in theology of process is a source of commitment to the creative and dialogical construction of history. God does not impassively endow man with his unconditional good but co-creates life with him. On the other hand, the process of becoming fully human is only possible in this relationship with God, a relationship of love, defined as the joy of existence and the desire for good to others. Withdrawal, fear of relationships and lack of commitment not only means wasting the potential for creation, but above all not taking responsibility for the world⁴⁸. A believer, together with the experience of the faith, is involved in the service that God expects. According to the French philosopher, "Adherence to the Christian faith is not in any sense a privilege [...] but an additional commission, a responsibility, a new work"⁴⁹. In the view of the French Christian anarchist, this service is connected with the effort of resistance, contestation, opposition to all oppression, domination and coercion. Although most religions in history have been an excuse or pretext for wars, and the worst possible atrocities have been committed in the name of God, in Ellul's opinion, the need for a believer to remain faithful to the practice of faith in the spirit of love and justice remains unchanged. He claims that

The truth is not a set of dogmas or decisions of papal synods. It is not doctrine. It is not even the Bible considered as a book. The Truth is a Person! It is not a question, then, of adhering to the Christian doctrine. It is a question of trusting the person who speaks to us. Christian truth can be grasped, heard, and received only in and by faith⁵⁰.

⁴⁷ M. Patalon, *Pedagogika ekumenizmu*, op. cit., p. 30.

⁴⁸ See *ibidem*, p. 55.

⁴⁹ J. Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, op. cit., p. 4.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 26.

In his declarations and actions, Ellul is dead against the use of violence. His anarchism is

pacifist, antinationalist, anti-capitalist, moral, and antidemocratic anarchism (i.e., that which is hostile to the falsified democracy of bourgeois states). There remains the anarchism which acts by means of persuasion, by the creation of small groups and networks, denouncing falsehood and oppression, aiming at a true overturning of authorities of all kinds as people at the bottom speak and organize themselves⁵¹.

In the face of the radical fight against the emblems of power of some over others, the fight against the “conformist society”⁵² by the ubiquitous state, bureaucracy, and propaganda, which make us all “producers and consumers”⁵³, the philosopher calls for stirring doubt and organisation on the margins of mainstreams:

Most people, living heedlessly, tanning themselves, engaging in terrorism, or becoming TV slaves, ridicule political chatter and politics. They see that there is nothing to hope for from them. They are also exasperated by bureaucratic structures and administrative bickering. If we denounce such things, we gain the ear of a large public. In a word, the more the power of the state and bureaucracy grows, the more the affirmation of anarchy is necessary as the sole and last defence of the individual, that is, of humanity⁵⁴.

The author opposes participation in any political game which, instead of pushing for real changes in society, is entangled in complex networks of mutual interests and dependencies, in complex and unclear organisational structures, and thus opposes participation in local and central government elections. He is convinced that anarchy is above all “conscientious objection”⁵⁵, which results in a much broader opposition than a boycott of elections: it is an opposition to taxes, compulsory vaccinations, mandatory education, in a word – opposition to the omnipresence of the state. An interesting example of effective functioning on the outskirts of the state is the order that was established at the time when he himself was a “refugee”⁵⁶ in a French village. At that time, he was a law student and, having gained the trust and friendship of the inhabitants, provided them with “legal services”, which had no legal

⁵¹ Ibidem, p. 14.

⁵² Ibidem, p. 12.

⁵³ Ibidem.

⁵⁴ Ibidem, p. 23.

⁵⁵ Ibidem, p. 15.

⁵⁶ Ibidem, p. 18.

force under the law, but which were treated by the interested parties as legally binding and decisive as official letters.

In his references to biblical texts, the French philosopher consistently tries to expose not so much the abuse of power (this has already found its infamous expression in historical, sociological and political studies of religious research), but power as such. Ellul's earlier criticism of the "monarchic" traditional readings of biblical texts is part of an anarchist tradition that is succinctly expressed in the following words: "neither God, nor master"⁵⁷.

He believes that the biblical God should be read first of all through the prism of the Book of Exodus, rather than Genesis; the former is the key to understanding God's way of acting in the world⁵⁸, as the Liberating God: "The Biblical God is above all the one who liberates us from all bondage, from the anguish of living and the anguish of dying. Each time that he intervenes it is to give us again the air of freedom"⁵⁹. For this purpose, as Ellul proves, God gave the people of Israel the Decalogue: not as one would think to control it or to use moral coercion against man, but as a kind of map with landmarks and boundaries to separate life from death. In this way, a free person with this map is given the opportunity to move responsibly around the world: "See, I set before you today life and prosperity, death and destruction. choose life, so that you and your children may live" (Dt 30: 15, 19). God – Liberator – Love is on the side of man's freedom and wants his empowerment, commitment and action in his interest. He is not, as Ellul consistently maintains in his reflections, a God interested in the relations of power and subjection. It is man who searches for power, desires it and gets entangled in it. The biblical story of the chosen people is an almost constant testimony to the crisis and the demoralisation of power, evidence of how much it depraves those in its possession, how it initially deceives and then anaesthetises and blinds, leading to destruction and death. The very few examples of "good rulers" are considered by the author as exceptions to the rule.

⁵⁷ Authorship of this famous statement is ascribed to the nineteenth-century French revolutionary Auguste Blanqui. We know that it was emblazoned on the side of the Titanic, which later gave rise to tempestuous debates in religious communities on God who "would not be laughed at" and in a spectacular manner interferes with the history of human atheistic pride.

⁵⁸ At the same time, he points to the earlier creation of the Book of Exodus than the Book of Genesis as the key to his position. He is to develop this thesis in the book of his own authorship: *Ethique de la liberte* (vol. 3, Geneva 1975-1984) (c.f. J. Ellul, *Anarchy and Christianity*, op. cit., p. 38).

⁵⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 39.

In the analyses of biblical texts presented in the essay, Ellul reinterprets several stories related to the subject of power. Among the stories of the New Testament, he looks at, among other things, the stories of the Gospel – a miracle with a coin in the fish’s muzzle, the apprehension and trial of Jesus, as well as the figure of the Beast of the Apocalypse of St. John and fragments from Paul’s letter to the Romans. In an interesting way he also takes up the story from Mark’s Gospel, in which the followers of King Herod ask him a provocative question about whether it is allowed or not to pay Caesar’s tax (Mk 12:13-17). Jesus says well-known words there: “Give to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s”. These words are most often interpreted as legitimizing the separation of church and state, without calling into question the claims of any of these subjects. Meanwhile, the interpretation proposed by Ellul completely changes the reading of the story.

The philosopher points first of all to the irony contained in Jesus’ statement. The sign on the coin, which becomes a pretext for conversation with the Pharisees and the Herodians, the Emperor’s sign, is a sign of ownership, a sign of possession, commonly used in the Roman Empire. In his characteristic style, Ellul compares it to cattle brands in the American West in the 19th century⁶⁰. He points out that the Roman holder of the designated good was only a temporary owner. Therefore, there is nothing to prevent the designated good from being surrendered to its rightful owner. However, this good is a pathetic testimony to the real power of the Emperor and its actual limits. While money, monuments, and some altars belong to him, is there anything else that is his? All the unmarked rest simply does not belong to him. All the rest belongs to God. As Ellul observes:

This is where the real conscientious objection arises. Caesar has no right whatever to the rest. First, we have life. Caesar has no right of life and death. Caesar has no right to plunge people into war. Caesar has no right to devastate and ruin a country. Caesar’s domain is very limited. We may oppose most of his pretensions in the name of God⁶¹.

Ellul criticises all of the most characteristic interpretative traditions of reading the fragments of the New Testament, proposing new versions of their “translations”, taking into account anarchistic assum-

⁶⁰ Ibidem, p. 59.

⁶¹ Ibidem, p. 60-61.

ptions. He points to the biblical lack of justification for the creation of the state apparatus and the legitimacy of power, to the unfounded, erroneous and disastrous absolutization by the Christian tradition of the words: "All power comes from God". Finally, he points to the tendency to conformism and passivity, common in the Bible, as mechanisms conducive to subjectivity and tyranny. He shows Jesus as a "guerrilla"⁶², a distanced, intelligent free thinker who skilfully uses irony, mockery or provocation, who efficiently uses understatement, is able to sow doubt and give food for thought. He is not a revolutionary insurgent, but an anarchist, aware of his goals and shunning violence.

The strong stress on his own opinion, contrasted with that of others, the emotional tone, the highlighting of sensitive and disputable issues, the ostentatious distancing himself from critics, the frequent use of exclamation marks and the imperative mood - all these measures and stylistic means shown in the language used can be read as an expression of the author's commitment and bias. Ellul speaks "from himself", despite the declared minimum (waiting only for "being listened to"), appears to be a strong advocate of reasons defined by the program, a radical pedagogue with a definite vision of a better world. This is the expression of his ideological intransigence and the utopian aspect of his demands: "Anarchy must regain its pungency and courage. It has a bright future before it. This is why I adopt it"⁶³.

CONCLUSION

General education as a discourse creates an inclusive space for numerous heterogeneous and incompatible voices. This inclusiveness at the same time imposes obligations in the area of its tasks. As Joanna Rutkowiak emphasized this issue in the 1990s: "Understanding the identity of pedagogy as a map of multiple qualities and multilingualism requires a multiplication of the cognitive work necessary to identify the quality that makes up this multiplicity and to follow the changes taking place in this area"⁶⁴. Both critical pedagogy and pedagogy of religion are nowadays supported by an extensive tradition and fully legitimate fields of independent pedagogical theories. For the development of general

⁶² See *ibidem*, p. 51.

⁶³ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

⁶⁴ J. Rutkowiak, "Wielość języków pedagogiki a problem jej tożsamości", [in:] *Wprowadzenie do pedagogiki. Wybór tekstów*, ed. T. Jaworska, R. Leppert, Kraków 2001, p. 15.

pedagogy, the impulses that allow it to problematize their borderland are of crucial importance.

Jacques Ellul's statements from his essay *Anarchy and Christianity* presented in this article, and in particular their language and the issues they address: authority, power, freedom, resistance, emancipation, anarchy, seem to situate this concept in the field of interest of critical pedagogy. Its fundamental postulates articulated by the authority of contemporary supporters of this direction, the American pedagogue Henry A. Giroux, can also be applied to Ellul's concept:

radical pedagogy needs a vision – one that celebrates not what is but what could be; that looks beyond the immediate to the future and links struggle to a new set of human possibilities. This is a call for a concrete utopianism. It is a call for alternative modes of experience, public spheres that affirm one's faith in the possibility of creative risk-taking, of engaging life so as to enrich it; it means appropriating the critical impulse so as to lay bare the distinction between reality and the conditions that conceal its possibilities⁶⁵.

With his criticism of the interpretative order dominating in the Christian tradition, with the practice of exposing the ideological interests responsible for this state of religious institutions, as well as with his overt revolutionary and anarchist social project, Ellul is a perfect match for the tradition of critical pedagogy in its emancipatory version.

At the same time, as a theologian declaring his religious position and undertaking in fact religious interpretations of biblical texts from a Christian perspective, he fits equally well into the tradition of religious pedagogy or the pedagogy of religion. Opposing conservative interpretations of Christian revelation, this enthusiast of religious anarchism will certainly not gain recognition within the catechetical, kerygmatic, built on the confessional dogma of religious pedagogy, but in the hermeneutical or critical aspects of religious pedagogy, honouring the conflict of various interpretations and reconciled with the impossibility of establishing their common denominator.

Therefore, if the task of general pedagogy is to recognize, reconstruct and integrate ideas filling numerous spaces of pedagogical thinking, then undertaking attempts to confront and review some intellectual traditions via others, carefully looking at places of contact and intersections of paths identified so far with separate theories,

⁶⁵ H. A. Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education. A Pedagogy of the Opposition*, Massachusetts 1983, p. 242.

tracking semantic diffusions and mutual penetration of topics can be considered as fully legitimate research activities in the field of pedagogical discipline in its meta-perspective.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Amsterdamski S., *Between History and Method. Disputes about the Rationality of Science*, transl. O. Amsterdamska, G.M. Moore, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 145, Springer-Science + Business Media, B. V., 1992.
- Arendt H., "Civil Disobedience", [in:] H. Arendt, *Crises of the Republic*, A Harvest Book, New York, London 1972.
- Bartnik C.S., *Personalizm*, Wydaw. KUL, Lublin 2008.
- Chrost S., *Homo capax Dei jako ideał wychowania*, Impuls, Kraków 2013.
- Ellul J., *Anarchy and Christianity*, transl. G.W. Bromiley, Wipf and Stock Publishers, Grand Rapids 1999.
- Forest J., *Love is the Measure: A Biography of Dorothy Day*, Orbis Books, New York 1994.
- Giroux H. A., *Theory and Resistance in Education. A Pedagogy of the Opposition*, Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Massachusetts 1983.
- Granat W., *Personalizm chrześcijański. Teologia osoby ludzkiej*, Księgarnia św. Wojciecha, Poznań 1985.
- Hitchens C., *Letters to a Young Contrarian*, Basic Books, New York 2005.
- Hryniewicz W., *Hermeneutyka w dialogu. Szkice teologiczno-ekumeniczne*, vol. 2, Wydaw. św. Krzyża, Opole 1998.
- Kincheloe J.L., McLaren P., "Rethinking Critical Theory and Qualitative Research", [in:] *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Research*, ed. N.K. Denzin, Y. S. Lincoln, Sage Publications, London, New Delhi 2005.
- Kołakowski L., *Nasza wesoła apokalipsa. Wybór najważniejszych esejów*, Wydaw. Znak, Kraków 2010.
- Leksykon wielkich teologów XX i XXI wieku*, vol. 1-3, ed. J. Majewski, J. Makowski, Biblioteka Więzi, Warszawa 2003-2006.
- Mech K., *Człowiek – Natura – Transcendencja*, Instytut Myśli Józefa Tischnera, Kraków 2014.
- Milerski B., "Pedagogika religii", [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, vol. 1, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, PWN, Warszawa 2003.
- Milerski B., *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna. Perspektywy pedagogiki religii*, Wydaw. Naukowe ChAT, Warszawa 2011.
- Milerski B., Karwowski M., *Racjonalność procesu kształcenia. Teoria i badanie*, vol. 2, Impuls, Kraków 2016.
- Mondin B., *I teologi della liberazione*, Edizioni Borla, Roma 1977.
- Palka S., *Pedagogika w stanie tworzenia*, Wydaw. UJ, Kraków 1999.
- Patalon M., *Pedagogika ekumenizmu. Procesualność jako paradygmat interkonfesyjnej i interreligijnej hermeneutyki w ujęciu Johna B. Cobba Jr.*, Wydaw. Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 2007.

- Patalon M., *Teologia a pedagogika. Teologia mediacji H. Niebuhra jako źródło inspiracji pedagogicznych*, Wydaw. Pomorskiej Akademii Pedagogicznej w Słupsku, Słupsk 2002.
- Rutkowiak J., "Wielość języków pedagogiki a problem jej tożsamości", [in:] *Wprowadzenie do pedagogiki. Wybór tekstów*, ed. T. Jaworska, R. Leppert, Impuls, Kraków 2001.
- Skurczyński Ł. P., *Życie znaczy stawiać opór. Ellul dla początkujących*, <http://ewangelicki.pl/20162-3/zyc-znaczy-stawiac-opor-ellul-dla-poczatkujacych-lukasz-p-skurczynski/> (access: 23.12.2016).
- Śliwerski B., "Badania porównawcze teorii wychowania", [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, vol. 2, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, PWN, Warszawa 2003.
- Teologowie Trzeciego Świata: jedenaście szkiców biograficznych z Afryki, Azji i Ameryki Łacińskiej*, ed. H. Waldenfels, transl. B. Kita, Wydaw. Werbinum, Warszawa 1987.
- Vattimo G., *The Transparent Society*, transl. D. Webb, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992.
- Whitehead A. N., *Religion in the Making*, Macmillan Company, New York 1926.
- Witkowski L., "Radykalne wizje podmiotu w dramacie współczesności", [in:] L. Witkowski, *Edukacja wobec sporów o ponowoczesność*, Kodruk, Warszawa 1998.
- Witkowski L., *Wyzwania autorytetu w praktyce społecznej i kulturze symbolicznej (przechadzki krytyczne w poszukiwaniu dyskursu dla teorii)*, Impuls, Kraków 2009.
- Włodarczyk R., *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej*, Impuls, Kraków 2016.

Abstract:

For general pedagogy, the concept of Jacques Ellul is an important example of solving the tension between religious and critical-emancipation engagement, which are usually involved in the theory of education in a separate way. We are able to give many examples of educational trends or ideologies that are within religious education and that dogmatically defend against criticism, as well as critical education, which in principle distrusts communities that are based on confessional devotion to religious principles and practices. Hence the Ellul's concept that links Christianity and anarchy, from the perspective of general pedagogy is an important complement to its efforts to create a map of directions and currents of contemporary pedagogy.

Keywords:

anarchy, Christianity, Jacques Ellul, general pedagogy, critical pedagogy, pedagogy of religion

GRAŻYNA LUBOWICKA

University of Wrocław

FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE IN SYMBOLIC SPACE – INTERPRETATION AND IMAGINATION IN UNDERSTANDING MEANINGS¹

The symbolic space of a community identifies itself with what in a broad sense we call culture or a social whole in its linguistic dimension. It imposes and preserves meanings functioning in social life, constituting the basis for rules of communication and its real processes. The meanings fixed in the symbolic space become cultural codes understandable for all, which function in everyday use.

How does language function in the symbolic space, how are meanings understood in communication processes? The answer to these questions will be presented from the perspective of philosophical reflection on language, the most recent discovery of which is to bring its rhetoric to the foreground.

The rhetorical nature of language means that meanings are not understood literally, that they are constructed according to their mutual relations. The way in which rhetorical language is understood will be presented on the example of the metaphor as a basic rhetorical trope. The analysis of metaphorical meaning illustrates that it emerges only

¹ Originally published: Grażyna Lubowicka, "Język figuratywny w przestrzeni symbolicznej – interpretacja i wyobrażenia w rozumieniu znaczeń", [in:] *Komunikacja a zmiana społeczna*, ed. J. Kędzior, B. Krawiec, M. Biedroń, A. Mitreğa, Instytut Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2018, p. 19-29, <http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/95523>.

from mutual relations between the meanings of words that make up a metaphorical expression, and that its understanding requires both fixed language codes as well as the contribution of subjective interpretation and imagination. The rhetorical nature of language in the symbolic space will also be shown by the analysis of other forms of language, such as symbol and image, whose meanings also emerge only in the process of interpretation and thanks to the use of imagination. Symbolic meaning is not literal, but, as in the case of metaphor, figurative, so its understanding requires both reliance on cultural codes, as well as commitment to interpretation and imagination. An image is also a form of language, which has a non-literal meaning, of figurative character, close to a symbolic meaning. The rhetoric, symbolism and imagery of language indicate that it does not contain literal meanings. Such an understanding of language can be described not only as rhetorical, but in a broader sense as entirely figurative. By analysing the understanding of metaphorical, symbolic and image-based meanings, we will show how language functions, how figurative meanings are produced and interpreted.

THE RHETORICAL TURN IN LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY

The understanding of language, as well as highlighting its rhetorical character, is a consequence of philosophical reflection on language, which in the 20th century took the form of a “linguistic turn”. The term “linguistic turn” in humanities and social sciences is attributed to Richard Rorty, who in 1987, during the symposium *Rhetoric of Human Sciences* in Iowa City, USA, stated that the linguistic and constructivist breakthrough, which occurred in the 1960s, placed language, understood as discourse as well as sign, and its meaning at the centre of reflection on culture or the society. The essence of this new understanding of language, known as the linguistic turn, is the loss of adequacy of the relationship between the *self* and its thought or image, the loss of adequacy of the relationship between an object and its representation. As a consequence, meaning becomes ambiguous and dependent on other meanings, so it requires interpretation or becomes only an interpretation. This linguistic breakthrough, which determines further reflection on language, includes, as Rorty shows, three successive turns: linguistic turn, interpretative turn and rhetorical

turn. As a consequence of these turns, language, i.e. systems of signs and meanings, together with the thesis of its ambiguity, is accepted by humanities and social sciences as the basic way to understand social and cultural reality.

The linguistic turn occurred in 1967, which coincided with publishing of the book, whose chief editor was Rorty, entitled *The Linguistic Turn*². This turn emphasizes the fundamental role of language, discourse, text (and their meanings) as active factors in the creation and understanding reality, especially that of the society. The second turn described by Rorty is an interpretative turn, which is implemented mainly by contemporary representatives of hermeneutics (Hans-Georg Gadamer, Paul Ricoeur, Stanley Fish, Charles Taylor, Clifford Geertz, also Charles Sanders Peirce) and introduces the central role of understanding as text mediated interpretation. As a result of the interpretative turn, the meaning of a sign is perceived as dependent on its interpretation, complementing each other within the meaning. The meaning of a sign is thus complemented by the process of a specific interpretation, which requires the involvement of a subject, as well as a reference to the context of a given symbolic space. The understanding of meaning is therefore based on some prior knowledge, preliminary assumptions, which means that interpretation requires knowledge of cultural codes, rules and meanings of a specific symbolic space. However, understanding of the meaning is at the same time its formation, which depends on the interpreting subject and is therefore subjective and creative.

The most significant for further considerations is the third most important linguistic turn, described by Rorty as the rhetorical turn (rhetorical constructivism). The authors of this turn highlight not only the fact that all knowledge is a construct of language, because access to the world or our experience of the world is possible only through discursive forms of knowledge and representation, but also emphasize the functioning of rhetorical mechanisms in discourses, i.e. the role of tropes, rhetorical figures and argumentation techniques. The rhetorical turn develops the methodological perspective, oriented towards the interpretation of society and culture, in which the mechanisms

² See *The Linguistic Turn. Essay in Philosophical Method*, ed. R. Rorty, Chicago 1967. In this book Rorty presents ponderings of proponents of philosophy of language, mainly belonging to the group of analytical philosophers (Rudolf Carnap), but also its opponents (Willard Van Orman Quine) and thinkers who went beyond that analytical paradigm (Max Black, Jerrold Katz).

and tools of rhetoric play a significant role. The process of understanding is therefore mainly tropological in nature, and the interpretation captures and takes into account the conventions of rhetoric. This rhetorical turn is connected with the thought of Jacques Derrida, who in his work *Margins of Philosophy* presents the metaphorical nature of philosophical concepts³. Its main theoretician is Paul de Man, who in the book *Allegories of Reading*⁴, according to the concept proposed by Friedrich Nietzsche, emphasizes the rhetorical character of language. As the source of his theses, he points out that language is entirely rhetorical, i.e. it is rhetoric⁵. The symbolic space itself is structured not only as text or sign systems, but also in a rhetorical way.

RHETORIC NATURE OF LANGUAGE IN PAUL DE MAN'S APPROACH

The most important theoretician of the rhetorical turn is de Man, who in the aforementioned work *Allegories of Reading* highlights two theses concerning the place of rhetoric in discourse. In his view, the rhetorical turn does not mean a return to the old rhetoric developed by Aristotle, but it shows something more – the rhetorical or figurative character of language. Thus, as de Man claims, rhetoric cannot be understood as a specific discursive practice, but is a way of functioning of the language itself.

In the text *Semiology and Rhetoric*, which opens the book *Allegories of Reading*, de Man distinguishes between the old and new rhetoric, broadening its meaning by the definition of *tropes rhetoric* and leaving the term *rhetoric of persuasion* to describe the old rhetoric. Therefore, figures belonging to the old rhetoric should be treated as a specific case of the very way in which language functions. Rhetoric loses its former meaning as an art of persuasion and is replaced by rhetoric as a way of human reasoning.

The dependence of eloquence on figure is only a further consequence of a more fundamental observation: tropes are not understood aesthetically, as ornament, nor are they understood semantically as a figurative meaning that derives from literal, proper denomination. Rather, the reverse is the

³ See J. Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, Chicago 1982.

⁴ See P. de Man, *Allegories of Reading. Figurative Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust*, New Haven, London 1979.

⁵ See P. de Man, *Aesthetic Ideology*, Minneapolis, London 1996.

case. The trope is not a derived, marginal, or aberrant form of language but the linguistic paradigm par excellence. The figurative structure is not one linguistic mode among others but it characterizes language as such⁶.

Therefore, in de Man's opinion, it is not possible to speak of rhetoric as a field of knowledge, there is no rhetoric in principle, there are only mechanisms once recognized and named after, which have been noticed everywhere where language is present. The "rhetorical basis of language" is brought to the foreground⁷.

Adopting rhetoric as a feature of language, de Man relies on the fundamental finding for the whole linguistic turn that language can no longer be understood as a transparent medium for communication with non-linguistic reality, but on the contrary, that it always contains rhetorical or figurative elements that undermine the referential character of the utterance and that introduce ambiguity and uncertainty into the discourse. Rhetorical discourse reveals a lack of foundation of meaning and its infinite branching in the configuration of other meanings. Thus, there are no literal meanings in language that could be defined and fixed in the form of rules, established meanings of the symbolic space.

This transition from the term "rhetoric" to the term "rhetoricity" of the language propagated by de Man is supported by Friedrich Nietzsche and his thesis that "No such thing as an unrhetorical, »natural« language exists that could be used as a point of reference: language is itself the result of purely rhetorical tricks and devices. [...] *language is rhetoric*"⁸. As de Man emphasizes: "Nietzsche writes: »There is no difference between the correct rules of eloquence [*Rede*] and the so-called rhetorical figures. Actually, all that is generally called eloquence is figural language«"⁹. Referring in the text *Rhetoric of Tropes* (Nietzsche) to Nietzsche's text indirectly devoted to rhetoric, *On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense*, de Man argues, after its author, that the rhetoric of language and human aspiration to create metaphors constitute the basis for interpreting the world, that our knowledge is essentially tropological.

The literality of language is therefore an illusion, it is false, Nietzsche says. The conviction of the possible literality of the language, de Man

⁶ P. de Man, *Allegories of Reading*, op. cit., p. 105.

⁷ Ibidem, p. 8.

⁸ F. Nietzsche, *Description of Ancient Rhetoric*, per: P. de Man, *Allegories of Reading*, op. cit., p. 105.

⁹ Ibidem.

adds, "It is a naive belief in the proper meaning of the metaphor without awareness of the problematic nature of its factual, referential foundation"¹⁰. The rhetorical turn therefore eliminates the distinction between literal and rhetorical language, which was pushed into the field of literature and poetry and is now shown as the proper way of functioning of language.

The illustration of the rhetoricity emphasised by de Man as a feature of language is the significance of metaphor as a basic rhetorical figure. The analysis of the meaning of a symbol and image, on the other hand, allows us to broaden the characteristics of language by these two forms close to metaphor. The analysis of these three ways of shaping meaning, from metaphor and symbol to image, brings closer the rhetorical or figurative character of language and shows the role of interpretation and imagination in its understanding. How are the meanings of rhetorical figures or figurative meanings constructed and understood?

INTERPRETATION AND IMAGINATION IN FIGURATIVE LANGUAGE: METAPHOR, SYMBOL AND IMAGE

How do meanings function in the metaphor? How do we understand or interpret them?

In his theory of metaphor, Ricoeur assumes that it has a semantic character, because its carrier is a sentence, an expression, a few words taken as a whole and not a single word. Metaphor is a semantic construction, presenting a given thing as if it were a completely different thing, and yet in a certain way similar to the first one, even though the similarity concerns various concepts or meanings¹¹.

For the last 30 years the concept of metaphor, especially in the environment of literary critics of the English language, to whom Ricoeur refers, has taken the form of a theory of interaction, mutual communication and influencing each other. The meaning of the metaphor in this approach is not literal, but only emerges from the context of a sentence or words, and has its source in the action of the context which leads to the interaction of semantic fields of several words and

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 111.

¹¹ Paul Ricoeur introduces the theory of metaphor in his book *La métaphore vive*, Paris 1975.

in which it is contrasted with words taken literally. Metaphor is, therefore, a multi-word expression constructed in such a way that if each word is assigned its proper, literal meaning in the code of a given language, an inconsistent expression is obtained, but this inconsistency in the metaphor also helps to capture the mechanism underlying such a combination of words (e.g. their similarity). Understanding a metaphor is therefore based on the knowledge of the cultural code, which allows us to grasp the literal meaning, but at the same time it is situated in a divergence, in a distance from that meaning.

Ultimately, the meaning of metaphor is based on the foundation of similarity, on the approximation between different semantic fields. This similarity is only constructed in the process of understanding, since semantic fields are initially distant from each other. A metaphor therefore always contains an inconsistency, deviation, distortion (*déviante*) concerning the predictive structure itself, and is thus based on a distorted or “strange” predicate. How does this inconsistent predicate come to pass? How does a new meaning emerge despite its inappropriateness in normal language use? Inconsistency in metaphorical expressions is the consequence of violation of the semantic code in a given language, which organizes the assignment of predicates in its normal use. But this remoteness of meaning at the word level and this incoherence of a new predicate leads to the emergence of a new appropriateness (convergence) which reduces the inconsistency. From an inconsistent expression emerges a new meaning, a new appropriateness, the expression acquires a sense as a whole. Each new metaphor introduces a semantic innovation, a new meaning, not yet established, hence it is creative¹².

To understand a metaphor is to capture the dynamics which makes a metaphorical statement, i.e. a new semantic relevance, emerge from the ruins of such semantic inappropriateness that one can see when reading a sentence in a non-transferable way. However, this sense can become an ordinary one, and the metaphor itself can be included in the semantic system due to the habit of using it and, in this sense it becomes worn out. Such metaphors occur in the form of permanent idiomatic phrases functioning in the common consciousness and are often referred to as “fossils” or “frozen metaphors”. However, as Ricoeur points out,

¹² “The innovation lies in the producing of a new semantic pertinence by means of an impertinent attribution” (P. Ricoeur, *Time and Narrative*, vol. I, Chicago, London 1990, p. ix).

The metaphor is alive as long as we can perceive, through the new semantic pertinence – and so to speak in its denseness – the resistance of the words in their ordinary use and therefore their incompatibility at the level of a literal interpretation of the sentence¹³.

In Ricoeur's perspective, imagination, which is the basis for understanding a metaphor, has a linguistic semantic character and is not identified with an image. It is an operation of creating meanings, which consists primarily in grasping the similarity of semantic fields, which is a form of response to their initial semantic distance. Imagination is, therefore, an operation of making semantic fields of different notions similar in the process of generating meaning, it is a transition between them, creating a new appropriateness through them.

Imagination in this operation of matching is an approach, perception, intuitive *insight*, which belongs to the discourse itself, and which implements a change in the distance between different semantic fields.

Imagination is thereby approximation. Aristotle referred to such a logical vision, saying that "creating good metaphors is perceiving (contemplating) of what is similar (*to to homofon theôrein*)" (*Poétique*, 1459 a 3–8)¹⁴.

This vision of what is similar is at the same time, as Ricoeur puts it, seeing and thinking. It is thinking because it is the realization of transforming semantic fields, re-categorizing what has already been categorized. But this thinking is seeing, as long as perception consists in a momentary grasp of the offered, given combination possibilities.

Ricoeur describes this creation of similarity through a logical approximation as an assimilation that consists in making the concepts it connects and places in the metaphorical expression close semantically. In Ricoeur's view, however, it does not mean traditional assimilation by similarity, which was based on mechanical attraction between different mental elements. Ricoeur replaces it by an operation specific to the language and its act of predication. Assimilation is possible when this approximation meets with earlier categorisation, so that it is only the predication that appears to be "strange". The metaphor remains alive as long as we see previous inadequacy through new adequacy. The operation of imagination, therefore, consists precisely in capturing

¹³ Ibidem.

¹⁴ P. Ricoeur, *Imagination et métaphore*, texte d'une communication faite par Paul Ricoeur à la Journée de Printemps de la Société Française de Psychopathologie de l'Expression, à Lille les 23–24 mai 1981, "La Revue Psychologie Médicale" 1982, No. 14.

tension, not only between the logical subject and the predicate, but also between literal understanding and metaphorical understanding of the same expression, in perceiving simultaneously what is similar, despite... and through what is different.

In this sense – Ricoeur says – we can speak together with Gadamer about the fundamental metaphorical nature of thinking, as long as the figure of discourse, which we call a metaphor, allows us to see the overall operation of generating concepts. Because in a metaphorical process the movement towards the general is crossed by the resistance of difference, the metaphor emerges as a figure of rhetoric¹⁵.

The operations of imagination described on the example of metaphor, i.e. the synthesis of imagination based on the difference and similarity between different semantic fields, and the new figurative meanings that emerge from it, form the basis for the interpretation of meanings, including the symbol and image. Not only the meaning of the metaphor, but also of the symbol and image is figurative and constructed by interpretation based on imagination.

Symbol, due to its structure of meaning, is close to metaphor in the fact that its meaning is also not literal, but figurative. The meaning of a symbol is not produced by the context of various notions, because a symbol is not an expression, but a sign. Also a symbol, as a sign, has a double or even multiple meaning. Specifically, a symbol is a linguistic expression with a double meaning, one of which is explicit whilst the other is implicit. As defined by Ricoeur in his work *Existence and Hermeneutics*: “I define »symbol« as any structure of signification in which a direct, primary, literal meaning designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary, and figurative and which can be apprehended only through the first”¹⁶. The understanding of a symbol comes from the secondary, direct, imaginary sense, which refers to the original sense. This understanding is a transition from the secondary sense to the primordial sense, but it is an interpretation, since these two levels of meaning exist only at the level of interpretation. Interpretation of meaning is led by the riddle underlying symbols, so it is both socially or culturally conditioned, because it is based on the knowledge of cultural codes, as well as creative, because it co-creates meaning through the autonomy of thinking. The operation

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ P. Ricoeur, *Existence and Hermeneutics*, [in:] P. Ricoeur, *The Conflict of Interpretations. Essay in Hermeneutics*, Evanston 1974, p. 12-13.

of imagination in this transition from one meaning to another consists, as with the metaphor, in capturing two meanings - literal and figurative - in their mutual tension and dependence, as well as similarity.

The image is of a linguistic and semantic character, because its meaning has a symbolic structure. Jean-Jacques Wunenburger writes in his book entitled *Philosophie des images (The Philosophy of Images)*: "An image, better than a concept, appears as a symbolic configuration that retains a certain reserve of meaning, hidden in signs or figures, which can be reactivated by the interpreting subject"¹⁷. Like a symbol, an image is a carrier of certain knowledge, information and content on a direct and indirect level. Because, as Wunenburger writes, "sets of images are a tangle of latent mental meanings and their decryption, they do not boil down to some kind of unreasonable revelation but call upon a thought to decipher and translate them into another language"¹⁸. Understanding the meaning of an image, as in the case of a symbol, must therefore be related to the meanings of the symbolic space, to an understandable code, but it is also subjective. In the case of an image, like a symbol, "interpretation appears to be a subjectivisation of what is given to the intuition, the hidden content of the images"¹⁹. The transition from the explicit content of the image and its explicit meaning to the implicit content is based, as in the case of the symbol, on the operation of imagination, the synthesis of which, while capturing various semantic fields, creates the meaning of the image by making them similar.

A metaphor, a symbol, or an image are forms of the symbolic space language, which has a rhetorical or, more broadly, a figurative character. The figurative nature of language expands the ambiguity of meanings and the possibilities of its subjective, creative interpretation, which also takes into account the operations of imagination which, following Immanuel Kant in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, is the art of producing syntheses that constitute the basis of figurative meanings, the art deeply hidden in human souls. Understanding the meaning of each of these three language forms requires reference to cultural codes fixed in symbolic space, which indicates its passivity and receptiveness. The meaning of metaphor, symbol and image as indirect, non-verbal, however, requires linking these cultural codes with subjective

¹⁷ J.J. Wunenburger, *Philosophie des images*, Paris 1997, p. 85.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 84.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 86.

interpretation and reliance on the operations of imagination. Passivity and receptivity of understanding, its subordination to cultural codes, rules and fixed meanings existing in symbolic space, is connected with creative interpretation and creative imagination, which indicates its activity and subjectivity. Understanding meaning in figurative language is not just a passive reflection of the existing codes; it requires the recipient to be equally active. The processes of imagination connected with semantics and imagery that participate in the interpretation require creativity and have unpredictable dynamics.

The concept of creative imagination understood in this way, presented on the example of the analysis of the meaning of metaphor and symbol in Ricoeur's approach and the image in Wunenburger's approach, referring to Kant's pre-conceptual syntheses and adopting a semantic dimension, places it, as Patrick L. Bourgeois stresses in *Imagination and Postmodernity*, in the central space of "philosophy today" and particularly in "postmodernism"²⁰. Figurative language, whose meanings are based on both interpretation and operations of the creative imagination, increases the postmodern ambiguity of language and its openness, at the same time introducing subjectivity and thus it "reestablishes the position of the humanities as central against the anti-humanism of deconstruction", "re-establishes the humanities in a central position, which deconstruction attempts subvert"²¹. This central place of man means at the same time subjectivity, freedom, creativity in the process of interpreting meanings. The figurative language, shaping the symbolic space and determining the way of understanding meanings in the processes of communication, is no longer merely a manipulation of metaphors, symbols, images, but leaves room for free, subjective interpretation. Metaphors, symbols and images, effective in bringing about social change, should therefore no longer only refer to cultural codes, but also influence these subjective processes of interpretation and the rules of synthesis of creative imagination.

²⁰ See P.L. Bourgeois, *Imagination and Postmodernity*, Lanham 2013.

²¹ *Ibidem*, p. xiii.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Bourgeois P. L., *Imagination and Postmodernity*, Lexington Books, Lanham 2013.
- Derrida J., *Margins of Philosophy*, transl. A. Bass, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1982.
- Man P. de, *Aesthetic Ideology*, ed. A. Warminski, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, London 1996.
- Man P. de, *Allegories of Reading. Figurative Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust*, Yale University Press, New Haven, London 1979.
- Ricoeur P., *Existence and Hermeneutics*, transl. K. McLaughlin, [in:] P. Ricoeur, *The Conflict of Interpretations. Essay in Hermeneutics*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1974.
- Ricoeur P., *Imagination et métaphore*, texte d'une communication faite par Paul Ricoeur à la Journée de Printemps de la Société Française de Psychopathologie de l'Expression, à Lille les 23–24 mai 1981, "La Revue Psychologie Médicale" 1982, No. 14.
- Ricoeur P., *La métaphore vive*, Seuil, Paris 1975.
- Ricoeur P., *Time and Narrative*, vol. I, transl. K. McLaughlin, D. Pellauer, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, London 1990.
- The Linguistic Turn. Essay in Philosophical Method*, ed. R. Rorty, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1967.
- Wunenburger J. J., *Philosophie des images*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1997.

Abstract:

The paper examines the philosophical account of language arising from the so-called rhetorical turn that occurred in the seventies of the twentieth century and was authored mainly by Paul de Man. Paul de Man emphasises rhetorical mechanisms at work in language, which means that the process of understanding is essentially tropological in nature and interpretation captures and pays close attention to the conventions of rhetoric. How do meanings operate in a language which is rhetorical? Metaphor as a basic rhetorical trope, together with symbol and image, have been chosen to illustrate how meanings are constructed and understood in a language thought of as being rhetorical. An analysis of metaphor, symbol and image shows a fundamental role interpretation and imagination play in understanding meanings. The understanding of meanings requires reference to the linguistic code operating in the symbolic space, but also allows for subjective and creative interpretation.

Keywords:

image, imagination, interpretation, metaphor, Paul de Man, rhetoric, rhetorical turn, symbol

PART II

IDEOLOGICAL *LEADING* OF EDUCATION

GRAŻYNA LUBOWICKA

University of Wrocław

IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA IN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES¹

The social imaginary is defined as a representation of social reality of individuals and groups as well as a foundation for their self-cognition and shaping their own identity. Characteristic features of these functions of the imaginary are provided by Charles Taylor in his work *Modern Social Imaginaries*, where he stresses that imagination is an indispensable component of social reality. The proposed analysis of the meaning of the imaginary does not stop at this general characteristic. The presentation of the social imaginary from the perspective of contemporary hermeneutics, especially Clifford Geertz and Paul Ricoeur, does not only show it as an indefinite imaginary representation of social life, but also helps to bring out such features of imagination as its activity and creativity, and to pose a question about how it reflects social processes, the relations between them and the ideas related to them. The answers to these questions are based on the analysis of the two components of the social imaginary: ideology as understood by Geertz and Ricoeur and Ricoeur's approach to utopia, closely linked with ideology. Ideology (and utopia) expresses the basic feature of the imaginary as outlined by Taylor, its non-transparency

¹ Originally published: Grażyna Lubowicka, "Ideologia i utopia w wyobraźni społecznej", [in:] *Imaginarium interakcji społecznych*, ed. M. Biedroń, J. Kędzior, B. Krawiec, A. Mitreğa, Oficyna Wydawnicza ATUT – Wrocławskie Wydaw. Oświatowe, Wrocław 2017, p. 53-63.

and inadequacy in relation to social reality and reveals the way it functions. Its definition as a distortion of social imagination and the location of the source of this distortion in relations of dominance characteristic of social reality, is common to various theories of ideology. On the other hand, the common feature of both ideology and utopia is the inadequacy of their representations of the current social reality. Ideology and utopia, then, are according to Ricoeur: “two opposite sides or complementary functions typifies what could be called social and cultural *imagination*”².

THE IMAGINARY AS A SYMBOLIC SPACE OF A COMMUNITY

The most general characteristics of the imaginary as presented by Taylor link it to the self-cognition of individuals and groups, to which it provides the backdrop. The imaginary, says Taylor, is expressive of “the way [in which] ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings, and this is often not expressed in theoretical terms, but is carried in images, stories and legends”³. Therefore, this way of understanding oneself in society is connected with the perception of oneself in everyday life or in relation to the world of one’s life. Self-understanding is therefore based on socially shared senses, “because of this, we can say that sense giving draws on our whole world, that is, our sense of our whole predicament in time and space, among others, and in history”⁴. The imaginary as a background of self-cognition and social practices is not, then, a set of patterns, abstractions and theories, and the knowledge of the imaginary is not theoretical and has no clear-cut boundaries:

That’s the very nature of what contemporary philosophers have described as a ‘background’. It is in fact that largely unstructured and inarticulate understanding of our whole situation, within which particular features of our world show up. It can never be adequately expressed in the form of explicit doctrines because of its indefinite and unlimited nature. This is another reason for speaking here about the imaginary and not a theory⁵.

² P. Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, ed. G. H. Taylor, New York 1986, p. 1.

³ C. Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, Durham, London 2004, p. 23.

⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 28.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 25. A similar take on the role of the imaginary in social life is adopted by Jean-Jacques Wunenburger in his work *Philosophie des images*: “Although the history of institutions in the West testifies to the rationalization of its forms and

The imaginary offers sense to social activity: “the understanding of what we are doing right now [...] makes the sense it does because of our grasp on the wider predicament: how we continuously stand or have stood in relation to others and to power”⁶. The imaginary is a background of self-understanding and actions of individuals and social groups due to its social character. It is inclusive of beliefs “shared by large groups of people, if not the whole society [...]. the social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy”⁷. References to collective rules of the imaginary require that each social action, practice or communication be based on a shared meaning of rules if they are to be understood by and addressed at others: the imaginary “incorporates some sense of how we all fit together in carrying out the common practice. Such understanding is both factual and normative [...]”⁸. The understanding of norms or rules of action refers to a certain “moral or metaphysical order, in the context of which the norms and ideals make sense”⁹.

According to the hermeneutic perspective of Geertz and Ricoeur, the imaginary as the socially-related background of understanding allows a “common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy”¹⁰. Self-understanding is always mediated and requires distance through the interpretation of action in symbolic terms. The understanding of oneself in the context of hermeneutics consists in the indirect understanding (interpretation) of practices (actions) and, as a consequence, of one’s own identity¹¹.

The backdrop of understanding in the meaning of Ricoeur’s and Geertz’s hermeneutics is expressed as a symbolic space which includes

foundations, especially through the idea of social and political agreement and the progress of democratic spirit, the rational notion of togetherness and power remains to a large extent based on or surrounded by images” (J. J. Wunenburger, *Philosophie des images*, Paris 1997, p. 276).

⁶ C. Taylor, *Modern Social Imaginaries*, op. cit., p. 27.

⁷ Ibidem, p. 23. “This implicit grasp of social space is unlike a theoretical description of this space [...] The understanding implicit in practice stands to social theory in the same relation that my ability to get around a familiar environment stands to a (literal) map of this area [...] Similarly, for most of human history and for most of social life, we function through the grasp we have on the common repertory, without benefit of theoretical overview. Humans operated with a social imaginary well before they ever got into the business of theorizing about themselves” (ibidem, p. 26).

⁸ Ibidem, p. 24.

⁹ Ibidem, p. 25.

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 23.

¹¹ This sense of pre-cognition is taken up by Taylor, too.

symbols and senses. This helps bring out in it active and creative processes by identifying two of its fundamental functions: ideology and utopia. Geertz defines symbolic space in the context of his own understanding of cultural anthropology based on the foundations of hermeneutics, according to which all social processes and practices are expressed through symbolic action; their senses and rules are expressed via symbols. Thanks to its power of generating senses, a symbol, as Geertz stresses, has a “capacity to grasp, formulate, and communicate social realities”¹². Since our understanding is an attempt at capturing something with the aid of symbolic tools, symbols “are extrinsic sources of information in terms of which human life can be patterned – extrapersonal mechanisms for the perception, understanding, judgment, and manipulation of the world”¹³. Such symbolic patterns, i.e. rules, for the organisation of social and psychological processes, are described by Geertz, in accordance with the tradition of cultural anthropology, as cultural models. The concept of symbolic space complements the general term “imaginary” as proposed by Taylor, defining it via symbol-mediated social imaginary. Jean-Jacques Wunenburger, too, emphasizes the need for the imaginary to be approached in semiotic terms, i.e. as the place and manner of functioning of symbolic languages: “Socio-political life becomes understandable only when we discover the driving force of symbolic and mythical languages, which supplement or abolish the rational language that supposedly governs the institutions and manifestations of public life”¹⁴.

The imaginary as a set of symbols shared and understood by a community is, then, a figurative language, with its specific rules and regulations, functioning according to Geertz’s remarks from his text *Ideology as a Culture System*, in a manner similar to a “metaphor, analogy, irony, ambiguity, pun, paradox, hyperbole, rhythm, and all the other elements of what we lamely call ‘style’ operate”¹⁵. The rhetorical power of social symbols means that “these devices are of any importance in casting personal attitudes into public form”¹⁶. Thus, according to Geertz, social activities and processes are expressed by stylistic figures, by the rhetoric of public discourse, by the processes of constructing symbolic

¹² C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays*, New York 1973, p. 210.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 216.

¹⁴ J. J. Wunenburger, *Philosophie des images*, op. cit., p. 276.

¹⁵ C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, op. cit., p. 209.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

systems and manipulating them. The final effect of these interactions is the result of both the configuration of different meanings influencing the expressive and rhetorical power of a given symbol, and the effect of social processes is “an occurrence not ‘in the head’, but in that public world where ‘people talk together, name things, make assertions, and to a degree understand each other’”¹⁷.

The definition of the social imaginary in terms of symbolic structures enables it to be shown not only as an undefined representation of existential experience, but also underlines its activity and creativity. The way of shaping the imaginary due to ideology and utopia as two complementary functions of the social imaginary shows the social process as cultural, taking the form of transformations of the symbolic sphere. Ideology and utopia, inseparable from the imaginary, express themselves as dynamic processes, shaping the basic ways in which the social imaginary operates. Ideology explains the process of inevitable inadequacy of imagination in relation to social reality, posing the problem of interdependence between symbols and social reality, which “concepts like ‘distortion’, ‘selectivity’ or ‘oversimplification’ are simply incompetent to formulate”¹⁸. According to Ricoeur and Geertz, ideology is constitutive for mediation of symbolic self-understanding and social action, and its main function is the integration of the community. Ricoeur also introduces utopia in a function opposite to that of ideology, i.e. as disintegration, which results from utopia undermining the existing order. As Ricoeur points out in the introduction to *l’Ideologies et l’Utopie*: “My own attempt, as perhaps has already been anticipated, is not to deny the legitimacy of the Marxist concept of ideology, but to relate it to some of the less negative functions of ideology. We must integrate the concept of ideology as distortion into a framework that recognizes the symbolic structure of social life”¹⁹. The presentation of ideology and utopia as function of operation of the social imaginary helps to show some of its principles (process of social integration and disintegration), and thus its influence on the self-understanding of individuals and social groups related to this symbolic space.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 213.

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ P. Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, op. cit., p. 8.

IDEOLOGY IN THE SOCIAL IMAGINARY – THE FUNCTION OF INTEGRATION

Individuals and social groups understand their real social situation by always inadequate imagination, and this distortion of the actual situation of an individual or group in an imaginary relationship is accounted for, according to Geertz and Ricoeur, by ideology. The ideology in its function of distortion of consciousness or self-understanding was first described by Karl Marx in the *Economics and Philosophy Manuscripts of 1844* and then in *German Ideology*. The author considers distortion and inconsistency with reality understood as praxis to be the basic feature of ideology. In the *Economics and Philosophy Manuscripts*, ideology is a part of the work process and its assimilation in the capitalist relations of production, where private property is the cause of domination of one person (social class) over another. The work is understood by Marx as the basic activity of man, the place of its production as a species and its assimilation and its own and nature, in the broadest sense it is treated as praxis. The assimilation of work and its products is never fully understood; the self-consciousness mediated by production is distorted. Therefore, ideology is defined by Marx as a distortion of praxis, i.e. as a biased awareness of oneself and one's situation in the process of production; it is an expression of human alienation. In *German Ideology*, Marx defines ideology through a metaphor of an inverted image of reality. The image of real life (praxis, human activity) is reversed and thus distorted "in the heavens of ideas". The representation of praxis is always distorted and always untrue and depends on the context of one's own place, the status of a class or group in society as a whole, and precisely is a consequence of the interests of the dominant class. A more universal concept of ideology was put forth by Karl Mannheim in his 1929 *Ideology and Utopia*. The author saw its source not so much in praxis but in the process of representation and idealization of the interests of the dominant group or simply political power. Ideology in this neutral and broad sense is made up of ideas expressing the interests of the dominant group, which represent this group's image and transform into the dominant ideas of the epoch.

Marx's concept of ideology, in which praxis, which produces a distorted awareness, is separated from the idea as its representation, leaves unsolved the problem of how praxis produces ideology and distorts consciousness? How can the relationship between praxis and

the world of ideas in the process of self-understanding be presented in the social imaginary? How, in Mannheim's view, can we define the relationship between the dominant class and its interests and the dominant ideas of a given era?²⁰ According to Geertz, it would be hard to define ideology as a representation of interests; how could interest be expressed in an idea? How are interests expressed by something else? As Geertz observes, this search for group interest, which is expressed in ideology, is based on a superficial "theory of benefit" or banal historicism, "that speaks with a studied vagueness of men's ideas as somehow 'reflecting', 'expressing', 'corresponding to', emerging from' or 'conditioned by' their social commitments"²¹. These difficulties are addressed by the concept of ideology proposed by Geertz, which expresses the distortion and obscuration resulting from the interests, and thus the relationship of power and domination, exclusively through the symbolic structures of social life. Therefore, ideology is constitutive for the imaginary, and its primary function is to distort social activities and processes that are explained in terms of interest. In Geertz's opinion, social interests (groups, power), which are transformed into dominant ideas, have a symbolic structure, which is expressed solely as a relation between meanings. As Geertz points out, ideology functions in a purely symbolic way, so it cannot be compared and linked to *praxis*. Geertz, then, and Ricoeur adopts this reasoning, sees ideology solely as a manner of functioning of symbolic space, shunning questions about its sources in *praxis*. Instead, Geertz poses questions about the manner of its expression via symbols or functions it performs in the social context. As Ricoeur stresses, "Only because the structure of human social life is already symbolic can it be distorted"²². The study of ideology boils down, then, to the analysis of interdependencies in a symbolic space or to the analysis of symbolic action.

²⁰ Mannheim took up the problem of the possibility of criticizing ideology from the point of view of social sciences, e.g. sociology, concluding that the theory or critical science itself is ideology and cannot serve as a basis for its investigation. This proposition, or "the Mannheim paradox", shows the impossibility of applying the concept of ideology to oneself; the theory of ideology is also an ideology (what we say as representatives of social sciences is also obscure, represents interests which we ourselves do not know), leading to an epistemological and ethical relativism.

²¹ C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, op. cit., p. 202. "The nature of the relationship between sociopsychological stresses that incite ideological attitudes and elaborate symbolic structures through which those attitudes are given a public existence is much too complicated to be comprehended in terms of vague and unexamined notion of emotive resonance" (ibidem, p. 207).

²² P. Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, op. cit., p. 10.

Power, its interests, its ideas are expressed solely by the rhetorical supremacy of social symbols, through which our experience is also expressed. The dominant group produces an ideology or dominant ideas, representing its interest as a common interest for all members of society, thus giving it a universal form. Therefore, a coherent ideological system based on shared images, ideas and ideals presents an image of a social group or of social order. The main positive function of ideology as a symbolic strategy applied to depict the situation of the community as perceived by Geertz and Ricoeur is the integration of society. Through myth, religion, philosophy, propaganda or rhetoric, the group represents its own place in society, and ideology is connected with the necessity for the group to create an image of itself, to present itself and thus its own identity. Ideology in the social imagination becomes a guarantee of order and coherence of the identification process.

The integrative function of ideology in the social imaginary is, according to Geertz and Ricoeur, constructive because it nurtures social ties and identity. Integration is based on a common language and sense, on a common image of culture, whose essential element is the memory of the founding events. Ideology has the function of strengthening and consolidating the social bond through symbolic simplification, schematization, stereotyping, ritualization or mythical behaviour and representation²³. Social integration is also based on the repetition and retention of shared meanings, which makes it possible to retain power and at the same time consolidate the identity of the community. Wunenburger describes the integration function as follows: "Images contribute to both the creation of a community bond, to the shaping of the identity of a group united by the rule of law, especially in the form of national identification, and to the legitimisation of the very figure of power"²⁴. However, in this function, due to its striving to preserve and consolidate social bonds and identity, ideology becomes an obstacle

²³ Ideology in this function presents a special symbolic strategy: "ideology names the structure of situations in such a way that the attitude contained toward them is one of commitment. Its style is ornate, vivid, deliberately suggestive: by objectifying moral sentiment through the same devices that science shuns, it seeks to motivate action. Both [science and ideology] are concerned with the definition of a problematic situation and are responses to a felt lack of needed information" (C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, op. cit., p. 231). "The imaginary of the political sphere can be captured in many ways; we will tackle two of them: one can first demonstrate the role of archetypical images in the self-imagination of the social and political body" (J. J. Wunenburger, *Philosophie des images*, op. cit., p. 276).

²⁴ J. J. Wunenburger, *Philosophie des images*, op. cit., p. 276.

to social change, while at the same time adopting pathological forms such as compulsion to repeat, schematic images, empty rhetoric. Therefore, as Ricoeur stresses, the integration function necessary for the imaginary should be accompanied by the opposite processes, namely resistance to the fixed images of a social group, which leads to the disintegration of identity; only combined do the functions of integration and subversion trigger social change.

However, the relationship between the dominant class and the dominant ideology cannot be understood mechanically. In *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, Ricoeur opposes the assumptions of causality in social life and the application of mechanistic thinking to it. According to Ricoeur, the symbolic function of ideology integration is explained by the motivational rather than causal model already proposed by Max Weber. The relationship between interest and ideology, as well as the function of the integration of ideology, the problem of relations between dominant groups and dominant ideas can be understood in terms of legitimacy, authority and recognition of credibility. The process of universalization of dominant interests is at the same time a process of validation of the authority of a dominant group or power. Claims for authority that are the basis for legitimacy, however, require recognition by society that is based on the notion of motivation. Like Weber, Ricoeur therefore stresses that the source of ideology is not so much the interest of the group or power, but the pursuit of its legitimacy, since all forms of domination require authority and trust. Ideology occupies a place in the process of legitimising power, in which claims for authority require their acceptance. According to Ricoeur's, in this motivational process of legitimising power, ideology supplements our conviction, trust and credibility against the claims of authority²⁵. Ideology provides a surplus of confidence in authority in a situation of its legitimacy.

UTOPIA IN THE SOCIAL IMAGINARY – THE DISINTEGRATION FUNCTION

In his *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, Ricoeur indicates two fundamental and interlinked forms of activity of the social imaginary, i.e.

²⁵ “We must recognize that passive acquiescence is part of social action, as it is a component of the belief in authority; to obey, to submit oneself to, to assume the validity of an authority, is part of an action” (P. Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, op. cit., p. 185).

ideology and utopia. The common criterion for ideology and utopia is, as Mannheim has already stressed, their incompatibility with reality. If the primary function of ideology is integration, that is to say, preserving the identity of groups or individuals by maintaining and reproducing it at the level of symbolic action, the function of utopia is the opposite and in this sense it is destructive. Therefore, utopia plays the function of social disintegration. Utopia is oriented towards the future, while ideology, related to the dominant group, is oriented towards the past.

The concept of utopia is ambiguous; it was initially the name of a literary work containing an imaginary project of an alternative society or institution. The name *Utopia* was used by Thomas More in the title of his 1516 book. It would be difficult to find a common denominator for different concepts of utopias presented in similar works, as well as in various sociological and philosophical frameworks (utopian socialism). They present different intentions and give a different shape to the images of other types of society. Utopias also propose various forms of reconstruction of society or suggest ways of escaping from it, both into the future (end of oppression, triumph of freedom) and into the past (conservatism)²⁶.

Utopia, initially but a name of literary works, introduces however a special kind of thinking. The utopias addressed in these texts denote “a-topos”, or “nowhere”, “a place outside a place”, which can be subsequently projected onto the actual social reality, as a result of which we notice that this reality can be understood in another way. Utopia expresses the “nowhere” since the social image it depicts invariably remains outside the actual social reality.

I suggest that we start from the kernel idea of the nowhere, implied by the word “utopia” itself and by the descriptions of Thomas More: a place which exists in no real place, a ghost city; a river with no water; a prince with no people, and so on. What must be emphasized is the benefit of this special extraterritoriality. From this “no place” an exterior glance is cast on our reality, which suddenly looks strange, nothing more being taken for granted. The field of the possible is now open beyond that of the actual; it is a field, therefore, for alternative ways of living²⁷.

²⁶ Utopia has been the subject matter of works by Thomas Münzer, Thomas More, Campanella and of utopian socialists: Saint-Simon and Fourier.

²⁷ P. Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, op. cit., p. 16.

Utopia is therefore, as Ricoeur notes, “situationally transcendent”²⁸ (“*situationnellement transcendante*”), is impossible to implement in the current order; in this sense it opens up other possibilities. Utopia is not practicable, because it is not a legitimization of what there is. Literary fiction is an imaginary variation, proposing a rewriting of possibilities. Utopia introduces “nowhere” to the constitution of social action or symbolic action and its interpretation, which is the basis for undermining the established order. In this way, it undermines the existing state of affairs, raises doubts, criticism, also undermines the claims of political power to authority, reveals the weaknesses of its legitimacy, and demystifies ideology: the function of utopia is “to expose the credibility gap wherein all systems of authority exceed [...] both our confidence in them and our belief in their legitimacy”²⁹. Contrary to integration, then, utopia plays a destructive role. It reveals a specific temporal dynamic; as a transcendent element it is incompatible with reality, denies it, suspends claims about reality, opens up other possibilities, but also, by influencing current historical processes, it increasingly thwarts its own incompatibility with it by adapting to reality.

Utopia as a recognition of new possibilities and contestation of the current order becomes in the social imagination a carrier of social desire and hope. It is characterized by wishful thinking and expectation, always contradictory and different from the given circumstances. Utopian imaginative activity can also take on pathological features, as it contains a strong emotional dimension: phantasmagoria, a crazy dream, schizophrenia, fixations, escape, and eccentricity.

Imagination in its function of ideology and utopia refers in different ways to the problem of non-transparency of social reality or, more precisely, to the domination of the interests of political power. The consequence of ideology is subordination of the current reality; individuals and groups gain stability, but at the same time they are stripped of delusions, dreams and desires, an interest in searching for meaning and destiny. In this situation, the utopian factor is necessary, introducing tension, distance and critique into social life, which is a prerequisite for change. If ideology is “false consciousness of our real situation, we can imagine a society without ideology”³⁰? Ricoeur claims that social life should contain utopias, i.e. a distance to reality, and first of all its

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 173.

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 17.

³⁰ Ibidem, p. 283.

prospective function, or hope. Utopia is liberating, opens up to a range of possibilities and creates a horizon of expectations³¹.

The creative power of imagination is thus expressed in the relation between these two figures of consciousness, the integration function, the repetition and consolidation of ideology and its subversion by utopia. Ricoeur believes that "There is no social integration without social subversion, we may say. The reflexivity of the process of integration occurs by means of the process of subversion"³². The mutual dialectic of ideology and utopia delineates two tense directions of the social imagery. Ideology is not critical; it increases opacity, leads to immobility, wears out quickly, and eliminates opportunities. Social change requires the intertwining in the social imaginary of the subversive function introduced into history and tradition by utopia: disintegration alongside integration, desire and hope for stability, emotion and motivation instead of adjustment, the ability to be guided by critical ideas and relativization towards trust and affirmation towards what there is. As Ricoeur stresses, "the turning point of ideology from its integrative to its distorting function is also the turning point of the utopian system"³³. Hope inherent in utopia becomes a motivation for social change.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Geertz C., *The Interpretation of Cultures. Selected Essays*, Basic Books, New York 1973.

Ricoeur P., *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, ed. G.H. Taylor, Columbia University Press, New York 1986.

Taylor C., *Modern Social Imaginaries*, Duke University Press, Durham, London 2004.

Wunenburger J.J., *Philosophie des images*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 1997.

³¹ Wunenburger sees the subversive function of utopia mainly in the actions of rebellion, revolution and resistance: "also participates in representations and actions belonging to the sphere of political disputes, referring to violence that undermines the established order and idealizing the social model that would replace it. The imaginary of rebellion, and revolution in particular, gathers a strong load of images that individuals and groups are supposed to give a mobilizing impetus to" (J.J. Wunenburger, *Philosophie des images*, op. cit., p. 276).

³² P. Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, op. cit., p. 16-17.

³³ *Ibidem*, p. 17.

Abstract:

The paper presents the social imaginary from the perspective of contemporary hermeneutics, with the focus on Paul Ricoeur's and Clifford Geertz's theories, as the basis for the self-understanding of individuals and social groups. The point of departure is the problem of social imaginary Charles Taylor discusses in his *Modern Social Imaginaries*. The background to understanding in both Ricoeur's and Geertz's hermeneutical accounts is a symbolical space comprising symbols and senses, an interpretation which allows to identify active and creative processes within that space through distinguishing its two primary functions, i.e. ideology and utopia. The way in which the imaginary is being shaped according to ideology and utopia as two complementary functions of the social imagination offers the possibility of construing social processes as cultural processes taking form of symbolical space transformations. Thinking of ideology and utopia as functioning as social imagination activity makes it possible to show the rules that govern social imagination (social integration and disintegration processes), as well as to discuss social change in which the dialectic of ideology and utopia occupies the central place.

Keywords:

social imagination, symbolical space, ideology, utopia, Clifford Geertz, Paul Ricoeur

WIKTOR ŻŁOBICKI

University of Wrocław

HOLISTIC AND TRANSDISCIPLINARY CHARACTER OF CONTEMPORARY ACADEMIC EDUCATION¹

INTRODUCTION

It would be hard to dispute the statement that the academic community has to face many present-day challenges. I would therefore like to refer one of them, namely the nature of academic education in which academics and students are directly involved. Teachers determine the quality of knowledge created in scientific research, which is then passed on to students, who consume this knowledge by creating their professional competences. Taking social sciences as an example, I would like to point out the need to recognise the holistic and transdisciplinary nature of knowledge used in academic education.

HOLISM

When reflecting on the essence of holism, or a comprehensive approach to the world, one may invoke words of one of the greatest scholars, Albert Einstein, who observed that:

¹ Originally published: Wiktor Żłobicki, "Holistyczny i transdyscyplinarny charakter współczesnej edukacji akademickiej", [in:] *Nowe strategie w kształceniu studentów. Dobre praktyki – rekomendacje*, ed. Ż. Kaczmarek, J. Morbitzer, Uniwersytet Medyczny im. Piastów Śląskich, Wrocław 2018, p. 13-36.

A human being is a part of the whole called by us universe, a part limited in time and space. He experiences himself, his thoughts and feeling as something separated from the rest, a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and the whole of nature in its beauty².

Albert Einstein's ideas and his theory of relativity made holism a major notion also in the humanities and social sciences. The term *holism* comes from the Greek word *holos* (entirety) and was popularised by Jan Christian Smuts, who in his book *Holism and Evolution* (1926) introduced the theory of cognition based on three pillars:

- man experiences the surrounding environment with all the senses – an observation inspired by Kantian philosophy;
- the perception of reality is holistic, rather than fragmentary, which means that the whole is something different and something more than the sum total of its components – a contention that draws on Plato's views;
- holism is a state of aspiration of a part to merge with the whole – the author owed this way of order in the world to Hegel's philosophy.

The postulate of holism can be illustrated by the example of a fragrant rose, which has thorns, stem, leaves and petals forming a flower cup. Therefore, although each leaf of the rose is a singular whole, and so is the stem or a single thorn, only their combination creates a beautiful plant. Is a single thorn or flower petal of the most beautiful rose a rose? Undoubtedly, the most beautiful rose will lose its charm if we divide it into components. Likewise, we can speak of a comprehensive knowledge of the world. In fact, understanding the world is not fully possible if you explain its existence – as is often the case in the educational process – with the knowledge accumulated in so-called study subjects. Physics, chemistry, biology, mother tongue or mathematics constitute fascinating fields of knowledge – but they are single fields only! For example, the phenomenon of the birth of man cannot be explained by mathematical knowledge alone. Still, without maths this cannot be done in a holistic way, either.

We should assume, then, that the holistic approach means a “need for a comprehensive and integrated approach to experience, irrespec-

² After: H. Dauber, *Obszary uczenia się w przyszłości. Perspektywy pedagogiki humanistycznej*, Kraków 2001, p. 78.

tive of whether they concern groups, objects or individuals, rather than their division into identifiable fragments”³. Following this line of reasoning, we may assume that human perception is tuned to holism. Such comprehensive images and experience linked to the needs we wish to satisfy contribute to our knowledge of the world at large. At the same time, we need to remember that human experience is geared towards the discrimination of opposites and is linked to an established dual tradition and to a mutual exclusion of contradictions. Is there, then, such a thing as objective knowledge? Can a description of an object in a manner shared by all objects tell us that the object really exists? Contemporary science may prove it and yet the object may be regarded as a token of a subjective, irrational perception and actually does not exist. This, too, can be proved in this way. There are, then, two opposite concepts of perceiving reality. From this point of view, creating pairs of opposites in one’s consciousness can be considered a kind of falsification of reality. The unilateral nature of opposites should be replaced by their reciprocity and cyclicity, as evidenced, for example, by inhalation and exhalation, adolescence and aging. From this point of view, for example, the notion of *nothing* and *something*, or *emptiness* and *fullness*, are by no means isolated from each other, as is the case in dualistic reasoning, but are in a relationship with each other. The essence of this way of thinking is explained, for example, by one of the most important works of Eastern philosophy in which we find the following reasoning:

Thirty spokes join the wheel nave
And make of void and form a pair,
And a wagon’s put to use.
Clay is thrown to shape a vase
And make of void and form a pair,
And a vessel’s put to use.
Door and window vent a room
And make of void and form a pair,
And a room is put to use.
Thus the value of what is
Depends for use on what is not⁴.

³ Ch. Sills, S. Fish, P. Lapworth, *Pomoc psychologiczna w ujęciu Gestalt*, Warszawa 1999, p. 11 [Ch. Sills, S. Fish, P. Lapworth, *Gestalt Counselling*, Winslow Press, Oxford 1995].

⁴ Laozi, *Dao De Jing. The Book of the Way*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 2001, Stanza 11, p. 51.

The ideas of holism are moreover present in poetry. One of the greatest poets, Horace, defined the co-existence of opposites as follows:

Whoever fears the opposite of these things marvels almost in the same way
As the one who desires them;
What is the troubling in each case is the alarm that results,
As soon as an unexpected appearance startles either.
Whether he feels joy or grief, desire or fear, what does it matter, if,
When he has seen something better or worse than he had hoped,
He becomes numbs and his eyes and mind and body are transfixed?⁵

Anthony de Mello justifies it in yet another manner, observing as follows:

If I had spoken of my emptiness or even been aware of it would it be emptiness? Music needs the hollowness of the flute, letters, the blankness of the page, light, the void called a window, holiness, the absence of the self⁶.

The idea of holism can also be applied with respect to the classical understanding of opposites, based on the concept of imbalance. This imbalance manifests itself, among other things, in emphasizing synthesis with violation of the role of analytical processes; rational, scientific knowledge separated from intuitive life wisdom; in rivalry that disregards cooperation, expansion that is not offset by stabilization processes, etc. Fritjof Capra⁷ was trying to explain the lack of this balance in the cultural reality of the Western world. It should be noted that the scientific justification for the presence of the idea of holism in the humanities is based on the achievements of contemporary quantum physics and the theory of relativity. The infallibility of the Cartesian concept of dualism of spirit and matter, on which the scientific knowledge of the modern world was based, was questioned. The author regards this one-sidedness as the cause of the deep social, ecological, moral and spiritual crisis of the contemporary Western world and therefore refers to the philosophical thought of the East.

It should be emphasized that not only the views of the above representatives of modern quantum physics encourage us to draw on the richness of intellectual thought in the East. Contemporary philosophers, too, more and more often refer to the philosophy of the East. For

⁵ F.K. Horacjusz, *Dziela wszystkie. Gawędy, listy, sztuka poetycka*, vol. I, Warszawa 2000, p. 278.

⁶ A. De Mello, *The Prayer of the Frog*, 1995, p. 49.

⁷ See F. Capra, *The Tao of Physics. An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism*, London 1991.

example, Leszek Kołakowski in an interview observed that Marcus Aurelius' stoicism about the essence of philosophy comes close to the truths proclaimed by Buddhist philosophy⁸. In another text he described the philosophical views of Heraclitus of Ephesus, whom he called *the preacher of eternal transformation*⁹. Heraclitus' beliefs regarding the essence of holism, popularised in maxims such as: "the road up and the road down is one and the same road" or "everything flows" or "everything is in a state of flux", or "you could not step twice into the same river" demonstrate the transformation of particular qualities into other ones, the interplay of opposites and their incessant transformation. By no means does it lead to chaos, since the transformation is subject to proportion and equilibrium. As Leszek Kołakowski confirms, "In everything we see a game of opposites, without which the world would fall into ruin"¹⁰. There are here such simple antonymies as the beginning and end on a circle, which can be located at any given point. There are those which involve a gradual transition of something into its opposite, such as cold and hot. There are finally those which trigger tension, as in archery. The action of opposites can be seen, for example, in the fact that water has varying effects on living beings: it is a good environment for oxygen uptake by fish, but not by humans, and so on. The above species will react differently to atmospheric oxygen, however. Therefore, in order to understand the essence of holism, it is extremely important to conclude from Heraclitus' philosophy that, in spite of widespread variability, the world is one and is in order.

SCHOLARLY DISCIPLINES

Basing on the distinctiveness of scientific disciplines is sometimes an expression of the strategy of those scientists who find it easier to defend the boundaries of their own speciality than of the need, resulting from the development of science, to get closer to other areas of knowledge and establish cooperation with their representatives. Meanwhile, the present day challenges us not only to search for and organize scientific knowledge, but also to transcend and relocate the boundaries of disciplines. This does not mean abandoning important

⁸ See L. Kołakowski, "Sen, w którym żyjemy", *Przekrój* 2006, No. 33/3, p. 15.

⁹ See L. Kołakowski, *O co nas pytają wielcy filozofowie. Seria I*, Kraków 2004, p. 29.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 30.

landmarks in the topographies of individual scholarly disciplines, but the community of sciences may bring us closer to the ideal of integrated knowledge about the world.

For example, in both its theory and practice, pedagogy without transgressing the limits of its own field and applying the legacy of philosophy, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and political science would become an imperfect instrument of describing, diagnosing or intentional impacting another person. At the same time, however, it is impossible – without the risk of their deformation – to exclude certain areas of pedagogues' interests completely from the fields where the above disciplines are responsible for research. Hence, pedagogical discourses seem to be both relatively less stable and more susceptible to the impulses of change created by other disciplines. Therefore, today the issue of inter- and transdisciplinarity of pedagogy is also a question about the condition of this discipline, which cannot ignore the need – and often the necessity – to delineate, but also to cross its own boundaries and integrate knowledge from other fields, not only in the area of research and educational practice, but also in the area of theoretical reflection. Thus, today, in the face of the development of the humanities and social sciences, we see more and more clearly the illusion and blurred boundaries of disciplines, the weaknesses of many theories and the flickering ambiguity of notions used by scientists. Admittedly, discipline should be regarded as a dominant feature of practicing science, but it should be remembered that disciplines of knowledge are not so much a reflection of nature, but rather a social and cultural product perpetuated by 19th-century processes of social modernisation¹¹.

According to Leszek Koczanowicz, the division into disciplines of science was augmented by

specialization processes, which caused the separation of disciplines from each other and from their shared mother, i.e. philosophy. Such a breakdown turned out to be inevitable; the very act of constitution of a discipline requires above all a gesture of rejection of what is not that discipline. Such negative identification is an obvious part of any identity, and the closer the identities are, the more effort must be put into distinguishing them.

¹¹ See J. Mittelstrass, *Stichwort Interdisziplinarität. Mit einem anschließenden Werkstattgespräch*, Basel 1996, [after:] A. Maihofer, "Inter-, Trans- und Postdisziplinarität. Ein Plädoyer wieder die Ernüchterung", [in:] *Quer denken – Strukturen verändern. Gender Studies zwischen Disziplinen*, ed. H. Kahlert, B. Thiessen, I. Weller, Wiesbaden 2005, p. 196.

Exploration of the distinguishing features of each discipline, which will contribute to its precise definition and separation from other more or less related fields of knowledge, resulted in the fact that the most important thing was to prevent other points of view and cognitive perspectives from interfering in a given science¹².

The relation between philosophy and psychology is a spectacular example referred to by the author. The ties between these sciences were broken when behaviourism evolved from psychological theory into an ideology of examining the objective determinants of behaviour of what had previously been described as the world of man and his creations. Attempts to explain human behaviour by means of a theoretically and empirically complicated introspective psychology were replaced by technologically oriented behavioural knowledge about the ways of behaviour modification¹³.

IS IT TRUE THAT THE WORLD HAS PROBLEMS AND UNIVERSITIES HAVE FACULTIES?

The academic community sustains the structure of scholarly disciplines, which often proves a stumbling block for the knowledge development process. It was aptly commented on by Garry D. Brewer, who observed that “the world has problems while universities have faculties”¹⁴. It seems, therefore, that one of the responses to the increasingly obvious knowledge crisis has been the crossing of boundaries between disciplines. A multifaceted analysis of this phenomenon can be found in the twelfth volume of interdisciplinary studies on gender issues, entitled *Quer denken – Strukturen verändern. Gender Studies zwischen Disziplinen*¹⁵. As one of the co-authors of this work, Sabine Kark, writes, a review of literature on sociology and the history of knowledge indicates a lack of a clear understanding of the concept of disciplinarity¹⁶. For instance, disciplinarity is seen as the first principle of creating

¹² L. Koczanowicz, “Interdyscyplinarność – między rabunkiem a dialogiem”, [in:] *Interdyscyplinarność i transdyscyplinarność pedagogiki – wymiary teoretyczny i praktyczny*, ed. R. Włodarczyk, W. Żłobicki, Kraków 2011, p. 36.

¹³ See ibidem, p. 36-37.

¹⁴ See G. D. Brewer, “The Challenges of Interdisciplinarity”, *Policy Sciences* 1999 No. 32, p. 328.

¹⁵ *Quer denken – Strukturen verändern*, op. cit.

¹⁶ S. Hark, “Inter/Disziplinarität. Gender Studies Revisited”, [in:] *Quer denken – Strukturen verändern*, op. cit., p. 69-70.

and organizing scholarly knowledge, but an opposite view sees it as a stabilizing agent of routine in science. The former approach, aired by Burton R. Clarke and Rudolph Stichweh, assumes that a scholarly discipline is the “fundamental unit of inner differentiation of scholarly knowledge”. As a consequence, from the point of view of the process of knowledge development, one can indicate criteria of its formation into a scholarly discipline:

- a sufficiently homogeneous nature of the communication between researchers forming the scientific community;
- representation in textbooks of the backbone of scientific knowledge in the form of codified and agreed core concepts;
- variety and topicality of the problems addressed;
- a set of research methods and paradigms;
- discipline-specific structure and institutionalization of research careers¹⁷.

In turn, Ellen Messer-Davidow believes that there are three constitutive functions of any discipline: production, regulation and reproduction¹⁸. The first is to create science subjects, i.e. areas of interest and research topics, and to “produce” science professionals, i.e. researchers who make up a structured environment with professors at the top and underpaid assistants at the bottom of the hierarchy. The regulatory function serves the organisation of scientific knowledge with the aid of specific instruments and the formation of the structure of the science community¹⁹. The reproductive function related to the continuation of the process of knowledge formation on the basis of scientific accomplishments and re-creation of the science community.

¹⁷ These views were aired by: Burton R. Clark, *The Higher Education System: Academic Organizations in Cross-national Perspective*, Berkeley, Los Angeles 1983 as well as Rudolph Stichweh, *Wissenschaft. Universität. Professionen*, Frankfurt 1994, [after:] S. Hark, “Inter/Disziplinarität. Gender Studies Revisited”, op. cit., p. 73.

¹⁸ E. Messer-Davidow, *Disciplining Feminism. From Social Activism to Academic Discourse*, Durham, London 2002, [after:] S. Hark, “Inter/Disziplinarität. Gender Studies Revisited”, op. cit., p. 75-76.

¹⁹ The production and regulation aspect of a discipline was highlighted by Timothy Lenoir (earlier than Ellen Messer-Davidow). According to this Author, this serves the purpose of mapping out unique scholarly territories, regulating the assignment and distribution of academic privileges, resources, and goods – (T. Lenoir, “The discipline of nature and nature of disciplines”, [in:] *Knowledge. Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity*, ed. E. Messer-Davidow, D.R. Shumway, D.J. Sylvan, Charlottesville, London 1993, [after:] S. Hark, “Inter/Disziplinarität. Gender Studies Revisited”, op. cit., p. 76).

Referring to the above-mentioned second thesis on disciplinarity as a stabilizer of routine in science, one must note the justified anxiety concerning the fact of whether science in its internal, disciplinary diversity copes with the challenges of contemporary, increasingly complex reality? We must also mention the still unresolved discussion of scientists as to whether in this situation the borders of individual disciplines should be sealed, extended or transcended?²⁰.

PEDAGOGY AS A SCHOLARLY DISCIPLINE

This dilemma applies likewise to pedagogy, whose status – i.e. the limits of it as a discipline have been much debated after the socio-political breakthrough of 1989. On the one hand, pedagogy celebrates its educational triumph, since it has enjoyed enormous popularity as a university major and, as Zbigniew Kwieciński observed, “has transformed from a university Cinderella subject to a true hit of academic studies of the fifteen year period after 1990”²¹.

On the other hand, against the background of this spectacular success, the science of pedagogy is still being discussed, and its achievements are often marginalised by representatives of other humanities and social sciences, despite the strong link between the theory of pedagogy and, among others, humanist and postmodernist concepts. As Antoni Smołalski rightly pointed out, pedagogy with due respect refers to the many areas whose conceptual network and scientific achievements it uses but gets little if any respect in return²². Zbigniew Kwieciński pointed to one more property of the borderlines of pedagogy as a scholarly discipline; he asked a question: “Can one be a successful pedagogue as a scholar and teacher without prior mastery of its fundamental canon, with zero knowledge at the onset of one’s academic career?”²³. In reply, the Author referred to the names of many professors of Polish pedagogy who hold master’s and doctoral degrees in other disciplines, including economics, mathematics, chemistry, psychology, military sciences, theology, geography, biology and

²⁰ *Quer denken – Strukturen verändern*, op. cit., p. 32.

²¹ Z. Kwieciński, *Między patosem a dekadencją. Studia i szkice socjopedagogiczne*, Wrocław 2007, p. 67.

²² A. Smołalski, *Paradygmaty i historiozofia pedagogiki*, Wrocław 2009, p. 153.

²³ Z. Kwieciński, “Pedagogiczne zero. Zastosowania problemowe, epistemiczne i magiczne”, *Nauka* 2004, No. 2, p. 16-17.

history. The flexibility of the boundaries of modern pedagogy is therefore due to the creative presence of professors such as: Kazimierz Denek – earlier a Ph.D. in Economics, Stefan Kwiatkowski with an M.Sc. in IT, Zbyszko Melosik whose first degree was in Political Science and Lech Witkowski, with a Master’s degree in Maths.

In the past, too, pedagogy was open to concepts which originated on other disciplines. One cannot conceive e.g. of current humanistic pedagogy without its eminent inspirators, e.g. Janusz Korczak or Carl R. Rogers. The contribution to pedagogy of Janusz Korczak – a physician and Carl R. Rogers – a psychotherapist must be at least cursorily mentioned here. Janusz Korczak, a paediatrician by profession and a writer and essayist by passion, saw the need for transcending the limits of one’s own prime discipline. His professional experience of a man connected with medicine sparked an interest in pedagogy, which he generously gifted with numerous volumes of his works; despite the passage of years, they continue to inspire pedagogues to this day²⁴. The fact that Janusz Korczak transcended the limits of his medical education and shifted towards pedagogy is evidenced, among other things, by the foreword to one of his most famous texts from the beginning of the 20th century:

The main place in medicine is occupied by the science of recognition. The student examines a number of individuals, learns to look and - noticing the symptoms - to explain them, interconnect and make inferences on their basis. If pedagogy wants to follow the path paved by medicine, it must develop educational diagnostics based on the understanding of symptoms. What fever, coughing and vomiting is for the doctor, smiles, tears or a flush is for the educator²⁵.

Referring to a typical clinical observation, Janusz Korczak was a co-creator of emerging humanities and a promoter of modern pedagogical thought. In another publication, analysing the problems of adolescence, Janusz Korczak expressed his conviction that “the period of adolescence should cease to be the focus of medicine, which took care of its physical and material side, and shift to pedagogy, tasked with taking care of

²⁴ See e.g. the multi-volume edition of Janusz Korczak’s writings, published in Warsaw by Oficyna Wydawnicza Latona [J. Korczak, *Selected Works*, transl. J. Bachrach, National Science Foundation by the Scientific Publications Foreign Cooperation Center of the Central Institute for Scientific, Technical and Economic Information, Warsaw 1967].

²⁵ J. Korczak, “Momenty wychowawcze”, [in:] *Dzieta*, vol. 7, Warszawa 1993, p. 361.

its spiritual side”²⁶. He stressed, therefore, that medicine and pedagogy should not only be mindful of their separate nature, but also of the shared subject of studies. Importantly, Janusz Korczak decided to become a pedagogue under the impact of his practice as an educator during summer camps for young people and in the orphanage.

Another example of transcending the borders of a discipline one represents was a famous psychotherapist, co-founder of humanistic psychology and person-centred education, Carl R. Rogers, who became an active member of the New Education current after 1968 and laid the foundations of person-centred education. He assumed that the human being is born with a unique developmental potential and a strong desire for realising it, i.e. with a tendency for self-actualisation²⁷. Human needs, desires and drives manifest it and serve the development of the individual, whereas all distortions of development result from the negative experience of a dysfunctional social environment. The universal character of Carl R. Rogers’ focus on the person helped to define the optimum learning conditions, and thus development criteria. Fundamental here is the conviction of the huge potential of each and every student, which in a significant manner determines the role to be played by the person facilitating the learning process. Of key importance, then, is Carl R. Rogers’ idea of *facilitation*, or support of the learning process, with the preservation of the subjective nature of the teacher-student relation²⁸. As a consequence, the features of person-centred education are as follows:

- the teacher identifies with the idea that each person wants to learn and has belief in his or her role of the *facilitator*;
- the program, planning and financing of such learning is the joint responsibility of all the stakeholders: the *facilitator*, the students, their parents and school authorities;
- the *facilitator* offers access to learning resources (source texts, books, other people’s experience, etc.);
- the student by him- or herself or in cooperation with other learners selects, creates and develops a curriculum and takes responsibility for its effects;

²⁶ J. Korczak, “Szkoła życia”, [in:] *Dzieła*, vol. 4, Warszawa 1998, p. 222.

²⁷ See C. R. Rogers, *On Becoming a Person. A Therapist’s View of Psychotherapy*, New York 1995, p. xix.

²⁸ The original source of the *facilitation* concept in education is, naturally, Carl R. Rogers’ person-centred psychotherapy.

- there is a climate conducive to learning and learning from one another;
- the content of the curriculum is important yet not the most important, since students' success is "the learning progress, how to learn what they want to know";
- students reach their goals via self-discipline which replaces superimposed discipline²⁹.

Thus, if we assume that the basic activity of any organism is growth and development, the teacher, rejecting the traditional concept of guiding the learning process, focuses primarily on supporting the process. In the proposed creation of a person-centred education process as an alternative to traditional schooling, Carl R. Rogers invoked his experience as a psychotherapist, which is not the only instance of the rapists' interests in pedagogy³⁰.

MULTIDISCIPLINARITY – INTERDISCIPLINARITY – TRANSDISCIPLINARITY OF PEDAGOGY

The achievements of pedagogy are therefore associated with the presence of many figures representing various specialties. Today, pedagogy has its place at universities, but at the same time it is entangled in a complicated arrangement between a variety of disciplines of knowledge. Representatives of German pedagogy comment on these complex relations and claim that the relations between the disciplines reflect the notion of multidisciplinary (often referred to as pluri-disciplinary), interdisciplinarity and transdisciplinarity³¹.

Multidisciplinary is characterised by a joint approach to a certain question by various disciplines, each of which retains full autonomy and does not take advantage of the effects of cooperation for changes in the structure of its own theory or methodology. Interdisciplinarity, in turn, denotes not only joint action of at least two (sub)disciplines,

²⁹ C. R. Rogers, *A Way of Being*, New York 1995, p. 309-310.

³⁰ This is done also by, e.g. Gail King, the author of the publication *Counselling Skills for Teachers* (Buckingham 1999). Despite the much-promising titles, the book should not be read as a lecture or a self-help manual on therapy, but rather as an incentive for teachers to take the effort to improve their professional competence. Sharing her experience of a counsellor, the Author addresses the skills indispensable in teachers, such as: listening, paraphrasing, reading body language, showing emotions, empathy, etc.

³¹ A. Maihofer, "Inter-, Trans- und Postdisziplinarität. Ein Plädoyer wieder die Ernüchterung", op. cit., p. 185-202.

but also creation of shared terminology. Interdisciplinary cooperation may involve engagement in various topics, resulting in the modernization of knowledge in each discipline, sometimes also resulting in the emergence of a new (sub)discipline. Transdisciplinarity means the rejection of the limits of one discipline and conducting a research process on the basis of shared theoretical assumptions. Transdisciplinary work contributes to defining and solving complex problems, develops a trans-disciplinary theory and is effective where single disciplines fail, e.g. to solve complicated problems of the natural environment. According to Heike Kahlert, transdisciplinarity in science became simultaneously a challenge and a fact when the first sputnik was launched into orbit in 1957³². The event ushered in a crisis of traditionally perceived knowledge; this crisis has continued to date, as witnessed by the Wissenschaftsrat approach. In one of its official documents, this highest scientific body in Germany stressed that e.g. the development of transdisciplinary skills is of key importance for the creation of new higher education offer³³. It is therefore appropriate to agree with the assumption that the professional credibility of contemporary pedagogues must be built from a broader perspective than their own discipline. This is because pedagogy is expected to meet the increasingly complex challenges resulting from dynamic changes in social reality. These expectations, often contradictory, are formulated both by representatives of the world of politics, represented e.g. by educational authorities, and by educational stakeholders. i.e. students, parents and teachers, who are aware of their role. In a sense, therefore, pedagogy may appear to be a “hostage” to these expectations. No wonder, therefore, that Hannah Arendt places an exceptionally high demand on teachers as the most numerous professional group in the society, one that requires knowledge which is not only strictly pedagogical – because “with respect to the child the teacher is as though a representative of all adult inhabitants of this world, pointing out the details and saying to the child: ‘This is our world’”³⁴. All the more so, there is a pressing need for the exploration and intensification of dialogue with

³² H. Kahlert “Wissenschaftsentwicklung durch Inter- und Transdisziplinarität: Positionen der Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung”, [in:] *Quer denken – Strukturen verändern*, op. cit., p. 28-29.

³³ Wissenschaftsrat: *Empfehlungen zur Einführung neuer Studienstrukturen und -abschlüsse (Bakkalaureus/Bachelor-Magister/Master) in Deutschland*, Berlin 2000, p. 21, www.wissenschaftsrat.de/download/archiv/4418-00.pdf (access: 22.03.2015).

³⁴ H. Arendt, *Between Past and Future*, London 1968, p. 194.

philosophy, anthropology, psychology, sociology and more and more often with social therapy and psychotherapy.

Such a trans-disciplinary approach to competences is offered by Gestalt in pedagogy, defined in relevant literature most often as *Gestaltpädagogik*, Gestalt pedagogy or character pedagogy³⁵. Gestalt is one of the currents of humanistic pedagogy, an exemplary case of pedagogy transcending its borders. The leading motif, a kind of passport entitling to a trip in both directions is holism, i.e. a holistic view of education, which not only legitimizes the implementation of philosophical, psychological and psychotherapeutic content in the structure of pedagogical knowledge, but also allows Gestalt teachers to explore the fields reserved until recently only for specialists from the above areas. The sources of the Gestalt current in education can be found in the American “free schools” movement, which appeared in the first half of the 1960s as a response to the authoritarian and excessively technological education system. The following decade saw the intensification of the process of incorporating into scientific pedagogical knowledge of the experiences of various - earlier and later - currents of psychology, represented, for example, by humanistically-oriented psychologists such as Carl R. Rogers, Abraham Maslow and Ruth Cohn, founders of character psychology, e.g. Max Wertheimer and Kurt Lewin and precursors of Gestalt therapy, Fritz and Laura Perls and Paul Goodman. The first in Europe comprehensive book on Gestalt in education, by Hilarion Petzold and Georg I. Brown (collaborators of Fritz Perls), introduces the proposal of the use of Gestalt therapy in education and upbringing and furnishes a description of experience with its use in teachers’ lifelong learning process³⁶. It was an important step towards deepening the understanding of pedagogy, broadening its boundaries and accepting the right of educators to explore psychological and psychotherapeutic knowledge. At present, Gestalt in education is a holistic (comprehensive) concept, extensively drawing on sources originating in anthropology, existential philosophy, the philosophical systems of the East, phenomenology, psychology and Gestalt psychotherapy. As a consequence, competence development by Gestalt pedagogues transcends

³⁵ Gestalt in education is addressed in my monograph – see W. Żłobicki, *Edukacja holistyczna w podejściu Gestalt. O wspieraniu rozwoju osoby*, Kraków 2008.

³⁶ H. Petzold, G.I. Brown, *Gestaltpädagogik. Konzepte der integrativen Erziehung*, München 1977.

standard occupational learning, takes more time, requires the transcendence of borders of traditionally understood pedagogy and is run for a few years in professional Gestalt psychotherapy centres by certified trainers and psychotherapists.

In modern pedagogy, we have more and more examples of the fruitful use of opportunities to verify discipline boundaries, both in terms of their transcendence and expansion. A concrete example of the diverse relationships between specialists in different disciplines of knowledge is provided by Elżbieta Łobacz-Kloosterman³⁷. Drawing on the UK experience concerning care over visually impaired children and their families, the Author indicates three differing models of co-operation between specialists: multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary. Under the multidisciplinary model, specialists dealing with a particular problem in the child rarely communicate with one another. Each of them works individually, focusing on an isolated aspect of the child's development. For example, a speech therapist is responsible for verbal communication, a typhlopedagogue is answerable for the improvement of the child's visual functions, etc. Under the interdisciplinary model, specialists, too, carry out their tasks individually, but are in regular communication with one another. In turn, the transdisciplinary model is underpinned by the collaboration of all specialists at every stage of work with the child, i.e. diagnosis, creation and realization of an individual program of supporting the development of a blind child, evaluating and modifying therapy, and cooperating with the parents. We deal, then, with a holistic approach to the functioning of a small blind or visually impaired child and his family and the shared responsibility of each team member for the implementation of the comprehensive therapy program.

CONCLUSION

The above reflections related to holism and limits of a discipline are but a small contribution to a more general debate on the present and future of academic education. The knowledge worked out by successive

³⁷ M. Smith, N. Levack, *Best practices for VI teachers serving students with visual and multiple impairments. A resource guide*, Austin, TX 1997, p. 13, [after:] E. Łobacz-Kloosterman, *Możliwości realizacji transdyscyplinarnego modelu wspomaganie rozwoju małego dziecka z niepełnosprawnością wzrokową*, [in:] *Edukacja bez granic - mimo barier*, t. 2 *Przestrzeń tworzenia*, ed. T. Smal, A. Zduniak, Wydaw. Wyższej Szkoły Bezpieczeństwa, Poznań 2008, s. 318-324.

generations of scholars does not keep up with complex and often unpredictable reality, which the authors of the Club of Rome report aptly called the “human gap”. Global issues such as the economic crisis, energy resources of our planet, the greenhouse effect, natural and humanitarian disasters in many parts of the world legitimize the existence of this gap, defined as the “distance between the growing complexity of the world and our ability to address it”³⁸. Hence, perhaps, more and more frequent attempts to combine strictly scientific knowledge with meta-scientific and para-scientific knowledge, the creation in the mass media of a new practice of removing philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and asking instead politicians, sensation-seeking journalists or financial analysts to explain the world to a mass audience. Perhaps, then, referring to the immortal statement by Socrates: “I know I don’t know”, which admittedly corresponds to the highest level of human consciousness, it pays off to be more flexible in approaching disciplinarity and its limits and turn to holism and transdisciplinarity in science.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Arendt H., *Between Past and Future*, Penguin Classics, London 1968.
- Botkin J., Elmandjra M., Malitza M., *No Limits to Learning. Bridging the Human Gap*, Pergamon Press, Oxford 1979.
- Brewer G.D., “The Challenges of Interdisciplinarity”, *Policy Sciences* 1999 No. 32.
- Capra F., *The Tao of Physics. An Exploration of the Parallels between Modern Physics and Eastern Mysticism*, Harper, London 1991.
- Dauber H., *Obszary uczenia się w przyszłości. Perspektywy pedagogiki humanistycznej*, transl. J. Marnik, M. Wawrzak-Chodaczek, Impuls, Kraków 2001.
- Hark S., “Inter/Disziplinarität. Gender Studies Revisited”, [in:] *Quer denken – Strukturen verändern. Gender Studies zwischen Disziplinen*, ed. H. Kahlert, B. Thiessen, I. Weller, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften/GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2005.
- Horajusz F.K., *Dzieła wszystkie. Gawędy, listy, sztuka poetycka*, vol. I, transl. O. Jurewicz, Państwowe Wydaw. Naukowe, Warszawa 2000.
- Kahlert H., “Wissenschaftsentwicklung durch Inter- und Transdisziplinarität: Positionen der Frauen- und Geschlechterforschung”, [in:] *Quer denken – Strukturen verändern. Gender Studies zwischen Disziplinen*, ed. H. Kahlert, B. Thiessen, I. Weller, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften/GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2005.

³⁸ See J. Botkin, M. Elmandjra, M. Malitza, *No Limits to Learning. Bridging the Human Gap*, Oxford 1979.

- King G., *Counselling Skills for Teachers*, Open University Press, Buckingham 1999.
- Koczanowicz L., "Interdyscyplinarność – między rabunkiem a dialogiem", [in:] *Interdyscyplinarność i transdyscyplinarność pedagogiki*, ed. R. Włodarczyk, W. Żłobicki, Impuls, Kraków 2011.
- Kołąkowski L., *O co nas pytają wielcy filozofowie. Seria I*, Znak, Kraków 2004.
- Kołąkowski L., "Sen, w którym żyjemy", *Przekrój* 2006, No. 33/3.
- Korczak J., "Momenty wychowawcze", [in:] *Dzieła*, vol. 7, Oficyna Wydawnicza Latona, Warszawa 1993.
- Korczak J., "Szkola życia", [in:] *Dzieła*, vol. 4, Oficyna Wydawnicza Latona, Warszawa 1998.
- Kwieciński Z., "Pedagogiczne zero. Zastosowania problemowe, epistemiczne i magiczne", *Nauka* 2004, No. 2.
- Kwieciński Z., *Między patosem a dekadencją. Studia i szkice socjopedagogiczne*, Wydaw. Naukowe Dolnośląskiej Szkoły Wyższej Edukacji TWP we Wrocławiu, Wrocław 2007.
- Laozi, *Dao De Jing. The Book of the Way*, transl. M. Roberts, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 2001.
- Lenoir T., "The discipline of nature and nature of disciplines", [in:] *Knowledges. Historical and Critical Studies in Disciplinarity*, ed. E. Messer-Davidow, D.R. Shumway, D.J. Sylvan, University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, London 1993.
- Łobacz-Kloosterman E., "Możliwości realizacji transdyscyplinarnego modelu wspomagania rozwoju małego dziecka z niepełnosprawnością wzrokową", [in:] *Edukacja bez granic - mimo barier*, t. 2 *Przestrzeń tworzenia*, ed. T. Smal, A. Zduniak, Wydaw. Wyższej Szkoły Bezpieczeństwa, Poznań 2008.
- Maihofer A., "Inter-, Trans- und Postdisziplinarität. Ein Plädoyer wieder die Ernüchterung", [in:] *Quer denken - Strukturen verändern. Gender Studies zwischen Disziplinen*, ed. H. Kahlert, B. Thiessen, I. Weller, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften/GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2005.
- Mello A. de, *The Prayer of the Frog*, Gujarat Sahitya Prakash, 1995.
- Messer-Davidow E., *Disciplining Feminism. From Social Activism to Academic Discourse*, Durham, London 2002.
- Mittelstrass J., *Stichwort Interdisziplinarität. Mit einem anschließenden Werkstattgespräch*, Basler Schriften zur europäischen Integration, Basel 1996.
- Petzold H., Brown G. I., *Gestaltpädagogik. Konzepte der integrativen Erziehung*, Pfeiffer, München 1977.
- Quer denken - Strukturen verändern. Gender Studies zwischen Disziplinen*, ed. H. Kahlert, B. Thiessen, I. Weller, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften/GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden 2005.
- Rogers C.R., *A Way of Being*, Houghton Mifflin, New York 1995.
- Rogers C.R., *On Becoming a Person. A Therapist's View of Psychotherapy*, Mariner Books, New York 1995.
- Sills Ch., Fish S., Lapworth P., *Pomoc psychologiczna w ujęciu Gestalt*, transl. E. Bielawska-Batorowicz, Warszawa 1999.

- Smolański A., *Paradygmaty i historiozofia pedagogiki*, Teson – Agencja Poligraficzno-Wydawnicza Andrzej Tekieli, Wrocław 2009.
- Smuts J.Ch., *Die holistische Welt*, Berlin 1938.
- Stichweh R., *Wissenschaft. Universität. Professionen*, Surkamp, Frankfurt 1994.
- Wissenschaftsrat: *Empfehlungen zur Einführung neuer Studienstrukturen und -abschlüsse (Bakkalaureus/Bachelor-Magister/Master) in Deutschland*, Berlin 2000, <http://www.wissenschaftsrat.de/download/archiv/4418-00.pdf> (access: 22.03.2015).
- Żłobicki W., *Edukacja holistyczna w podejściu Gestalt. O wspieraniu rozwoju osoby*, Impuls, Kraków 2008.
- Żłobicki W., *Pedagoga rozważania o granicach dyscyplin wiedzy*, [in:] *Interdyscyplinarność i transdyscyplinarność pedagogiki – wymiary teoretyczny i praktyczny*, ed. R. Włodarczyk, W. Żłobicki, Impuls, Kraków 2011.

Abstract:

Nowadays, in academic education, we are becoming more and more aware of the crisis of scientific knowledge, knowledge which does not answer the global problems resulting from the increasing complexity of the world. This situation confronts scientists with the challenge of not only looking for comprehensive knowledge, but also crossing and moving disciplinary boundaries. It seems that the structure of knowledge disciplines, which has its roots in the nineteenth century – as well as the boundaries set between them, constitute a barrier to the development of knowledge. It is worth showing more flexibility in the division of disciplines and flexibility about their boundaries and turn to holism and transdisciplinarity in science.

Keywords:

holism, disciplinarity, knowledge, science, development, borders, education

RAFAŁ WŁODARCZYK

University of Wrocław

SCHOOLS “DETACHED” FROM REALITY. ON THE ARCHITECTONICS AND DYNAMICS OF CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL SPACE¹

*In our days we receive three
different or contrary educations;
namely, of our parents, of our
masters, and of the world.
What we learn in the latter effaces
all the ideas of the former*

Montesquieu, *The Spirit of Laws*

The statement in the title can be read as a metaphor used primarily for persuasion, but it also reflects a phenomenon important for pedagogy, namely the gap between school education and social reality. It is justified in the sense that each social practice, especially institutionalised one, is subject to regionalization, takes place in a separate, appropriate time, spatial and situational context, so that, undisturbed, it can unfold at its own pace². However, our pedagogical anxiety is aroused when school education, contrary to expectations and assumptions, is

¹ Originally published: Rafał Włodarczyk, “Szkoly »oderwane« od rzeczywistości: o architektonice i dynamice współczesnych przestrzeni edukacyjnych”, [in:] *Transgresje w edukacji*, vol. 2, ed. I. Paszenda, R. Włodarczyk, Impuls, Kraków 2014, p. 43-58.

² See A. Giddens, “Time, Space and Regionalisation”, [in:] *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, ed. D. Gregory, J. Urry, London 1985, p. 265-295.

not compatible with social reality, and when we see that rather than being bridged, the gap is growing; so is dissonance. This anxiety is not a *signum temporis* of a particular period. The history of pedagogical ideas suggests that it has accompanied pedagogies present in schools for a long time. Contemporary research indicates individual processes that are responsible for this state of affairs, while the aim of this article is to organize them by distinguishing three dimensions of ‘detachment of school from reality’.

1.

In his *Essays*, Michel de Montaigne often expresses his unfavourable opinion of teachers and schools. As can be deduced from his scattered remarks, he was irritated by the cult of superficial knowledge, the underestimation of the role of experience, genuine engagement, and personal involvement. As he observes in his essay “On Schoolmasters’ Learning”: “I dislike the borrowed and begged for wisdom. Learned we may be with another man’s learning: we can only be wise with wisdom of our own”³. In addition, there is waste of time, spoilage of character, emphasis on unproductive effort and learned helplessness. This is what he writes about classes taught at school:

If our souls do not move with a better motion and if we do not have a healthier judgement, then I would just as soon that our pupil should spend his time playing tennis... But just look at him after he has spent some fifteen or sixteen years of studying: nothing could be more unsuited for employment⁴.

In Montaigne’s work teachers, focused on linguistic precision and providing instruction, seem to symbolise the type of school’s *detachment* from the everyday reality of the world. This looks similar to the currently oft-repeated accusation that the staff of the education system prepare pupils to “gather encyclopaedic knowledge”, and thus separate them from the realm of personal experience of the world. He claimed that: “They have learned the theory of everything: try and find one who can put it into practice”⁵.

³ M.de Montaigne, *The Complete Essays*, London 2003, p. 155.

⁴ *Ibidem*.

⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 157. See also: *ibidem*, p. 163, 182-183. “Our soul acts, directed solely by others’ authority, bound and given to others’ illusions, enslaved and subdued by the seriousness of their teaching. We are so much used to walk in the treadmill

The voice of the Renaissance humanist, despite the passage of time and civilizational changes, still sounds familiar, hence the assumption that what we are complaining about at present, given some weaknesses of school education, is not only relevant to the present time. Nor is the awareness of the school's mission, which Montaigne seems to include in the following statement: "the most vital thing is to awaken willingness and love; otherwise one produces fools only burdened with books [...]"⁶. These intuitions may be confirmed both in the writings of the precursors and leaders of the New Education movement active in the era of dominance of the ideology of Modernism, and in contemporary representatives of humanistically-oriented pedagogics, such as Benjamin M. Spock, Paulo Freire, Ivan Illich, Carl R. Rogers, Alice Miller, Marshall B. Rosenberg, and Henry A. Giroux⁷.

In his book published almost a century ago, *Democracy and Education*, John Dewey notes:

There is the standing danger that the material of formal instruction will be merely the subject matter of schools, isolated from the subject matter of life-experience. [...] Those which have not been carried over into the structure of social life, but which remain largely matters of technical information expressed in symbols, are made conspicuous in schools⁸.

Recognizing reflective experience as the fundamental component of effective education, Dewey expected that its conscious use in the processes of upbringing and education would not only result in the integration of theory with practice, school space with social space, but also in the alignment of the school curriculum with the student's inner world. In the second half of the 20th century, a similar concept of personally-centred teaching was developed by Carl R. Rogers. Opposing traditional school education, i.e. the one which "There is no place for whole persons in the educational system, only for their intellects" with the concept of education aimed at a holistic development of the human person, i.e. one thanks to which "the learning tends to be deeper, proceeds at a more rapid rate, and is more per-

that we are no longer able to walk freely; our power and our freedom are gone [...]" (ibidem, p. 132).

⁶ Ibidem, p. 152.

⁷ See K. Sośnicki, *Rozwój pedagogiki zachodniej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku*, Warszawa 1967; B. Śliwerski, *Współczesne nurty i teorie wychowania*, Kraków 2010.

⁸ J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, New York 2009, p. 8.

vasive in the life”⁹, he expected its effects to be both the merger of the pupil’s passion, feeling and intellect and his or her school and extracurricular experience.

Despite repeated criticism and recurring demands for change, the problem seems to be still present in the late modern era. The pupil, his world of experiences and experiences connected with social reality and school education function as *detached* from one another. However, this is not the only dimension in which the claim made in the title takes on meaning.

2.

One can moreover refer to “schools *detached* from reality” also in the sphere of organization. Analyses offered by Max Weber at the close of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th one about the expansion of bureaucracy, so characteristic of modernity, ushered in studies on the impact of this kind of organizational changes on the process of school upbringing and education. From this perspective, when teachers become officials of an institution managed in a modern manner, they are subject in their work to the same rules as other employees in other sectors of state administration, in private companies and the corporate world.

Weber identified several of the most important features specific to bureaucracies, such as: a clear hierarchy of power, formally codified rules of conduct and responsibilities defined for each position and level of functioning of the organization, permanent employment, fixed working hours and remuneration, separation of the domain of an official’s work from his personal life, property and private matters¹⁰. This type of order, on the one hand, promotes transparency, stability and predictability of the system. In this sense schools, just like factories operating at the mass production level, are subject to standardization, which enables long-term planning and quality control. Yet on the other hand, it generates oppositions and conflicts between what is general and what is individual, between the promoted and somewhat

⁹ C. R. Rogers, *A Way of Being*, New York 1995, p. 297, 300.

¹⁰ See M. Weber, “Bureaucracy”, [in:] M. Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1978, p. 956-1005; R. Sennett, “Bureaucracy”, [in:] R. Sennett, *The Culture of the New Capitalism*, Yale 2007, p. 15-83.

rigid and limited offer and the intrinsically unstable group and individual aspirations, between the statics of the institution and the dynamics of life, between predictability and the need to evolve and adapt to changing conditions and needs, between the sustainability of the organization and the tasks for which it was originally set up, between procedure and exception, security and creativity, formal education and learning, etc.

The antinomies generated by the institutional order survived modernity and became one of the main causes of the crisis of the ideologies of modernism, determining the directions of development of western societies¹¹. However, before it happened, it was widely accepted that the inability to remove contradictions or resolve conflicts was a temporary weakness of the time of social transformation. It was widely accepted that the search for the right proportions and equilibrium of the system carried out by researchers and philosophers is coming to an end, and that the numerous changes in the organization of institutions and the social division of labour made by politicians and social engineers signify civilizational progress¹². The same happened in the field of education, as evidenced, for example, by the concepts, utopias and educational practice of numerous reformers and alternative centres operating at the turn of the twentieth century¹³.

These contradictions and their effects can be related to the functioning of a school and at the same time define the conditions of its policy, as a result of which it was necessary to achieve internal consolidation and separation of the sphere of the educational system, including its specific institutions, from other social spheres. However, separation is not the same as detachment, although - importantly - it enables it to a large extent. The formation and separation of institutions, the definition of their borders and domains is symptomatic of modernism, striving for the ideal of a well-ordered society, while *detachment* in this case should be understood as a side effect of the social transformation process initiated as early as the Enlightenment.

¹¹ See A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, Cambridge 2004; Z. Bauman, *Legislators and Interpreters*, Cambridge 1989; Z. Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, Cambridge 2000.

¹² See W. Lepenies, "Lęk a nauka", [in:] W. Lepenies, *Niebezpieczne powinowactwa z wyboru*, Warszawa 1996, p. 32-51; A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity*, op. cit., p. 1-54.

¹³ See S. Sztobryn, "Pedagogika Nowego Wychowania", [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, vol. 1, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, Warszawa 2006, p. 278-292.

The working environment of modern officials, dominated by bureaucratic rules, was conducive to the formation of patterns and criteria for assessing behaviour, which would guarantee the required optimal efficiency achieved within the imposed framework of action. Inspired by the research conducted by the Weber brothers, in his book published in the 1940s *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, Karl Mannheim called this type of efficiency a functional rationality and defined as follows:

a series of actions is organized in such a way that it leads to a previously defined goal, every element in this series of actions receiving a functional position and role. Such a functional organization of a series of actions will, moreover, be at its best when, in order to attain the given goal, it co-ordinates the means most efficiently. It is by no means characteristic, however, of functional organization in our sense that this optimum be attained or even that the goal itself be considered rational as measured by a certain standard¹⁴.

Of course, it is not that this type of action occurred with the emergence of an industrial society. This is, as Mannheim explained, rather a difference in degree:

The more industrialized a society is and the more advanced its division of labour and organization, the greater will be the number of spheres of human activity which will be functionally rational and hence also calculable in advance. Whereas the individual in earlier societies acted only occasionally and in limited spheres in a functionally rational manner, in contemporary society he is compelled to act in this way in more and more spheres of life¹⁵.

Adaptation to bureaucratic rules is not tantamount to their internalization. Still, the long-term impact of the environment has socialization value, is not limited to the acquisition by an official of a routine and relevant habits but leads to significant changes in personality and adoption of particular attitudes. Mannheim addresses these changes briefly as follows:

Modern society attains perhaps its highest stage of functional rationalization in its administrative staff, in which the individuals who take part not only have their specifications prescribed – this sort of rationalization of tasks may possibly be more advanced in the Taylorization of workers in an industrial plant – but in addition have their life-plan to a large extent

¹⁴ K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*. *Studies in Modern Social Structure*, London 1960, p. 53.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 55.

imposed in the form of a 'career', in which the individual stages are specified in advance. Concern with a career requires a maximum of self-mastery since it involves not only the actual processes of work but also the prescriptive regulation both of the ideas and feelings that one is permitted to have and of one's leisure time¹⁶.

As evidenced by the study of both the overt and hidden school curriculum, the mechanisms and processes observed by Mannheim have found and continue to find their realizations also in education¹⁷. Both teachers and students adapt to the bureaucratic rules, thus giving them priority not only over the objectives for which the institution or a specific unit was created, but also over their own aspirations and potential. In the act of adapting to the rules of the school, they internalise the existing order and accept it as their own.

According to Erich Fromm, this state of affairs is symptomatic for the process of alienation of contemporary man and should be blamed principally on modern bureaucracies¹⁸. According to Fromm, who merged the theories of Marx and Freud, in the process of alienation, a person loses contact with his/her own needs and development potential, and at the same time succumbs to external strength, amplifying it with his/her work and devotion, which in consequence leads to personality disorders. As he explains:

In the widest sense, every neurosis can be considered an outcome of alienation; this is because neurosis is characterized by the fact that one passion (for instance, for money, power, women, etc.) becomes dominant and separated from the total personality, thus becoming the ruler of the person. This passion is his idol to which he submits even though he may rationalise the nature of his idol and give it many different and often well-sounding names. He is ruled by a partial desire, he transfers all he has left to this desire, he is weaker the stronger 'it' becomes. He has become alienated from himself precisely because 'he' has become the slave of a part of himself¹⁹.

¹⁶ Ibidem, p. 56. In this context it is worth mentioning Erving Goffman's research and the theory of total institutions, which seem to correspond and at the same time illustrate the theses put forward by Mannheim (see E. Goffman, *Asylums. Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*, London 2017).

¹⁷ See R. Moore, "Socjologia edukacji", [in:] *Pedagogika*, vol. 2, ed. B. Sliwerski, Gdańsk 2006, p. 317-459; M. J. Szymański, *Studia i szkice z socjologii edukacji*, Warszawa 2000, p. 100-162; W. Żłobicki, *Ukryty program w edukacji. Między niewiedzą a manipulacją*, Kraków 2002.

¹⁸ See E. Fromm, "Alienation", [in:] E. Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, New York 1961, p. 43-58; E. Fromm, "On Disobedience as a Psychological and Moral Problem", [in:] E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, New York 1981, p. 16-23.

¹⁹ E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud*, London 2017, p. 73-74. "In the Marxist system, by alienation is meant a mode of expe-

The concept of alienation proposed by Fromm may foster understanding of a certain type of dependence on institutions, creating conditions for seeking answers to the question why some students and teachers – the longer they stay within the educational system, the more they find it difficult to leave it in order to exist and cope independently in other areas of social life. According to the interpretation of the alienation process adopted by Fromm, school requires students and teachers to develop the ability to operate in the conditions of a specific form of organization, at the same time separating them from their proper needs and development potential, thus weakening them and subordinating them to an external force. Moreover, it separates them from other spheres of social life, which are characterized by different properties and require different skills, competences and knowledge from the people who engage in them. In short, the more subordinated a student and the more engaged to optimally meet his or her school requirements and expectations, the more alienated and weakened internally they are, and the more he or she feels as a stranger to himself or to the outside world. As a consequence, alienation increases distance.

The effect observed in the above-mentioned studies on education seems to be in line with the observation made by Robert Merton, another sociology classic, on the dysfunctionality of modern bureaucracy²⁰. Lack of flexibility of officials and avoidance of basing decisions on one's own judgements, resulting from the habit of adhering to established rules, may make the organization somehow sabotage the realization of its own goals. Moreover, it may be unable to react to cases requiring special treatment and care. Such dysfunctionality is an acute problem for the functioning of the educational system in accordance with humanistic values. It is also an argument in favour of the assertion presented in the title.

When talking about “schools *detached* from reality” in organizational terms, another important factor should also be taken into account, which has already been mentioned in a way. The coherence of the

rience in which the person experiences himself as an alien, whose acts and their consequences have become his masters, whom he obeys” (E. Fromm, *The Sane Society*, New York 1955, p. 120).

²⁰ See R.K. Merton, “Bureaucratic Structure and Personality”, [in:] R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, New York 1968, p. 249-261; S. Czepiński, “Przyczynę w sprawie klasycznej teorii biurokracji: Robert King Merton i Max Weber”, *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska* 2004, vol. XI, p. 237-243.

internal structure, coordination of stakeholders and activities, as well as orientation and regulation of the dynamics of the educational system and its individual institutions depends on their educational ideology²¹. Awareness of the impact and nature of this factor, as Zvi Lamm emphasizes, did not play a major role in the educational spheres of traditional society, but gained in importance in modernity²². It determines the legitimacy of the order established for a given educational space, its uniqueness and specificity, as well as the policies and directions pursued within it. In modern societies, in contrast to traditional ones, the reconstruction of the whole social order, including the educational one, required in each case the adoption of an ideal, setting goals and creating a project that would meet the criterion of progressiveness - elimination of risk and superstition and improvement and, consequently, change for the better. However, more than once its implementation triggered unexpected side-effects, which were contrary to expectations. It was often acknowledged after some time that the new reality deviates from the initial project assumptions and that such a state of affairs is often due to the deficiencies of the project itself, which distorts the envisaged ideal. It was assumed that it was not the ideal that needed to be corrected, but rather the project and the way it was implemented. According to Fromm, who writes about the tasks of social criticism, only the distortion of the ideal, rather than the ideal itself, is an ideology; in this sense, unlike in this article, he applies a valorising concept of ideology: "Criticism is not to denounce ideals but to demonstrate how they transform into ideologies and to criticise ideology in the name of a betrayed ideal"²³. In other words, the "betrayed ideal" should be regarded as one of the factors contributing to "schools being *detached* from reality". This seems to be borne out, too, by Bogusław Śliwerski's diagnosis about the reasons for the aspirations of a few generations of educators to create alternative schools and educational projects:

²¹ See Z. Lamm, "Ideologies and Educational Thought", [in:] *Psychology and Counseling in Education*, ed. D. Bar-Tal, Jerusalem 1986, p. 19-50; M. J. Szymański, "Ideologie edukacyjne", [in:] M. J. Szymański, *Studia i szkice z socjologii edukacji*, op. cit., p. 62-86; G. L. Gutek, "Ideology and Education", [in:] G. L. Gutek, *Philosophical and Ideological Perspectives on Education*, Needham 1997, p. 166-193.

²² See Z. Lamm, "Ideologies and Educational Thought", op. cit., p. 19.

²³ E. Fromm, "The Social Unconscious", [in:] E. Fromm, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion*, op. cit., p. 70-103. See E. Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, op. cit., p. 62-63.

The secret of [...] permanent reformatory ambitions stems not only from 'wishful thinking', i.e. the ideology of pedagogical individualism, neo-romanticism or the pedagogy of resistance, but also from the need, more and more strongly felt by the broadly understood educators, to abandon depersonalizing educational structures and practices in favour of real rather than declarative humanization of these processes²⁴.

The experience of the dissonance between the way the school operates and the ideals that guide it does not necessarily lead the educators to reject the latter, but in many cases it becomes an important impulse for them to find a way to implement it and to connect the school with the reality of everyday life around it.

Like Montaigne, who writes about traditional society, teachers focusing their own and their students' attention on theories of reality, abstract and thus move away from reality and their personal experiences. In modern institutions this distance is enlarged by the fact that they tend to submit to the forms and schemes appropriate to the institution in accordance with the way educational processes are organised. Moreover, by internalizing the imposed order, they risk alienation from students' expectations, goals and tasks of humanism, as well as their own aspirations and needs. If one considers that the teacher's involvement in the educational relationship with pupils and the creation of optimal conditions for their development plays a fundamental role in the process of school learning, one can see in the above trends the beginnings of the process of teachers' and pupils' distancing themselves from external and internal reality, but also more broadly - schools that are detached from the reality of everyday life, Husserl's *Lebenswelt*.

3.

There is one more aspect of "schools being *detached* from the reality of everyday life". although the phenomenon seems unique for the late modern era, its sources must actually be sought in the preceding period. In order to skilfully grasp the unique character of this *detachment*, we may return to Karl Mannheim's reflections on bureaucracy and stability of the social structure.

Mannheim assumed that social order may be at risk due to the disproportion between the progress of technological and natural

²⁴ B. Śliwerski, "Pedagogika alternatywna", [in:] *Pedagogika*, vol. 4, ed. B. Śliwerski, Gdańsk 2010, p. 447.

sciences and the incomparable development of knowledge about social and moral forces, which are unequally distributed among different social groups and classes. While traditional societies, as he believed, could afford some degree of disparity and imbalance in the integration of their structures, the growing democratization and complexity of the division of labour in modern Western societies, and with it the growing and increasing interdependence of individual elements and individuals on one another and on the whole as such, necessitates a control of the overall process based on rational and moral criteria, and the equitable distribution of mental and moral dispositions in social structure²⁵. The emergence of numerous small tensions, which, in principle, would not have an impact on the stability of the functioning of traditional societies, in the context of modern consolidation of the social structure gains a previously inaccessible potential for influencing the state and functioning of other elements of it. In other words, because of the close interdependence and the numerous links between the various factors that make up society and the actions of individuals and groups, the effects of even small shifts in the various parts of society's structure occur in a way that is difficult to predict and control and affect the entire society. The network of dependencies is so compact, complex and multifaceted that, according to Mannheim, it resonates easily at even a slight vibration within any social space. Therefore, the prevention of such tensions and disorderly displacements requires a stricter control of behaviour on the part of particular individuals. Functional rationalization in this case is not an adequate reaction to this type of interference. It does not suppress it. At the same time, Mannheim noticed that the form internalized by the individual is not the last stage of the rationalization process. As he says:

self-rationalization [...] it so far does not represent the most radical form of the rationalization of the acting subject. Reflection and self-observation, as distinguished from sheer self-rationalization, are an ever more radical form of it²⁶.

The reflectiveness of the subject, about which Mannheim wrote, becomes in this case a necessary component of participation in heterogeneous social spaces, so that the individual is able to mitigate the

²⁵ See K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, op. cit., p. 42-44. See also: K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York 1954, p. 1-48.

²⁶ K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, op. cit., p. 56.

tensions resulting from the unsynchronised displacements generated by the transforming individual institutions and social segments, which are independent of each other and according to their own internal logic. In the 1980s, Ulrich Beck drew attention to this problem, recognizing that this is the dominant late modernity trend which, in his opinion, creates the formation of a “risk society”²⁷. He pointed out that risks and threats cannot be removed by existing methods, i.e. by reforming and transforming the inherited institutions, since these reforms alone are the cause and transmission of further tensions within the social structure. In addition, they cannot be identified and assessed without recourse to expertise, which is itself responsible for generating risk, as it is neither certain nor static, but rather evolving and fragmented. Therefore, the most appropriate reaction of individuals is a declining confidence in institutions and the development of individual strategies for dealing with the contradictions and tensions of human collective organizations, for which reflective rationality seems to be essential²⁸. Beck is followed by Zygmunt Bauman: “one lives becomes a *biographical solution to systemic contradictions*”²⁹. While modernism retained faith in the legitimacy of the pursuit of the utopia of a well-ordered society, in which accidentally generated vibrations will threaten neither its stability nor the security of individuals, insofar as crisis situations are part and parcel of social life as its inextricable component to be managed to minimise or deliberately redistribute the effects of vibrations and tensions appearing in the social structure. In this sense, not only the individual, but also society as a whole should become reflective, so that in their emergence they can cushion the tensions created on the thresholds between relatively autonomous, evolving social spheres³⁰.

An example of such asynchronization and school’s *detachment* from social reality may be its relation to the labour market. The dynamics of this sphere has its own logic; the changes depend on current trends and technical possibilities and must respect consumers’ unstable needs and desires. Chance and risk cannot be ruled out. Similarly,

²⁷ See U. Beck, *Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*, Los Angeles 1992; A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Stanford 1991.

²⁸ See U. Beck, W. Bonss, Ch. Lau, “The Theory of Reflexive Modernization. Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme”, *Theory, Culture & Society* 2003, vol. 20; U. Beck, A. Giddens, S. Lash, *Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Cambridge 1994.

²⁹ Z. Bauman, *Liquid Modernity*, op. cit., p. 34.

³⁰ See U. Beck, A. Giddens, S. Lash, *Reflexive Modernization*, op. cit., p. 5-13, 112-119, 184-197.

the educational system has its own internal logic and dynamics, but the changes within it take place at a different pace, characteristic of this institution, thus creating an insurmountable gap. In other words, the school, using several-year periods of pre-planned education, is not able to reliably and exhaustively prepare students for active participation in the labour market, where trends not only cannot be predicted in advance, but occur in cycles of several months or even weeks (e.g. advancement of technical knowledge, the emergence of new professions and an atrophy of existing ones, changes in the employment structure, circulation of capital, relocation of production, migration, etc.).

This dimension of school's *detachment* from social reality can also be viewed from the perspective of criticism of ideology. First of all, the twilight of the era of "great narratives" did not bring about a decline in the demand for ideologies; the place of the powerful monopolists was taken by a number of different micro-stories and regional utopias. Democracy, human rights, rationalism, consumerism, postmodernism, technopoly, ecology, vegetarianism, paidocentrism, feminism, *laissez-faire*, corporations, Facebook, autonomy, state, further alter-globalism, Islam, Buddhism, Christianity, anarchy, race, nation, social justice, art, etc. - have become unconnected systems of orientation that mobilize action, each of which develops in a separate domain. Hence the image of a liberal democracy engaged in multiplying the common good of a citizen as modelled by the school is in conflict with the way in which students participate in civil society organizations, each of which legitimizes its actions by an ideology that is appropriate to its own group.

Secondly, as Zvi Lamm proves, the modern school, which was obliged to serve "three clients" with different, incompatible interests - society, culture and the individual - favoured the processes of socialization and acculturation in an attempt to reconcile the contradictions arising from the equal treatment and co-existence of these clients³¹. At the same time, experimental schools with a humanistic orientation, setting themselves in opposition to the tendencies dominating in education, opted for the priority of neglected individualism. The educational space of late modernity inherited this state of affairs, but a new era offered the Western society a ferment of the "revolution of subjects"³², with cultural plura-

³¹ See Z. Lamm, "Ideologies and Educational Thought", op. cit., p. 19-50.

³² See A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity*, op. cit.; A. Giddens, *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love, and Eroticism in Modern Societies*, Stanford 1992; Z. Melosik, T. Szkudlarek, *Kultura, tożsamość, edukacja. Migotanie znaczeń*, Kraków 1998; L. Witkowski, "Podmiot jako humanistyczne wyzwanie dla pedagogiki.

lity and extreme individualism being its two major reference points. As a consequence, this throws new light on the current role of orientations prevalent in the education system. In this sense school, subordinating education to the interests of society and culture, is not compatible with the everyday life of Western societies, in which the majority of people devote themselves to the politics of private life and group particularisms.

The content of the article does not exhaust the list of manifestations of “detachment of schools from reality”. Nevertheless, it is sufficient to justify the separation of its three historically shaped dimensions. They are different, but the processes taking place within them overlap, thus strengthening the ultimate effect of the gap created between the educational system and other social spheres and their practices. In the micro dimension, it is the gap appearing within individual experience, where school’s orientation on theory displaces the connection with everyday life and social practice. The organizational dimension of “detachment”, mezo, is related to the adopted form of institutionalization of the school, while macro - to the dynamics and consolidation of the social structure. We can try to eliminate the gap created in this way, looking for individual answers to the situation and counting on the effectiveness of the trial and error method. On the other hand, from the point of view of critical pedagogy, it seems much more important to ask what strategies and tactics - collective, individual and institutional - accompany the attempts to bridge the gap according to each of the distinguished dimensions? We can assume initially that there is no single line of action that would shorten the distance as much as possible in each of the indicated dimensions. Thus, the emerging sphere of research concerns the issue of how strategies and tactics enabling shortening the distance in one of its dimensions change the nature of the relationship between school and social reality in the other two aspects.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Bauman Z., *Legislators and Interpreters*, Polity Press, Cambridge 1989.
Bauman Z., *Liquid Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2000.

Przeciw skrajnym ‘podmiotowcom’”, [in:] L. Witkowski, *Edukacja wobec sporów o (po)nowoczesność*, Warszawa 1998, p. 127-140.

- Beck U., Bonss W., Lau Ch., "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization. Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme", *Theory, Culture & Society* 2003, vol. 20.
- Beck U., Giddens A., Lash S., *Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order*, Polity Press, Cambridge 1994.
- Beck U., *Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*, transl. M. Ritter, Sage Publications, Los Angeles 1992.
- Czepiński S., "Przyczynek w sprawie klasycznej teorii biurokracji: Robert King Merton i Max Weber", *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska* 2004, vol. XI.
- Dewey J., *Democracy and Education. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*, Feather Trail Press, New York 2009.
- Fromm E., "Alienation", [in:] E. Fromm, *Marx's Concept of Man*, Frederick Ungar Publishing, New York 1961.
- Fromm E., *Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx and Freud*, Bloomsbury, London 2017.
- Fromm E., "On Disobedience as a Psychological and Moral Problem", [in:] E. Fromm, *On Disobedience and Other Essays*, Seabury Press, New York 1981.
- Fromm E., *The Sane Society*, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., New York 1955.
- Giddens A., "Time, Space and Regionalisation", [in:] *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, ed. D. Gregory, J. Urry, Macmillan, London 1985.
- Giddens A., *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1991.
- Giddens A., *The Consequences of Modernity*, Polity Press, Cambridge 2004.
- Giddens A., *The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love, and Eroticism in Modern Societies*, Stanford University Press, Stanford 1992.
- Goffman E., *Asylums. Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*, Routledge, London 2017.
- Gutek G.L., "Ideology and Education", [in:] G.L. Gutek, *Philosophical and Ideological Perspectives on Education*, Allyn and Bacon, Needham 1997.
- Lamm Z., "Ideologies and Educational Thought", [in:] *Psychology and Counseling in Education*, ed. D. Bar-Tal, Ministry of Education, Jerusalem 1986.
- Lepeniec W., "Lęk a nauka", [in:] W. Lepeniec, *Niebezpieczne powinowactwa z wyboru*, transl. A. Zeidler-Janiszewska, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 1996.
- Mannheim K., *Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, transl. L. Wirth and E. Shils, Routledge and Kegan Paul, New York 1954.
- Mannheim K., *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction. Studies in Modern Social Structure*, transl. E. Shils, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London 1960.
- Melosik Z., Szkudlarek T., *Kultura, tożsamość, edukacja. Migotanie znaczeń*, Impuls, Kraków 1998.
- Merton R. K., "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality", [in:] R. K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, The Free Press, New York 1968.
- Montaigne M. de, *The Complete Essays*, transl. M.A. Screech, Penguin, London 2003.

- Moore R., "Socjologia edukacji", transl. A. Sulak et al., [in:] *Pedagogika*, vol. 2, ed. B. Śliwerski, GWP, Gdańsk 2006.
- Rogers C. R., *A Way of Being*, Houghton Mifflin, New York 1995.
- Sennett R., "Bureaucracy", [in:] R. Sennett, *The Culture of the New Capitalism*, Yale University Press, Yale 2007.
- Śliwerski B., "Pedagogika alternatywna", [in:] *Pedagogika*, vol. 4, ed. B. Śliwerski, GWP, Gdańsk 2010.
- Śliwerski B., *Współczesne nurty i teorie wychowania*, Impuls, Kraków 2010.
- Sośnicki K., *Rozwój pedagogiki zachodniej na przełomie XIX i XX wieku*, PZWS, Warszawa 1967.
- Sztobryn S., "Pedagogika Nowego Wychowania", [in:] *Pedagogika. Podręcznik akademicki*, vol. 1, ed. Z. Kwieciński, B. Śliwerski, PWN, Warszawa 2006.
- Szymański M. J., *Studia i szkice z socjologii edukacji*, IBE, Warszawa 2000.
- Weber M., "Bureaucracy", [in:] M. Weber, *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, transl. E. Fischoff et al., University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1978.
- Witkowski L., "Podmiot jako humanistyczne wyzwanie dla pedagogiki. Przeciwność skrajnym 'podmiotowcom'", [in:] L. Witkowski, *Edukacja wobec sporów o (po)nowoczesność*, IBE, Warszawa 1998.
- Żłobicki W., *Ukryty program w edukacji. Między niewiedzą a manipulacją*, Impuls, Kraków 2002.

Abstract:

Each institutionalized social practice, including school practice, is placed in a separate temporal, spatial and situational context appropriate for itself. In this way a distance is created between school education and social reality. This distance is changing under the influence of developments in the organization of schools and social practices. A number of studies reveal the negative effects of the increasing distance between school education and social practice. The aim of this paper is to show three dimensions in which the distance between school education and social reality is formed.

Keywords:

bureaucracy, experience, distance, school education, ideology, social practice, social realities, social structure

JACEK GULANOWSKI

University of Wrocław

NEW POLE IN NEW POLAND. UPBRINGING ACCORDING TO JAN STACHNIUK

Jan Stachniuk, a.k.a. “Stoigniew” (1905-1963) was a Polish thinker and publicist who created an original philosophical concept called by him and his followers “culturalism” or the “ideal of Zadruga”. His thought remained relatively unknown in the period of the Second Polish Republic, and in the period of the People’s Republic of Poland as it was purposefully forgotten and overlooked. A certain revival occurred in the Third Republic of Poland, when some Polish nationalist circles began to refer to culturalism. At the beginning of the 21st century, Polish researchers such as Bogumił Grott, Jan Skoczyński and Jarosław Tomasiewicz began to look into the works of Jan Stachniuk. Stachniuk’s thought is both attractive and difficult for researchers. Both of these features have the same source which is originality, resulting from Stachniuk’s thesis that Catholicism, or even Christianity, do not constitute the essence of the Polish identity. They are not even an addition to this identity, but actually contradict it and led to the distortion of the national character of Poles.

Stachniuk unceremoniously treats both Polish and European philosophical tradition. In his thoughts, he introduces superior categories, such as the opposition of culture and co-culture, which allow him to critically assess all other trends, social phenomena or historical events. This detachment from other philosophical schools makes the reconstruction of Stachniuk’s thoughts evolve into an original

interpretation of the researcher. And so Jan Skoczyński proposes to treat it as a specific form of gnosis¹, Bogumił Grott considers it to be one of the heterodoxical currents of Polish nationalism², Jarosław Tomaszewicz proposes a possible interpretation of Stachniuk's thoughts as Polish national bolshevism³, while Stanisław Potrzebowski shows its anti-communist character, and in the first version of his monograph he calls it the Polish volkist movement⁴. Zdzisław Słowiński and Mieczysław Cenin try to connect it with the concepts of Erich Fromm or with the revival of small communities in the global online village⁵, Tomasz Gabiś points to common threads in Stachniuk's thoughts and the post-colonial theory⁶, Gawęł Strządała links it with the German conservative revolution⁷, while Paweł Bielawski connects it with the ideas of the European New Right⁸.

“IDEAL OF ZADRUGA”: CULTURE AGAINST ANTI-CULTURE

The basis of Jan Stachniuk's thoughts is constituted by his vision of man, i.e. who he is and what role he plays in the world. As Stachniuk writes:

The fundamental property of man is the genius of creation, i.e. the ability to bind the elements of human psyche with the elements of nature in such a way that a new and mighty shape of power arises, which is subordinate to man. We could call it an element or genius in the reconstruction of the natural order of the world⁹.

This original vision of man leads to an original vision of humanism, which “is the creative momentum in man's nature, aiming at the com-

¹ See J. Skoczyński, *Negonoza polska*, Kraków 2004.

² See B. Grott, *Religia, cywilizacja, rozwój – wokół idei Jana Stachniuka*, Kraków 2003.

³ See J. Tomaszewicz, *Rewolucja narodowa: nacjonalistyczne koncepcje rewolucji społecznej w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, Warszawa 2012.

⁴ See S. Potrzebowski, *Słowiński ruch Zadruga*, Szczecin 2016.

⁵ See M. Cenin, Z. Słowiński, *Prawia – mit dziejotwórczy: systemowa teoria kultury*, Wrocław 2013.

⁶ See T. Gabiś, *Dwaj panowie S. o pożytkach z kolonizacji Polski*, 2014, <http://www.tomaszgabis.pl/2014/06/02/dwaj-panowie-s-o-pozytkach-z-kolonizacji-polski/> (access: 25.10.2018).

⁷ See G. Strządała, *Kulturalizm Jana Stachniuka, czyli rewolucja konserwatywna po polsku*, 2013, <https://konserwatyzm.pl/strzadala-kulturalizm-jana-stachniuka-czyli-rewolucja-konserwatywna-po-polsku/> (access: 25.10.2018).

⁸ See P. Bielawski, *Nowa Zadruga*, Wrocław 2016.

⁹ J. Stachniuk, *Człowieczeństwo i kultura*, Wrocław 1996, p. 10.

plete transformation of the natural order of the world into a new form of connected forces”¹⁰. The ultimate goal of man at the external level is to “control and subordinate all energy existing in the world to human beings”¹¹, whereas, at the internal level, the ultimate goal is to master the elements of our psyche, which will be the end of the creative evolution. Hence, “humanism is the task of complete reconstruction beyond the elements in man and nature”¹². According to Stachniuk, “humanity means transforming the world, perfecting it”, and “a resignation from this task is a resignation from the very essence of humanity”¹³.

The concepts of “man”, “humanity” and “humanism” are connected with another key term for the ideal of Zadruga, i.e. “culture”. According to Stachniuk, “Culture is precisely the process of reorganization of the natural order of the world, collecting elements and combining them according to a different pattern, thanks to which a new type of power subordinate to man is created”¹⁴. With regard to humanity “culture is the process of fulfilling our mission which consists in reorganizing the field of elements”¹⁵. Another important term is “creative will” or the power present in man and the world, inspired by the Nietzschean will for power. Culture is a growing creative will and its objectification in the cultural heritage of mankind¹⁶.

Stachniuk sees a tragic element in human life, the essence of which is the phenomenon of heroism, which he understands as “the tragic beauty of destroying the life substance of an individual in order to obtain creative values”¹⁷. According to Stachniuk, heroism consists in “overcoming the vegetation rollercoaster and sacrificial transformation of personality’s life into objective works of culture”¹⁸. It is the hero who sacrifices his biological life in order to create a cultural work that exists outside him that is the highest ideal of man, which man as an individual and mankind as a community should strive for¹⁹.

However, according to Stachniuk, both in man and in the world there is a force contrary to the will of creation. In man, it is a desire to

¹⁰ Ibidem, p. 12.

¹¹ Ibidem, p. 13.

¹² Ibidem.

¹³ Ibidem, p. 15.

¹⁴ Ibidem, p. 26.

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 28.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ Ibidem, p. 80.

¹⁸ Ibidem, p. 87.

¹⁹ Ibidem, p. 88-89.

escape from the task of taking control of the world and plunging into blissful vegetation²⁰. In the world, this is the opposite of culture, i.e. anti-culture. Anti-culture is a nihilistic aspiration to plunge into vegetation or emptiness, to transfer the purpose of human existence from the only existing world to some invented netherworlds. Stachniuk considers Christianity to be the highest stage of anti-culture, i.e. total anti-culture²¹. For Stachniuk, this dualistic conflict of culture and anti-culture constitutes the axis of human history, the key to the interpretation of events and phenomena both in the past and in the present²².

SLAVIC HERITAGE: ZADRUGA AND PAGANISM

Stachniuk considers the term “Zadruga” as meaning the original form of the Slavic family community. While Slavic history researchers do not share this view, the term “Zadruga” functions among the southern Slavs and means a community based on kinship and affinity ties that runs a farm together. It was precisely this idea of Zadruga that Serbian socialist Svetozar Marković referred to. He wanted to make Zadruga the basis of the reborn Serbian state and society²³. Accidental or non-accidental similarities between the concepts of Marković and Stachniuk remain an unexplored area.

Stachniuk perceived paganism in the same subservient way as the best known representative of Polish nationalism Roman Dmowski treated Catholicism, namely as an element and a tool subordinate to his idea. He believed that the so-called ethnic religions are one of the expressions of the creative will in the world, so he considered them to be subordinate to his vision of culture. This authorial understanding of culture allows him to critically analyze and evaluate various religions, a religion that is not ethnic allows him to evaluate and analyze culture. Stachniuk was an advocate of a naturalistic vision of religion, in which gods become personifications of various natural phenomena (sun, fire, rain, earth, vegetation cycle) as well as social phenomena (war, family, law, ethnic community). However, this is not merely atheistic reductionism, because Stachniuk sees something else, i.e. the creative will that

²⁰ See *ibidem*, p. 18-23.

²¹ See *ibidem*, p. 90-116.

²² See *ibidem*, p. 117-129.

²³ See E. Bujwid-Kurek, *Mysł polityczna i państwowo-ustrojowa Svetozara Markovića (1846-1875)*, Kraków 2000.

works in the universe, both in nature and in mankind. It is precisely the concept of will, the fullest expression of which is culture on a non-human level, that constitutes the essence of Stachniuk's pantheism.

New ideological projects are often accused of trying to take the place of religion in society, life of an individual or culture. The accusation of an attempt to create a new secular religion was raised against communism on the one hand by conservative thinkers and on the other, by those who themselves originated from the Marxist tradition (such criticism of Marxism is formulated, for example, by Leszek Kołakowski).

Such an accusation can also be formulated against Jan Stachniuk's thoughts. However, it should be noted that the author himself is perfectly aware of the religious dimension of his ideas. He not only openly admits this, but also turns it to the advantage of his concepts. Stachniuk believed that religious beliefs are natural for man and he cannot and should not give them up. Therefore, Stachniuk was convinced that no social and political system can survive without support in religion, which is why he aptly predicted the end of people's democracy in Poland. Stachniuk was an anti-Christian and anti-Catholic thinker (he also spoke negatively about other religions that he considered as anti-cultural, e.g. Buddhism). However, he was not an anti-religious thinker, it was the traditional ethnic religions that he considered as a naturalistic basis on which religion should be reborn in the form the ideal of Zadruga. Anti-Catholic and anti-Christian nationalism of Stachniuk is not as original against the background of European nationalism or Polish nationalism as it might seem. Polish nationalism, especially in its national-democratic version, was rooted in the positivist tradition, in which the understanding of man and his place in the world was determined more by social Darwinism than by catechism and encyclicals, and temporal goals related to the life of an individual as part of a national community were more important than the metaphysical perspective. One of the founding fathers of Polish national democracy, Zygmunt Balicki directly supported atheistic Darwinism against Christianity, and Roman Dmowski himself was at first close to such tendencies. Only at the end of his life did Dmowski recognize the greatness of Christianity as a universal philosophical concept. Before that, he treated Catholicism itself as well as the Catholic Church instrumentally, i.e. cultural Catholicism as one of the elements from which the identity of a new Pole can be built, and the Church as an institution that can be involved in organizational activities for the

promotion of this new national identity. It is worth mentioning, however, that the first editorial office and the first edition of *Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka* (*Thoughts of a modern Pole*) contained a large anticlerical and anti-Christian charges. Stachniuk himself referred directly to this tendency present in the thoughts of national democrats, and later he calls the rapprochement between Dmowski and the Catholic Church “an attack of the sacristy on Dmowski”. Hence Potrzebowski’s justified thesis that Stachniuk’s thought is a development of this early version of national-democratic thought²⁴.

UPBRINGING AND ITS ESSENCE ACCORDING TO JAN STACHNIUK

Stachniuk uses the term “upbringing” differently than it is accepted in contemporary pedagogical literature. He uses it to define the process of transmitting and shaping both values and knowledge and skills. Therefore, in Stachniuk’s terminology, “upbringing” means “education”, i.e. both upbringing and training.

According to Stachniak, upbringing “serves to maintain continuity”²⁵. As the author explains: “The institution responsible for upbringing, i.e. school in the first place, is oriented towards including a maturing individual in the continuity of the group’s life”²⁶. Here, however, a problem arises which is important for Stachniuk in further analysis of educational phenomena, namely what purpose this continuity is to serve. Upbringing may serve either to maintain the continuity of culture, i.e. including more and more individuals in the work of extending human control over the world²⁷.

Anti-culture can also utilise upbringing for its purposes: “There, the principles of continuity of the group are supposed to halt progress, to halt the development of culture, because the stagnation leads to the development of the disease. In such an environment, the upbringing authority is oriented towards the breeding of an ahistorical type of man, preserving the continuity of tradition as an end in itself. Other educational values are subordinated to this goal”²⁸. As Stachniuk

²⁴ See S. Potrzebowski, *Słowiański ruch Zadruga*, op. cit.

²⁵ J. Stachniuk, *Droga rewolucji kulturowej w Polsce*, Wrocław 2006, p. 49.

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ See ibidem, p. 49-51.

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 53.

concludes: "It is decisive what this group is like, whether it strives for developing culture to preserving ahistoricism"²⁹.

According to Stachniuk, upbringing consists of three elements, which constitute the subsequent stages of the upbringing process:

First, a) he is taught the most general principles, which are the norms of the worldview; then, b) he should develop innate abilities and forces, i.e. the efficiency of mind and body, general emotional dispositions namely courage, submission and discipline; and finally, c) he is equipped with social tools such as knowledge and skills. The basis of upbringing is the first factor: induction into the norms of the worldview³⁰.

Therefore, these elements have a hierarchical structure, the first one being the most important.

Upbringing occupies an important place in the ideology of the group, i.e. in the paradigm defining the life of a given society.

The mechanism of group ideology consists of such aspects as religious concepts and the system of organization of religious life (church), the educational system and its ideals (school, family, social environment), general ideas, living in a given environment, the content of national consciousness, the legal and moral system, language and its properties, literature, philosophy, art and science. Together they constitute a set of means of ideology of a group that reproduces a given cultural type with their help. Hence the consistency of the national character, which is not subject to any significant changes, although the background in which it exists i.e. the wave of emerging and disappearing generations is ever-changing³¹.

According to Stachniak, upbringing is omnipresent in the society and it determines the nature of man.

The educational system depends not only on education, but also on the family and the social environment. These circles are similar to machine tools that sculpt the adolescent generations. The basis of the educational system is to imagine the ideal of man, who is to be fulfilled in the flexible material of young minds. These ideals can be different, there as many worldviews as religious systems. For the worldview defines the essence of all things, the purpose of being, explains the meaning of life, its value and the system of life values in general. Educational ideals are a simple deduction of the worldview prevailing in a given group; they are realized by the school with its system, content of views and criteria, which are put into the soul of the child and the maturing individual. The family plays the same role. After all, parents are people who have been shaped by the

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ Ibidem, p. 54.

³¹ J. Stachniuk, *Dzieje bez dziejów: teoria rozwoju wewnętrznego Polski*, Wrocław 1990, p. 85.

same mould only a generation back, so they have a spiritual profile already formed and in their part, they can shape their children according to the same pattern. The social environment works on the basis of the same principles³².

Stachniuk outlines the following vision of the upbringing society:

The imposition of criteria and principles of group ideology takes place through countless suggestions from various authorities. The whole system is described as social education. In childhood, these functions are performed by parental authority, teachers, the elderly, institutions such as the church, the state, the social environment, and so on. The spiritual world of an individual, based on these principles, can develop, expand, but it can never violate the criteria on which it rests. The soul of an average individual is a system of values corresponding to a given group ideology. As such, it seems obvious and natural. Its justification is always connected with faith in a superhuman, absolute origin. The belief-oriented character of the value system provides a strong foundation for the whole worldview. In this way, everything can be evaluated according to the criteria that form the basis of a given worldview. Every act, action, desire, thing, relationship in the surrounding world is valued according to this scale of values that seem absolute³³.

Therefore, the group's ideology is dominant and total. It is the group that decides what kind of person an individual will be and permeates every aspect of social life.

DUALIST VISION OF EDUCATION

Stachniuk is very critical of upbringing in Poland, both in old and contemporary Poland. He presents the following negative vision of Polish upbringing.

The destructive work of the Polish upbringing system dates back to the 16th century. The systematic mutilation of generations, the constant production of a desperate type of man who surrounds us today, began when the ideal of a 'good Pole' was shaped. Before that it used to be different. Although upbringing was in the hands of the same dark powers, their range was limited. After all, the traditions of pagan naturalism, stored in beliefs, general norms, oral tradition, proverbs, peculiarities of language, etc., were not yet extinct. At one point, these traditions were joined by the European current of Renaissance and humanism, creating together the basis for the Reformation. The victory of the Catholic reaction undermined the possibility of further development. The seeds of Polish civilization

³² Ibidem, p. 85-86.

³³ Ibidem, p. 90.

were destroyed, the campfire was extinguished, which promised to be something equivalent to what was later created in Protestant countries. The suicidal work of the upbringing institution for the nation consists in consolidating in a living mass of generations a pathological model of a human being - a 'good Pole'³⁴.

Stachniuk criticizes the upbringing that took place in contemporary Poland in the period between the wars. He sees a problem, which he calls "the antinomy of Polish upbringing". The essence of this problem lies in the fact that "the principles of general upbringing, instilled into the psyche of a pupil, should release dispositions to develop general condition, once as the strength of mind and body, and further as a desire for knowledge and skills, in order to use them effectively in fruitful life activities"³⁵. Meanwhile,

at the basis of Polish upbringing we find tragic fission. A 'good Pole' is bred, that has an ahistoric personality, a definitely vegetative attitude, and at the same time he is given precise instruments for intensive, cultural activity. On the one hand, he is supposed to be an individual with a vegetative attitude to life, proud that he 'does not lose' his personality in pursuit of something, and on the other hand, equipped with agility and skills aimed at dynamism and momentum. The Polish education system works in both these mutually exclusive fields of study. It wants to preserve the traditional ideal of 'Polish identity' in the type of 'good Pole', and at the same time equip him with the skills and skills of character mind, so that he can defend and protect his own inefficiency with these tools. He wants to be able to withstand the living pace of work and life using rich means³⁶.

As Stachniuk writes "the educational ideals of Polish group ideology are identical to those of Catholicism. These, in turn, are anchored in the ideals of Judaism"³⁷. Stachniuk considers these in turn to be nihilistic as anchored in the imaginary supernatural world, distracting man from the transformation of the world in accordance with his will, and thus as the embodiment of anti-culture. So

the educational system as a whole had to stifle everything that in the nature of a biologically normal Pole was an expression of the creative attitude. Throttling innate drives must be combined with overcoming a certain resistance. Creative attitudes pushed into the underworld of consciousness had to exert pressure, creating the spiritual state of restless tension³⁸.

³⁴ J. Stachniuk, *Droga rewolucji kulturowej w Polsce*, Wrocław 2006, p. 48.

³⁵ *Ibidem*.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 49.

³⁷ J. Stachniuk, *Dzieje bez dziejów*, op. cit, p. 90.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 91.

Stachniuk considers the baptism of Poland as the first turning point in the history of Poland. Unlike most historians or thinkers, Stachniuk perceives it as a negative turn. He claims that the original beliefs of the Slavs (which he calls 'the Slavic naturalistic myth') were the first stage of the group's ideology development in Poland and a good starting point for further development of the Polish nation. However, from the moment of baptism Christianization began, combined with the growing presence of the Catholic Church in Poland. At that time, the church was the most important institution promoting culture. There was a reaction against this anti-cultural tendency, i.e. the Reformation, which had a superficially Christian character, but in its essence was an expression of the struggle between culture and anti-culture. However, there was another turning point in the history of Poland, which, according to Stachniuk, was the Counter-Reformation:

the Church, taking advantage of this opportunity, decides to make the whole Poland Catholic. Using the nobility as a faithful tool, it quickly embraced the nervous centres of the nation. By conquering the educational system completely and basing it on its personalistic ideals, through school, family and the environment it fills the spiritual world of an individual with its content, and imposes its criteria of understanding the essence of being³⁹.

Stachniuk considers Jesuit upbringing to be the purest and most dangerous form of this victory of anti-culture in Poland. For him it is the opposite of Zadruga upbringing and a total implementation of the ideal of anti-cultural upbringing.

According to Stachniuk, since the triumph of Counter-Reformation, as a result of e.g. subordinating upbringing to the Catholic Church, Poles have become a nation professing the anti-cultural ideology of the group. Therefore, he ambivalently perceives the actions of the invaders in the territories of the former Polish Republic. On the one hand, they fought Polish identity. On the other hand, they tried (at least in the Prussian partition) to free upbringing from the catholic influence and to educate people who may no longer consider themselves Poles, but who will lose many negative qualities of a Pole-Catholic. Stachniuk is extremely critical of the reborn Poland, of the Second Polish Republic, where the Catholic Church has regained most of its influence and is still trying to strengthen its position, among other things by seeking to take control of the educational system.

³⁹ Ibidem, p. 85.

RENAISSANCE OF POLISH UPBRINGING

However, Stachniuk sees the solution to this tragic situation from the perspective of the ideology of Zadruga. It is a turn towards culture and a foundation for the rebirth of both the Polish state and the Polish nation, which will result in the rebirth of the Polish upbringing.

As Stachniuk writes,

the antinomy of Polish upbringing can only be overcome in one case: when we get rid of the traditional core of Polish identity, which in the form of the enslaving ideal of vegetative individualism is passed down from generation to generation. What we consider to be the essence of Polish historical individuality must be destroyed in order to clear the area for the development of another one, now suppressed, but really Polish, creative and humanistic individuality. If we expel vegetative individualism from the Polish educational ideal, we will severely injure the appropriate ideomatrix organ. Only the impulse of continuity of tradition and a part of instrumental education will remain at our disposal. In turn, what is the core of upbringing, general principles, must be reinstalled⁴⁰.

According to Stachniuk, a cultural ideal should be replaced by an anti-culture upbringing ideal.

The model of the capable, creative Pole should be enthroned. The differences between him and a 'good Pole' must be the same as they exist between an a-historical personality, even armed with perverse instrumentalism, and a heroic personality. The model of a Pole should have the attributes of a heroic personality. They cannot hang up in the air. Hence the postulate that individual's emotional attitudes should be ingrained in a given historical context. The latter focuses on particular difficulties. These are issues related to the inclusion of the creative will of a given individual in the stream of life under construction. There are no such difficulties in anti-culture, which gets rid of them through an act of simple negation⁴¹.

Stachniuk also presents his vision of the revival of Polish upbringing in the spirit of Zadruga ideology.

The healing process should be expressed in the transformation of world-view norms in the creative and cultural spirit, in the creation of positive patriotism, which is in complete opposition to the group consciousness of the Jesus-Mary followers, and in the reconstruction of literature. Based on experiencing the world, which is typical for heroic personality, each of these fields will become something completely different than they currently are. This is where the creative educational ideal will emerge, which the institution of the school will multiply in millions⁴².

⁴⁰ J. Stachniuk, *Droga rewolucji kulturowej w Polsce*, op. cit., p. 32.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, p. 33.

⁴² *Ibidem*.

Above all, therefore, there must be a total change in the basic content, i.e. general content. As Stachniuk writes,

the content of general education must be the subject of revision in the first place. The radical transformation of the content of general education, apart from the expulsion of anti-culture, consists in the development of a new ideal of man, consistent with the spirit of the forming community. We could arbitrarily call this new creation the ideal of a constructive Pole, as it will be a denial of the 'good Pole' we already know. The appearance of the constructivist model of a Pole is simply a revolutionary change, turning the stream of social evolution in a completely new direction. This is the starting point for a fundamental change⁴³.

The creation of a new upbringing will mark a turning point in the history not only of Poland, but of the whole world.

Developing a model of a new upbringing organ will be a breakthrough in the history of spiritual culture, and not only in Poland. The giant body of mankind, in its overwhelming mass, is affected by the same disease in most parts of the globe. The conscious overcoming it in some small, even the smallest section is an introduction to the global upheaval. It will be the beginning of a human revolution, the beginning of an avalanche, opening up prospects for a truly revolutionary new and wonderful world⁴⁴.

THE STATE AND UPBRINGING

On the basis of Stachniuk's declarations, it can be concluded that in his opinion the key role in upbringing is played by public education (here also understood as an educational system).

Man will behave and act as society has taught him through public education, norms of opinion, ideas and models from environment. With this apparatus, countless millions of individuals can recover from stagnation and stillness. Without it, millions of these individuals can easily turn into a frozen density of rotting biological and mental energy, unnecessary to anyone, completely helpless in their abandonment⁴⁵.

Upbringing in the Zadruga state would have a state character. It is worth emphasizing that Stachniuk, when describing the Zadruga state, devotes most attention to the ideology that will prevail in it. Little does he write about the state apparatus itself; however, he points out that the state would cover all spheres of life of society and individuals, and

⁴³ Ibidem, p. 34.

⁴⁴ Ibidem, p. 65.

⁴⁵ J. Stachniuk, *Zagadnienie totalizmu*, Wrocław 1990, p. 48.

that all aspects of social life would be educational in nature, thus striving to convey and strengthen the Zadruga ideology of the group that prevails in it⁴⁶.

According to Stachniuk, the state has a duty to take on the task of educating citizens:

Similarly, in the social and organizational field, the state is an exponent of man as a whole, it gives a system of means of realization, destroying a specific ideal that serves to intensify life. It must therefore, make it possible to educate a complete man; it must create the social conditions from which the higher moral, volitional and mental types of individuals result in order to arm the nation to effectively fight against the resistance of the biophysical environment⁴⁷.

The Zadruga vision of state upbringing is a total vision, according to which upbringing covers all stages and aspects of human and social life and this upbringing ultimately shapes a person. In the book *Zagadnienie totalizmu (The Issue of Totalism)* Stachniuk quite accurately presents his vision of upbringing in the state.

The first place should be given to public education. The achievements in this area are enormous. Millions of children immediately after leaving the cradle find themselves in a system that forms their personality from the very beginning. The universality of teaching, its range and complexity of pedagogical means, exploit every area of the emotional element. Public education is nowadays an incredibly powerful lever for extracting the latent potential of an individual. It can serve any value, any idea when it becomes the centre of political disposition. The apparatus of public education is such a flexible instrument that it can multiply the worldview model imposed on it in millions of copies, i.e. emotional behaviours, criteria of good and evil, the model of everyday life behaviour, etc. Political battles and revolutions will be fiercely fought for this authority in the future. Controlling it allows you to cultivate the soil of the collective soul as you want. The prevalence of teaching means that millions of mentalities of the growing generation are formed in a specific, uniform way. This determines the commonness of collective perceptions, the uniformity of reactions, the common goals and aspirations, the uniformity of collective individuality, such as nations. If in the ancient past a man had to fight brutally for a woman, because it was a condition for the extension of his biological type, through his offspring, then a similar situation will be characteristic for the ideals of civilization, fighting for the right to maintain and develop through the authority over public upbringing. The control over the system of educational means is a source of power and survival of certain ideals of the worldview⁴⁸.

⁴⁶ See *ibidem*, p. 132-136.

⁴⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 24.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 45-46.

SUMMARY

The vision of education, according to Jan Stachniuk is of a dual character, just like all of his concepts. On the one hand, he creates a vision of negative education, anti-cultural one, which led to the downfall of Poland and Poles and which stalls them in this downfall. This education is identified with a Christian model of upbringing, especially the catholic or the Jesuit one that despite advancing secularization of the state and society is still an ideal of upbringing realized by the official education system. He also negatively perceives the then, but contemporary to him, tendencies in the catholic thought, i.e. the philosophy of personalism which in the past was an expression of the cultural rebellion against catholic anti-culture, but eventually gave in to anti-cultural tendencies themselves. He also negatively evaluates secular upbringing, which he merely considers a secularized version of the catholic upbringing, i.e. an anti-culture without metaphysical basis.

On the other hand, a vision of positive education emerges, the cultural education of Zadruga which will lead to the rebirth of Poland and Poles. This is the upbringing which will foster the creative will and that will encourage people to make a heroic effort to fulfil their task, i.e. to aim for the total control of man over the world. Thus the cultural revolution in Poland will occur through the revolution in upbringing, which will result in the establishment of the state of Zadruga, whose main task will be to educate a new Pole according to the Zadruga ideal of upbringing.

In the Zadruga concept of education, upbringing supersedes educating. The upbringing (connected with fostering the faith in the ideal of Zadruga, among the next generation) embodies the ultimate goal of education. This new Zadruga man is supposed to dominate the world through his knowledge of science and technology, but the path of development both as an individual, as part of a community, the national community as such and, finally, humanity, is defined by the ideal of Zadruga. The upbringing here has a religious character, but in the specific, original understanding of religion. It is a 'secular mysticism', a sense of unity with the creative will that fills the universe and its realization through heroism, both at the individual and community level, through creativity and participation in the biological life of the community, because according to Stachniuk, only through his deeds and through his offspring can a person secure immortality for himself.

An attempt to inscribe Stachniak's thoughts in the system of coordinates organizing contemporary upbringing currents may be interesting. According to these criteria of analysis, the second-best concept of upbringing is a concept that assumes striving for a radical change of consciousness, which is supposed to lead to a radical social change. According to Stachniuk consciousness defines existence and culture governs politics, which is close to the metapolitical concepts of the European New Right. However, it should be stressed that the European New Right is definitely anti-totalitarian in nature. Meanwhile, Stachniuk, despite the fact that he separates himself from the 20th-century totalitarianisms and criticises them thoroughly, creates a vision of the Zadruga state, which is definitely total in nature. The most total, however, is the vision of ubiquitous ideology permeating every aspect of individual and social life, and thus the vision of total state upbringing, which can freely and fully shape a new human being.

According to the traditional classification of the currents of pedagogy made by Stefan Wołoszyn, the Zadruga concept of upbringing would be one of the currents of ideological pedagogy alongside national, nationalist or religious pedagogy. Interestingly, Stachniuk's vision is close to all three of these pedagogy trends. It is certainly a vision of nationalist pedagogy, but it goes against the mainstream of Polish nationalism. It is a religious pedagogy, but it opposes all contemporary religions. And it is a pedagogy which claims to become a new national pedagogy. However, it is contrary to the most common understanding of the essence of Polish identity and the nation itself.

The leading role of culture in the Zadruga ideology makes it possible to compare the current concept of upbringing with the pedagogy of culture. And indeed, similarities can be seen here, such as the slogans of the ultimate goal of upbringing as the inclusion of man in the process of creating culture, or upbringing through culture and for culture. Stachniuk even refers to the works of Bogdan Suchodolski, although he does it in a selective and instrumental way. It should be emphasized that the vision of culture expressed by Stachniuk is different from the vision of culture educators. For Stachniuk, culture does not have a universal character, but a national one, the issues of contemplation and aesthetics are subordinated to the issues of deed and heroism. And most importantly, Stachniuk strongly rejects Christian values, also in their secularized version: lay and humanistic.

Although the ideology of Zadruga aims at becoming an official state ideology and taking over the cultural hegemony, and then a total change of the paradigm of both individual and collective thinking, it is now an alternative idea to the official ideology of upbringing. However, it does not resonate with other alternative concepts, which most often arise from anti-authoritarian approaches and seek to reduce the state's control over education and to liberalise education itself. On the contrary, Stachniuk demands an increased state control over education (or, according to his terminology, upbringing). It should be stressed, however, that the state mentioned here will first be reconstructed in accordance with the ideas adopted by Stachniuk.

Stachniuk, when considering the problem of education (in his understanding upbringing), takes into account the institutional aspect, i.e. school at all levels, including higher education. He also touches upon the issue of the so-called youth organizations, i.e. the scouting popular in his time or other institutions relating to similar methods of upbringing through activity, such as the Soviet Union Pioneer Organization or German Hitlerjugend. A certain paradox appears here. Stachniuk appreciates the role of culture as a paradigm defining how an individual and the whole society thinks and acts. This is a paradigm difficult to grasp, not always open, requiring deep reflection and insightful analysis. However, when it comes to analysing the very mechanism of sharing culture or integrating it into culture through upbringing, Stachniuk analyzes only its institutional aspect, ignoring the role of non-institutional or informal factors. His recipe for a change of education is similar. It is not about creating an alternative institution to the world system, which he considers to be anti-cultural, or the implementation of education consistent with the idea of Zadruga education, outside the institution of school. The aim is to seize power in the state and thus, take control over the educational system, which this time will operate in accordance with the Zadruga ideology.

Taking into account Stachniuk's ambitious goals, such as the implementation of the cultural revolution in Poland, the transformation of the whole cultural ideomatrix, the total reorganisation of Polish society and the Polish state, he pays surprisingly little attention to the specific means of implementing this project, including the education itself. Like critical educators, Stachniuk believes that education has led to the current negative state of affairs and is now serving

the status quo, but only education can lead to a change in the future. Nevertheless, it only sets the general objective of this revolutionary education, specific objectives must be developed by the reader himself. The vision of cultural revolution created by Stachniuk assumes establishing the elite of a nation, which then adheres to the ideas of Zadruga and as a result of its actions, masses of people are activated, followed by the seizure of cultural and political power in the state. The environment of 'Zadruga' was supposed to be this new elite, but it failed. The Zadruga followers who succeeded in the People's Republic of Poland did so at the cost of abandoning their ideals and subordinating themselves to the system.

CONCLUSION

Jan Stachniuk's thought is full of paradoxes. For instance, he acts against the right and left, against conservatives and liberals, for a planned economy and rapid modernization, but against the Soviet communism, for total subordination of an individual to the collective in the new state, but against totalitarianism, for the supreme role of religion in social life, but against the church. It is related to the originality of its concept in all aspects. This originality and these paradoxes are also present in the vision of Zadruga upbringing. It is religious upbringing, albeit according to the original understanding of religion, which is alternative to the official one. It is pedagogy of culture, but according to the original understanding of culture, which is alternative to the official one. It is also national and Polish upbringing, but according to the original understanding of the nation, nationalism and Polish identity, which is alternative to the official one. Stachniuk himself describes his vision as 'humanistic', but it is a specifically understood humanism, resulting from his original vision of man and humanity. Regardless of the assessment of the value of Jan Stachniuk's works, the researchers emphasize the originality of his thoughts. Stachniuk's concepts were created against and contrary to all the most important currents present in the times of his activity. This originality is also revealed in the analysis of the problem of education in Jan Stachniuk's thought. However, it should be emphasized that while this vision is interesting from the researcher's point of view, it does not affect the existing ways of thinking about upbringing and it is unlikely to affect them in the future either.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Bielawski P., *Nowa Zadruga*, Fundacja Watra, Wrocław 2016.
- Bujwid-Kurek E., *Myśl polityczna i państwowo-ustrojowa Svetozara Markovicia (1846-1875)*, Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2000.
- Cenin M., Słowiński Z., *Prawia – mit dziejotwórczy: systemowa teoria kultury*, Toporzeł, Wrocław 2013.
- Gabiś T., *Dwaj panowie S. o pożytkach z kolonizacji Polski*, 2014, <http://www.tomaszgabisz.pl/2014/06/02/dwaj-panowie-s-o-pozytkach-z-kolonizacji-polski/> (access: 25.10.2018).
- Grott B., *Religia, cywilizacja, rozwój – wokół idei Jana Stachniuka*, Nomos, Kraków 2003.
- Potrzebowski S., *Słowiański ruch Zadruga*, Wydaw. Triglav, Szczecin 2016.
- Skoczyński J., *Negonoza polska*, Wydaw. UJ, Kraków 2004.
- Stachniuk J., *Człowieczeństwo i kultura*, Toporzeł, Wrocław 1996.
- Stachniuk J., *Droga rewolucji kulturowej w Polsce*, Toporzeł, Wrocław 2006.
- Stachniuk J., *Dzieje bez dziejów: teoria rozwoju wewnętrznego Polski*, Toporzeł, Wrocław 1990.
- Stachniuk J., *Mit słowiański*, Toporzeł Wrocław 2006.
- Stachniuk J., *Zagadnienie totalizmu*, Toporzeł, Wrocław 1990.
- Strzadąła G., *Kulturalizm Jana Stachniuka, czyli rewolucja konserwatywna po polsku*, 2013, <https://konserwatyzm.pl/strzadala-kulturalizm-jana-stachniuka-czyli-rewolucja-konserwatywna-po-polsku/> (access: 25.10.2018).
- Tomasiewicz J., *Rewolucja narodowa: nacjonalistyczne koncepcje rewolucji społecznej w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, Europejskie Centrum Analiz Geopolitycznych, Warszawa 2012.

Abstract:

Jan Stachniuk was a Polish thinker, who created the ideology of culturalism or the so-called “ideal of Zadruga”. According to his concepts, the aim of mankind is the maximal control of the world, which is the expression of its culture. The opposition of this tendency is the nihilistic striving for vegetation, the expression of which is the so-called “anti-culture”. This dualistic vision of mankind and the universe is expressed in Stachniuk’s vision of education. On the one hand, Stachniuk negatively evaluates the existing Polish education, the roots of which he found in Counter-Reformation, which he considered an expression of anti-culture. On the other hand, he believed that only through a transformation of the ideal of education can a cultural change be achieved. He called for a cultural revolution and the realisation of the ideal of “Zadruga-based state”, which will take total control of education and create a new man.

Keywords:

Jan Stachniuk, Zadruga, culturalism, ideology and education, educational ideal, national education

PART III

**ON THE EXPERIENCE OF EDUCATIONAL
EVERYDAY REALITY**

IWONA PASZENDA

University of Wrocław

ROUTINE AS AN EXTRAORDINARY EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF PRAGMATISM¹

INTRODUCTION

Considering the problem of routine as an extraordinary educational experience, based on the concept of pragmatism, at the beginning it is worth explaining what “everyday life” is in fact. Analysis of relevant literature indicates², that the term is complex and variously defined. Its wide range of applications makes it problematic to establish a consistent definition. The understanding of the concept of “everyday life” has changed with the development of culture. In the past it was associated with routine, monotony, boredom. Each day resulted from the

¹ Originally published: Iwona Paszenda, “Rutyna jako nie-codzienne doświadczenie edukacyjne w perspektywie pragmatyzmu”, *Studia z Teorii Wychowania* 2017, vol. 8, No. 4, p. 223-233, <http://files.clickweb.home.pl/4f/66/4f66472a-2bfe-4992-8979-fe86bf70ff3c.pdf>.

² See Z. Bauman, “Niecodziennosc nasza codzienna”, [in:] *Barwy codzienności. Analiza socjologiczna*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Warszawa 2009; *Między rutyną a refleksyjnością. Praktyki kulturowe i strategie życia codziennego*, ed. T. Maślanka, K. Strzyczkowski, Warszawa 2012; *Socjologia codzienności*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, P. Sztompka, Kraków 2008; R. Sulima, *Antropologia codzienności*, Kraków 2000; R. Sulima, “Moda na codzienność. Kategoria »codzienności« w kulturze ponowoczesnej”, *Kultura Współczesna* 2011, No. 4; A. Zadrożyńska-Baraź, “Codzienność – Niecodziennosc – Święto”, [in:] *Wychowanie – Pojęcia – Procesy – Konteksty. Interdyscyplinarne ujęcie*, vol. 5: *Codziennosc w szkole. Szkoła w codzienności*, ed. M. Dudzikowa, M. Czerepaniak-Walczak, Gdańsk 2010.

previous one and gave an outline to the next day. This provided the basis for safety, certainty as to what would happen and could not happen: what to do and what to avoid. Thus, one may agree with the thesis proposed by Zygmunt Bauman that in the past “everyday life was the enemy of everything what was out of the ordinary”³.

In postmodern culture the term “everyday life” is associated with surprises, astonishment and the extraordinary⁴. As a consequence, this leads to a combination of everyday life and extraordinariness. The uncommonness, permeating every day of human life, makes the dominant experience, which he can be sure and which is routinely repeated from day to day, is the conviction that “a high probability of unusual events is nowadays an ordinary experience”⁵.

Nevertheless, the extraordinary time, the time of celebration, as more contemplative, requires prior preparation and happens less frequently. On the other hand, everyday life, which is devoid of deeper interpretation, always returns automatically without much human involvement⁶. For most people, understanding everyday life does not require special efforts. What is everyday and routine seems to be natural, known and therefore understandable, not requiring more intense reflection. In these circumstances, the normality of everyday life is associated with something boring, uninteresting or, because of the predictability of everyday practices, with something limiting rather than deserving a broader analysis⁷.

In conclusion, we can assume that “everyday life” is an automated time, abounding in routine activities that do not require special attention and reflection. On the other hand, “the extraordinary” is a festive time, occurring rarely, and giving the opportunity of non-schematic, reflective action.

These different perspectives on the extraordinary prove that they cannot be considered as a whole. In the article I would like to show that – metaphorically speaking – “routine” is also such an extraordinary concept, difficult to define unambiguously. This is evidenced by two different ways of understanding it which were proposed by John Dewey

³ Z. Bauman, “Niecodziennosc nasza codzienna”, op. cit., p. 77.

⁴ See ibidem, p. 78.

⁵ Ibidem.

⁶ See ibidem, p. 171.

⁷ See T. Maślanka, K. Strzyczkowski, “Wstęp”, [in:] *Między rutyną a refleksyjnością*, op. cit., p. 10.

and Richard Sennett⁸ who represented one intellectual tradition i.e. pragmatism.

The aim of this article is to analyze and interpret pragmatic thoughts of both researchers, which can be a source of inspiration and instruction for contemporary pedagogy as a scientific discipline.

The key considerations will be preceded by a reference to the essence of pragmatism. The characteristic feature of this current is the connection of the category of experience with life and action. This connection not only became the reason why pragmatism made a key breakthrough in the tradition of empiricism, but also created a link between pragmatism and the issue of the philosophy of life, which was fashionable at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries.

THE ESSENCE OF PRAGMATISM

The most important elements of the philosophy of pragmatism were presented by its co-founder William James. In his understanding pragmatism was supposed to be such a philosophical direction that would oppose determinism and rationalism, allowing people to think and act according to their needs and confirmed in their real life. In his treatise *The Meaning of Truth*, James proves that the truth is what a person is convinced of at a given moment. In this way, he wants to prove that the criterion of truth is included in man's active attitude towards reality and consists in the sovereign conviction that his predictions will be confirmed. According to pragmatists, the ideas that an individual is able to adopt, justify, confirm and verify are true, and "any truth that helps us to deal practically or intellectually with a certain reality is something that belongs to it"⁹. The problem is that this "belonging" is not a constant but a changeable phenomenon, i.e. it happens to our ideas at one time and not at the other, and whether we are dealing with the first or the second case is determined by the "benefit of our thinking". However, whether an idea is useful or not is determined by whether it helps us or "does not help us to deal practically or intellectually with a certain reality or something belonging to it".

⁸ In one of his works Sennett points at himself as the contemporary representative of pragmatism, see R. Sennett, *The Craftsman*, New Haven & London 2008, p. 287.

⁹ See W. James, *The Meaning of Truth. A Sequel to 'Pragmatism'*, New York 1997, p. ix-x.

This statement indicates that not only an idea must appear, but also an action that will define the “meaning of truth”. Therefore, one can say that the pragmatist perspective (from Greek *prágma* – action, activity) is expressed in the attitude towards action (practical or intellectual)¹⁰. Because for the philosophy of pragmatism practical consequences which result from experience are quite important and only they are a gauge of truthfulness¹¹. Truthfulness, on the other hand, is related only to what is most beneficial for experience, what is useful, and thus practical. Nothing that is not proven can be true. Truthfulness is therefore something that takes place within experience and is subject to the control of experience¹².

This viewpoint indicates that everything one knows about the world is the result of self-organising reason, which is at the same time self-controlled and self-regulating reason. An objective reality, even if it existed, according to the idea of pragmatism, would be superfluous. The complexity and diversity of everyday human experiences, as well as their needs, could never be contained in its essence. As pragmatism postulates a subjective look at reality, devoid of objective facts.

The philosophy of pragmatism has also broader connotations, as certain theories of truth have also begun to be denoted by pragmatism. The most important role was played by inductive logic, i.e. the study of the conditions in which knowledge was developed. At the time when the first mathematical, logical and natural rules were discovered, when the first laws were known, people were delighted with the clarity, beauty and simplicity of these results. They believed that they deciphered the authentic thoughts of God. But as knowledge progressed, the view that most, if not all, laws were merely approximations became more and more established. Moreover, the laws became so numerous that it was difficult to count them. In all branches of knowledge, so many contradictory formulas have been proposed that researchers became accustomed to the view that theories are not an absolute copy of reality, but that some of them may be useful from a certain standpoint. Their great importance lies in the fact that they balance old facts

¹⁰ See Z. Drozdowicz, “Pragmatyczna racjonalność religii i religijności w ujęciu Williama Jamesa”, *Przegląd Religioznawczy* 2010, No. 1, p. 32.

¹¹ See W. James, *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, [in:] W. James, *Writings 1902-1910*, New York 1987, p. 505–522.

¹² See H. Buczyńska-Garewicz, *James*, Warszawa 1973, p. 85–99.

and lead to new ones¹³. This trend of scientific logic was set by John Dewey, an outstanding American philosopher and educator.

ROUTINE AS “EVERYDAY” EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE – PERSPECTIVE JOHN DEWEY’S

Dewey’s understanding of pragmatism was specific from the beginning. Based on Darwin’s philosophy, he understood human thought as a tool in the struggle for existence. For this reason, to define his own philosophical position, he preferred to use the name “instrumentalism” rather than “pragmatism”.

Dewey broadened the concept of instrumentalism and presented thinking as an “instrument” of human growth¹⁴. The key to his theory was the understanding of experience, which has always had a humanistic dimension, as it could be understood as a human experience. Dewey’s concept of experience was not only opposed to objective idealism, but also to those empirical directions, according to which experience is a subjective sensation, at most signalling the existence of reality, but not reflecting it at all. Contrary to these concepts, Dewey understood experience as a process of gaining knowledge about the world and oneself, and as a process of own development and growth achieved through the accumulation and exchange of ideas¹⁵. However, as he claimed, not every experience has an educational character. The pro-development experience is the one that stimulates progress, “which arouses interest, joy and challenges in the child’s direct perception”. The researcher emphasizes that “To learn from experience” is to make a backward and forward connection between what we do to things and what we enjoy or suffer from things in consequence¹⁶.

This statement indicates that the activity will be conducive to the student’s development, provided that, thanks to it, the student is aware of the links between the activities and anticipates their consequences.

The philosopher was convinced that experience is not something fixed and contained in itself, but that it is alive and therefore growing.

¹³ See *ibidem*.

¹⁴ See B. Suchodolski, “Wstęp”, [in:] J. Dewey, *Demokracja i wychowanie. Wstęp do filozofii wychowania*, Wrocław 1972, p. XVII.

¹⁵ See *ibidem*, p. XVII-XVIII.

¹⁶ J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, Hazelton 2001, p. 146.

However, if it is ruled by the past, custom and routine, it is often opposed to the position of rational reflection. In his or her consciousness, experience contains a reflection that frees man from the limiting influence of senses, desires and traditions. Experience can accept and assimilate everything that is discovered by the most penetrating thought¹⁷. A thought is penetrating only if the grounds for a claim are reliably and conscientiously sought and examined to what extent they are sufficient to justify it. This process is called reflective thinking and only this type of thinking has educational value¹⁸.

The frequent subject appearing in Dewey's writings is "professionalism". His works include reflections on the relationship between solving and discovering problems, the relationship between technology and expression, or work and play. Dewey combines these themes best in his work *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education*¹⁹. The author analyzes in this book the notion of "education", showing its meaning as a social function of natural growth and as a conscious guide. Since he noticed that in the process of education routine kills the development of a pupil and a teacher²⁰. School subjects are taught mechanically, thus limiting the learners' cognitive power. Teachers' routine is based on the use of a relatively easy teaching technique, which involves training in memorizing, observing, remembrance, attention, etc. Routine activity does not contribute to new insights, it narrows rather than broadens the scope of concepts²¹. Automatic repetition of the curriculum and teaching methods creates a kind of permanent immobility, which in turn leads to a monotony of the repeated content²². In Dewey's opinion, the teacher's acquisition of proficiency, uniformity, taking the shortest way to achieve the desired goal, dictating every step, mechanical training, are such features which can have a disastrous impact on the power of reflection²³. However, routine efficiency, which is often the subject of someone's pride, is completely useless²⁴. A rigid and uniform method of behaviour/action can be disastrous for the actor at a critical

¹⁷ See J. Dewey, *How We Think. A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process*, Lexington 1933, p. 201-202.

¹⁸ See *ibidem*, p. 3-4.

¹⁹ See J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, *op. cit.*

²⁰ See *ibidem*, p. 57-60.

²¹ See *ibidem*, p. 83.

²² See J. Dewey, *Experience and Education*, New York 1997, p. 62.

²³ See J. Dewey, *How We Think*, *op. cit.*, p. 61-68.

²⁴ See *idem*, *Democracy and Education*, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

point in time. As he writes: “Everything that inhibits growth is actually the end of life: also mechanical routine, enslaving habits, indifference and disappearance of curiosity”²⁵. Dewey believes that life, which ceases to be a process of growth, is not a full human life, and following a routine means giving up a life worthy of a human being²⁶. However, the philosopher realizes that using in the process of education some monotonous and routine exercises may in result lead to a great proficiency when it comes to mastering one, individual action, but as he claims, it will be a limited proficiency²⁷. In this context, the tasks of school education are formulated as stimulating and developing the need and ability to think. Because he believes that thinking is the only way to avoid a routine in action²⁸.

ROUTINE AS “EXTRAORDINARY” EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE – PERSPECTIVE RICHARD SENNETT’S

Richard Sennett presents a diffident approach to understanding routine. In his book *The Craftsman*²⁹, similarly to Dewey, the scholar devotes his attention to the dimensions of professionalism, which, in his opinion, is based on carefully developed skills. Professionals are focused on the pursuit of quality, on doing good job, and this is – as he emphasizes – a basic feature of a skilful person³⁰. A good professional is a skilful, competent and committed person who, in his thoughts, engages in a dialogue with specific practices that take the form of habits. Habits shape the cycle “from solving problems to discovering problems”, and each answer found leads the professional to ask himself an array of new questions³¹. A skilful man uses the solutions he has developed to explore new territories. Curiosity makes the professional ask “why?” and “how?”. Sennett believes that in today’s world it is difficult to be a professional because of three oppressive methods of organizing professionalism³².

²⁵ B. Suchodolski, “Wstęp”, op. cit., p. XXXV.

²⁶ See ibidem, p. LXIII.

²⁷ See J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, p. 70-71.

²⁸ See B. Suchodolski, “Wstęp”, op. cit., p. LX.

²⁹ See R. Sennett, *The Craftsman*, op. cit.

³⁰ See ibidem, p. 20-25.

³¹ See ibidem, p. 9.

³² See R. Sennett, *Together. The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation*, New Haven and London 2012, p. 7-8.

The first problem is related to institutional attempts to motivate people to work well. Competition between individuals, not the community, is the best incentive to do a good job. However, success is achieved first and foremost by companies that rely on cooperation.

The second obstacle is related to the development of skills. Skill is a well-trained practice. The sociologist claims that we misuse the modern technology if it deprives its users of repetitive self-controlled training. In his opinion, when the head and hand are separated, the result is a mental mismatch.

The third issue is related to conflicting quality measures. One measure assumes the need to adapt to certain standards, while the other assumes the need to act in accordance with practical experience. A professional who tries to do his or her job is pushed in two different directions at the same time. An example is when politicians conducting a health or education reform introduce absolute evaluation criteria that are incompatible with rooted practices.

Philosophy describes this phenomenon as a conflict between the various demands of implicit and explicit knowledge³³. Silent knowledge gives people an anchor and certainty that they do their job well. On the other hand, self-awareness, subjecting one's work to reflection and, on its basis, adopting new reflexes and meanings in one's works, gives the opportunity for criticism and making corrections. Then the quality of a profession results from decisions that are based on habits and assumptions about new ways of doing things.

Unfortunately, as Sennett notes, these days, constant changes in work, caused by short-term contracts, are not conducive to the development of silent knowledge. People lack the necessary experience to make decisions. Instead, they receive a set of abstract recommendations from their employers regarding high quality work.

The sociologist is of the opinion that only when people learn to do what they are doing really well can they start to feel their work to the full. They can also become able to think about it in more depth³⁴. A set of rituals can be helpful to do it.

One of the ways of shaping rituals as autonomous practices is repetitiveness identified with routine, which supposedly dulls the senses of man, and yet, according to a sociologist, has an educative power. Repeating an activity teaches criticism and allows us to focus on details,

³³ See R. Sennett, *The Craftsman*, op. cit., p. 50–52.

³⁴ See *ibidem*, p. 25.

which Sennett has confirmed on the example of musical rehearsals³⁵. Admittedly, the sociologist realizes that work based on routine can be regarded as dull and identify routine with boredom. However, as the example of people who develop their manual skills proves, it shows that it can be different.

Doing something over and over is stimulating when organized as looking ahead. The substance of the routine may change, metamorphose, improve, but the emotional payoff is one's experience of doing it again³⁶.

However, "Modern education fears repetitive learning as mind-numbing. Afraid of boring children, avid to present ever-different stimulation, the enlightened teacher may avoid routine – but thus deprives children of the experience of studying their own ingrained practice and modulating it from within"³⁷.

This statement indicates that when a person opens up to the opportunity to learn by trial and error, when he masters the art of correct repetition, he stops being afraid of mistakes. As a result, he strengthens himself, he can also introduce new ideas and explore the world of similarities and differences³⁸.

CONCLUSION

The above mentioned perspectives of understanding routine show two different ways of perceiving it. On the one hand, it has an educational value because it contributes to human growth. On the other hand, it is devoid of this value because it "distances itself" from reflective thinking.

The first perspective, proposed by John Dewey, is a metaphor of everyday life, in which the mechanized routine, speed and automaticity of actions do not foster human development. The work based on routine shows that he has reached the moment when he is not curious or puzzled. This means that he does not develop, does not seek answers to professional questions, such as: how? or why? He does not even take

³⁵ Sennett, who in his youth was a professional musician (a cello player and a conductor), experienced by himself that thanks to painstaking exercise, which consisted in critical studying and modifying his behaviour, a musician can achieve professional perfection. See *ibidem*, p. 37.

³⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 175.

³⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 38.

³⁸ See *ibidem*, p. 160.

the trouble of asking such questions. As a result, he does his work automatically, without reflective thinking.

The perspective articulated by Richard Sennett can be regarded as a metaphor for uncommonness. In this approach, work based on routine allows for careful consideration, reflection and modification of one's own ways of doing things. However, as the sociologist emphasizes, in order to do one's work well, one has to be curious, one has to study, learn through ambiguous situations, open oneself to learning by trial and error. Enthusiasm for experiments which are characteristic for a professional way of working as well as acting according to the rhythm whereby, having solved one problem, one immediately searches for the next one, is the best incentive to do a good job.

The attempts to understand the routine described by the representatives of pragmatism can be a source of instruction and inspiration for contemporary pedagogy and, more broadly, for the reconstruction of one's own work by educators. By working out two definitions of routine, an education practitioner gains more freedom to choose a "tool" to do the work, which can be completed in two ways.

The first method is to escape from everyday routine and employ rational analysis, i.e. a reflection on action, which makes it possible for a person to better control the practical side of the process. The second option is work based on repetitiveness of actions, which teaches criticism and concentration on details; embracing the right to make a mistake, which has a teaching power, because only by making mistakes can a person profoundly understand the rules of his or her work. The choice of the "tool" to work will depend on person's individual convictions. This is in line with the basic principles of pragmatism, for which it is important that people, depending on the context, choose what is most beneficial for them, and thus most useful.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

Bauman Z., "Niecodziennosc nasza codzienna", [in:]: *Barwy codzienności. Analiza socjologiczna*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Wydaw. Naukowe Scholar, Warszawa 2009.

Buczyńska-Garewicz H., *James*, Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa 1973.

Codziennosc w szkole. Szkoła w codzienności, ed. M. Dudzikowa, M. Czerepaniak-Walczak, Gdańskie Wydaw. Pedagogiczne, Gdańsk 2010.

Dewey J., *Democracy and Education*, Pennsylvania State University, Hazleton 2001.

- Dewey J., *Experience and Education*, Touchstone, New York 1997.
- Dewey J., *How We Think. A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process*, D.C. Heath and Company, Lexington 1933.
- Drozdowicz Z., "Pragmatyczna racjonalność religii i religijności w ujęciu Williama Jamesa", *Przegląd Religioznawczy* 2010, No. 1.
- James W., *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking*, [in:] W. James, *Writings 1902-1910*, Penguin Books, New York 1987.
- James W., *The Meaning of Truth. A Sequel to 'Pragmatism'*, Longmas, Green, and Co., New York 1997.
- Między rutyną a refleksyjnością. Praktyki kulturowe i strategie życia codziennego, ed. T. Maślanka, K. Strzyczkowski, Wydaw. Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warszawa 2012.
- Sennett R., *The Craftsman*, Yale University Press, New Haven & London 2008.
- Sennett R., *Together. The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London 2012.
- Socjologia codzienności*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, P. Sztompka, Znak, Kraków 2008.
- Suchodolski B., "Wstęp", [in:] J. Dewey, *Demokracja i wychowanie. Wstęp do filozofii wychowania*, transl. Z. Doroszowa, Ossolineum, Wydaw. Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Wrocław 1972.
- Sulima R., "Moda na codzienność. Kategoria »codzienności« w kulturze ponowoczesnej", *Kultura Współczesna* 2011, No. 4.
- Sulima R., *Antropologia codzienności*, Wydaw. UJ, Kraków 2000.
- Zadrożyńska-Barąż A., "Codzienność – Niecodzienność – Święto", [in:] *Wychowanie – Pojęcia – Procesy – Konteksty. Interdyscyplinarne ujęcie*, vol. 5, *Codzienność w szkole. Szkoła w codzienności*, ed. M. Dudzikowa, M. Czerepaniak-Walczak, GWP, Gdańsk 2010.

Abstract:

The aim of the article is to analyze and decode, for the theory and practice of pragmatistic education, the thought of the renowned philosopher and educator – John Dewey, and the American sociologist – Richard Sennett. Among many important concepts and solutions that can be drawn from the legacy of both philosophers, the author distinguishes the issue of routine, understood by each of the philosophers in a different way. John Dewey claims that routine leads to the blockage of human development, whereas Richard Sennett believes that routine has an educational power. These two distinct approaches to routine may be a source of instruction and inspiration for modern pedagogy as a scientific discipline.

Keywords:

routine, everyday life, uncommonness, pragmatism, John Dewey, Richard Sennett, pedagogy

IWONA PASZENDA

University of Wrocław

BETWEEN “HEALTHY-MINDEDNESS” AND A “SICK SOUL” – ON PRAGMATISM AND CONSEQUENCES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE IN EVERYDAY LIFE¹

INTRODUCTION

Postmodern societies are characterised by pluralism of values and standards. The social world in the so-called developed reflectiveness is characterized by both the rediscovery of tradition and its disintegration². The process of change is expressed on the one hand by the progressive weakening of traditional social ties and obligations, and on the other by the growth of space of personal autonomy³. In postmodern culture everyone has the right to experiment in their own lives, also in the field of moral choices. The necessity and uncertainty of choosing, because of the multitude of values and options, is invariably bound with risk.

¹ Originally published: Iwona Paszenda, “Między »zdrowomyślnością« a »duszą chorą« – o pragmatyczności i konsekwencjach doświadczenia religijnego w życiu codziennym”, [in:] *Między ekskluzją a inkluzją w edukacji religijnej*, ed. M. Humeniuk, I. Paszenda, Instytut Pedagogiki Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2017, p. 193-207, <http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/94571>.

² See A. Giddens, *Europe in the Global Age*, Cambridge 2007, p. 118.

³ See J. Mariański, *Religia w społeczeństwie ponowoczesnym. Studium socjologiczne*, Warszawa 2010, p. 24.

As a result, the freedom of choice becomes a burden⁴. In such a reality, the development of the world of everyday life⁵ seems a balancing act which calls for substantial dedication and sacrifice, often far beyond the capacities of individuals. All of this lays the groundwork for a society with no orientation and sense⁶. This lack of orientation and the loss of sense is offset by society by outlays on consumerism and luxurious life. Under the conditions of unbridled consumption, a society of experience is created with its slogans such as: “it’s your life”, “all things pleasurable are permissible”⁷. Too much stress on material values puts spiritual values at risk. The social processes associated with the increase in the sense of individual freedom make moral values emancipatory values, which, among other things, are freed from the impact of religions and Churches. As a result, in postmodern culture, the religious social “stage” is defined by the slogans of progressive secularization⁸.

According to Janusz Mariański, at present the claim of secularisation no longer explains anything and is increasingly criticised by scholars dealing with the place and role of religion in contemporary society. As the author indicates:

One mistake in secularization theories is to ignore the fact that religions in the modern era can and do undergo serious transformations and modifications. The changes can involve, hard as this is, shifts from being areligious to being religious. The transformations taking place in modern

⁴ See U. Beck, *The Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*, London 1992; A. Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Cambridge 2006, p. 3–4.

⁵ According to Alfred Schütz’s theory of the world we experience, the world of everyday life is the basic reference system for man’s actions and thinking. It structures its goals, intentions, as well as the motives of actions, at the same time determining the ways of experiencing and learning about reality. Everyday life is not shaped solely on the basis of private, individual experience, but is intersubjective; the world of everyday life is invariably co-experienced (see A. Schütz, “On Multiple Realities”, [in:] A. Schütz, *Collected Papers*, vol. 1, ed. M. Natanson, The Hague 1962, p. 207–259).

⁶ See J. Mariański, *Religia w społeczeństwie ponowoczesnym*, op. cit., p. 39–43.

⁷ See H. Słotwińska, *Pedagogika religii w relacjach z dyscyplinami teologicznymi*, Lublin 2016, p. 115–116.

⁸ The claim of secularization, prevailing for several decades in the sociology of religion, usually implies a dilution of the vitality of traditional religions in public life, a privatization of faith or a shift of the sacred into spheres which had remained outside the area of experiences defined as religious. As Janusz Mariański explains the importance of the thesis about the end of religion: “In the conditions of social modernization, religion is unable to maintain its dominant position and role in society and gradually loses its power of interpretation and integration. The basic thesis can be summarized here as follows: the more modern the society, the less religious it is” (see J. Mariański, *Religia w społeczeństwie ponowoczesnym*, op. cit., p. 75).

religiousness cannot be understood only in terms of secularization, but more broadly as transformation⁹.

Under these circumstances, what takes place in the public space of postmodern societies is not progressive secularization, but the process of de-institutionalization, individualization and pluralization of religion¹⁰. As a result, one experiments with one's own religious beliefs, which cease to resemble a coherent, compact structure, and more and more often resemble a patchwork¹¹ or a *bricolage*, a combination of content from a variety of sources.

The phenomenon of "privatization" is characteristic of those individuals who, like in a supermarket, choose their own religious merchandise and arrange individual menus out of them. This market orientation manifests itself not only in Churches, but also in religious movements, which were created for the cluster of alternative forms of life. In this way new social forms of religion are created, where religious functions are more and more often performed by non-religious structures. This applies to phenomena such as "media religiosity" or the religion of the "electronic church", which is conducive to accelerating the ever-increasing privatization of the Christian faith. Religious functions are also taken over by "civil religions", i.e. new forms of communities and therapies, witchcraft and astrology, which are referred to as "secular piety"¹².

This statement indicates that in postmodern culture the tendency to emphasize autonomy not only in private life, but also in religious life is growing. In these circumstances, the functioning of a unified and coherent worldview is problematic. Religion and religious worship become a matter of cultural choice – a private matter belonging to the individual experiences of the postmodern man. Some try to free their everyday life from the influence of religion and the Church, while others feel loneliness, anxiety and instability, so characteristic of post-modernity. These states make them refer to what they consider to be divine, i.e. religious experience.

In the literature on the subject there are many examples describing how, in the conditions of liquid modernity, people deal with their own religious beliefs. Therefore, the article will not aim to review these

⁹ J. Mariański, *Religia w społeczeństwie ponowoczesnym*, op. cit., p. 131.

¹⁰ See *ibidem*, p. 143.

¹¹ See J. Marzec, "Polityka religijności w epoce instant", *Forum Oświatowe* 2011, No. 2.

¹² See T. Luckmann, *The Invisible Religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*, New York 1967.

positions but to try to recognize the pragmatic nature and consequences of religious experience for the practice of everyday life of postmodern societies.

WILLIAM JAMES'S PHILOSOPHY OF PRAGMATISM

For a better understanding of pragmatism and the consequences of religious experience, it is worth referring to the concept of William James, who played an important role in the history of philosophical thought in the United States and Europe. In order to better understand James's views, it is necessary at the outset to refer to the fundamental concepts of pragmatism, which is the culmination of the research of the American philosopher and psychologist. These features would constantly surface in his way of thinking.

Pragmatism was one of the most important philosophical currents at the beginning of the 20th century and undoubtedly influenced the development of the most recent philosophy. Arising from the affirmation of life and science, it objected to the self-contained systems of the nineteenth century, developed in complete detachment from the then state of experimental sciences and in opposition to the philosophical concepts of empiricism and naturalism. The genesis of pragmatism was a rebellion against philosophy that purports to be the queen of sciences and imposes its ontological concepts on the other sciences. Pragmatism opposed them, referring to both the experience of sciences and the experience of everyday life. As a consequence, two fundamental philosophical tendencies of modernity found their roots in pragmatism. One is the pursuit of the methodology of empirical knowledge, the other – the pursuit of anthropological questions, i.e. those dealing with the human being and human life¹³.

The connection of the category of experience with life and action was not only the reason why pragmatism made a key breakthrough in the tradition of empiricism, but also created a link between pragmatism and the philosophy of life, fashionable at the turn of the 20th century. The category of life, as seen in the representatives of pragmatic philosophy, was not unequivocal. In the works of James, it was primarily psychological as it involved the history of the individual *self* and its various experiences and was synonymous with consciousness¹⁴.

¹³ See H. Buczyńska-Garewicz, *James*, Warszawa 2001, p. 11–17.

¹⁴ See *ibidem*, p. 27.

James introduced the most salient elements of pragmatism in *The Meaning of Truth*. The author observes that if what I am certain about at a given moment is the truth, pragmatism sees truth as “‘agreement’ of our ideas with reality”, as “the property of some of our ideas”. According to pragmatists, true ideas are those ideas which we can assimilate, validate, corroborate, and verify, as well as “any idea that helps us to deal, either practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings”¹⁵. The problem is that the “belonging” is not permanent but variable. It means that it sometimes happens to our ideas and other times it does not happen to our ideas; it is the “usefulness of our thinking” that decides whether we deal with the former or with the latter. Whether the idea is useful is decided by whether or not it helps us “to deal with either the reality or its belongings”.

This statement indicates that not only an idea, but also action must appear, which will determine the “meaning of truth”. One can assume, then, that the worldview of pragmatism (Greek *prágma* – action, activity) is predicated on action (practical or intellectual)¹⁶. The practical consequences resulting from experience are important and only they become a measure of truth¹⁷. Truthfulness, on the other hand, is related only to what is most beneficial for experience, i.e. what is useful. Nothing that has not been verified can be true. Truth, then, is something that takes place within experience and is subject to its control. In addition to cognitive elements, James’s concept of experience includes emotional and volitional elements. It is a subjective experience, shaped by the individual’s will¹⁸.

This position indicates that everything that man knows about the world is the result of a self-organising mind, which at the same time is self-controlled and self-regulating. An objective reality, even if it existed, would be superfluous according to pragmatism. The complex diversity of everyday human experiences and their needs could never be contained in its essence. Pragmatism postulates a subjective look at reality, devoid of objective facts.

¹⁵ See W. James, *The Meaning of Truth. A Sequel to ‘Pragmatism’*, New York 1997, p. ix-x.

¹⁶ See Z. Drozdowicz, “Pragmatyczna racjonalność religii i religijności w ujęciu Williama Jamesa”, *Przegląd Religioznawczy* 2010, No. 1, p. 32.

¹⁷ See W. James, “Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking”, [in:] W. James, *Writings 1902-1910*, New York 1987, p. 506-507.

¹⁸ See H. Buczyńska-Garewicz, *James*, op. cit., p. 84-86.

JAMES'S CONCEPT OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

In these circumstances, it is inspiring to see how James, in the context of his philosophy, interprets religious experience.

In an attempt to answer this question, it should be noted at the outset that in James's concept, the world of life is not only a sphere of the seen, but also of what is invisible. More precisely, it is the experience of "the invisible order"¹⁹, e.g. a religious experience, which is linked with ideas rather than actual objects. Hence, for the philosopher religious experience is a "study in human nature"²⁰, as borne out by the full title of the book: *The Varieties of Religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature*. One of the fundamental observations made by James is that psychological studies do not research religious institutions, rituals or ideas, but rather "religious emotions and drives"²¹, or an individual's actions and experience.

Of crucial importance for the understanding of the phenomenon in question is the understanding of the term *religion*, which in English means both an objective and subjective side of religion. James is exclusively interested in the subjective aspect. This is related to the methodological position of the author, who, as a supporter of introspection, does not deal with anything that does not appear directly or indirectly in consciousness, i.e. personal experience.

James defines his point of view as "exclusively biological". This means that he looks at the manifestations of religious life as a phenomenon from this world and uses the "empirical method of proof" to study them. Before applying this method, he performs an action that can be classified as "philosophical reasoning". It boils down to the study of "pure and simple personal religion as primary with respect to its institutional effects"²². At stake here are personal feelings, premonitions, emotions, piety, etc. "Like love, like wrath, like hope, ambition, jealousy, like every other instinctive eagerness and impulse, it adds to life an enchantment which is not rationally or logically deducible from anything else". He goes on: religion "ought to mean nothing short of this new reach of freedom for us, with the struggle over, the keynote of

¹⁹ See W. James, "The Varieties of Religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature", [in:] W. James, *Writings 1902-1910*, op. cit., p. 55-56.

²⁰ See P. M. Socha, "Przedmowa: doświadczenia religijne po 100 latach", [in:] W. James, *Doświadczenia religijne*, Kraków 2001, p. 1.

²¹ See *ibidem*, p. IV.

²² See *ibidem*.

the universe sounding in our ears, and everlasting possession spread before our eyes”²³.

Interestingly, James never defined the relationship between religion and religious experience, which would clarify whether he equated the two concepts. Only two years after the publication of *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, when asked by his eminent disciple James Pratt about his understanding of religious experience, he replied that this is “every moment of life which brings the individual closer to the reality of spiritual matters”²⁴. This is a gift that can be received by people yet cannot be rationally explained. Theologians dub it a “gift of God’s grace”, while philosophers call it a “gift of our organism”²⁵. The probability that such a gift may appear is equal to that of the gift never appearing. For religious experience is only an addition to a person’s life, especially significant when the outside life is not satisfactory.

This statement indicates that cognition and experience are not selfless; they always serve a purpose and always have a pragmatic dimension. When human beings experience the nonsense of everything that they painstakingly create in their daily lives, religion often comes to the aid. A religious person enters a state of mind where the will of self-affirmation is stronger than the fear of the uncertain or the unknown. In this way, uncertainty and internal tension disappear, and concern for the future is superseded by happy relaxation and a “calm deep breathing of an eternal present”²⁶. This state can be had as a “gift”; some receive it, others do not.

At this point it should be noted that James is not concerned with simply identifying religion with some form of happiness. His research demonstrates that religious feelings are not merely a manifestation of escape or avoidance, although this may be the case for some people. The power of religious happiness lies in agreeing to the existence of evil with the knowledge that evil has been defeated once and for all. According to the philosopher, the negative or tragic element of human everyday life enriches one’s religious consciousness²⁷.

²³ W. James, “The Varieties of Religious Experience”, op. cit., p. 50.

²⁴ See P. M. Socha, “Przedmowa”, op. cit., p. IV.

²⁵ See W. James, “The Varieties of Religious Experience”, op. cit., p. 50.

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ See ibidem, p. 52.

“HEALTHY-MINDEDNESS” AND A “SICK SOUL” – INDIVIDUAL WAYS OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

A good example of this phenomenon is the features (religious idiosyncrasies) described by James, which are characteristic of those who experience religion²⁸. This article will focus on two selected types of human personality, which demonstrate the underlying individual differences in the experience of religion and reveal the pragmatism and consequences arising from the selection of a specific path of religious experience, which I will endeavour to indicate in the further part of the text.

The first type of personality can be described as “healthy-mindedness”. At the root of its religious aspect is action aimed at “achieving, retaining or regaining happiness”. James observes that

With such relations between religion and happiness, it is perhaps not surprising that men come to regard the happiness which a religious belief affords as a proof of its truth. If a creed makes a man feel happy, he almost inevitably adopts it²⁹.

For many, this unique “religious happiness” is

congenital and irreclaimable. “Cosmic emotion” inevitably takes in them the form of enthusiasm and freedom [...] From the outset their religion is one of union with the divine³⁰.

Elements of the rationality of “healthy-minded” people include both the tendency “which looks on all things and sees that they are good” and the involuntary and methodical health-oriented mindset. Healthy-mindedness involuntarily perceives things as happy. On the other hand, methodical healthy-mindedness is based on the search for goodness and ignorance of evil³¹. James changed this activity, raising it to the rank of a therapeutic principle and a philosophical one: “The deliberate adoption of an optimistic turn of mind thus makes its entrance into philosophy”³². The latter was to contribute e.g. to the emergence of liberalism in Christianity and a “new kind of natural religions”, i.e. evolutionism.

²⁸ See *ibidem*, p. 57–76.

²⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 77.

³⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 78.

³¹ See *ibidem*, p. 85–86.

³² *Ibidem*, p. 87.

The idea of a universal evolution lends itself to a doctrine of general meliorism and progress which fits the religious needs of the healthy-minded so well that it seems almost as if it might have been created for their use³³.

The therapeutic principle, in turn, was to be instrumental for the birth and spread in America of a current known as the “Mind-cure movement”³⁴. The representatives of this movement believe in the salvific power of a healthy attitude towards life, manifested by hope, courage, trust towards people and the world. They despise doubt, fear, sadness. The philosopher reveals the doctrinal foundations of this movement, as well as its achievements: “The blind have been made to see, the halt to walk; lifelong invalids have had their health restored. The moral fruits have been no less remarkable”³⁵. It turned out that many people who did not see this ability in themselves were able to adopt a “healthy-minded” attitude of life as their own.

However, indirect influences were also significant. One could hear everywhere about the Gospel of Relaxation, about the movement against sadness, about people whose life’s motto was “youth, health, vigor!”. In families professing the Gospel of Relaxation one cannot complain about something that is beyond one’s control, for example bad weather. Neither can one talk about unpleasant things or complain about the deficiencies and inconveniences of everyday life³⁶.

The perception of goodness and the denial of evil is a form of suggestion or autosuggestion, a phenomenon known as faith healing³⁷. People who have experienced faith healing tend to be passive rather than active, and relaxed rather than tense. Their philosophy of life is based on the principle:

Give up the feeling of responsibility, let go your hold, resign the care of your destiny to higher powers, be genuinely indifferent as to what becomes of it all, and you will find not only that you gain a perfect inward relief, but often also, in addition, the particular goods you sincerely thought you were renouncing³⁸.

This is the nature of salvation according to James. It can only be experienced by those who, in their thinking and acting, go beyond a critical

³³ Ibidem, p. 89.

³⁴ See ibidem, p. 91.

³⁵ Ibidem, p. 92.

³⁶ See ibidem, p. 92-93.

³⁷ See P. M. Socha, “Przedmowa”, op. cit. p. XII.

³⁸ W. James, “The Varieties of Religious Experience”, op. cit., p. 105.

point that allows them to get the impression that they are under the influence of some external power. The capacity or lack of it of such experience is what differentiates a religious from a merely moralistic character:

With those who undergo it in its fullness, no criticism avails to cast doubt on its reality. They *know*; for they have actually *felt* the higher powers, in giving up the tension of their personal will³⁹.

In answer to the question where these successes come from, James points to the skilful use of “suggestive power”, the most important factor of which is “the force of personal faith, enthusiasm, and example, and above all the force of novelty”⁴⁰. Of special significance for the success of the mind-cure movement is that “its founders have added systematic exercise in passive relaxation, concentration and meditation to their reasoned advice and dogmatic assertions”⁴¹.

In his work, James refers to the examples of “mind-cure”, which are a form of today’s psychotherapy based on suggestion and a special set of optimistic beliefs (e.g. Gestalt, neurolinguistics). Another example is the preference for “spiritual vigour” in modern culture, in its religious form, which is necessary in order to cope with the “rat race”, where “evil is simply a lie”. All this in different parts of the world has resulted in new forms of expression for human spirituality and religious beliefs.

Opposing the attitude of the “healthy-minded” people, who consciously seek to diminish evil, there is the attitude which enables the intensification of evil, which James described as the “sick soul”.

“The sick soul” is a type of melancholic, a man of weak life energy. He is a victim of “pathological melancholy”⁴². It manifests itself in the form of helplessness and disillusionment with life, abandon, lack of interest, and a black-and-white vision of the world. The “sick” can either rebel against it or passively give up. He can accuse himself of this state of affairs or make claims to external power. Religion and religious experience are not only unable to cure him of this disease, but they can actually exacerbate or perpetuate this condition. The presenting symptoms of this disease vary from person to person. Some cases are more dangerous and others less so. For some, evil

³⁹ Ibidem, p. 106.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, p. 108.

⁴¹ Ibidem, p. 109.

⁴² Ibidem, p. 136.

means inadequate adaptation to things, an inappropriate attitude to the environment⁴³.

According to James, “positive and active anguish”⁴⁴, which takes on a variety of forms, is a far worse suffering. It can be expressed in distrust of oneself and self-doubt, suspicion, anxiety, concern, fear and disappointment with everyday life. The consciousness of a passive person is infested with a sense of evil, and thus the person loses the sense of existence of any good in the world. His consciousness ignores and excludes goodness. That is why he perceives the world only in black colours. This attitude does not allow him to seek help in his religious experience. Rather, it inclines him towards irreligiosity.

According to James, a “healthy-minded” personality and a “sick soul” need a different religion. The philosopher believes that the method of distracting human attention from evil and of “living simply”, as in the case of a “healthy-minded” personality, works as long as it fulfils its purpose. As long as it is effective, it cannot be blamed for anything as a religious solution. Unfortunately, its effectiveness breaks down when disillusion with life, melancholy (inability to feel joyful) and difficult situations occur in human life.

James believes that “healthy-mindedness” as a philosophical doctrine is something incomparable to the “sick soul”, because the incidents of evil, which the “healthy-minded” person does not want to admit, are an indispensable component of reality. The fall of man and his life failures is a natural, ordinary human fate. Everyday human life is constantly permeated with such experiences, own mistakes, wasted opportunities, because the nature of man is made up of setbacks. Therefore, even in the case of a person who appears happy on the face of it, one can find something evil inside.

The old man, sick with an insidious internal disease, may laugh and quaff his wine at first as well as ever, but he knows his fate now, for the doctors have revealed it; and the knowledge knocks the satisfaction out of all these functions⁴⁵.

⁴³ According to James, such evil can be cured in a natural way. It is enough to change the human being or the environment, or both simultaneously. There are cases, however, when “evil is no mere relation of the subject to particular outer things, but something more radical and general, a wrongness of vice in his essential nature, which no alteration of the environment, or no superficial rearrangement of the inner self, can cure, and which requires a supernatural remedy” (see *ibidem*, p. 127).

⁴⁴ *Ibidem*, p. 138.

⁴⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 132-133.

In these circumstances, material goods and carefree fun become nothing; they do not make us happy in the face of misfortune.

James, referring to the findings of contemporary psychology, points out that

Some persons are born with an inner constitution which is harmonious and well balanced from the outset. Their impulses are consistent with one another, their will follows without trouble the guidance of their intellect, their passions are not excessive, and their lives are little haunted by regrets. Others are oppositely constituted; and are so in degrees which may vary from something so slight as to result in a merely odd or whimsical inconsistency, to a discordancy of which the consequences may be inconvenient in the extreme⁴⁶.

The first type is that of a “healthy-minded” individual, and the other that of a person with a “sick spirit”,

Their spirit wars with their flesh, they wish for incompatibles, wayward impulses interrupt their most deliberate plans, and their lives are one long drama of repentance and of effort to repair misdemeanors and mistakes⁴⁷.

As a result, “sick souls” are internally split, hypersensitive and neurotic.

Interestingly, James can relate better to the experience of the “sick soul”. He considers its religious experience to be more valuable because, as he claims, the sick mind involves a larger scale of experience than the “healthy-minded” one. In his research, he assumed the hypothesis that evil facts (phenomena) are just as true components of the world as good ones. A world that denies sadness, suffering and death is incomplete and false, a poetic fiction rather than reality⁴⁸. In his opinion, bad experiences, difficult life events are the best key to understanding one’s own life and only they can open one’s eyes to a deeper knowledge of the truth about oneself and one’s life⁴⁹. These are “religions of deliverance”⁵⁰. In order to experience them, a person must die to an illusory life, before he can be born to a true one.

⁴⁶ Ibidem, p. 156-157.

⁴⁷ Ibidem, p. 157.

⁴⁸ Ibidem, p.151-153.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, p. 152-154.

⁵⁰ See ibidem, p. 154.

CONCLUSION

The findings of James's work indicate that there are two types of life: natural and spiritual. Man must lose the first one before he can enter the second one. We therefore get two different types of experience of the world, two different views on life. On the one hand, we see a "healthy-minded" person and, on the other hand, a "sick soul". The former is happy since biological birth; the latter must be born again in order to experience happiness.

James's work reveals that the "sick soul" itself can effectively heal itself. Religion is one of the paths to inner unification; "easily, permanently and successfully, it often transforms the most intolerable misery into the profoundest and most enduring happiness"⁵¹. James points out, however, that in non-religious cases man can also be reborn again. He points out that one can be reborn not only to religion, but also to irreligiousness; by being reborn one can move from the sensitivity of conscience to freedom or licence. Still, "In all these instances we have precisely the same psychological form of event, – a firmness, stability, and equilibrium succeeding a period of storm and stress and inconsistency"⁵².

The religious states of happiness and suffering described by James, which are part of religious experience, are important because of their diversity and the so-called practical fruits of life which constitute the value and pragmatism of religious feelings. James considers usefulness to be the criterion of truth – any religion that meets the needs of man's life is true⁵³. This observation indicates that faith in supernatural powers fulfils a certain essential function in culture. It satisfies specific needs that cannot be satisfied by any other cultural factors. Religious experience can therefore be considered pragmatic because of the effects it has on the well-being of those who experience them.

The brief analysis of individual forms of religious experience carried out in this article helps to distinguish two types of consequences of faith in the deity: dysfunctional and functional.

The former can be briefly described as the shift of responsibility. Man is considered here as passive, shifting responsibility for one's own life and deeds to higher powers. In his idea, it is the deity who chooses a strategy for solving a life problem and therefore a person passively

⁵¹ Ibidem, p. 163.

⁵² Ibidem.

⁵³ Ibidem.

expects signs from the higher powers in order to find out which of the ways of solving the problems should be applied. The effectiveness of such behaviour breaks down as soon as difficult and borderline events come to light in the person's life. An individual who has entrusted his or her life to external forces cannot on his or her own cope with them. This restriction prevents the individual from demonstrating an active attitude towards his or her own life.

The latter is fundamentally different from the former. It can be described as a self-direction. The individual takes action on his or her own to solve his or her own problems without the need to appeal to the higher powers. He treats himself as someone who has been endowed by the higher powers with the abilities and resources necessary to solve the problem. Religious experience is a kind of support for him/her in finding the sense of life and in implementing the process of transcendence, and as a result, harbouring hopes for a better quality of life. In these circumstances, the consequence of religious experience is the activation of the individual, who tries to understand and address the essential requirements of his or her life.

The usefulness of James's work boils down to two aspects. The first, with a more general meaning, is to see in his book a set of general instructions, which can be of benefit to any thinking reader; the second is a set of inspirations and instructions for pedagogy or, more broadly, for education.

An important issue addressed by James in his book is the call to confront head-on difficult situations in everyday life. Their conscious experience leads to an inner union and enables a better level of self-awareness and knowledge of one's life. Therefore, a person should be able to face negative experiences from an early age. From the pedagogical point of view, it is not so much important to offer help in the fight against them, as it is often simply unfeasible, but to support the person in the process of educating him/her to discover the meaning of life. In the case of young people, one of the ways of such support may be religious education and religious upbringing⁵⁴. In relation to adults, it may be important to provide religious themes for reflection on one's own life⁵⁵. Individuals who are not religious can discover the meaning

⁵⁴ See H. Słotwińska, *Pedagogika religii w relacjach z dyscyplinami teologicznymi*, op. cit., p. 111.

⁵⁵ See A. Walulik, *Edukacyjne wspomaganie dorosłych w refleksji nad życiem*, Kraków 2012.

of their own lives, for example within the framework of the emerging sub-discipline of science – the pedagogy of everyday life⁵⁶ or existentially important pedagogy⁵⁷.

I leave open the question of what educators can do to increase the role of questions leading to the discovery of the meaning of life in the education process.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Barwy codzienności. Analiza socjologiczna, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Scholar, Warszawa 2009.
- Beck U., *The Risk Society. Towards a New Modernity*, transl. M. Ritter, Sage Publications, London 1992.
- Buczyńska-Garewicz H., *James*, Wiedza Powszechna, Warszawa 2001.
- Codziennosc jako miejsce i źródło uczenia się, ed. E. Kurantowicz, M. Nowak-Dziemianowicz, "Teraźniejszość – Człowiek – Edukacja" 2003, special issue.
- Drozdowicz Z., "Pragmatyczna racjonalność religii i religijności w ujęciu Williama Jamesa", *Przegląd Religioznawczy*, 2010, No. 1.
- Giddens A., *Europe in the Global Age*, Polity, Cambridge 2007.
- Giddens A., *Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*, Polity, Cambridge 2006.
- James W., "The Varieties of Religious Experience. A Study in Human Nature", [in:] W. James, *Writings 1902-1910*, Penguin Books, New York 1987.
- James W., "Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking", [in:] W. James, *Writings 1902-1910*, Penguin Books, New York 1987.
- James W., *The Meaning of Truth. A Sequel to 'Pragmatism'*, Longmans, Green, and Co., New York 1997.
- Luckmann T., *The Invisible Religion. The Problem of Religion in Modern Society*, Macmillan, New York 1967.
- Mariański J., *Religia w społeczeństwie ponowoczesnym. Studium socjologiczne*, Oficyna Naukowa, Warszawa 2010.

⁵⁶ "Pedagogy of everyday life" helps educators regard daily life, identify there what eludes attention, discover the unknown, find new senses and significations, change all that it is criticised for. Reflections on the pedagogy of everyday life are in particular addressed in texts such as: Z. Melosik, "Pedagogika życia codziennego: teoria i praktyka", [in:] *Edukacja a życie codzienne*, vol. 1, ed. A. Radziejewicz-Winnicki, E. Bielska, Katowice 2002; *Codziennosc jako miejsce i źródło uczenia się*, ed. E. Kurantowicz, M. Nowak-Dziemianowicz, "Teraźniejszość – Człowiek – Edukacja", special issue, Wrocław 2003; R. Sulima, *Antropologia codzienności*, Kraków 2000; *Socjologia codzienności*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, P. Sztompka, Kraków 2008; *Barwy codzienności. Analiza socjologiczna*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, Warszawa 2009.

⁵⁷ See J. Orzelska, *W stronę pedagogiki istotnej egzystencjalnie. Życie i jego trudności z energią duchową jako wyzwanie pedagogiczne rezyduów tożsamości*, Kraków 2014.

- Marzec J., "Polityka religijności w epoce instant", *Forum Oświatowe* 2011, No. 2.
- Melosik Z., "Pedagogika życia codziennego: teoria i praktyka", [in:] *Edukacja a życie codzienne*, vol. 1, ed. A. Radziewicz-Winnicki, E. Bielska, Wydaw. Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 2002.
- Orzelska J., *W stronę pedagogiki istotnej egzystencjalnie. Życie i jego trudności z energią duchową jako wyzwanie pedagogiczne rezyduów tożsamości*, Impuls, Kraków 2014.
- Schütz A., "On Multiple Realities", [in:] A. Schütz, *Collected Papers*, vol. 1, ed. M. Natanson, The Hague 1962.
- Słotwińska H., *Pedagogika religii w relacjach z dyscyplinami teologicznymi*, Wydaw. Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin 2016.
- Socha P. M., "Przedmowa: doświadczenia religijne po 100 latach", [in:] W. James, *Doświadczenia religijne*, transl. J. Hempel, Zakład Wydawniczy Nomos, Kraków 2001.
- Socjologia codzienności*, ed. M. Bogunia-Borowska, P. Sztompka, Znak, Kraków 2008.
- Sulima R., *Antropologia codzienności*, Wydaw. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2000.
- Walulik A., *Edukacyjne wspomaganie dorosłych w refleksji nad życiem*, Wydaw. WAM, Kraków 2012.

Abstract:

In the article the question of religious experience combined with the problem of pragmatic philosophy of William James has been undertaken. The aim of the article is the attempt of (re)cognition of pragmatics and consequences of religious experience for the practice of everyday life of postmodern societies. The arguments and final conclusions presented in the text have been formulated on the basis of the chosen features of religious individualities, which characterize those who experience religiously. In the conclusion it has been assessed that religious experiences are pragmatic because of consequences which they exert on the feeling of those who experience religiously. Two types of consequences of believing in a deity have been distinguished – the dysfunctional and the functional. Conclusions have been formulated for religious upbringing and pedagogy of everyday life.

Keywords:

pedagogy of everyday life, postmodern society, pragmatism, religious experience

MONIKA HUMENIUK
University of Wrocław

TRANSGRESSIONS IN THE PEDAGOGY OF RELIGION – BETWEEN INSTRUMENTALIZA- TION AND EMANCIPATION OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION¹

INTRODUCTION

The progressive secularization of modern Western societies usually entails the erosion of the influence of traditional religions in public life, the privatisation of faith, or social shifts of the sacred into spheres previously outside the experiences defined as religious, such as sport or politics. Opinions on the cultural relativity of the secularization process and its dependence on specific historical and social conditions are becoming more and more popular, which additionally means that transformations of this type can take on a wide variety of scopes and forms². Interestingly, analysis of the state of research into the whole spectrum of these processes and phenomena does not provide a clear basis for talking about the complete disappearance of religion in Western societies. Therefore, it is difficult to assume that

¹ Originally published: Monika Humeniuk-Walczak, “Transgresje w pedagogice religii – między instrumentalizacją a emancypacją edukacji religijnej”, [in:] *Transgresje w edukacji*, vol. 2, ed. I. Paszenda, R. Włodarczyk, Impuls, Kraków 2014, p. 97-110.

² K. Dobbelaere, *Secularisation. An Analysis at Three Levels*, Brussels 2004.

the secularizing socio-cultural space would completely wipe out the individual and collective experience of religion, and thus also religious education understood as broadly as possible. What remains problematic, however, is the question of its available formulas, the adopted axiological foundations or the goals that it sets itself. It seems that its adaptability to contemporary realities and social expectations largely depends on the specificity of self-cognition within the adopted formula and the potential of transgressiveness, defined as the ability to constantly transcend the boundaries of this self-cognition.

For a better systematization of the challenges that the present day in its Western version poses to religious education, it is worth recalling the concept of the post-secular society as proposed by Jürgen Habermas. The philosopher draws attention to three conditions for the constructive representation of monotheistic religions in the social world.

First of all, the religious conscience must handle the encounter with other confessions and other religions cognitively. Second, it must accede to the authority of science, which holds a social monopoly on knowledge. Finally, it must participate in the premises of a constitutional state, which is based on a non-sacred concept of morality. Without this reflective ‘thrust,’ monotheisms within ruthlessly modernizing societies develop a destructive potential³.

This statement seems to accurately define the main problems of contemporary religious education. Each of the three indicated premises reveals a significant source of controversy that accompanies the disputes over the place of religion in the public sphere. Religious education is accused, on the one hand, of using political tools and moral coercion of conscience and belief, which are unacceptable in the era of pluralism. On the other hand, it is blamed for reproducing and transmitting an unscientific version of reality and for ignoring or depreciating the idea of a secular state, as one which is guided by insufficiently high moral standards.

In the reflection on selected models of religious education which I will present in the further part of the article, J. Habermas’ theory of cognitive interests and the corresponding types of rationality may prove useful. This theory, as Lech Witkowski emphasizes, makes it possible to achieve “significant differentiation within the types of competence

³ J. Habermas, “Faith and Knowledge”, <https://www.friedenspreis-des-deutschen-buchhandels.de/sixcms/media.php/1290/2001%20Acceptance%20Speech%20Juergen%20Habermas.pdf> (access: 12.11.2018).

with which one would like to ‘enlighten’ the individual”⁴. The categories of interest – technical (instrumental), practical (communicative) and emancipatory, as well as related, corresponding types of rationalities are interesting theoretical tests that enable reconstruction of the main types of religious education and models formulated and/or practiced in Europe and the United States during the 20th and 21st centuries. Their evocation and brief analysis will not only help to reconstruct the internal specificity and formulas of self-cognition within each of the invoked types of religious education, but also to determine their internal potential for transgression, important in view of the challenges that contemporary religious education must constantly face. In addition, it will make it possible to show a certain repertoire of practical solutions, concentrating the discourse of religious education not so much around the question of the legitimacy of religious education in a pluralistic society, but around its socially most advantageous version.

INTEREST AND RATIONALITY VS. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION – THE THEORETICAL CONTEXT OF REFLECTION ON SELECTED MODELS OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Habermas’ theory of cognitive interests assumes the existence of a specific set of interests and rationalities which determine and structure the manner of perceiving reality and knowledge about it. It is based on the conviction that knowledge is rooted in social and historical processes, while human cognitive activity is driven by interests corresponding to the problems and needs experienced by individuals. The author points to three types of interests: technical interest, practical interest and emancipatory interest. Each of them is a kind of permanent signpost, enabling the organization of everyday experience and of processing one’s accumulated knowledge about reality. Each of them corresponds to an analogous type of rationality, which, as Henry A. Giroux notes, is

a specific set of social assumptions and social practices that mediate how an individual or group relates to a wider society. [...] The knowledge, beliefs,

⁴ L. Witkowski, “Edukacja przez pryzmat teorii społecznej J. Habermasa”, *Socjologia Wychowania* 1984, No. V, p. 33.

expectations, and biases that define a given rationality both condition and are conditioned by the experiences into which we enter⁵.

Technical interest involves the extension of technical control over objectivised processes and an ability to manipulate the environment⁶. Within its framework, cognitive competence is constructed, and is understood as the ability to describe the framework and conditions of effectiveness and technical efficiency in action. Education is perceived here in a utilitarian way as a means of achieving the expected objectives, but it is assumed that “[...] the actor is supposed to choose and calculate means and ends from the standpoint of maximizing utility or expectations of utility”⁷. Technical interest, then, triggers action which aims at the acquisition or transfer of skills enabling the manufacture of a specific, desired product, including know-how and the ability to apply it effectively to achieve its intended purpose⁸. Interests of this type are, therefore, closely linked to instrumental action, underpinning rationality (technical) instrumental⁹, or adaptive¹⁰. This rationality, originating in the life sciences, is predicated on the existence of so-called objective knowledge, situated “above and beyond social realities and relationships of the people who produce and define it”¹¹. This is *reification* of knowledge¹², perceived as constant, invariable, objective, neutral, and arbitrarily legitimised. It is understood linearly as a predictable, verifiable, cause-and-effect logic-driven construction of so-called pure facts.

Religious education oriented on technical interest, constructed on the basis of a rationality of the discussed type is education aiming at the acquisition of knowledge and modification of behaviour, education emphasizing a careful selection of the learning content, strict control – didactic

⁵ H. A. Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education. A Pedagogy of the Opposition*, Massachusetts 1983, p. 171.

⁶ J. Habermas, “Knowledge and Human Interest. A General Perspective”, [in:] J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interest*, Boston 1972, p. 308.

⁷ J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, *Reason and the Rationalization Society*, Boston 1984, p. 85.

⁸ A. Dziemianowicz-Bąk, “Interesy konstytuujące nauczanie”, [in:] *Komercjalizacja edukacji. Konsekwencje i nowe zagrożenia*, ed. M. Syska, Wrocław-Warszawa 2010, p. 12.

⁹ L. Witkowski, *Edukacja przez pryzmat teorii społecznej J. Habermasa*, op. cit., p. 32-33.

¹⁰ R. Kwaśnica, *Dwie racjonalności. Od filozofii sensu ku pedagogice ogólnej*, Wrocław 2007, p. 33.

¹¹ H. A. Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education*, op. cit., p. 178.

¹² *Ibidem*, p. 179.

and educational – in the process of curriculum implementation, as well as the strengthening of conservative and conformist attitudes, which guarantee preservation of the contents of the messages and values conveyed. In such a model, one not so much facilitates learning as teaches and controls development rather than supports it.

An example of religious education that well expresses technical interest and the corresponding instrumental (adaptative, technical) rationality is so-called kerygmatic pedagogy, a current of exclusive ecclesiastical pedagogy, which sees its basic goal not in teaching about the Christian religion as a cultural, social and historical phenomenon, but in proclaiming the kerygma of salvation. The creator of the ideological foundations of the formula understood in this way, especially in its Protestant version, was Karl Barth, whose legacy and influence on the kerygmatic education is recapitulated by Bogusław Milerski in the following way:

The essence of Barth's views was, on the one hand, to emphasize the qualitative difference between man and God, and on the other hand, to stress the fundamental role of revelation transmitted in the form of God's Word. Since the supernatural is beyond the cognitive ken and didactic competences of man, it is not possible to teach about it. The essence of the Church's activity is therefore not teaching, but listening [...] and, above all, proclaiming and transmitting the Word of God as the basic form of revelation. From this perspective, Barth conducted a radical criticism of culture, religion and the limitations of humanistic education, emphasizing the importance of an individual existential decision to adopt the Christian faith¹³.

The logic of such an educational formula already at the very beginning introduces fundamental limitations in the scope of critical interpretation and analysis of the content, forms and methods of education. It moreover orientates educational activities towards achieving the effect of the final "product", i.e. a suitably "profiled" and "shaped" individual who makes "the right and proper" existential decisions. It should be stressed that the technical interest is fostered by a clear, codified framework of recommendations from the authorities and bodies representing this interest. A case in point is catechesis, well rooted in Polish conditions, deriving its self-cognition from Catholic theology. As a field of confessional pastoral theology, it is regulated by binding catechetical documents, which currently include above all John Paul II's exhortation

¹³ B. Milerski, *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna. Perspektywy pedagogiki religii*, Warszawa 2011, p. 148.

Catechesi tradendae, *Catechism of the Catholic Church* and *General Directory for Catechesis*¹⁴. Its core is fundamental catechism, dealing with the study of the purpose, nature, place and role of theology of catechesis in the salvific activity of the Church, where catechism is defined as one of the forms of proclaiming the Christian faith of the Roman denomination¹⁵. In the face of the challenges of social and cultural pluralism, European catechetics of the 20th and 21st century developed such directions of catechesis as didactic, pedagogical, kerygmatic, anthropological, biblical and hermeneutical, political, existential and interpretative, therapeutic, correlational, and integral¹⁶. Each of them, differing in methodology, didactics, psychological and pedagogical assumptions, remains fundamentally faithful to the contents of Catholic theology and the teaching of the Church, recognizing as key issues e.g. the biblical history of salvation, the development of knowledge of faith, liturgical education, moral formation, the teaching of prayer, education to community life, and introduction to the mission of the Church¹⁷. Religious education adopts this formula and treats pedagogy as its auxiliary science, providing the “tools” for the effective implementation of the pre-established goals, derived from the local version of theology¹⁸. Both models of religious education, i.e. kerygmatic pedagogy and catechism, are mainly subordinated to theological normativity, whose “only right” interpretation is entrusted to its depositary (Church). The formula of their self-cognition, with strict and tight conceptual, structural and functional boundaries, is expressed here in the adopted goals of religious education, aimed primarily at the development of the community of the faithful, the apologetics of religion and faith and the exclusive maintenance of the religious identity of own religious group. It is difficult to talk here about a serious potential of transgression in the epistemological dimension; after all, the foundations of the discussed paradigm of religious education are connected with the objectivity of the process of cognition and axiological absolutism, as well as functional absolutism. The process of crossing recognized boundaries in terms

¹⁴ P. Tomasik, “Katechetyka fundamentalna”, [in:] *Historia katechezy i katechetyka fundamentalna*, Tarnów 2003, p. 215.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 101.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 113.

¹⁷ J. Szpet, *Dydaktyka katechezy*, Poznań 1999, p. 24-27.

¹⁸ D. Stępkowski, *Pedagogika ogólna i religia. (Re)konstrukcja zapomnianego wątku na podstawie teorii Johanna F. Herbarta i Friedricha D. E. Schleiermachers*, Warszawa 2010, p. 15-16.

of content, language, forms and methods of the discussed educational formula would require more inclusive strategies of dealing with the differences in people and their visions of reality, worldviews or lifestyles. In the case of kerygmatic pedagogy and catechism, it is therefore difficult to speak of an education which transcends the limits of what is given, certain and sanctioned.

The second type of cognitive interests as proposed by Habermas is a practical interest, involving the “preservation and expansion of the intersubjectivity of possible action-orienting mutual understanding”¹⁹. Implemented via language through interaction, it is linked to communicative (hermeneutic) rationality, which is not interested in generating “monological” knowledge²⁰, but rather knowledge derived from the understanding of symbolic acts of interaction that contribute to individual and intersubjective significance. As defined by H.J. Giroux, “Rather than focusing on [...] the *a priori* forms of knowledge, its constitutive interest lies in understanding how the forms, categories, and assumptions beneath the texture of everyday life contribute to our understanding of each other and the world around us”²¹. Meaning here is a category constructed by all participants of the interaction, via constant negotiations and renegotiations, while the key concepts for thinking about education in general are intentionality and intersubjectivity. In order to understand human behaviour and activity, it is necessary to search for references to factors that constitute the context for understanding and interpreting the meanings generated in social interactions. Recapitulating the philosophical basis of pedagogical hermeneutics, Bogusław Milerski points to four such factors: the first of them is subjective pre-cognition, arising from a specific, original manner of *being in the world*, another one is colloquiality, a specific form of consciousness, the third one – superstitions rooted in particular traditions and cultures, and the fourth one, ideologies, are forms of social consciousness that prefer a particular social order by imposing particular senses²². Each of the above factors should, as far as possible, become a deliberate part of the process of communication in social interaction. The practical interest and the activities related to it are oriented towards reaching an agreement. They

¹⁹ J. Habermas, “Knowledge and Human Interest”, op. cit., p. 310.

²⁰ H. A. Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education*, op. cit., p. 184.

²¹ Ibidem.

²² B. Milerski, *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna*, op. cit., p. 215.

refer to members of the social group who, as Jürgen Habermas emphasizes, in their activities are guided by common values stemming from the social contract and in accordance with the expectations that all participants in the interaction will be able to expect from each other to act in accordance with these norms²³. The education that represents this perspective is, in Andrea Folkierska's opinion, not a simple transmission of information between the one who teaches and the one who is taught (between the one who *knows* and the one who *does not know*), but rather "teaching to listen to a word that is worth listening to, i.e. one that really teaches. It involves teaching to discover the real truth, i.e. one that requires disobedience to what is presented as necessary and only real"²⁴.

Therefore, motivated by hermeneutical rationality, religious education is an education that recognizes the diversity and conflict of interpretations, as well as the inability to establish a single interpretation. "Preference for an objective perspective may lead to indoctrination of understanding and absolutization of certain senses [...]", observes Bogusław Milerski, pointing at the same time to the necessity of constant verification and authentication of each interpretation through criticism of the text (exegesis), critical judgement and discursive negotiation²⁵. As it is emphasized in the position of the German Evangelical Church synod cited by the author, education within the framework of this model of education cannot be limited to the transfer of knowledge, shaping competences and focusing on the effective achievement of pre-established goals. Its essence is determined by a unique ontology of education defined in terms of an "empowered and liberating development of human life", where "empowerment and freedom have both an existential and spiritual character"²⁶ and where opposition to an authoritative transmission of teaching content is crucial. This is an opposition "[...] to indoctrination, enslavement and disempowerment of the *humanum* and to the technical approach to education"²⁷. Here, as the author indicates, religious education is seen on the one hand as a process of inner, autonomous and reflective transformation of the person's life, where adoption of imposed or borrowed patterns of understanding

²³ See J. Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, op. cit., p. 85.

²⁴ A. Folkierska, "Wychowanie w perspektywie hermeneutycznej", [in:] *Ku pedagogii pogranicza*, ed. Z. Kwieciński, L. Witkowski, Toruń 1990, p. 111.

²⁵ B. Milerski, *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna*, op. cit., p. 215.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, p. 218.

²⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 217.

reality and action in the world gives way to an understanding of discovery and internalisation. On the other hand, religious education is a set of interactions supporting this process, taking place in a normative space of values, senses, contents and events connected with tradition and contemporary pedagogy of a given religion. Such support should consist primarily in the development of mental competences such as the ability to understand and think critically about human existence with its socio-cultural context and the ability to reflect, not only in terms of internal reflection, but also in terms of the ability to articulate one's own beliefs. Education understood in this way is to support the life skills of individuals, making them emotionally, cognitively and socially mature, consciously realizing themselves, capable of reflexive affirmation and constructive criticism²⁸. "The basis and at the same time the pedagogical limit of religious education is the event of an encounter with Transcendence, which every monotheistic religion presupposes"²⁹.

Religious education constructed in the perspective of communicative rationality is e.g. hermeneutic pedagogy of religion, a concept put forth on the basis of textual hermeneutics and history studies developed in the spirit of Wilhelm Dilthey with the hermeneutics of Martin Heidegger and the de-mythologizing concept of Rudolf Bultmann. As Bogusław Milerski observes, from this point of view, the educational process is to be connected with the idea of "renewal of the mind", and its creators point to the truth encrypted in the texts (including the texts of sacred books) about the ways of human understanding and existence, to which access is gained through existential interpretation of the text. Such an interpretation would be aimed at acquiring new ways of understanding one's own existence, and not at recreating its origins - the history of creation, motivation of the author, etc.³⁰ It is important to take care of the relationship between religious education and social reality. The key issue should be the identification and description of basic human experiences and then the treatment of these experiences as a starting point for the process of religious education, as a result of which the individual will have a chance to gain new ways of understanding reality.³¹ In practice,

²⁸ Ibidem, p. 230-231.

²⁹ Ibidem, p. 231.

³⁰ Ibidem, p. 153.

³¹ Ibidem, p. 156.

hermeneutic religious pedagogy is to signify a departure from the adaptive and reconstructive functions of education and the dogmatic and authoritative nature of didactic activity. Knowledge is not a ready-made conglomerate of information and qualifications of a given individual to assimilate. Knowledge appears as problematic, heterogeneous and subjectively experienced. Education consists in constant reconstruction of senses and revision of self-cognition. In relation to the model of religious education constructed from the perspective of technical rationality, it is a significant, epistemological change, a transgression of the logic of thinking about the nature of truth and knowledge, and thus education in general, with all the consequences for educational practice. However, as pointed out by Jürgen Habermas, the practical interest and the communicative rationality connected with it, and secondarily – also education offered in this perspective, due to the subjectivism of understanding and self-cognition, is exposed to the danger of legitimizing such an interpretation of reality that would be based on incomplete and distorted knowledge. Henry A. Giroux defines this problem as follows:

such a posture tends to overlook how ideological and structural constraints in the larger society are reproduced [...] so as to mediate against the possibility of critical thinking and constructive dialogue. Thus, by reducing power and democratic action to the level of an epistemology that supports a form of subjective idealism, the reflective inquiry approach emerges as a one-sided theory of education [...] which has “miraculously” abstracted its social epistemology from such troublesome concepts as ideology, power, struggle, and oppression. As a result, the basic natures of existing social arrangements in the wider society go unquestioned or are questioned in relatively narrow terms³².

Educational activities connected with practical interest may therefore prove insufficient in exposing and transforming those elements of reality which limit the autonomy of individuals and social groups by treating them as objects. In the reflection on the model of religious education, what seems inevitable is transgression as understood by Michel Foucault, i.e. a constant contravention of established norms of truth in the process of critical thinking, and thus as a transition from interpretation and understanding towards criticism and emancipatory competence, towards the ability to negate the existing operating conditions, “including the ideologically frozen relations of subjection”³³.

³² H. A. Giroux, *Theory and Resistance in Education*, op. cit., p. 186-187.

³³ L. Witkowski, *Edukacja przez pryzmat teorii społecznej J. Habermasa*, op. cit., p. 33.

This competence corresponds to the third interest as indicated by Jürgen Habermas, i.e. the emancipatory interest.

Emancipatory interest with its attendant emancipatory rationality, while not rejecting the primacy of intentionality and meaning, considers as indispensable and incorporates the mechanisms of *criticism* and *action*. As part of such an interest-driven activity, criticism is made of what is limiting and dissuasive for individuals and groups, while at the same time supporting activities conducive to freedom and individuality. Criticised is moreover all that enables the creation of conditions for opposition and change of oppressive, enslaving, unfair elements of the social world, posing a threat to the individual and the group through institutionalisation of the consequences of such a social condition. The perspective of emancipation is therefore connected with the version of education which is

a practical application of systematically discovered mechanisms of governing, freeing the subject from the limitations encountered in particular contexts and fostering attainment of new rights and areas of freedom, in line with the individuals' available potential. It is an integration of thinking and action aimed at creating conditions for consciously and independently reaching maturity in particular spheres of individual and collective development. This involves discovering the role that education can play in the project of emancipation of the subject and realization of central values: freedom, independence, responsibility³⁴.

The aim of such education, defined in terms of process, is to constantly *emancipate* oneself. It becomes the autotelic value of education and the object of all educational efforts and is expressed in the development of such dispositions as courage, openness, assertiveness, tolerance and responsibility. As Maria Czerepaniak-Walczak additionally emphasizes,

projects of education for *emancipation* focus on the competences of the subject, especially those which are expressed in the reactions of resistance and transgression in situations of conflict, oppression and limitation. These competences, which enable defence against colonization of the world of life and its lasting effects, are referred to as emancipatory competences. [...] They are the result of learning in the process of action, in interaction with individual (especially oppressive) elements of social and material reality. Education is manifested in organizing educational situations that are a source of emancipatory competences³⁵.

³⁴ M. Czerepaniak-Walczak, *Pedagogika emancypacyjna*, Gdańsk 2006, p. 64.

³⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 67-68.

The perspective of emancipatory interest does not always appear obvious in the reflection on religious education, which is often accused of an arbitrarily defined and universalized vision of reality, a non-discursive interpretation of the texts of sacred books, a rigidly interpreted tradition and exclusive practices regulating internal and external relations within religious groups. The experience of some European countries, however, shows that religion, together with its own education, can support emancipation processes. As Bogusław Milerski notes, religion, as a socio-cultural phenomenon implicitly conveying certain ideological interests, generates a new type of task for the theory of Religious Education, which is precisely the analysis and deconstruction of religious traditions from the perspective of emancipatory interest³⁶. According to the underlying assumptions of so-called critical pedagogy of religion, emerging in Germany in the 1970s, underpinned by the concept of Marxist critique of ideology, liberation theology and the critical theory of the Frankfurt School, the desire to

to pass on to young people, even if only partially, the illusion of the holy world, would mean agreeing to an unreliable preparation for life [...] Therefore, education [including religious education] can never be critical enough. Above all, critical decisions become necessary in the face of great words, praised values or ideologies. Religious upbringing, and with it the lessons of Religious Education, are intended to make young people resistant to the dominant forces and ideologies. The second commandment of Decalogue [...] is a critical principle opposed to all tendencies of absolutization and deification. Christian faith has not always remained faithful to this and has transformed itself into an ideology. [...] It is all the more necessary to reactivate the critical potential of religious tradition. Critical religious teaching can contribute to the necessary sobering-up, can provide an insight into the real situation, foster critical analysis and, equally, the commitment to the creation of human relationships in our society³⁷.

The aims of creators and propagators of critical religious pedagogy were related to education for critical self-awareness of individuals and their emancipatory competences, including the ability to unmask forms of symbolic violence present in interpretations of texts and religious practices, as well as education for constructive social engagement. One of the principles determining the shape of this kind of education was to recognize religion as a product of socially constructed reality, and its analysis was to take into account the social

³⁶ See B. Milerski, *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna*, op. cit., p. 163.

³⁷ S. Vierzig, *Ideologiekritik und Religionsunterricht*, quoted after: B. Milerski, *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna*, op. cit., p. 162.

functions it performed. Moreover, the critical and emancipatory perspective was to abolish the practice of identifying religion with the Christian tradition. "The subject of teaching religion at school should be religion in a broad sense, not only in the form of Christianity or other historical religions, but also as a phenomenon describing various forms of constitution of existential senses and interpretation of social life"³⁸.

At present, traces of critical religious pedagogy can be found in the interest of religious education in minority ideologies or social movements. An example can be the more and more dynamically developing trend of *feminist theology*, present in Christianity as well as Judaism and Islam. Although it does not enter the mainstream in any of the above religions, it begins to play an increasingly important role in the discourse of knowledge, faith and social involvement, inevitably moving on to the discussion about the specificity, content and form of religious education. Unfortunately, feminist pedagogy of religion as a sub-discipline³⁹ continues to play a marginal role. The same applies to those currents within European and American Protestantism that are critically reflecting on the theological justifications for the exclusion of non-heteronormative people from the community of believers. The above examples continue to be poorly represented in local versions of the pedagogy of religion, especially in Poland. Nevertheless, it seems that cultural and social transformations of Western societies, including the process of their secularization, as well as the intercultural challenges of the era of globalization, will contribute to an increasingly courageous use of the last of the mentioned models of religious education, as the most compatible with the world experienced by contemporary individuals, as proved by attempts to construct the foundations of so-called *interreligious education*⁴⁰, *pedagogy of ecumenism*⁴¹ or the concept of broadly understood "mature Catholicism", discussed at length e.g. by Stanisław Obirek.

³⁸ Ibidem, p. 164.

³⁹ See M. Blasberg-Kuhnke, "Feministyczna pedagogika religii", [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii. Podstawy – koncepcje – perspektywy*, ed. C. Rogowski, Warszawa 2007, p. 192-196.

⁴⁰ See C. Rogowski, *Pedagogika religii podręcznik akademicki*, Toruń 2011, p. 372.

⁴¹ See M. Patalon, *Pedagogika ekumenizmu. Procesualność jako paradygmat interkonfesyjnej i interreligijnej hermeneutyki w ujęciu J. B. Cobba*, Gdańsk 2007.

CONCLUSION

The above reconstructed paradigms and models of religious education, presented on the basis of the concept of cognitive interests and corresponding types of rationality of Jürgen Habermas, indicate the divergent approaches to self-cognition by epistemology and educational pedagogy. Kerygmatic pedagogy and catechetics are formulas predicated on the objectivism of the cognition process and on axiological absolutism, with a poor potential of transgressiveness as to the educational practice they adopt. With respect to them, hermeneutical pedagogy of religion, based on the assumption of socially constructed sources of knowledge, shows a much greater ability to negotiate *praxis*, but remains helpless in the face of ideological reproductions and structural social constraints. Critical pedagogy of religion seems to be much better prepared for such challenges. It believes that the main goal of religious education is to instil emancipatory competence to expose and actively oppose any oppression and enslavement resulting from the ideologization of religion. In this case one can talk about the transgressive potential, on both the epistemological and functional level. I leave open the question of which of the presented formulas appears to be the most beneficial in the context of socio-cultural pluralism and transformations resulting from the secularization of Western societies.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Blasberg-Kuhnke M., "Feministyczna pedagogika religii", [in:] *Leksykon pedagogiki religii. Podstawy – koncepcje – perspektywy*, ed. C. Rogowski, Verbinum, Warszawa 2007.
- Czerepaniak-Walczak M., *Pedagogika emancypacyjna*, GWP, Gdańsk 2006.
- Dobbelaere K., *Secularisation. An Analysis at Three Levels*, Peter Lang, Brussels 2004.
- Dziemianowicz-Bąk A., "Interesy konstytuujące nauczanie", [in:] *Komercjalizacja edukacji. Konsekwencje i nowe zagrożenia*, ed. M. Syska, Ośrodek Myśli Społecznej im. F. Lassale'a, Wrocław-Warszawa 2010.
- Folkierska A., "Wychowanie w perspektywie hermeneutycznej", [in:] *Ku pedagogii pogranicza*, ed. Z. Kwieciński, L. Witkowski, UMK, Toruń 1990.
- Giroux H.A., *Theory and Resistance in Education. A Pedagogy of the Opposition*, Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Massachusetts 1983.
- Habermas J., "Faith and Knowledge", <https://www.friedenspreis-des-deutschen-buchhandels.de/sixcms/media.php/1290/2001%20Acceptance%20Speech%20Juergen%20Habermas.pdf> (access: 12.11.2018).

- Habermas J., "Knowledge and Human Interest. A General Perspective", [in:] J. Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interest*, transl. J.J. Shapiro, Beacon Press, Boston 1972.
- Habermas J., *The Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 1, *Reason and the Rationalization Society*, transl. T. McCarthy, Beacon Press, Boston 1984.
- Kwaśnica R., *Dwie racjonalności. Od filozofii sensu ku pedagogice ogólnej*, Wydaw. Naukowe DSWE TWP, Wrocław 2007.
- Milerski B., *Hermeneutyka pedagogiczna. Perspektywy pedagogiki religii*, Wydaw. Naukowe ChAT, Warszawa 2011.
- Patalon M., *Pedagogika ekumenizmu. Procesualność jako paradygmat interkonfesyjnej i interreligijnej hermeneutyki w ujęciu J.B. Cobba*, Wydaw. Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego, Gdańsk 2007.
- Rogowski C., *Pedagogika religii podręcznik akademicki*, Wydaw. A. Marszałek, Toruń 2011.
- Stępkowski D., *Pedagogika ogólna i religia. (Re)konstrukcja zapomnianego wątku na podstawie teorii Johanna F. Herbarta i Friedricha D. E. Schleiermachers*, Towarzystwo Naukowe Franciszka Salezego, Warszawa 2010.
- Szpet J., *Dydaktyka katechezy*, Wydaw. UAM, Poznań 1999.
- Tomasik P., "Katechetyka fundamentalna", [in:] *Historia katechezy i katechetyka fundamentalna*, Wydaw. BIBLOS, Tarnów 2003.
- Witkowski L., "Edukacja przez pryzmat teorii społecznej J. Habermasa", *Socjologia Wychowania* 1984, No. V.

Abstract:

On the basis of the human interests concept and relevant types of rationality by Jürgen Habermas I reconstructed three models of religious education: confessional, hermeneutic and critical approach. The first of them, confessional approach, grows from the cognition objectivism and the axiological absolutism. The second one, connected with the hermeneutics in a religious education, understands knowledge as a social construct and refers to communication skills in the negotiation meanings. The last one, critical approach, makes emancipation skills, in the areas of debunking and active opposition to an oppression and enslavement coming from ideologisation of religion, the major aim of a religious education. Each one of those models has a different potential of transgression understood as a flexibility towards boundaries of self-understanding. Each of them differently addresses the context of progressive secularisation and socio-cultural pluralism.

Keywords:

Jürgen Habermas, knowledge and human interest, instrumental rationality, communicative rationality, emancipation, religious education, the confessional approach to religious education, hermeneutics in religious education, critical religious education

WIKTOR ŻŁOBICKI

University of Wrocław

TEACHERS VS. THE UNIQUENESS OF THEIR OCCUPATIONAL ROLE. ON THE NEED FOR SUPERVISION IN EDUCATIONAL WORK¹

The reflections on the unique nature of the teaching profession, which I would like to present in this article, seem to be a consequence of the confluence of time, place and task that I have undertaken. As an academic, I work at the Institute of Pedagogy, which has its seat on the street bearing the name of Jan Władysław Dawid, an eminent Polish teacher who lived at the turn of the 20th century. This is hardly a coincidence, because Jan Władysław Dawid, having made pedeutology – a very important sub-discipline of pedagogy – the subject of his reflection, emphasized in his book *O duszy nauczycielstwa* that: “the teacher cannot ‘simply be just a lecturer’; in addition, he or she should perform such functions as the student’s educator, guardian, counsellor, partner, initiator of various cognitive activities, mediator, referee, etc. [...]”².

These views, although published for the first time more than a hundred years ago, are still of interest to pedeutologists. It is therefore worthwhile to refer to contemporary reflections on the teaching profession. The process of progressive professionalisation of teaching is inevitable and that is why Henryka Kwiatkowska emphasizes that when thinking

¹ Originally published: Wiktor Żłobicki, “Nauczyciel wobec osobliwości swojej roli zawodowej: o potrzebie superwizji w pracy pedagogicznej”, [in:] *Pomiar i ewaluacja jakości kształcenia*, ed. J. Grzesiak, UAM w Poznaniu, PWSZ w Koninie, Kalisz, Konin 2011, p. 115-122.

² J. Wł. Dawid, *O duszy nauczycielstwa*, Warszawa 1946, p. 72.

about teacher education³, a specific character of the job must be taken into account. First of all, the preparation of teachers is not limited solely to mastering professional knowledge, but above all should address its efficient use in practice. Secondly, in the training of teachers, one should reject a solely cognitive approach to any problems related to teaching and upbringing. Thirdly, teachers' qualifications cannot be determined by a specific model of professional activities. In reality, practicing this profession requires the ability to take a complementary approach to knowledge, methodical and specialist skills. Contemporary educators are expected to move away from their traditionally understood authoritarian role and become specialists in comprehensive human development. Therefore, in thinking about contemporary upbringing, the humanistic orientation takes on a special significance. According to Stanisław Wołoszyn, this means, among other things, that the educator - teacher⁴:

- perceives every didactic or educational situation as a *meeting between I - another*;
- first of all *can use themselves*;
- discovers his own unique personality and skilfully uses it as an instrument of pedagogical activity;
- treats the acquired theoretical knowledge as an opportunity for personal development and improvement of his/her practical activities.

From a pedeutological point of view, the narrative undertaken by Krzysztof Konarzewski seems to be particularly inspiring, as it contains not only a description and explanation of the peculiarities of the professional role of a teacher, but also a reflection on the strategy of coping with this role⁵. And here comes the point of contact between the knowledge contained in the academic textbook and an attempt at its practical application. The purpose of this article is to point to the need to use supervision in the teacher's work. In order to reflect on this proposal in-depth, it will be right to refer to the aforementioned investigations by Krzysztof Konarzewski, who assumed that the social role is "a set of expectations shared by the majority of members of

³ Nauczyciele nauczycieli. Z teorii i praktyki kształcenia nauczycieli, ed. H. Kwiatkowska, A. Kotusiewicz, Warszawa 1992, p. 4-5.

⁴ S. Wołoszyn, "Teoretyczne podstawy systemów kształcenia nauczycieli", [in:] Nauczyciele nauczycieli, op. cit., p. 71-72.

⁵ See K. Konarzewski, "Nauczyciel", [in:] *Sztuka nauczania. Szkoła*, ed. K. Konarzewski, Warszawa 1998, p. 148-179.

a given community”, towards whom an individual must take their own position, and the contemporary role of the teacher is “unclear, internally inconsistent, psychologically difficult, and incompatible with his other important roles”⁶.

The Author sees the unclear nature of the role as a lack of agreed upon, concrete and tangible criteria of professional excellence. In other words, this ambiguity means not so much ignorance of what teachers should do, but rather disagreement as to the yardstick of their doing their job well. The quality of work is not measured by the grades that the students receive, as they are most often decided by the teacher himself. All the more so, the quality of educational work is not unambiguously determined by the effects achieved. For example, the independent judgements of the students as inspired and developed by the teacher, may be assessed differently by the pupils themselves, their parents, and by the examiner who checks the results of the final test.

Another peculiarity is the inner inconsistency of the role. We deal with it when, under specific conditions, the fulfilment of certain expectations hinders or excludes the fulfilment of others. Krzysztof Konarzewski points to three such groups of expectations: supporting individual student development, reproduction of the social order and introduction to spiritual culture. On the one hand, the teacher is required to take an individual approach to each student in order to develop their potential, and on the other hand, the school and the teacher, in the process of reproducing social order, necessary for the functioning of society, select students in different ways, often hindering their development. The third group of expectations towards which the teacher has to take a stance concerns the introduction of young people into such forms of spiritual culture as: scientific knowledge, art and ethical models of life. It is often the case that some spiritual values are appropriated in the name of current interests of different social groups and thus may lose their universal character. The above examples lead to the conclusion that various requirements placed on teachers make their professional role profoundly inconsistent.

The existence of the psychological difficulty of the role is best evidenced by the significant percentage of teachers affected by the occupational burnout syndrome⁷. This is because of the

⁶ For the sake of this article I will briefly introduce the views on the uniqueness of the teacher’s role: see K. Konarzewski, “Nauczyciel”, op. cit., p. 151-161.

⁷ The occupational burnout syndrome affects mostly therapists, teachers, doc-

psychological burden faced by the employees of the education system. Some of the most important challenging situations include: permanent tension related to the relative unpredictability of the situation in the group of students, asymmetry of relations with students and parents, decreasing social status of the profession, etc.

The professional role of a teacher is also characterised by its incompatibility with other roles, which applies especially to women. The feminisation of the teaching profession may trigger occasional disturbances in systematic work with students due to female teachers' mother roles (maternity and child-rearing leave, sick leave due to childcare). On the other hand, in the case of men, due to relatively low earnings, this occupation may be incompatible with the traditionally perceived role of the father (the so-called head of the family), with a socially imposed duty of a family provider.

Importantly, among the many problems faced by teachers, one often hears about their poor communication skills. The framework of the article allows but a cursory presentation of this issue, so I will limit myself to mentioning some research results that confirm the above claim. The results of a study on communication between teachers and pupils - published both recently and at the beginning of the 1970s - lead to the conclusion that educators make an unacceptable number of mistakes. For instance, in the studies carried out by C. Wright and G. Nuthall, who analysed the average number of verbal behaviour of 17 teachers in five lessons, closed questions (115.2) were six times more frequently addressed to pupils than open questions (18), and other studies on initiating pupils' activity during lessons found that 86% of all stimulation was initiated by teachers and only 14% by pupils⁸. Contemporary research, too, seems to confirm the argument of the relative sustainability of the dominant role of teachers, who, by guiding the process of communication in the classroom, inhibit the activity and spontaneity of stu-

tors, and nurses, or representatives of professions where care about others is a significant part of the job description. See e.g.: J. Fengler, *Pomaganie męczy. Wypalenie w pracy zawodowej*, Gdańsk 2001; M. Sekułowicz, *Wypalenie zawodowe nauczycieli pracujących z osobami z niepełnosprawnością intelektualną. Przyczyny, symptomy, zapobieganie, przewyciężanie*, Wrocław 2002; H. Sęk, "Wypalenie zawodowe u nauczycieli. Uwarunkowania i możliwości zapobiegania", [in:] *Wypalenie zawodowe. Przyczyny i zapobieganie*, ed. H. Sęk, Warszawa 2009, p. 149-167; S. Tucholska, *Wypalenie zawodowe u nauczycieli. Psychologiczna analiza zjawiska i jego osobowościowych uwarunkowań*, Lublin 2003.

⁸ Data from these studies were referenced in the text by A. Janowski, *Uczeń w teatrze życia szkolnego*, Warszawa 1998, p. 170.

dents. For example, Maria Cackowska's research shows that the most frequent verbal messages given by teachers include: questions (approx. 50%), instructions (30%-50%), judgements (approx. 20%), and longer statements (2%-5%)⁹. In the light of other empirical analyses, in most lessons teachers issue orders and prohibitions, interrupt students' statements and impose their views¹⁰. If we add to this students' fears of unpleasant consequences, misunderstanding, criticism, indiscretion or indifference of teachers, it is no wonder that the postulate of subjective education cannot be upheld¹¹.

Summing up this part of the discussion on the basis of source texts, whose main claims and most important research conclusions have only been cursorily referenced, it is necessary to indicate the need to support teachers in coping with the requirements of their roles. One of the effective forms of coping with the difficulties of the role as described above is supervision. This is "a process of consulting with another who is valued as an expert in order to enhance our work with clients"¹². It must be added that supervision as a form of work is the subject of numerous scientific publications devoted to improving the competences of many other specialists, including psychotherapists, doctors, pedagogues, social workers, administrative staff, and politicians¹³. In foreign literature we find an example of the first supervision group. Set up in Paris still in 1959, it was called SPES (*séminaire de perfectionnement pour éducateurs spécialités*) and gathered educators¹⁴. It was established by Serge Ginger, a psychotherapist and supervisor, founder of the Parisian Gestalt School. Supervision as a form of enhancing the skills of persons professionally linked to the education system is increasingly popular in Poland and offered by both public psychology and pedagogy counselling centres and non-public therapy and educational centres¹⁵.

⁹ See M. Cackowska, "Komunikacja jako wyznacznik systemu nauczania", [in:] *Kultura, język, edukacja*. vol. 2, ed. R. Mrózek, Katowice 1998, p. 139.

¹⁰ See M. Snieżyński, *Sztuka dialogu – teoretyczne założenia a szkolna rzeczywistość*, Kraków 2005, p. 23-24.

¹¹ K. Badora, "Cechy komunikacji nauczyciela z uczniem", [in:] *Komunikacja i podmiotowość w relacjach szkolnych*, ed. S. Badora, D. Marzec, J. Kosmala, Częstochowa 2001, p. 106.

¹² M. C. Gilbert, K. Evans, *Psychotherapy Supervision. An Integrative Relational Approach to Psychotherapy Supervision*, Philadelphia 2000, p. 115.

¹³ This is addressed by M. Belardi in his *Supervision und Coaching: Grundlagen, Techniken, Perspektiven*, München 2005, p. 37.

¹⁴ See S. Ginger, A. Ginger, *A Practical Guide for the Humanistic Psychotherapist*, London 2012, p. xii.

¹⁵ For example, supervision for school pedagogues and psychologists is offered e.g.

We can say that the supervision relation is a meeting of two people who jointly reflect not only on the welfare of the student/s, but also on the welfare of the supervised teacher¹⁶. Regardless of whether the meeting is held in the forum of a supervision group or on the one-on-one basis, it consists in the search for and examination by the supervisee, together with the supervisor, of the general principles of good practice. It is likewise an attempt to reflect on how to apply these principles in a specific situation, rather than to establish rules for what is “appropriate” or “inappropriate” action.

The aim of supervision is not only to take care of the teacher’s relations with students, but also of the overall professional development of a teacher-supervisee¹⁷. If we want to treat supervision as a specific kind of learning, we should realize that

people develop an image of self as learner, which is influenced by parents, teachers and others in authority and that this image will either facilitate or impede the person’s subsequent learning. If learning has resulted in shame or if there has been significant educational deficit the person may learn to defend themselves against being shown up as wanting in a learning context and will approach supervision in a characteristic selfprotective manner¹⁸.

We may then have to deal with a lack of faith in the fact that the learning process during supervision can be cognitively inspiring and emotionally satisfying. This may trigger defensive attitudes in the supervisee. The most common defensive behaviours in relation to the supervision situation itself include: denial of the very need for supervision, fear of new experiences and earlier planning of the course of supervision, excessive concentration on the details of the problem situation. A range of defensive behaviours in relation to the supervisor may include: excessive self-criticism, perception of supervision as an “opportunity” for the supervisor’s criticism, picking up inconsistencies in the supervisor’s actions and burdening the supervisor with responsibility for problem solution¹⁹. In fact, what is at stake is the awareness

by: Psychology and Pedagogy Counselling centre No. 1 in Krakow, Centre for Psychological Education in Wrocław; for class tutors and school pedagogues – Specialist Centre of Support for Victims of Domestic Violence in Lesk; for community pedagogues (street pedagogues) – Group of Social Pedagogy and Animation in Łódź. The author of this article heads a supervision group in Wrocław on teaching at the university level for Ph.D. candidates and junior academics.

¹⁶ See M. C. Gilbert, K. Evans, *Psychotherapy Supervision*, op. cit., p. 51-52.

¹⁷ See *ibidem*, p. 69.

¹⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 57.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 58-60.

of the responsibility of supervised teachers entering into a relationship with both the student and the supervisor. While in many supervised teachers the interactive nature of supervision itself is unlikely to raise any doubts, the awareness of the interactive nature of the problems reported is much less frequent.

In this context, the dialogical nature of the relationship between the supervisee and the supervisor becomes of great importance. A model of the meeting of the learner and the facilitator can be presented in a diagram below. When interpreting a graphical representation of a supervision meeting, it is easy to notice that the supervisor's role is to constantly support the supervisee in the learning process. Supervision is therefore a process conducive to problem solving via acquisition of new emotional, cognitive, social, spiritual, and somatic experiences.




Fig. 1. Model of a supervision structure under the Gestalt approach²⁰

²⁰ The above supervision structure was developed on the basis of the Gestalt learning model, see H. Dauber, *Obszary uczenia się w przyszłości. Perspektywy pedagogiki humanistycznej*, Kraków 2001, p. 181.

One of the suggested effects of the learning process in the process of supervision is, among others, inclusion, i.e. “capacity to enter into the world of another and at the same time retain a sense of one’s own separateness and difference [...]”²¹. Practicing inclusion allows us to maintain an empathetic attitude towards the other person without losing contact with oneself. It moreover helps to distinguish a truly mutual relationship from one in which attention is focused solely either on oneself or on another person. At the same time, it should be added that the development of inclusion skills during supervision requires the creation of a safe space for the supervisee, in which he or she can have unlimited own experiences, including negative ones, because only after examining his or her own emotions can the teacher broaden the inclusive attitude. Such possibilities are offered by one of the methods of supervision described in professional literature, namely psychodrama²². In pointing to the educational aspect of psychodrama, one should refer to the views of its creator, Jacob L. Moreno, who defined the essence of this method as follows: “Play yourself as you’ve never been, so that you can be as you could be. Be your own inspiration, your own author, your own actor, your own therapist, and finally your own Creator”²³. Under this understanding, psychodrama, as a method of supervision, allows a teacher under the care of a supervisor trained in psychodrama to improvise various professional situations. This is supposed to facilitate the awareness of previously unnoticed emotions and various aspects of one’s behaviour and perception of the world. This is confirmed by a large number of publications on the usefulness of psychodrama in the supervision of didactic work²⁴. Recognising supervision as a form of professional development of teachers, it should be stressed that one of its most important features is the interpersonal nature of the relationship, in which the supervisor and the supervisee

²¹ M. C. Gilbert, K. Evans, *Psychotherapy Supervision*, op. cit., p. 10.

²² See A. Schreyögg, *Supervision: Ein integratives Modell. Lehrbuch zu Theorie Und Praxis*, Wiesbaden 2004, p. 245-276.

²³ E. Røine, *Psychodrama. O tym jak grać główną rolę w swoim życiu*, Opole 1994, p. 23.

²⁴ See e.g. *Angewandtes Psychodrama in Therapie und Pädagogik*, ed. H. Petzold, Paderborn 1978; A. Schreyögg, *Supervision: Ein integratives Modell*, op. cit.; T. Schwinger, H. J. Burmeister, “Psychodrama und konstruktivistische Erkenntnistheorie”, [in:] *Jahrbuch für Psychodrama, psychosoziale Praxis und Gesellschaftspolitik*, ed. F. Buer, Opladen 1996; T. Schwinger, Z. Teoharov, “Training psychodramatischen Rollenspiels als Beratungsmethode in Deutschland und Bulgarien – Fragen und Einsichten rund um einen Workshop”, [in:] *Soziale Verantwortung in Europa. Analysen und professionelles Handeln in verschiedenen Hilfesystemen*, ed. W. Seelisch, Darmstadt 2003; R. Springer, *Grundlagen einer Psychodramapädagogik*, Köln 1995.

arrive at new meanings of the situation under discussion. Last but not least, it is important to focus on developing inclusion and to be aware that what is at stake is investigating the essence of the problem rather than seeking some objective knowledge.

BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Angewandtes Psychodrama in Therapie und Pädagogik*, ed. H. Petzold, Junfermann, Paderborn 1978.
- Badora K., "Cechy komunikacji nauczyciela z uczniem", [in:] *Komunikacja i podmiotowość w relacjach szkolnych*, ed. S. Badora, D. Marzec, J. Kosmala, Wydaw. Wyższej Szkoły Pedagogicznej, Częstochowa 2001.
- Belardi N., *Supervision und Coaching: Grundlagen, Techniken, Perspektiven*, C.H. Beck, München 2005.
- Cackowska M., "Komunikacja jako wyznacznik systemu nauczania", [in:] *Kultura, język, edukacja*, vol. 2, ed. R. Mrózek, Wydaw. Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, Katowice 1998.
- Dauber H., *Obszary uczenia się w przyszłości. Perspektywy pedagogiki humanistycznej*, transl. J. Marnik, M. Wawrzak-Chodaczek, Impuls, Kraków 2001.
- Dawid J. Wł., *O duszy nauczycielstwa*, Nasza Księgarnia, Warszawa 1946.
- Fengler J., *Pomaganie męczy. Wypalenie w pracy zawodowej*, transl. K. Pietruszewski, Gdańskie Wydaw. Psychologiczne, Gdańsk 2001.
- Gilbert M.C., Evans K., *Psychotherapy Supervision. An Integrative Relational Approach to Psychotherapy Supervision*, Open University Press, Buckingham, Philadelphia 2000.
- Ginger S., Ginger A., *A Practical Guide for the Humanistic Psychotherapist*, transl. J.-M. Jacot, S. Reeder-Cojean, Karnac, London 2012.
- Janowski A., *Uczeń w teatrze życia szkolnego*, Wydawnictwa Szkolne i Pedagogiczne, Warszawa 1998.
- Konarzewski K., "Nauczyciel", [in:] *Sztuka nauczania. Szkoła*, ed. K. Konarzewski, Wydaw. Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1998.
- Nauczyciele nauczycieli. Z teorii i praktyki kształcenia nauczycieli*, ed. H. Kwiatkowska, A. Kotusiewicz, Wydaw. Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1992.
- Røine E., *Psychodrama. O tym jak grać główną rolę w swoim życiu*, transl. S. Łęcki, Kontakt, Opole 1994.
- Schreyögg A., *Supervision: Ein integratives Modell. Lehrbuch zu Theorie Und Praxis*, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2004.
- Schwinger T., Burmeister H.J., "Psychodrama und konstruktivistische Erkenntnistheorie", [in:] *Jahrbuch für Psychodrama, psychosoziale Praxis und Gesellschaftspolitik*, ed. F. Buer, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Opladen 1996.
- Schwinger T., Teoharov Z., "Training psychodramatischen Rollenspiels als Beratungsmethode in Deutschland und Bulgarien - Fragen und Einsichten rund um einen Workshop", [in:] *Soziale Verantwortung in Europa. Analysen*

- und professionelles Handeln in verschiedenen Hilfesystemen*, ed. W. Seelisch, Bogen Verlag, Darmstadt 2003;
- Sekułowicz M., *Wypalenie zawodowe nauczycieli pracujących z osobami z niepełnosprawnością intelektualną. Przyczyny, symptomy, zapobieganie, przezwyciężanie*, Wydaw. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 2002.
- Sęk H., “Wypalenie zawodowe u nauczycieli. Uwarunkowania i możliwości zapobiegania”, [in:] *Wypalenie zawodowe. Przyczyny i zapobieganie*, ed. H. Sęk, Wydaw. Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 2009.
- Springer R., *Grundlagen einer Psychodramapädagogik, nScenario*, Köln 1995.
- Śnieżyński M., *Sztuka dialogu – teoretyczne założenia a szkolna rzeczywistość*, Wydaw. Naukowe Akademii Pedagogicznej, Kraków 2005.
- Tucholska S., *Wypalenie zawodowe u nauczycieli. Psychologiczna analiza zjawiska i jego osobowościowych uwarunkowań*, Wydaw. Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego, Lublin 2003.
- Wołoszyn S., “Teoretyczne podstawy systemów kształcenia nauczycieli”, [in:] *Nauczyciele nauczycieli. Z teorii i praktyki kształcenia nauczycieli*, ed. H. Kwiatkowska, A. Kotusiewicz, Warszawa 1992.

Abstract:

The issues of the specificity of the teacher's professional role and the various strategies for implementing this role are important issues of pedeutology. Often, the teacher's role is unclear, internally incoherent, psychologically difficult and inconsistent with other important social roles to must carried out by a given person, which creates conditions conducive to professional burnout. One of the ways to prevent professional burnout is the possibility of a teacher using supervision, that is, using the consultation regarding their own professional work with a specialist supervisor. The purpose of such supervision may be not only the teacher's relationship with the students, but in general the whole of teacher's professional and personal development.

Keywords:

teacher, professional role, prevent professional burnout, supervision

TEAM OF THE GENERAL PEDAGOGY DEPARTMENT AT THE INSTITUTE OF PEDAGOGY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WROCLAW

WIKTOR ŻŁOBICKI – PhD with habilitation (postdoctoral degree) in Humanities, associate professor at the University of Wrocław, head of the General Pedagogy Department at the Institute of Pedagogy, University of Wrocław. Author of nearly 100 scientific publications, including monographs: *Rodzice i nauczyciele w edukacji wczesnoszkolnej* (2000; *Parents and Teachers in Early Childhood Education*), *Ukryty program w edukacji. Między niewiedzą a manipulacją* (2002; *Hidden Curriculum in Education. Between Ignorance and Manipulation*), *Edukacja holistyczna w podejściu Gestalt. O wspieraniu rozwoju osoby* (2008; *Holistic Education in the Gestalt Approach. About Supporting the Development of a Person*). Academic teacher and researcher of education with many years of practical experience gained at school, out-of-school education and in care and educational institutions, psychotherapist. He underwent foreign scientific internships and workshops in Austria, Switzerland, Germany and Slovenia. Honorary member of the Evangelische Hochschule Darmstadt, collaborator of the German Institute “Freundschaft mit Kindern” in Münster, chairman of the Wrocław Branch of the Polish Pedagogical Society, member of, among others: European Society “Gestaltpädagogische Vereinigung” e.V., Polish Society of Korczak, Polish Society of Gestalt Psychotherapy.

Email: wiktor.zlobicki@gmail.com

See also:

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/84256>

JACEK GULANOWSKI – PhD of Social Sciences in the discipline of Pedagogy. His research interests include adult education, education of seniors, family, popular culture, higher education, pedagogical experiment and modern technologies and games in education. Co-author of the monograph *Location-Based Games as a Contemporary, Original, and Innovative Method of Seniors' Teaching and Learning* (2019). Editor of the monographs *Uniwersytety Trzeciego Wieku – przeciw wykluczeniu, dla społeczeństwa wiedzy* (2012; *Universities of the Third Age - Against Exclusion, for the Society of Knowledge*). Co-editor of the monography *Od nowego rodzicielstwa do nowego dzieciństwa* (2016; *From the New Parenthood to the New Childhood*). Member of the editorial teams of scientific journals: *Journal of Education Culture and Society*, *Wychowanie w Rodzinie/ Family Upbringing*, *Ogrody Nauk i Sztuk, e-methodology*.

Email: jacek.gulanowski@uwr.edu.pl

MONIKA HUMENIUK – PhD in Humanities in the discipline of Pedagogy. Her research interests focus on the problems of general pedagogy, hermeneutic and critical pedagogy of religion, intercultural and axiological education, and religious studies. Author of scientific articles from the indicated scope and the monograph *Wizerunek kobiety w wielokulturowym społeczeństwie Kazachstanu odniesieniem do edukacji międzykulturowej* (2014; *Image of a Woman in the Multicultural Society of Kazakhstan as a Reference to Intercultural Education*), and co-editor of the work *Sukces jako zjawisko edukacyjne* volumes 1 and 2 (2017; *Success as an Educational Phenomenon*), *Codziennosc jako wyzwanie edukacyjne* volume 1 (2017; *Everyday Life as an Educational Challenge*), *Między ekskluzją a inkluzją w edukacji religijnej* (2017; *Between an Exclusion and Inclusions in Religious Education*). Email: monika.humeniuk@uwr.edu.pl

See also:

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/84054>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/84648>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/94566>

GRAŻYNA LUBOWICKA – PhD in Humanities in the discipline of Philosophy. Author of the monograph *Sumienie jako poświadczenie. Idea podmiotowości w filozofii Paula Ricoeura* (2000; *Conscience as a Certificate. The Idea of Subjectivity in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*) and many articles devoted to contemporary philosophy. She focuses his interest on the interpretation of Paul Ricoeur's ideas, and in particular extends his understanding of individual and social imagination. Email: lubgralla@gmail.com

See also:

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/81195>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/92826>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/84049>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/94668>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/84246>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/94565>

IWONA PASZENDA – PhD in Humanities in the discipline of Pedagogy. Her research interests focus on the issues of general pedagogy, pedagogy of everyday life and the philosophy of pragmatism. Co-author of the monograph *Treningi twórczości a umiejętności zawodowe* (2011; *Trainings of Creativity and Professional Skills*). Editor and co-editor of the works: *Transgresje w edukacji* volume 2 (2014; *Transgressions in Education*), *Sukces jako zjawisko edukacyjne* volumes

1 and 2 (2017; *Success as an Educational Phenomenon*), *Codziennosc jako wyzwanie edukacyjne* volumes 1 and 2 (2017; *Everyday Life as an Educational Challenge*), *Między ekskluzją a inkluzją w edukacji religijnej* (2017; *Between an Exclusion and Inclusions in Religious Education*).

Email: iwona.paszenda@uwr.edu.pl

See also:

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/84051>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/94674>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/84245>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/94571>

RAFAŁ WŁODARCZYK – PhD with habilitation (postdoctoral degree) in Social Sciences. He specializes in general pedagogy and the philosophy of education. His research interests also concern social philosophy and ethics, cultural anthropology, the borderland of Western and Jewish thought. Author of the monographs: *Ideologia, teoria, edukacja. Myśl Ericha Fromma jako inspiracja dla pedagogiki współczesnej* (2016; *Ideology, Theory, Education. The Thought of Erich Fromm as an Inspiration for Contemporary Pedagogy*), *Lévinas. W stronę pedagogiki azylu* (2009; *Lévinas. Towards Pedagogy of Asylum*), and together with Leszek Koczanowicz *Współczesna filozofia społeczna. Rozważania i eseje o społeczeństwie obywatelskim i etyce demokracji* (2011; *Contemporary Social Philosophy. Considerations and Essays on Civil Society and the Ethics of Democracy*). Co-editor of the works: *Kultura demokracji* (2009; *Culture of Democracy*), *Aktualność Marksa* (2010; *Marx's Nowaday*), *Interdyscyplinarność i transdyscyplinarność pedagogiki – wymiary teoretyczny i praktyczny* (2011; *Interdisciplinarity and Transdisciplinarity of Pedagogy – Theoretical and Practical Dimensions*), *W literackich konstelacjach* (2013; *In Literary Constellations*), *Transgresje w edukacji* volume 2 (2014; *Transgressions in Education*), *Między rozumieniem a porozumieniem. Eseje o demokracji niekonsensualnej* (2014; *Between Understanding and Agreement. Essays on Non-Consensual Democracy*), *Fromm – aplikacje* (2016; *Fromm – Applications*), *Utopia a edukacja* volumes 1-3 (2016-2017; *Utopia and Education*). Email: rafal.wlodarczyk@uwr.edu.pl

See also:

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/81191>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/94646>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/92821>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/84244>

<http://www.repozytorium.uni.wroc.pl/publication/94560>

SEE ALSO OTHERS PUBLICATIONS OF THE GENERAL PEDAGOGY DEPARTMENT AT THE INSTITUTE OF PEDAGOGY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WROCLAW:

- Utopia a edukacja*, vol. 1, O wyobrażeniach świata możliwego, ed. J. Gromysz, R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2016, <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/publication/81184>.
- Utopia a edukacja*, vol. 2, Pedagogiczne konteksty społecznych wyobrażeń świata możliwego, ed. R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2017, <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/publication/92816>.
- Utopia a edukacja*, vol. 3, Nadzieje i rozczarowania wyobrażeniami świata możliwego, ed. K. Rejman, R. Włodarczyk, Wrocław 2017, <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/publication/92817>.
- Codziennosc jako wyzwanie edukacyjne*, vol. 1, ed. M. Humeniuk, I. Paszenda, Wrocław 2017, <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/publication/84040>.
- Codziennosc jako wyzwanie edukacyjne*, vol. 2, Refleksyjność w codziennosci edukacyjnej, ed. I. Paszenda, Wrocław 2017, <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/publication/94613>.
- Sukces jako zjawisko edukacyjne*, vol. I, ed. M. Humeniuk, I. Paszenda, W. Żłobicki, Wrocław 2017, <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/publication/84167>.
- Sukces jako zjawisko edukacyjne*, vol. I, ed. M. Humeniuk, I. Paszenda, W. Żłobicki, Wrocław 2017, <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/publication/84168>.
- Między ekskluzją a inkluzją w edukacji religijnej*, ed. M. Humeniuk, I. Paszenda, Wrocław 2017, <http://www.bibliotekacyfrowa.pl/publication/94553>.